POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIAL NETWORKS IN RUSSIA SINCE 1991

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

by Dafne Ter-Sakarian

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School of Slavonic and East European Studies

University of London

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Note on Transliteration

The rules pertaining to the Library of Congress transliteration system are followed throughout, except where Russophone scholars are cited using a different system. In those cases, their choice will be respected.

Introduction

Words of Warning

'The human condition is small brains, big problems'[1].

This thesis began with the germ of an idea which was to branch out, over the course of three years, in ways its author could not have even imagined when the research was begun. The original idea was simple and small in scope: simply to chart, by looking at secondary data, changes in specific political values, attitudes and behaviour in the Russian Federation since 1991. Nothing very complex there: even the empirical evidence would have been processed by other scholars, wiser in the ways of statistics than this particular researcher. Alas! That golden age when everything was simple and straightforward was not to last very long, since, as the ideas which were to form the backbone of this thesis developed, they reached further and further into social science disciplines outside what is strictly considered political science. Consequently, the interrelationship between all the concepts which were eventually deemed part of a meaningful study of political culture in Russia gained complexity and could not be studied, in the end, by the simple means of charting single variables' specific attitudinal distributions amongst the Russian population. The increasingly complex web of ideas used as a theoretical framework for the study thus led to a concomitantly more elaborate methodological approach, one based on the tendencies of *groups*.

Groups had become important during the development of the theoretical framework because the starting point, political culture, had gradually led to an assessment of the importance of social relationships – or, in other words, social networks – as a determining factor in the formation of the individual's personality and cultural predisposition in all spheres of life. Salient amongst the many social science concepts examined in this study were therefore Ferdinand Tönnies' theories of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, two normative constructs of paramount importance in describing social ties. Having posited the impact of different kinds of relationships on the individual, this thesis then sought to establish the different kinds of individual which could be said to 'fit' these different networks. This was done, once again, with the help of other ideas from anthropology, social psychology and political science. Guided by these ideas, several factors were selected as being useful tools for

describing and interpreting political culture, and these factors were used as the basis for the selection of the variables to be examined in this study. The idea of the politically competent citizen, in particular, was fundamental to this thesis, since it has long been held in political science that a competent, self-confident citizenry is a *sine qua non* of civic society. Following on from this, Russians' levels of trust in different institutions were also examined in great detail, due to the importance given to this factor in the study of political culture.

These writings thus reflect the process whereby the research project gained complexity over time, starting with three relatively straightforward chapters the subject matter of which will be familiar to most scholars in the field of Russian studies, and culminating in three very dry, difficult chapters, numbered ten to twelve, after which this researcher has aimed to recover some of the simplicity of earlier chapters, in order to avoid leaving the reader in a statistical stupor.

Part I aims to set the scene by examining the theories and methods to be used in this assessment of political culture. Chapters One and Two examine, first, the definitions of political culture to be used in this study, and, second, the meaning of Russian political culture according to this researcher. Chapter Three reviews some of the most recent survey work done on political culture, and discusses the various approaches and issues at stake in its study. In Chapter Four, other social science disciplines are brought in to the equation, and theoretical concepts and frameworks shamelessly stolen from them, to the benefit of this research project. Chapter Five ends Part I with an explanation of the philosophy underlying the methodological standpoint taken by this researcher.

Part II then proceeds to analyze the results of the first of three surveys to be used in this study, by means of the multivariate statistical technique of cluster analysis, which, as far as this researcher is aware, has never been used before to study Russian political culture at a national level (though it has been tried, with promising results, at a local level). Chapter Six introduces the groups into which the sample was divided by means of this technique, and Chapter Seven examines each group's tendencies with regards to variables dealing with the economy and the workplace. Chapter Eight

then looks at the political orientations and values most likely to be found in these groups, and Chapter Nine brings all the results reported in Part II together, before moving on to Part III.

The last part of this study consists of four chapters, the first three of which examine data from a 1993 survey by means of correspondence analysis (another multivariate technique), and compare them to the data from 1991, this time also subjecting them to this second statistical method. These three chapters will prove rather testing for most readers, but they are nevertheless important, not only because they constitute the longitudinal part of the research project, but also because they demonstrate the different kinds of results yielded by different approaches. Chapter Ten introduces the new methodology, and explains why it was chosen over the more simple approach of comparing straight counts in each survey. Chapter Eleven compares the political competence of different socio-demographic groups of Russians in 1991 and 1993, whilst Chapter Twelve does the same thing for trust. Finally, and as a sort of comic relief after several thousand words of hard work, Chapter Thirteen reports the results of this researcher's fieldwork in Russia.

This thesis concludes, not surprisingly, with a conclusion, bringing together all its seemingly disparate methods and ideas together into a coherent, empirically valid theory.

Notes

[1]Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 66.

Part I: Background

Chapter One – On Political Culture

> 'An important stimulus [to the political culture approach] was provided by political events in the "Third World" when constitutions and institutions with which newly-independent states had been endowed fairly rapidly began to function in ways which surprised, and sometimes dismayed, their former political mentors'[1].

The collapse of the USSR has meant the end of Sovietology as such and the emergence of a more comparative approach to political studies of former Communist states[2]. The focus of these studies, however, is no longer on the elaboration of systems theories[3], since all the countries concerned are attempting to establish democracies of one sort or another, but rather on the process of democratization itself. Studying this process has in turn led to a reinvigoration of the political culture approach, which had been somewhat abandoned in the eighties due not only to the prevalence of structural and interest group theories seeking to explain the quick succession of leadership changes, but also to the limitations and difficulties encountered in utilizing and defining the concept of political culture[4].

In spite of its limitations, however, analyses of political culture are currently the best approach to post-Soviet studies for reasons which – aside from the influence of postmodernism in academia[5] – are connected to the nature of the study of developing societies, where the anthropological concept of culture originated. In developing societies, which is what the ex-USSR and its former satellites have become, political structures are weak and political values uncertain. New patterns of behaviour have to be learnt, and, in the case of democratization, new civic responsibilities assumed.

These things cannot be analyzed by means of systemic models, since the whole system – and not just the political system, in the case of these countries[6] – is in a state of flux. Neither are class approaches fully adequate, largely due to the dramatic rise of organized crime and frontier capitalism, where the lack of the rule of law means that the interests of class-based groups as a whole are not protected; vertical social structures deserve as much attention as horizontal ones if a fuller understanding of the political motives and actions of social formations are to be understood. It is both too early and too late for systems theories: T H Rigby is right

in saying that 'it is too early to say what [post-Soviet nations] are in transition *to*'[7]. The political culture approach, on the other hand, allows us to try 'to establish which cultural patterns can survive regardless of institutional arrangements [...], which the new arrangements encourage or allow to persist [...] and which ones they actively create'[8]. This difference in focus between the political culture approach and systems or 'functional-systems'[9] approaches (such as totalitarianism[10], or institutional pluralism[11]) is not always clear in accounts of Soviet studies: often, political culture is classed as an *alternative* to theories of the state and system[12], thereby missing the central point that political culture is not a study of a country's state or system, but of the *modus operandi* of actors within that state or system, and that scholars interested in political culture 'were not claiming any distinctive research method, nor that political culture was a more important field of investigation than others, nor that it was a label for what the authors found to be the essential features of Communist systems. This needs to be spelled out because of the confusion spread in the subject by the use of the word "approach" and the loose use of the word "model"'[13].

The final argument for a political culture approach in post-Communist studies is the new availability of empirical data of the kind often sighed for by sovietologists in the past: '[n]ew possibilities [have] opened up to political scientists by the development of survey research in Russia which (at least in part) is of an acceptable standard'[14]. These data are the stock-in-trade of the political culturalist, and, although extensive cross-national information is still hard to come by, it is bountiful compared to what used to be available – especially in terms of attitude surveys and opinion polls – under the Soviet regime. Through the analysis of empirical data, one can not only make assessments on the nature of political culture in one country, but also make cross-cultural studies, thereby fostering comparative political analysis in the field of post-Soviet studies, and eventually – it is to be hoped – in political science as a whole.

Contending Definitions of Political Culture

> '[S]hould an analytical distinction be made between political culture, on the one hand, and political behaviour, on the other, in order to see what part, if any, the former may play in the latter? The risk of tautology would certainly seem less if behaviour is *not* subsumed under political culture, though even writers who view

> political culture as "the subjective orientation to politics" have not always avoided the danger of circularity inherent in making inferences about values from behaviour and then using values to explain behaviour'[15].

The use of the various types of empirical data mentioned above raised, in the seventies, questions fundamental to divisions within the political culture 'school' itself, divisions which have not always been interpreted correctly. There is a marked tendency – common to all social sciences, but perhaps especially true of Soviet studies – to exaggerate the extent and even the nature of disagreements between scholars. In the heyday of political culture, the main division was between what could loosely be termed 'subjectivists' and 'behaviourists'[16], yet even recently some authors have come to surprising conclusions about other scholars' work on political culture[17]; furthermore, opposing definitions sometimes did not differ as much as their proponents themselves believed. Archie Brown found all of this to be the case when reviewing political culture, noting that '[i]t may be concluded that not only is Moore less opposed to explanation in terms of culture than some of his hastier readers have assumed, but that he comes closer to recognizing culture as an independent causal factor in explaining what people do than he has himself recognized'[18], yet we will see later on that a similar statement could be made about Brown himself.

The bone of contention between the two schools of thought concerned the issue of political behaviour: was it a part of overall political culture, or a separate concept which was to be explained by – amongst other factors such as economic performance – political culture itself? In the first instance, political culture was defined as 'the set of informal, adaptive postures – behavioural and attitudinal – that emerge in response to and interact with the set of formal definitions – ideological, policy and institutional – that characterize a given level of society'[19]; in the second, political culture was taken to mean 'the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the *subjective* orientation to politics'[20].

The difference between these two schools of thought was largely academic, since they both accepted that behaviour and beliefs were undeniably linked, whether they be concordant or discrepant. There is always a reason why people act according to their beliefs, but when people act in ways that contradict their beliefs, there is usually

an even more potent reason, such as fear of reprisal. Even in the first debates on the subject, neither side of the argument disagreed with this[21]; the question was whether the link between the two operated within political culture itself, or between political culture and an outside – the behavioural – element.

Robert Tucker, in his defence of the 'holistic' definition of political culture – that is, one encompassing both attitudes and behaviour – argued that, in isolating behaviour from culture, 'political scientists have parted way with many anthropologists [who] have treated it as a behavioural as well as a psychological concept'[22]. This was rejected by Brown, who cited numerous instances where anthropologists had found that broad definitions of culture, in trying to cover too much ground, did not serve the purposes of academic research as usefully as narrower definitions[23]. This argument, however, implicitly confirmed Tucker's assertion that the definition one chose was 'ultimately a matter of scholarly expediency'[24]. The purpose and objectives of political culture research were, therefore, themselves in question, since 'the choice of the broader or the narrower version of the concept [appeared] to affect subsequent assessments of the issue'[25].

Proponents of the subjective approach took issue with the view, often found amongst behaviourists, that the political approach 'assists us to take our bearings in the study of the political life of a society, to focus on what is happening or not happening, to describe and analyze and order many significant data, and to raise fruitful questions for thought and research – *without explaining anything*'[26]. For them, although 'political culture on its own, of course, [explained] nothing, particular aspects of a political culture [contributed] to an explanation of particular phenomena'[27], and, consequently, narrow definitions, having greater empirical and explanatory possibilities, were to be desired[28]. This was so obvious to them that '[w]hy this polemic should have developed [was] something of a mystery, since it would seem elementary that one of the main questions one would ask about these phenomena is how the two – attitude and behaviour – relate to each other'[29].

This shows a different problem, which was never fully addressed in the controversy. In all the definitions given by proponents of the subjective approach, 'values',

'beliefs' and 'attitudes' were used synonymously with 'culture', though, oddly enough, not with each other, as can be seen in Brown's definition of political culture as 'the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental *beliefs and values*, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups'[30]. Curiously enough, although Brown once cited Brian Barry as saying that '"values" and "culture" are worth separate treatment as causal factors in any attempt to explain what people do'[31], he did not follow this line of reasoning, merely treating the quote as support for his contention that culture did not include behaviour; yet, if we pursue Barry's thought, we see that the difference between the subjective and the behaviourist definitions is simpler, yet more confusing, perhaps, than it at first appears.

Compare Stephen White's assertion that 'the relationship between [...] political beliefs and political behaviour is [...] an empirical matter to be resolved in the light of the evidence available'[32], with Sidney Verba's that 'though the relationship between political beliefs [...] on the one hand and political behaviour on the other may vary, it is clear that they are never irrelevant to each other'[33]. The difference between the two statements lies in the fact that, for Verba, 'beliefs' *are* the culture, whereas for White they are an *aspect* of it, as is behaviour. In other words, the subjectivists have singled out *behaviour* and isolated it from all other aspects of political life, classing the latter all together as 'political culture', without really explaining why it was that, in the spectrum ranging from values through attitudes to behaviour[34] – a spectrum that implied a relationship between the three – the link between attitudes and behaviour was seen as somehow different than that between attitudes and values. Brown considered that 'it would not be particularly useful to attempt to separate *perceptions* of interests from other political perceptions or from political knowledge, beliefs and expectations, since there is a strong case for regarding them as interlinked'[35], but he did not apply this same reasoning to beliefs and behaviour, even though he admitted that 'ultimately, a test of values and of basic political beliefs is that they should be reflected in behaviour'[36]. However, if behaviour is predictable from the sum of a person's 'salient evaluative beliefs'[37], and behaviour alone is meaningless without a value system to interpret it[38] (neither of which the

subjectivists contest) is separating the two not like having only one half of the equation, the solution of which is *total* political experience?

The answers to these questions, from the subjectivist point of view, was that, in the comprehensive (behaviourist) definition there was a danger of circularity, since, by using both behaviour and beliefs as valid parameters for the study of political culture, it was easy to end up in a situation where political values were inferred by political behaviour, and then used to explain that behaviour, especially in diachronic studies[39]. Furthermore, as in the case of Communist states, '[w]here behaviour often indicates little but the effectiveness of the coercion which gave rise to it, a distinction between "real" and "false" behaviour is necessary. But this distinction can only be made on the basis of the attitudes which underlie each type and therefore requires the analytical separation of attitudes and behaviour'[40].

Avoiding a circular explanation would certainly justify isolating behaviour from '*the psychological orientation towards social objects*'[41] for methodological reasons, but it is insufficient, if only because the danger is there – regardless of whether we consider behaviour as a part of political culture or not – since, as cited above, one of the main explanatory aims of the subjective approach is to determine the relationship between beliefs and behaviour. What the 'circularity argument' glosses over is that the difference between the two approaches is a normative one, since much of their research is the same. Any analysis of the interaction between beliefs and behaviour, whether they are considered parts of a greater whole or not, is bound to involve methodologically dangerous cross-references between the two. To more or less disregard behavioural evidence altogether, as Stephen Welch suggests, is not the solution[42]. The importance of the impressionist, historical approach that he advocates should not be underestimated, but history is ultimately based on facts, and, although 'interpretation plays a part [...] in the gathering of information itself'[43], the repository of information from which different conclusions can be drawn stays the same (new discoveries notwithstanding), and any study of the world around us, however interpretative, can be reduced to an observational, if not empirical, starting point.

As for the distinction between 'real' and 'false' behaviour, it seems to imply that there are corresponding 'real' and 'false' beliefs informing that behaviour. But, as was pointed out earlier, even behaviour that runs counter to an individual's convictions is determined by beliefs that the individual has about the appropriateness of that behaviour. The fear of coercion stopped many people in the Soviet Union from voicing an opinion, but not all; it must therefore be concluded that the fact that coercion existed was not alone responsible for the decision to stay silent itself – that the decision itself was determined by individuals' priorities concerning civil liberties as opposed to, for example, social advancement. The set of priorities an individual may have cannot be said to be any more 'false' than their beliefs, and, consequently, neither can the behaviour arising from them. Welch would seem to be using the term 'false' when 'hypocritical' would perhaps be more appropriate, although, on the whole, the value judgements implied by the use of words such as 'false' are undesirable in the social sciences[44].

Time seems to have favoured the behaviourist approach; most analyses of current political developments in Russia from the cultural perspective are being carried out by its proponents. Although there are studies that focus on the 'subjective orientation to politics', the factors under scrutiny are seen as part of the greater whole that is political culture from the behavioural point of view; scholars who have at one time or another claimed that the behaviourists were not interested in subjective factors were missing the point of their holistic approach[45]. Aside from personal conviction, this author is therefore justified by current trends and perspectives in defining political culture, for the purposes of this thesis, as the sum total of the interaction between beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviour in a society, related to the political – *of the polis* – operations of the system the said society exists in.

Notes

[1]Archie Brown, 'Introduction', in Archie Brown and Jack Gray (eds), *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 1-20 at p. 3.

[2]See Alexander Motyl, 'The End of Sovietology: From Soviet Studies to Post-Soviet Studies', in Alexander Motyl (ed), *The Post -Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 302-14.

[3]Even in Motyl, 'The End of Sovietology', the author recognises that his post-facto defence of totalitarianism as the 'right' model of the Soviet state is now of limited use. In any case, his argument involves modifying Friedrich and Brzezinski's original six-point concept so much that it is hard to see the difference between what he terms 'ineffective' totalitarian states and what would normally be defined as authoritarian states. For the six traits of totalitarian regimes, see Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 9-10.

[4]For a scathing critique of the concept of political culture, and especially of Stephen White's use of it, see Mary McAuley, 'Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back', in Archie Brown (ed), *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (London: Macmillan in association with St Antony's College, Oxford, 1984), pp. 13-36.

[5]See John Street, 'Political Culture – From Civic Culture to Mass Culture' (review article), in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 24, Part 1 (January 1994), pp. 95-113 at p. 96.

[6]Unlike, for example, in transitions from authoritarian states, such as Franco's Spain, where the market economy is in place by the time political reforms begin.

[7]T H Rigby, 'Reconceptualizing the Soviet System', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds) *Developments in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics*, second edition (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 300-10 at p. 300.

[8]McAuley, 'Political Culture and Communist Politics', p. 31.

[9]Robert Tucker, 'Culture, Political Culture and Communist Society', in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (June 1973), pp. 173-90 at p. 181. This article was later reprinted, somewhat edited, as chapter one – 'Culture, Political Culture and Soviet Studies', in his *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987).

[10]See, for example, Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*.

[11]See, for example, Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, third printing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), esp. chapter fourteen – 'The Distribution of Power', pp. 518-55.

[12]See, for example, M Steven Fish, chapter one – 'Western Scholarship and the New Russian Revolution', in his *Democracy from Scratch: Opposition and Regime in the New Russian Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 3-29, especially Table 1 on p. 5. Like most other attempts to schematize schools of thought in the social sciences, his diagram seems to confuse rather than clarify the issues. He himself admits that '[i]n some cases, several "schools of thought" are lumped together in a single category, and several scholars appear in more than one category. The categories are not entirely mutually exclusive; some works do not fit neatly into a single box. Many important ideas and their authors are not included in the scheme' (p. 4). He also classifies political culture with neo-totalitarianism, but this model's main exponent these days, Motyl ('The End of Sovietology'), sees political culture as a very different approach to his own.

[13]John Miller, 'Political Culture; Some Perennial Questions Reopened', in Brown (ed), *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, pp. 40-57 at p. 41.

[14]Matthew Wyman, 'Russian Political Culture: Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys', in *Journal of Communist Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 25-54 at p. 25.

[15]Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown and Gray (eds), *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, p. 9, citing Sidney Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds) *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 512-60 at p. 513.

[16]As with most easy labels, the exact origins of these are uncertain. However, McAuley is normally credited with being the first to use the term 'subjectivists' to group all the different proponents of the view that political culture is distinct from political behaviour (in McAuley, 'Political Culture and Communist Politics'). As for the term 'behaviourists', these scholars derived their label from their adherence to the view that social classifications can be made through the quantification of behaviour, which can be measured in the social sciences as well as in their natural counterparts.

[17]See Fish, 'Western Scholarship and the New Russian Revolution', and also Street, 'Political Culture – from Civic Culture to Mass Culture'. While Street cites the subjectivist definition used in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), and cites this work extensively, he

then concludes that '[t]he *behavioural* view of political culture used by Almond and Verba is inadequate both as an account of how culture works and of how it might explain political action' (p. 113, italics added). He is therefore confusing an empirical approach with the different uses that empirical data may be put to; in this case, he treats Almond and Verba's use of attitude surveys as measuring behaviour, which they explicitly do not.

[18]Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown and Gray (eds), *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, p. 5, referring to Barrington Moore.

[19]Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), p. 55.

[20]Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', p. 513 (italics added).

[21]See, for example, Archie Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown (ed), *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (pp. 1-9), where the author explains that, although he did not realize it at the time, the contributors to Brown and Gray (eds), *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* had toned down their differences considerably. This shows that they shared enough common ground for a joint evaluation of the concept.

[22]Tucker, *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia*, p. 3.

[23]Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown (ed), *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, pp. 5-6.

[24]Tucker, *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia*, p. 4.

[25]Archie Brown, 'Conclusions', in Brown (ed), *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, pp. 149-92 at p. 150.

[26]Tucker, *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia*, p. 5 (italics as in text). See also Stephen White, 'Soviet Political Culture Reassessed', in Brown (ed), *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, pp. 62-92: 'the concept of political culture [provides] a useful means of referring to aspects of politics that extend beyond formal institutional boundaries, without necessarily assuming that it has any substantial explanatory utility' (p. 63). Brown, on the other hand, considered the explanatory aim a modest one that could and should be achieved – see Brown 'Introduction', in Brown and Gray (eds) *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, pp. 9-10.

[27]Archie Brown, *Soviet Politics and Political Science* (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 104.

[28]'[Q]uite enough has already been brought under the umbrella of political culture in the "subjective" definition [...] to broaden its scope further reduces its analytical usefulness' – Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown (ed) *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, p. 3.

[29]Gabriel Almond, 'Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*' (book review), in *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 1981), pp. 307-8 at p. 307.

[30]Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown and Gray (eds), *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, p. 1 (italics added).

[31]Brian Barry, *Sociologists, Economists and Democracy* (London: Collier and Macmillan, 1970), p. 98.

[32]Stephen White, 'Soviet Political Culture Reassessed', p. 74.

[33]Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', p. 524.

[34]See Brown, 'Conclusions', p. 161.

[35]*Ibid.*, p. 157.

[36]*Ibid.*, p. 164.

[37]For the meaning of this concept, see Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, *Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behaviour: An Introduction to Theory and Research* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 218-22; see also J Richard Eiser and Joop van der Pligt, 'Attitudes in a Social Context', in Henri Tajfel (ed) *The Social Dimension: European Developments in Social Psychology*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), Vol. 2, pp. 363-78, at pp. 364-5.

[38]'The political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values *which defines the situation in which political action takes place*' – Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', p. 513 (italics added).

[39]See Brown's quote on p. 20.

[40]Stephen Welch, 'Issues in the Study of Political Culture – The Example of Communist Party States' (review article), in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 17, Part 4 (October 1987), pp. 479-500 at p. 482.

[41]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 14 (italics as in text).

[42]Welch, 'Issues in the Study of Political Culture', pp. 483-85.

[43]*Ibid.*, p. 497.

[44]See, for instance, the criticisms made about the Anglo-American bias in *The Civic Culture* in Carole Pateman, 'The Civic Culture: A Philosophical Critique' (pp. 57-102); and also in Jerzy Wiatr, 'The Civic Culture from a Marxist-Sociological Perspective' (pp. 103-23); both in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), *The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1980).

[45]Welch, in 'Issues in the Study of Political Culture', with his distinction between 'impressionists' and 'empiricists' rather than 'subjectivists' and 'behaviourists' (pp. 494-5), makes a similar mistake to the one made by Street (see note 17). Welch finds 'White's position on these basic issues ambiguous', disregarding the fact that, by that statement, he is expecting White to conform to a classification with which, for all Welch knows, White may not even agree.

Chapter Two – The Russian Tradition

> 'The monk Philotheus in 1510 penned his famous address to the Tsar arguing that "two Romes have fallen, but the third stands", suggesting that Moscow should take up where Rome and Constantinople had left off, a view that later took the form of the conviction that the Russian nation was a "God-bearing people" (*narod bogonosets*). The theme of the individual's duties to the state, the idea that collectivism, known as *sobornost'* or communality, is of a higher moral order than crass individualism, and the view of the Russian as other-worldly and idealist rather than grossly materialistic like the Westerner, all contribute to the Russian idea'[1].

The salient characteristics of Russian political culture were defined, in Western scholarship, during the Soviet period. They are now so established as to be unquestioned, and Western scholars are in danger of missing part of the picture by only looking for what they expect to find. 'The tendency to conceive of political authority in personalised terms'[2] and its concomitant tendency to leader-worship; the weakness of representative institutions; the priority given to the collective over the individual; the peasantry's fear of change and innovation – which led to a tradition of revolution from above – and the greater value placed on welfare than on civil liberties are all well-documented[3], especially in terms of the parallels between Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union. Yet it was inevitable that, in seeking to explain the Soviet Union, scholars focused on those features of the political culture that produced a 'fit', to the detriment of others. However, this 'fit' obscured the difference, not only between *mass* and *elite* political culture, but also between the *Imperial* and *Soviet* elites.

There are several problems involved in a historical assessment of Russian political culture, leaving aside the paucity of empirical data. Firstly, there can be little doubt that, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Imperial elites shared more in common with their European counterparts than with the Russian peasant masses[4], not just because they dressed like Westerners and spoke French, but also because they subscribed less and less to the notion of the Tsar's divine right[5]. Was this, then, '*Russian* elite political culture', or was it '*Western* elite political culture', or even '*nineteenth-century* elite political culture'? Secondly, the problem applies even to the Russian peasantry. The values described above, their essentially conservative and God-fearing nature, the refusal to get involved with or even understand the government, and even the distrust of individualism, are characteristics shared by

peasant societies the world over. Stories are told about Russian peasants needing to be told how to vote as extraordinary anecdotes that typify the Russian mentality[6], yet this is precisely what used to happen in nineteenth-century rural Spain. Known, in fact, as *caciquismo* in Spanish political culture, it was the practice whereby the *caciques* – village 'big men' – told the peasants under their control which way to vote in elections[7]. Although the underlying threat was understood by all, voting itself was not valued by most peasants, and the practice was therefore not deemed unacceptable.

A further problem complicates the issue when Soviet political culture comes into the equation. If we accept that the Imperial elites for the most part fled or were killed during the revolution, that Stalin then proceeded to wipe out most of the intelligentsia – especially the more 'Western', cosmopolitan parts of it – and that, to paraphrase the writer Boris Pilniak, 'the dark waters of *muzhik* Russia' swallowed the Communist Party[8], then, clearly, the political culture of the new elites should have been very similar (if not the same) to that of the masses – in other words, 'it is scarcely possible to argue both the operational importance of traditional popular culture and national character in the Soviet era *and also* to insist on the utter divorce of the Kremlin's masters from the rank and file'[9], which is precisely what many sovietologists do. Although some writers, mainly from former Communist countries[10], argued that 'the mediocrity, conformism and even boorishness apparent in the personal behaviour of the Soviet political elite, which we attribute to the influence of Russian peasant traditions, actually stem from the pathologies of bureaucracy'[11], this argument was never really taken up by the majority of Western scholars in the field; many of these were aware of the argument but did not pursue that line of enquiry, preferring to support the widely-held view that primary socialization experiences as peasants determined the style of the Soviet political elites[12].

Yet this latter view poses a major question: although it could be said that Stalin's *apparatchiki* were socialized as peasants, what happened after his massive industrialization program and the urbanization that accompanied it? Were the new generations not increasingly socialized as workers, and should this not have brought

about a change of values? The implication of this last question is that, if it did not, then maybe Andras Hegedus was right, and those values were not the product of primary, but rather of *adult* socialization experiences. The evolution (or lack of it) of the political style of the higher echelons of the Communist Party is not one of the concerns of this work, but the question of the effects of industrialization on the population as a whole will be examined in this thesis, and we must therefore attempt to come to a conclusion about the nature of Russian development.

The argument that Russia has a special place in history originated with the Russians themselves. With one foot in Europe and the other in Asia, Russian nationalism developed 'notions of Russian exceptionalism expressed through concepts like "the Russian idea" and [...] an ambivalent attitude towards the West and democracy'[13]. This has been accepted almost unquestioningly by Western scholars, yet the same sort of ideas could be put forward about many countries: as Alexander Dallin points out, '[i]n all likelihood, the love/hate relationship one finds in Russian attitudes toward the "advanced" West is none too different from the ambivalence toward the West found in India, Nigeria or Japan'[14].

The same applies to ideas about political culture. Although every country's is different, to a greater or lesser extent, it is always possible to classify each as part of a wider 'sphere of influence', so to speak. Except, seemingly, Russia. The lack of scholarly attention to the elites in Imperial Russia within the framework of political culture accounts for the fact that explicitly Western *mores* have not been discussed from this perspective, and therefore one of the possible links between Russia and Europe which could show how socio-economic development affects political culture in similar ways – regardless of national identity – has not been explored. As was the case with the Soviet elites, this study will not investigate their Imperial counterparts, but it is an area which this author deems worthy of deeper analysis[15].

In a sense, when sovietologists concentrated on mass political culture, they were following tradition. By 'Russian culture' the Russians usually mean a set of traditions, the repository of which is the *narod*. This is clearly shown in the centuries-old love affair of the intelligentsia with 'the people' as they imagined them to be. Yet two

points have to be made on this subject: first, the idealization of the peasantry as being in touch with Nature, God, etc., etc., is as old and widespread as the concept of the Noble Savage, and particularly in vogue in Europe during the Romantic period, which (not so curiously) was the time when Slavophile ideas were most popular. In wanting a return to the essence of 'Russian-ness', the Slavophiles were being more 'Western' than ever. In fact, the intelligentsia itself 'was a direct consequence of the innovations Peter the Great introduced into the nature and practice of the service elite, as it was also *the child of Western ideas and norms*. [It] owed its self-appointed role of social critic and of commitment to the welfare of the people to the heritage of the Petrine concept of service – service to the state, service to the people and, *in fine*, service to that total community called Russia'[16]. Yet, in spite of, or maybe because of all these ideas, the intelligentsia 'had but a faint, if any, genuine spiritual affinity or even contact with the Russian people – although both Slavophiles and populists in the nineteenth century made some efforts at a *rapprochement*'[17]. The second point is that the intelligentsia's disappointment with the peasantry – widely experienced during the 'Going to the People' movement, which was met by the peasantry 'with cynicism and derision'[18] – could be said to be the result of imagining that Russian peasants were different to peasants anywhere else, that they actually embodied the myth of the Russian Soul.

The anthropologist George Foster, who studied peasant societies in Africa and South America, elaborated the concept of 'limited good' to describe the basic ethos of peasant-traditional societies. What it means is that 'broad areas of peasant behaviour are patterned in such a fashion as to suggest that peasants view [...] their total environment [...] as one in which all of the desired things in life such as [...] friendship [...] honour [...] power, influence, security and safety exist in finite quantity and are always in short supply [...] hence it follows that an individual or a family can improve a position only at the expense of others'[19]. The natural equilibrium an outlook like this leads to within a social group is therefore a situation where the lowest common denominator is adopted in all things, where outsiders are viewed with suspicion (as potential competitors for scarce resources), and where the collective rules over the individual. This is perfectly expressed in the Russian concept of *sobornost'*, usually translated as 'community' or 'communality'. 'When applied to

political life, *sobornost'* is basically a demand to make decisions and act "all in common". The demand implies the community in question is an intrinsically integral entity [...] Autonomous actions [...] are seen as violation of unity and an outrage against *sobornost'*'[20]. This holistic approach to the social group, however, is not unique to Russia, but rather to all traditional societies, and *sobornost'* is probably best translated, in fact, as *Gemeinschaft*. Support for the contention that Russian rural society is more similar than it is different to peasant society as a whole can be found in the fact that the transition to civil society – that is, to a *Gesellschaft* society, where there are 'autonomous sub-groups actively pursuing their interests *vis-à-vis* the state'[21] – is proving hardest in *all* those countries and republics of the former Communist bloc where traditional rural societies have existed longest, and not just in Russia[22]. Whilst not disputing the fact that some of the features of Russia's political culture are unique, the obstacles to democratization derive not from the fact that it is Russian, but from the fact that it is 'based [...] on a society of a highly "traditional", *Gemeinschaft* character, in which there [is] a strong tradition of group solidarity together with its converse, a suspicion of outsiders; a greater degree of reliance upon face-to-face relations than upon anonymous procedures; and in which it [is] accepted that every aspect of the life of the community [...] should be subject to the regulation of the community as a whole'[23].

The Soviet regime's ability to coerce and take over Russian society can also be explained not simply in terms of a specifically Russian predisposition towards autocracy – after all, examples of fledgling representative institutions can be found throughout Russian history, even if few of them successfully challenged the state[24] – but rather in terms of the affinity between totalitarian and traditional societies. What the two share is a 'parochial-subject orientation'[25], one where individuals form part of social networks only at a local level, and do not contribute as political animals, being merely the objects of state action. Consequently, '[a]lthough totalitarianism appears to be the outcome of a unique constellation of circumstances peculiar to modernity, the "man of the mass" in whose psychology it is reputedly rooted is by no means a "new" man – he is essentially a man of the traditional, "pre-mass" culture'[26]. In both Imperial and Soviet Russia, state and society were polar opposites in between which there existed practically nothing to link the two. Organized social

networks were either part of the state apparatus or completely outside it, in many cases illegally so.

This leads us to the 'image of dual Russia'[27] – the idea that state and society were so different and separate as to constitute two distinct 'Russias', first articulated by Alexander Herzen, who argued that the reforms of Peter the Great had so greatly alienated the Russian peasant from the State that '[i]n the officer he [saw] a policeman; in the judge, an enemy. In the landowner, invested with authority, the might of a beast which he [had] not the strength to control [...] People in uniform [seemed] to him representatives of the German Government'[28]. This psychological distance was reinforced by actual physical distance, since in Imperial Russia, even by 1917 '[t]he life of the local community [...] carried on at the same time as, and largely unaffected by, political events at the centre of the Empire'[29]. This situation changed under the Soviet regime. The Communist Party took over the structures of the Imperial bureaucracy and built upon them, expanding them and dramatically increasing the state's ability to penetrate society and intrude in the life of individuals. Thus it was that, as the Soviet state reached deeper and deeper into society, this 'dual Russia' was transformed from a horizontal into a vertical divide, running through the individual person, creating *1984*'s 'doublethink'. The individual 'ha[d] a role and self-identity in official Russia, but also a hidden unofficial existence and identity'[30].

Once again, however, although the situation depicted in *1984* was based on the Stalinist regime, the point of the novel was that it could happen anywhere. Just as the divide between state and society seen in Imperial Russia, whilst it was more extreme than elsewhere in Europe, was not unknown in predominantly agrarian states, the state and Party bureaucracies in all Communist countries shared certain features, which were *reinforced*, for reasons we shall see later, in countries sharing a similar agrarian past. Thus – and this is a slight variation on Hegedus' argument – apparatchiki from Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Ukraine and Poland, for example, shared a very similar political culture, conditioned by an ideologically rigid bureaucracy. Furthermore, the split between an official and an unofficial personality developed in all countries of the former Communist bloc. The dual image is therefore a necessary product of certain circumstances, not an ethnic characteristic.

We have seen that Russian political culture, far from being in a class of its own, can be understood in terms of Russia's socio-economic features, and that 'a good deal of the alleged Russian uniqueness fades once the Russian experience is compared with that of other societies [...] True, much of what developed in Russia came with a substantial time lag and often did have a particular Russian stamp on it [but] there is truth in Henry L Roberts' formula that, by comparison with the European West, Russia often seemed both "related and belated" – but surely not unique'[31]. In studying Russia, one must therefore 'bear in mind a chronological discrepancy'[32], and even though the technological revolution and different pace of socio-economic development that this discrepancy has created mean that it is no longer a simple question of different points along one same continuum, the main point still holds: Russia's difficulties with civil society and the rule of law are similar to those in other predominantly agrarian former Communist countries, and, indeed, to those in predominantly agrarian countries in transition from any kind of authoritarian regime. There is indeed much evidence to suggest that, in spite of the specific features of post-Communist transitions, they 'may, nevertheless, be usefully viewed as a sub-category of a more generic phenomenon of transition from authoritarian rule'[33], an example of which is the fact that *glasnost'* was not 'a uniquely Russian phenomenon. In a recent study of more than a dozen cases from authoritarian rule [...] it was found that in every case the transition began with a period of *glasnost*-like liberalization [...] often referred to in discussions of the Latin world as *decompressao* (decompression) or *apertura* (opening)' [34]. Although Russia was – and is – particularly vulnerable to obstacles in the formation of a civil society due to its geographical expanse, which makes any sort of 'All-Russian' organization or association impossible without access to vast resources[35], it was the framework of communal, personal relations inherited from an agrarian and pre-capitalist past that became entrenched during the Soviet era, when, 'at the same time the party was transforming society, "society" entered the party'[36].

This entrenchment was possible through the mechanisms of the command economy, on the one hand, and the pervasive fear of outsiders bred by Stalin's purges, on the other hand. The fear of informants dovetailed neatly with the fear of outsiders that George Foster identified in peasant societies, thus reinforcing the mentality that

Russian peasants brought to the party: the philosophy of 'limited good' thus became a matter of life and death, since the safest way not to be informed on by others was by constantly informing on them first. Furthermore, as the Soviet economy ground slowly to a halt, the goods that the average citizen could get hold of were indeed limited, and the only way to get around the all-pervasive and inflexible bureaucratic apparatus was through personal social networks. Thus it was that Soviet society arrived at a situation where the complex networks of patron-client relationships normally found in traditional societies (which market capitalism eventually erodes) became the organizational basis of the Communist Party, informing the political beliefs and behaviour of Russians to this day. The political elites of the Russian Federation are therefore the heirs of a political culture where, on the one hand, the State operates as a patronage-based clique, and, on the other hand, the people minimize 'contact with the state and [rely] on dense horizontal networks of friends to insulate themselves from the state'[37].

It must be pointed out once more, however, that the situation in the Soviet Union was not unique to it. The combination of circumstances leading to it were, obviously, historically exclusive to Russia, but many combinations are possible to arrive at the same situation, and traditional patron-client networks have survived even in Western Europe[38]. The political implications of these social arrangements and the kind of situations in which they flourish or decay therefore needs to be examined if our understanding of political culture is to be deepened in any way, and the attempt to do this will be one of the main concerns of this thesis.

Having established that Russia does not follow a unique path of development, it seems reasonable to argue that sovietology, and 'post-sovietology', as it were, can benefit from a range of theories and concepts from the social sciences as a whole, such as *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, which we have already touched upon. It will therefore be the aim of this thesis to assess Russian political culture from a wider perspective than is normally the case; but before we pursue this line of inquiry, we must first look at current analyses of political culture in Russia, in order to contextualize this study.

Notes

[1]Richard Sakwa, 'Russia, Communism and Democracy', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds), *Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics*, third edition (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 287-308 at p. 292.

[2]Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 31.

[3]See, for example, ibid., esp. Chapters 2 and 3.

[4]It has been argued that, before Peter the Great, 'the political culture of the Great Russian peasant [...] mutatis mutandis was also shared by the elite classes' – Marc Raeff, 'The People, the Intelligentsia and Russian Political Culture', in *Political Studies*, (special issue: 'The End of "Isms"'), Vol. 41 (1993), pp. 93-106 at p. 94. This seems to run counter to the argument that 'for centuries the State power [...] remained in Russia what it was when the northern Vikings first came: an outsider to whom allegiance was won only in the measure of his utility. The people were not willing to assimilate themselves to the State, to feel a part of it, responsible for the whole. The country continued to feel and live independent from the State authorities' – P N Miliukov, *Russia To-day and To-morrow* (London: Macmillan, 1922), p. 10.

[5]Contemporary accounts substantiate this: see, for example, S Iu Witte, *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, translated by Abraham Yarmolinsky (London: Heinemann, 1921); see also Dominic Lieven, *Russia's Rulers Under the Old Regime* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

[6]See, for example, White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, p. 33.

[7]For a fuller account, see Robert Kern, *Liberals, Reformers and Caciques in Restoration Spain* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974).

[8]Boris Pilniak, *Gohyi god* (Peterburg: Izdatel'stvo Z I Grzhebina, 1922), cited in Tucker, *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia*, p. 95. The original statement referred to the Petrine empire.

[9]Alexander Dallin, 'Uses and Abuses of Russian History', in Frederic Fleron and Erik Hoffmann (eds), *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: Methodology and Empirical Theory in Sovietology* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 131-40 at p. 134.

[10]See, for example, Michael Voslensky, *Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet Ruling Class*, translated by Eric Mosbacher (London: The Bodley Head, 1984); Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger, 1957); and Andras Hegedus, *Socialism and Bureaucracy* (London: Allison & Busby, 1976). See also Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, for an overview of Marxist-Leninist regimes from a comparative perspective.

[11]Stephen Burant, 'The Influence of Russian Tradition on the Political Style of the Soviet Elite', in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 102, No. 2 (Summer 1987), pp. 273-93 at p. 275. Burant does not argue this himself, but is summarizing the case made in Hegedus, *Socialism and Bureaucracy*.

[12]*Ibid.*, esp. pp. 275-80. He dismisses the bureaucratic idea somewhat too easily by simply arguing that, since Weber argued that bureaucratic pathologies mostly affect unelected officials, and since the 'officials who comprise the Politburo, the Secretariat and even the Central Committee hold an autonomous position vis à vis the bureaucracy [...] they should be freer of bureaucratic styles and habits than their appointed subordinates. Consequently [...], one can attribute greater weight to carryovers from traditional culture, compared to bureaucratic habits' (p. 276). Whilst this may sometimes be the case, the fact that those officials were once 'appointed subordinates' (and, indeed, remained dependent on the General Secretary) is not addressed.

[13]Sakwa, 'Russia, Communism and Democracy', p. 297. See also Raeff, 'The People, the Intelligentsia and Russian Political Culture', pp. 102-3: '[a]n early manifestation of this concern was the doctrine of Eurasianism [...] Its interpretation of history was based on the notion of a perennial struggle between steppe and forest [...] rooted in the specific climatic conditions of the Eurasian land mass'.

[14]Dallin, 'Uses and Abuses of Russian History', p. 139.

[15]Lieven, *Russia's Rulers Under the Old Regime*, presents a vivid and insightful picture of the members of the State Council from 1894-1914. Nevertheless, although it covers the mentality, upbringing and lifestyle of a representative sample of the elites, it does not address – nor does it claim to – broader cross-national issues specifically affecting political culture. Still, it provides an excellent starting-point for a deeper analysis of pre-Revolutionary elite political culture.

[16]Raeff, 'The People, the Intelligentsia and Russian Political Culture', p. 98 (first italics added).
[17]Ibid., p. 99.
[18]White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, pp. 60-1.
[19]George Foster, 'Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good', in *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 67, No. 2 (April 1965), pp. 293-315 at pp. 296-7.
[20]Victor Sergeyev, Nikolai Biryukov and Jeffrey Gleisner, 'The Crisis of *Sobornost'*: Parliamentary Discourse in Present-day Russia', in *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April 1995), pp. 149-75 at p. 151.
[21]William Reisinger, Arthur Miller, Vicki Hesli and Kristen Hill Maher, 'Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implications for Democracy', in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 24, Part 2 (April 1994), pp. 183-223 at p. 187.
[22]See, for instance, Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, pp. 78-9. Jowitt compares Romanian *pile* and Russian *blat* and argues that both 'reinforce the traditional community and regime political cultures with their stress on covert, personalized, hierarchical relationships involving complicity rather than public agreements' (p. 78). The exact same phenomenon has counterparts in Western Europe, for example Spanish *enchufe* and French *piston*, and this phenomenon is important in terms of the nature of social relationships, again related to ideas about *Gemeinschaft* .
[23]White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, p. 64.
[24]For example, the Duma from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and the Zemskii Sobor' in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, pp. 24-7; see also Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974).
[25]See Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, pp. 17-26, for definitions of parochial, subject and participant orientations in society, and their mixes.
[26]Victor Sergeyev and Nikolai Biryukov, *Russia's Road to Democracy: Parliament, Communism and Traditional Culture* (Aldershot, Hants: Elgar, 1993), p. 4.
[27]Robert Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change*, rev. ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 121-42, esp. pp. 122-5.
[28]Alexander Herzen, 'O sel'skoi obshchine v Rossii', an article appended to his *Dvizhenie obshchestvennoi mysli v Rossii* (Moskva: Tipografiia T-va I D Sytina, 1907), pp. 175-181 at p. 181 (my translation).
[29]White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, p. 34.
[30]Ibid., p. 140.
[31]Dallin, 'Uses and Abuses of Russian History', p. 136, citing Henry Roberts, 'Russia and the West: A Comparison and Contrast', in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 1964), pp. 1-12.
[32]Raeff, 'The People, the Intelligentsia and Russian Political Culture', p. 91.
[33]Russell Bova, 'Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective', in Fleron and Hoffman (eds), *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science*, pp. 239-59 at p. 239.
[34]*Ibid.*, p. 244, referring to Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
[35]Only through strict organizational discipline (as opposed to the random acts of the populists) were the Bolsheviks able to form a small core organization with enough resources to fund itself which was, even so, poorly represented in the provinces.
[36]Burant, 'The Influence of Russian Tradition on the Political Style of the Soviet Elite', p. 279.
[37]Richard Rose, 'Russia as an Hour-Glass Society: a Constitution without Citizens' (special report), in *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 34-42 at pp. 34-5.
[38]'Old boy' networks in England, for example.

Chapter Three – The Search for Objective Reality

> 'Alas in political science what is more easily "proven" tends to be also more trivial. [S]ignificant propositions concerning [...] historical processes [...] necessarily tend to be elusive of the reassuring precision of the statistical method, and require somewhat impressionistic and therefore also controversial judgements'[1].

As mentioned earlier, Russia's experiment in democratization meant the end of systems theories and brought the issue of political culture to the fore, making it the top research priority. This was surely not unrelated to the resurgence, in the late 1980s, of academic interest in cultural perspectives in political science as a whole, since, as we will see later on, several sovietologists, especially in America, advocated a *rapprochement* with other social sciences and greater comparative analysis with other area studies within political science. This was further helped by the blossoming of academic research in Russia, by Russians, after years of politicised, isolated work, much of which went unpublished[2]. By 1993, the pendulum had swung the other way, however, to the extent that

> 'sociology as a science had become identified with empirical research, and the latter with the pre-eminence of public opinion surveys. In conditions of deepening [...] crisis, the majority of newspapers had begun to run permanent columns – "Through the Eyes of the Sociologist", "In the Mirror of Sociology", etc. The use of sociological data had become a self-styled trump card in political programs on the radio, and, especially, on television'[3].

One particular article, itself heavily influenced by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture*, was seminal to ideas about political culture research. In 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', Ronald Inglehart argued that 'different societies are characterized to very different degrees by a specific syndrome of political cultural attitudes; that these cultural differences are relatively enduring, but not immutable; and that they have major political consequences, being closely linked to the viability of democratic institutions'[4]. In liberal democracies, this syndrome consists of high levels of '[l]ife satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust, and support for the existing social order'[5], and constitutes 'a crucial link between economic development and democracy'[6]. The component parts of this 'syndrome' are now used as guidelines for political survey research in Russia, not only by Western specialists in the field[7], but also by Russian scholars themselves, notably in a

collaborative article between Dutch and Russian sociologists, which follows almost step by step Inglehart's article in both presentation and methodology[8].

Inglehart's article, however, is not without its flaws. Firstly, as he himself admits, many of the links he makes have 'the causal ambiguity of the chicken-versus-egg question"[9]. Whilst this is inevitable in the social sciences, since there is no way to set up a 'control' experiment against which to measure reality, it sits uncomfortably with the assumption, implicit in the taking of such detailed measurements as Inglehart is at pains to produce, analyze and correlate, that we *can* quantify things like 'satisfaction'. Secondly, even if the data he presents us with were true, they do not fully support his assumptions, at least not if we decide to be really 'scientific' about interpreting them. In every case, for every parameter, there is an awkward exception. The most striking case is Mexico, as Almond and Verba themselves found out during their research on comparative political culture[10]. Inglehart, in fact, disregards Mexico altogether, arguing that

> 'data are also available for Mexico, but because they are not based on a representative national sample, they have been omitted from these quantitative cross-national analyses. For what they are worth [!], these data show surprisingly high levels of life satisfaction [...] despite relatively negative conditions'[11].

Other data are not so easily cast aside, however, and are dealt with unsatisfactorily. A graph showing levels of life satisfaction from 1973 to 1987 shows a sharp decline of satisfaction in Belgium. Inglehart notes that the 'substantial decline in the subjective well-being of the Belgian public [...] stands in dramatic contrast to the overall stability of the cross-national differences manifested throughout this period'[12], yet he goes on to say that '[d]espite dramatic economic upheavals from year to year and despite large differences between the experiences of the different countries, I find remarkable stability in the relative positions of these publics'[13]. Belgium is neither explained nor mentioned again. Similar anomalies relating to Japan and Hungary in terms of the relationship between life satisfaction and per capita GNP can be found later on[14], as well as the avowedly questionable positioning of France in a graph correlating life satisfaction and stable democracy[15].

Other questions arise. Inglehart takes up Weber's theory of the Protestant ethic and its influence on economic development, which led to the spread of capitalism in

Northern Europe, to the detriment of previously wealthier Catholic countries in the South. Whilst I do not take issue with this argument as a whole, to say that 'one feature common to traditional value systems [such as Catholicism] is that they emerge in, and are adapted to, economies characterized by very little technological change and economic growth'[16] seems to treat the discovery of the Americas, or the Italian Renaissance (to name but two examples) as minor, inconsequential events. Furthermore, his contention that in traditional societies 'social mobility is a zero-sum game, heavily laden with conflict and threatening to the social system' and that 'virtually all traditional cultures discourage upward social mobility and the accumulation of wealth'[17] is quite simply incorrect, as a look at any number of 'primitive' tribes anywhere in the world can testify[18]. As a matter of fact, he himself says later on that in Imperial China, the 'Confucian system [...] institutionalized a socially accepted and even honoured channel for upward mobility'[19].

This article's most significant contribution to political culture theories, however, is the notion of 'postmaterialism'. In postmaterialist societies, people 'emphasize a high salary and job security less than working with people they like or doing interesting work [...] and are [...] economic underachievers'[20], which leads to a slowdown in the economic growth of the societies they live in. He concludes that 'though wealthier societies are most likely to produce postmaterialists, after an appropriate time lag the more postmaterialist societies have the lowest growth rates'[21]. Once again, unfortunately, this correlation is not as neat as could be hoped, since Japan, with the highest growth rate of all, does not have the largest number of postmaterialists, and a clear Catholic/Protestant divide cannot be drawn in any direction without allowing for exceptions[22]. Furthermore, scholars have found that neither postmaterialism nor interpersonal trust show 'covariance with other indicators'[23].

To review Inglehart's article in further detail is not relevant to this thesis; suffice it to say that, as he himself comments at one point, '[h]ow we interpret [data] depends on one's theoretical expectations'[24]. His research uncovers 'striking deviant cases'[25] but fails to come to a similarly striking conclusion, merely stating that

> 'economic development by itself does not produce democracy. Unless specific changes occur in culture and social structure, the result may not be democracy but a variety of alternatives ranging from the Libyan to the Soviet [...]

> Finally, it appears that economic development itself is influenced by cultural variables. [...] Clearly, this analysis cannot be regarded as conclusive. But the available evidence tends to confirm Weber's insight that culture is not just a consequence of economics but can shape the basic nature of economic and political life'[26].

Inglehart's article has nevertheless paved the way for studies of political culture in the Russian Federation, serving as a guideline for much of the research carried out amongst the Russian public, since the 'political culture approach to democratization argues that certain mass orientations, such as interpersonal trust as well as support for democratic values and institutions must be present in society before democracy can take root or become consolidated'[27]. This research is spearheaded by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy in Glasgow[28], which, in co-operation with the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) in Moscow, has been conducting the yearly *New Russia Barometer* (*NRB*) since 1992, attempting to measure not only the components of the democratic syndrome established by Inglehart, but also asking questions about the level of support for different political figures and parties, including the CPSU and figures from the Soviet past. The questions first asked in the baseline survey of 1992 are repeated every year, but questions relating to specific areas of interest are also added; for example, in 1994, the survey paid 'particular attention to the behaviour of Russians at their place of work'[29].

Other surveys, such as the *Post-Soviet Citizen Surveys* (*PSCS*)[30], ask, by and large, the same kinds of questions as the *NRB*; the difference between surveys lies not in the questions, but rather in the conclusions derived from – or the 'spins' put on – the answers, which depend on researchers' different theoretical inclinations. For example, whereas Richard Rose heavily emphasizes the role of interpersonal trust in democratization processes[31], Arthur Miller and his colleagues come to the conclusion that their analysis 'does not support the hypothesized impact of trust in people on democratization'[32]. Once more, we cannot escape the fact that, no matter how 'objective' we try to make data through rigorous testing and retesting, its interpretation is inherently subjective – in other words, '[s]urvey data are equivalent to other information that is politically neutral until put in a framework'[33]. Opinion polls suffer particularly from their utility as political tools now that the Russian political establishment has awakened to concepts such as market research and advertising. Russian survey and research organizations such as Vox Populi and

ROMIR (Russian Public Opinion and Market Research) are greatly in demand for their services by both the presidential administration and politicians seeking 'to determine if the time [is] right to reveal their presidential intentions, or [...] to adjust their appeal to voters'[34]. Although it can be argued that Western scholars are not as constrained by political pressure, other considerations do affect the outcome of research, for instance, the 'undue emphasis on novelty in the reward structure for academics [which] has led to the ever-increasing proliferation of new concepts, theories and approaches'[35], to name but one.

The imprecise nature of the social sciences, best exemplified by how unprepared most sovietologists were for the collapse of the USSR[36], has had another consequence, which is the reluctance of scholars, not only to make any predictions, but even to express any definite opinions. A greater degree of commitment to one's results might be possible, on the other hand, if post-Communist transitions were compared not to each other, as they currently are, but to transitions to democracy as a whole, since '[c]omparisons are required in order to understand what may be the essential conditions of whatever we are trying to understand'[37]. Tentative steps have been taken towards this goal: Donna Bahry and Lucan Way, for instance, have found that 'Spain, which is often held up as one of the success stories in democratization, had levels of conventional participation and alienation in the early 1980s that were comparable to those we describe [...] for Russia'[38]. Further analysis along those lines would quite possibly demonstrate that a lot of the research efforts currently being made in the study of post-communist transitions are perhaps misguided.

One example of this is the notion of 'synoptic thinking', proposed by William Zimmerman as a 'step toward better assessing the relative plausibility both of views that emphasize the malleability of political culture and those that emphasize the stability of traditional Russian cultural norms'[39]. Synoptic thinking is 'one of the two fundamental approaches to the manipulability and mastery of political and social reality and, in turn, to the organization of society'[40], and derives from the work of Charles Lindblom, who identified two basic societal models[41]. Synoptic thinking prevails in 'Model 1' societies, where people believe that there is 'only one correct philosophy', and where the few 'guide' the many. 'Model 2' societies, on the other

hand, are based on the assumption that everyone is equally fallible, and that there are 'partial truths and multiple philosophies'. People in these societies, according to Zimmerman, 'are drawn to market systems'[42]. Yet, if this is the case, how does he explain authoritarian societies? Democratic standards in Southeast Asia leave much to be desired, yet these are undeniably market economies, and doing better than most, at that. Zimmerman is obviously aware of this, because, in his analysis of synoptic thinking amongst the Russian population[43], he combines 'orientation to the economy and orientation to the polity' and constructs four groups: 'liberal democrats', 'market authoritarians', 'social democrats' and 'socialist authoritarians'[44]. He does not explain, however, why he replaces the original bipolar framework with this foursome, only to return to the original two models in his conclusion; neither does he address the fact that, by constructing those four typologies, he is implicitly acknowledging the flaw in the premise that synoptic thinking is incompatible with market economy. By the time he reaches the conclusion that the elites, the educated and the urban populations are more likely to reject synoptic thinking, it is not clear in what way his findings 'are significant [...] both for what they suggest about Russian political culture and what they imply for the prospects for economic and political pluralism'[45]. This would seem another instance where novelty has won out over the 'testing and retesting of existing theories'[46].

One interesting fact to come out of Zimmerman's article is the large amount of 'don't know' and other missing answers amongst the general public in Russia, a fact common to many surveys. Zimmerman argues that missing answers represent the people 'who, in the current Russian context, would be most likely to be reticent about expressing themselves about any factual or value questions in a survey'[47], but does not address the wider question of how relevant is public interest in politics in the democratization process, nor is it very clear how the 'uncommitted' were cross-tabulated[48]. Ellen Carnaghan has addressed the methodological problems posed by non-responses, in an attempt to establish what 'don't knows' and 'it is hard to says' mean in Russia. Since the numbers of non-responses are so high, leaving them out can 'seriously bias findings if such responses are not randomly distributed across the population, especially in multivariate analysis where all cases with any missing values are often deleted'[49]. She analyzes whether fear, apathy or ambivalence lie behind the

inability to give an answer, and the implications of each for democracy, showing that substantial numbers of the Russian public do not, in fact, have strong opinions about concepts such as 'capitalism', 'democracy', or even 'Marxism-Leninism'[50]. The implications of this for democracy, however, are unclear. On the one hand, she points out that 'Russians may not be so different from Americans'[51], but, on the other hand, a system where people have 'neither strong democratic nor anti-democratic leanings'[52] does not sound like a system with a strong support base, in which case popular reaction to a coup might be minimal. Since 'a citizen within the civic culture [...] is not the active citizen: he is the potentially active citizen'[53], the interesting question is therefore not the existence of apathy, but rather what levels of apathy can coexist with democracy.

The greatest obstacle to thorough polling in the Russian Federation, however, remains one of resources. Due to the lack of an efficient communications networks, interviews often have to be conducted in person, which means that the more remote areas of the country are excluded from national polls. Whereas this is not necessarily unusual – survey companies in the UK normally exclude the Scottish Highlands and Islands for cost reasons[54] – in Russia's case it means excluding larger areas than is normally the case in other countries, thereby compromising the representativeness of given samples. As a result of this problem, survey research in Russia can be classified into two broad types, which can be described as 'horizontal' and 'vertical', each with its own advantages and disadvantages.

Horizontal research is nation-wide, and tries to obtain a representative sample by means of careful stratified selection processes. Nevertheless, no amount of thorough research can really compensate for the fact that the samples – usually ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 respondents (or thereabouts) – whilst adequate for the relatively small countries of Europe, do not constitute a significant fraction of the Russian Federation's population, neither can it compensate for the regions that have to be left out[55]. On the other hand, in terms of gaining an impressionistic picture of the state of play throughout the Russian Federation, these surveys are invaluable, as much for what they reveal as for the questions they give rise to. Vertical research, on the other hand, is localised, usually in prominent urban centres or the more

technologically developed areas of European Russia[56]. With these surveys, what is gained in terms of achieving a representative sample is lost because a 'study of Iaroslavl can no more be generalized to the whole of Russia than, say, a study of Birmingham could to the whole United Kingdom'[57]. For some scholars, however, the difficulties in sampling all-Russian surveys and the shortage of trained personnel to conduct interviews and process data all lead them to have 'serious doubts about whether it is possible at present to conduct a republic-wide survey of public opinion in Russia [...] that is representative within the mathematically determined limits of probability common to such research in the west'[58]. Supporters of the case-study approach try to conduct their research in areas which they consider to be 'typical' of Russia – avoiding, for example, Moscow and St Petersburg – in order to offset the fact that there is 'no way of saying scientifically whether conclusions based on a single city study are generalizable elsewhere'[59], but, as in the case of Iaroslavl, Jeffrey Hahn's argument that there is 'no compelling reason to think that Iaroslavl citizens are very far out of the Russian political mainstream'[60] does not take into account the marked urban-rural divide that most other scholars have found in the Russian Federation[61].

The geographical scope of surveys, however, is not the only source of controversy. At the heart of the debate on Russia's democratization prospects lies a question almost of temperament: there are optimists and there are pessimists. They derive radically different conclusions from similar material, and it is usually possible to tell which areas academics will be interested in simply by looking at their previous work as sovietologists. Stephen White, for example, has always been interested in political participation[62], and continues to focus on elections, voting behaviour and party affiliation[63]. Another good example is Hahn, who was conducting case studies in Russian cities and seeing the beginnings of a civic culture in Russia as far back as 1988; his study of Iaroslavl is in a very similar vein to his work before the Soviet Union's collapse[64], concluding now, as he did then, that 'the rudiments of a democratic political culture arose before Gorbachev came to power – despite an authoritarian institutional context – and that they will continue to exist even if one is reimposed'[65]. Matthew Wyman, on the other hand, takes issue with Hahn's assertion, clearly implying that a study of Iaroslavl in 1990 cannot be considered sufficient

evidence, and arguing that the 'examination of a larger number of studies from the whole period 1989-93 shows that the evidence is at best deeply mixed'[66]. Perhaps tacitly acknowledging this problem, Hahn himself has argued that '[w]here dramatically different results are obtained, then the researchers at both levels may want to be more cautious in presenting their findings'[67]. That this is not simply a matter of geography, however, can be seen from the fact that Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans are closer to Hahn's point of view than to Wyman's, even though they worked with a nation-wide survey. Their 'findings do not support the argument that the elections of December 1993 represented the reaffirmation of [...] traditional Russian political culture. Some reasons to doubt this hypothesis are the continuing levels of normative support for democracy and the market, the absence of an alternative normative project and the clear relationship between those holding left-wing and nationalist views and their experience of the transition itself'[68].

These differences of opinion will only be settled, if at all, by history itself. The problem with trying to analyse political culture is that, even without the controversy over definition described earlier, the 'bountifulness of subjective political attitudes'[69] means that 'we have to make prior judgements on what we are interested in, on what counts as views, on how to organize the perceptual hotchpotch of a society to give it some form and meaning'[70]. This explains why scholars' conclusions are fairly predictable: their different research interests have remained the same even after the demise of the USSR. That one's hypothesis should drive the methodology employed is inevitable, however, for 'despite our certainty that an objective world exists, there can be no philosophical certainty that what we purport to observe is, in fact, what is. Thus, the facts that we claim as evidence for or against a theory are facts and are therefore evidence only because the theory acknowledges them as such'[71].

It is bearing this in mind that current trends in the study of political culture must be reviewed. Although the behaviourist approach – i.e., including behaviour in definitions of political culture – is now predominant, there is some disagreement as to whether 'democratic' political behaviour should include 'unorthodox' behaviour, such as rioting and mass protests. Stephen White treats mass protests as undesirable forms of political participation in the process of democratization in Russia, since the

'strong link between the likelihood of protest and economic dissatisfaction, coupled with the widespread popular sympathies that remain for the old Soviet regime, represent one of the greatest obstacles to the consolidation of a democratic political system'[72]. A Russian study, on the other hand, has not found a direct relationship between a population's willingness to participate in mass protests and its democratic propensities. In 1990-1, for instance, just under 50% of the respondents of both Ireland and West Germany – two very different countries – were willing to participate in rallies and demonstrations; Belgium came in at 29% and Russia at 37% in 1993[73]. Clearly, although they are often a manifestation of political instability, there is no substantial evidence that mass actions in general are inherently 'destabilizing'[74]. 'The difficult problem is to explain why people would participate in mass demonstrations, in illegal sit-ins or boycotts, in the throwing of rocks at troops, and so forth, when their individual participation in the mass activity is not noticeable but may lead to arrest or physical harm – or simply to an expenditure of time which has no impact on the final outcome'[75]. Excluding mass protest from analysis, however, does not leave the scholar with easily definable phenomena. A vote is not just a signal of affiliation, it can be many other things, such as a protest vote, or even an 'I don't know who to vote for, so I'll vote for this one' vote. The media greatly influences the electorate all over the world, as shown by the fact that elections are often won on the basis that one candidate looks better on television than another[76]; it can therefore no longer be said without uncertainty that electoral results reflect political culture, unless we take the political culture to be one where politics are considered cosmetic or irrelevant. In the Russian case, the Duma election results of December 1995 are a dramatic departure from those of 1993, a fact that scholars confidently analysing the 1993 elections did not foresee. In spite of their cautious words, their articles gave the definite impression that some sort of grip could be had on the Russian situation through election results and data on party affiliation[77].

Political behaviour alone is not, as we can see, a sufficient tool of analysis, and it is therefore correlated with attitudinal studies, which takes us back to Inglehart's 'satisfaction' indices, and to questions which try to place respondents on a left/right spectrum. The problem with this is, of course, that 'left' and 'right' no longer have conventional meanings for us, whereas 'democracy', 'pluralism' and the like can

mean any number of things to the average Russian, or none at all[78]. Researchers are careful to back-translate everything several times, but no amount of translation can guarantee that what we mean is what is understood. The phrasing of questions can also be misleading, since 'given a choice between an "iron hand" and a democracy virtually equated with anarchy', the majority will choose order, whereas if 'the choice is posed for or against the very much more loaded term "dictatorship", the results [will be] a mirror image'[79]. Problems arise, in fact, even before a question is translated or asked, since, in order to assess the values and beliefs of individuals and their commitment to democracy, the questions to be asked must first be identified[80].

But the main problem encountered when trying to understand and classify political culture is cultural distance itself. Sovietology in particular has always been dominated by Anglo-American perspectives, with a pronounced middle-class orientation which tends to judge other nations mainly by their treatment of intellectuals, of people in tune with western notions of human rights[81]. Yet this emphasis on political over economic freedoms tends to forget the fact that economic freedom developed *before* political freedom even in 'civilized' countries, and that political freedom is meaningless without freedom from want and starvation. To counteract this bias, it would be best to follow Sidney Verba's suggestion to focus on 'primitive political beliefs', which are 'those so implicit and generally taken for granted that each individual holds them and believes all other individuals hold them. They are the fundamental and usually unstated assumptions or postulates about politics'[82], which cannot be investigated by means of subjective questions that say more about the person asking the questions than they do about the person answering them. As Verba points out,

> 'Too often [...] students of politics have asked questions about those political attitudes which political scientists consider important – about attitudes toward political issues or toward partisan affiliation. When the individual does not respond in ways that fit the researcher's view as to what a consistent political ideology is [...] he is considered to have no political ideology. But by focusing on basic value orientations – often implicit assumptions about the nature of man and the nature of physical reality – we may find a set of political attitudes that, though not structured as the political philosopher might structure them, nevertheless have a definite and significant structure. Since an individual's involvement in society is likely to be only peripherally political – since he is likely to invest more concern and affect in his personal relations or economic relations than in his political ones – it is quite likely that he will structure his political attitudes in ways that derive from his structuring of attitudes toward these more salient areas of activity rather than in terms of the ways in which political scientists or political theorists structure the political world'[83].

Notes

[1]Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past?', in Paul Cocks, Robert Daniels and Nancy Whittier Heer (eds), *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 337-351 at p. 347.

[2]'The existence of sociology, up to the 1980s, was itself controversial' – Stephen White, 'Public Opinion and Political Science in Postcommunist Russia', in *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (June 1995), pp. 507-26 at p. 508. See pp. 508-15 for a brief account of political science and sociology in the last three decades of the Soviet Union's existence.

[3]M N Rutkevich, 'Sotsiologiia, vlast', obshchestvennoe mnenie', in *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, 1993, No. 7 (July), pp. 3-14 at p. 3 (my translation).

[4]Ronald Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (December 1988), pp. 1203-30 at p. 1203. This article was based on the results of the *World Values Survey* (*WVS*), a survey of over fifty nations, the Russian data of which will be used in Part II of this study.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 1215.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 1219.

[7]See, for example, Richard Rose, *Distrust as an Obstacle to Civil Society*, Studies in Public Policy Series, No. 226 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press, 1994); also Jeffrey Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, Part 4 (October 1991), pp. 393-421; also Reisinger *et al.*, 'Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania'.

[8]V O Rukavishnikov, Peter Ester, Luke Halman and T P Rukavishnikova, 'Rossiia mezhdu proshlym i budushchim. Sravnenie pokazatelei politicheskoi kul'tury naseleniia 22-kh stran Evropy i Severnoi Ameriki', in *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, 1995, No. 5 (May), pp. 75-90. This article compared the results of the European countries in the *WVS* dataset to those of two surveys carried out in Russia in 1993 and 1994, and two methodological points should be made: firstly, the Russian surveys were exclusively city-based, whereas the *WVS* was not; and secondly, the Russian questionnaires were not originally designed on the basis of those used in the *WVS*.

[9]Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1204. Further examples of this are: '[a]gain, we have the chicken-versus-egg question: Does a culture of dissatisfaction and distrust give rise to an extremist vote or do extremist parties produce distrust and dissatisfaction?' (p. 1214); on the link between the political culture 'syndrome' found in democracies and enduring democratic institutions: '[s]uch casual linkages are difficult to demonstrate conclusively' (p. 1215); and, finally, 'we do not have sufficient data to sort out the casual linkages between political culture, economic development, and democracy' (p. 1219).

[10]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*.

[11]Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1217.

[12]*Ibid.*, p. 1206.

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 1207.

[14]*Ibid.*, Figure 2, p. 1208.

[15]*Ibid.*, Figure 5, pp. 1216-7.

[16]*Ibid.*, p. 1222.

[17]*Ibidem.*

[18]The Trobriand islanders, for example, accumulate bamfuls of yams to enhance their social status. See Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagos of Melanesian New Guinea* (London: G Routledge & Sons, 1922), for the Trobrianders' complex wealth/status relationships.

[19]Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1228.

[20]*Ibid.*, p. 1224.

[21]*Ibid.*, p. 1225.

[22]*Ibid.*, Figure 9, p. 1226.

[23]Reisinger *et al.*, 'Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania', p. 211. Rukavishnikov *et al*, 'Rossiia mezhdu proshlym i budushchim', also found that the level of interpersonal trust in Russia was 54% in 1993 and 57% in 1994, coming fourth after Sweden, Norway and Denmark

alone. According to the authors, 'the level of interpersonal trust of Russians can be seen as a traditional trait of Russian popular culture and national character, not directly related to the level of material well-being' (p. 80, my translation).

[24]Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1209.

[25]*Ibidem.*

[26]*Ibid.*, p.1229.

[27]Arthur Miller, Vicki Hesli and William Reisinger, *Understanding Democracy: A Comparison of Mass and Elite in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine*, Studies in Public Policy Series, No. 247 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press, 1995), p. 3.

[28]Directed by Richard Rose.

[29]Richard Rose, *New Russia Barometer IV: Survey Results*, Studies in Public Policy Series, No. 250 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press, 1995), p. 3.

[30]The *PSCS* were conducted in 1992 in Ukraine and European Russia under the direction of Arthur Miller, Vicki Hesli and William Reisinger from the University of Iowa, in collaboration with Andrei Melville, Alexander Nikitin and Elena Bashkirova from the USSR Academy of Sciences.

[31]See, for example, Richard Rose, *Distrust as an Obstacle to Civil Society*; Richard Rose, 'Post-Communism and the Problem of Trust', in *Journal of Democracy* Vol. 5, no. 3 (July 1994), pp. 18-30; William Mishler and Richard Rose, *Trust, Distrust and Scepticism about Institutions of Civil Society*, Studies in Public Policy Series, No. 252 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press, 1995).

[32]Miller, Hesli and Reisinger, *Understanding Democracy*, p. 31.

[33]McAuley, 'Political Culture and Communist Politics', p. 25.

[34]White, 'Public Opinion and Political Science in Post-Communist Russia', p. 515. Another example of the growing awareness of marketing amongst political parties was the emergence of 'pomo-politika' in practically every party's campaign for the December 1995 Duma elections.

[35]Frederic Fleron and Erik Hoffmann, 'Communist Studies and Political Science: Cold War and Peaceful Coexistence', in Fleron and Hoffmann (eds), *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science*, pp. 3-21 at p. 12.

[36]There were exceptions, such as Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, but even so, she thought that the nationality problem would destroy the 'empire', not that the centre itself would bring about its own demise. See Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *L'empire éclaté: la révolte des nations en URSS* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978). See also Andrei Amalrik, *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

[37]C Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 147.

[38]Donna Bahry and Lucan Way, 'Citizen Activism in the Russian Transition', in *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (October-December 1994), pp. 330-66 at p. 364. Bearing in mind, of course, that '[t]he fact that there were similar political dynamics at work in post-Franco Spain and in the post-Brezhnev USSR does not mean that Spain's present is the Soviet Union's future' – Russell Bova, 'Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition', p. 259.

[39]William Zimmerman, 'Synoptic Thinking and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia', in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 630-41 at p. 631.

[40]*Ibidem.*

[41]See Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems*, pp. 247-60.

[42]Zimmerman, 'Synoptic Thinking and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia', p.632.

[43]Based on surveys conducted in 1992 and 1993 by ROMIR, under the direction of Elena Bashkirova.

[44]Zimmerman, 'Synoptic Thinking and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia', p.635.

[45]*Ibid.*, p. 640.

[46]Fleron and Hoffmann, "Communist Studies and Political Science', p. 12.

[47]Zimmerman, 'Synoptic Thinking and Political Culture in Post-Soviet Russia', p.636.

[48]*Ibid.*, Tables 1-3 (pp. 636-9).

[49]Ellen Carnaghan, 'Alienation, Apathy or Ambivalence? "Don't Knows" and Democracy in Russia', in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 325-363 at p. 326.

[50]*Ibid*, p. 325. In the *NRBI* (1992), 46% of respondents found it 'hard to say' whether either 'Marxism-Leninism' or 'capitalism' evoked positive or negative feelings. An alternative explanation to Carnaghan's could be, however, that a number of Russians are saying what they think they *ought* to say, and when they can't gauge what this might be, give 'don't know' as an answer.

[51]*Ibid.*, p. 331.

[52]*Ibid.*, p. 335.
[53]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 481.
[54]See Matthew Wyman, Stephen White, William Miller and Paul Heywood, 'Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections', in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (June 1995), pp. 591-614 at p. 593.
[55]See, for example, Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans, 'The Russian Elections of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience', in *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January-March 1994), pp. 38-60; their sample of 2,030 respondents came from only fifty regions of the Russian Federation (see pp. 41-42 for their stratification procedures). A notable exception, in terms of sample size, was the survey directed by Timothy Colton, Susan Lehmann and Jerry Hough in December 1993, with 33,869 respondents. Even so, only sixty-nine regions and republics were included. For a report on the results, see Jerry Hough, 'The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes Toward Economic Reform and Democratization', in *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January-March 1994), pp. 1-37.
[56]See, for example, Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture' for a 1990 study of public opinion in the town of Iaroslavl; also Stephen Wegren, 'Rural Reform and Political Culture in Russia', in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 46, no. 2 (March 1994), pp. 215-41 for an in-depth study of Kostroma *oblast'* in 1992.
[57]Wyman, 'Russian Political Culture', p. 29.
[58]Jeffrey Hahn, 'Public Opinion Research in the Soviet Union: Problems and Possibilities', in Miller, Hesli and Reisinger (eds), *Public Opinion and Regime Change*, pp. 37-46 at p. 43.
[59]*Ibid.*, p. 404, n. 44.
[60]Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 403.
[61]See, for example, Wyman *et al.*, 'Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections', p. 606 ('The rural-urban effect appears in this context to be rather stronger than the traditional relationship between education and political tolerance'); p. 601 ('[T]he differences in politics in big cities and politics in provincial towns is particularly striking'); also Hough, 'The Russian Election of 1993', pp. 22-9 ('The Rural Bases of Conservative Voting' and 'Voter Turnout in the Cities'); also Wegren, 'Rural Reform and Political Culture in Russia', for cultural continuity in the countryside.
[62]See White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics.*
[63]See Wyman *et al.*, 'Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections'.
[64]See Jeffrey Hahn, *Soviet Grassroots* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
[65]Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 421.
[66]Wyman, 'Russian Political Culture', p. 37.
[67]Hahn, 'Public Opinion Research in the Soviet Union', p. 44.
[68]Whitefield and Evans, 'The Russian Election of 1993', p. 58.
[69]Lucian Pye, 'Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture', in Louis Schneider and Charles Bonjean (eds) *The Idea of Culture in the Social Sciences* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 65-76 at p. 72.
[70]McAuley, 'Political Culture and Communist Politics', p. 21.
[71]Alexander Motyl, 'The Dilemmas of Sovietology and the Labyrinth of Theory', in Fleron and Hoffmann (eds), *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science*, pp. 77-98 at p. 90.
[72]Ian McAllister and Stephen White, 'Political Participation in Post-Communist Russia: Voting, Activism and the Potential for Mass Protest', in *Political Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 593-615; this article is also Studies in Public Policy Series, No. 223 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde Press, 1994).
[73]Rukavishnikov *et al.*, 'Rossiia mezhdu proshlym i budushchim', Table 3, p. 82.
[74]The poll-tax riots in the UK, for example, not only did not bring down the government, but also failed to bring back the rates system.
[75]Jerry Hough, 'The Logic of Collective Action and the Pattern of Revolutionary Behaviour', in Fleron and Hoffmann (eds), *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science*, pp. 347-67 at p. 351.
[76]As Nixon discovered when he took Kennedy on.
[77]For example, Wyman *et al.*, 'Public Opinion, Parties and Voters in the December 1993 Russian Elections', asserted that they saw 'each of the most popular parties strengthening its support among the electorate. The data give a sense of the dynamic process whereby the conduct of democratic elections forces parties to begin to focus their appeal on particular interests in

society, which is a major element in a country's democratization' (p. 601). The 'irony', of course, is that this process was also undergone by the KPRF.

[78]See Carnaghan, 'Alienation, Apathy or Ambivalence?'

[79]Wyman, 'Russian Political Culture', p. 33.

[80]'For example, what does it demonstrate to find that "there was a broad and virtually unanimous demand that rights of every sort should be unconditionally protected"? It could be convincingly argued that in fact democracy requires that certain rights should *not* be protected in certain circumstances'. *Ibid.*, p. 29; citing Gibson and Duch, 'Emerging Democratic Values in Soviet Political Culture', p. 78.

[81]For an account of Anglo-American biases, see Frederic Fleron and Erik Hoffmann, 'Post-Communist Studies and Political Science: Peaceful Coexistence, Detente and Entente', in Fleron and Hoffmann (eds), *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science*, pp. 371-83 at pp. 373-4.

[82]Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', p. 518. He borrows the term 'primitive beliefs' from Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations Into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1960), pp. 40-42, which we will examine later.

[83]*Ibid.*, p. 523.

Chapter Four – Borrowing from other Disciplines[1]

> 'To become both less specific to the institutional forms of Western democracy and more sensitive to the dimensions of political life which extended beyond those boundaries, the study of politics was forced to turn to disciplines in which the analysis of less developed societies [...] had received a greater degree of attention. Sociology, and more particularly social anthropology, was the most important of these'.[2]

Since political culture is not only 'not divorced from [...] culture in the widest social sense [and] closely related to cultural values and orientations more generally'[3], but is in fact a peripheral aspect of most people's lives, it follows that the study of political culture has to be referred to cultural norms as a whole if it is to make any sense – in other words, it has to be given a context within which to operate. Political scientists in general, and sovietologists in particular, however, tend not to do this, or worse, tend to analyse other political cultures in terms of their own. This is partly a product of the atomization of social science disciplines into increasingly narrow categories, and partly the consequence of Western – specifically, Anglo-American – predominance in these fields of study[4]. As a result, sovietology has suffered from a lack of reference points which might contribute to a better understanding of *all* the countries of the former Soviet Union, and not just those conforming to one or another Soviet stereotype. This thesis does not deal with the whole of the former USSR, but it is to be hoped that its analysis of Russia will be a guide for other scholars seeking a less narrowly-focused, less ethnocentric approach to the study of democratic transitions.

The issue of Russian uniqueness, so dear to certain scholars and writers[5], has already been discussed, and it has been argued that Russian cultural values do not exist in a vacuum, but rather are shaped by factors at work in all societies to one degree or another. Everything that has been said so far points to the fact that 'the process of socio-economic modernization tends to lessen the specific weight and the saliency of traditional culture' through the disruption of socio-economic conditions[6]. However, differences between, for example, Japan and the USA, illustrate that similar levels of technological development do not lead to similar cultures, political or otherwise. It is

therefore time to broaden our field of study, in order to assess what lies at the heart of cultural change.

The Origins of the Social Animal

> 'The heart of Tönnies' system lies in the doctrine of human relationships or social entities (*soziale Wesenheiten*). This rests, in turn, on the distinction between the "basic concepts", "*Gemeinschaft*" and "*Gesellschaft*". The historical importance of the theorem of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* lies in the synthesis of the rational and the romantic conception of society. The two concepts of social life which, since the time of Aristotle, have been the principal theme of the discussion of social philosophers are there held to be a one-sided picture of social reality. Its essential feature is not the construction of two antithetic concepts [...] but the clear conceptual distinction between two social patterns, representing alternative possibilities of forming social groups'[7].

Without social interaction, the human being is incapable of developing the linguistic and social skills necessary for communicating effectively with others of its kind, as the unfortunate examples of 'wild children' through the ages have shown. The socialization process is therefore essential for the development of an individual's world view, and without its outcomes – in terms of customs, habits, etc. – there would be no culture as we defined it earlier[8]. Furthermore, not only do 'people learn how to see the world from other people'[9]: they also learn about themselves from other people. Thus it is that the individual learns, from the group, 'what to think about the political world and what to think about himself as a political individual'[10]. Consequently, in order to understand a given culture, one must first analyse the nature of the social links which gave rise to it, and in order to understand political culture, one must first examine the preconceptions that people bring to politics.

These links start in the family unit, where, at a very basic level, the individual learns about hierarchies and *dyads*, these being the 'ultimate unit[s] of political interaction'[11]. A term of anthropological origin, a dyad is 'the interaction of two persons, normally a dominance dependence, or patron-client relationship'[12]. This relationship arises as 'an elementary form of political life, one of the three logical possibilities open to weak persons confronted with more powerful ones'[13]. Thus a series of networks are formed, which 'underlie all strategies for coalition building in political as well as other social situations'[14].

These networks and relationships can be of two basic types, which the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies classified into 'two opposed models of society: a rational choice one and a communitarian one'[15]. The essence of the dichotomy is that 'a group or a relationship can be willed because those involved wish to attain through it a definite end and are willing to join hands, even though indifference or even antipathy may exist on other levels. In this case rational will [...] prevails. On the other hand, people may associate themselves together as friends do, because they think the relationship valuable as an end in and of itself. In this case it is natural or integral will which predominates'[16]. In other words, an individual's ties to others may arise and develop spontaneously – 'organically' – or they made be forged deliberately – 'mechanically'. This idea has a long and illustrious history, going all the way back to thinkers such as Plato and Confucius[17], but its clear formulation as a conceptual system 'was possible only after the romantic theory of state and society had prepared the way in the criticism of natural rights and rationalistic social doctrines; the knowledge of the social life of primitive peoples [...] attained through cultural anthropology, comparative philology and the studies of comparative law were also a prerequisite'[18].

Organic networks arise out of personal relations, and are characteristic of the *Gemeinschaft*, or 'community'. Its members are 'bound together by liking [...], custom [...] or devotion to common goals. [...] The *Gemeinschaft* is, for its members, an end in itself. It serves no external purpose, nor any particular end at all; rather it expresses the whole person'[19]. In a society of this type, for example, gift exchange is a *prestation totale*, involving 'the total social personality of the giver and receiver: his standing, his ritual and political self as well as his material goods'[20]. Social relationships in the *Gemeinschaft* are based on *Wesenwille*, translated variously as 'essential', 'natural' or 'integral' will. This type of will is 'an amalgam of organic appetites, [...] acquired habits or traditions and remembered norms. Essential will constitutes the disposition of character or *essence* of the person in whom it predominates. There may be reflection *before action*, but reflection is never *prior to the will*; reflection serves the will and does not change it'[21]. Depending on whether the *Wesenwille* is based primarily on 'inclination, habit or conviction'[22], therefore, the *Gemeinschaft* can range from being a group of mutually sympathetic or biologically related individuals, to one sharing

certain values or characteristics, such as, for instance, religion, ethnic identity or guild membership. The latter is one of the last stages of development of the *Gemeinschaft*, coming very close to "'*Gesellschaftlichen*" relationships, which are always purely mental'[23].

The *Gesellschaft* is deliberately construed by its members for specific purposes, with 'an explicit or implicit contractual form. A *Gesellschaft* is, to each participating individual, a means to a private end: it fulfils only that and does not express the whole person'[24]. Unlike *Gemeinschaftlichen* relationships, which are based on affinity, and are therefore considered valuable in themselves, participants in a *Gesellschaft* can have absolutely nothing in common outside it. The prevailing will in the *Gesellschaft* is therefore *Kürwille*, sometimes translated as 'rational' will, but also as 'arbitrary' will[25]. This type of will 'distinguishes between end and means'[26], and may in fact conflict with the *Wesenwille* in cases where the only means to an end are ones that the individual in question deems immoral. *Kürwille* is, in other words, 'will which has come to be dominated by thought; thought is prior to the will, which it controls'[27].

On the Use and Value of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*

> 'The two categories of "*Gemeinschaft*" and "*Gesellschaft*" stand in a complicated relationship to one another which is not always understood by critics. The objection has been raised that these concepts represent, on the one hand, antithetical conceptional categories and, on the other hand, stages of historical development, and that they are also mere classificatory concepts [...] "*Gemeinschaft*" and "*Gesellschaft*" are pure concepts of ideal types which, as such, do not exist in the empirical world. They can, therefore, find no employment as classificatory concepts. Rather are they to be regarded as traits, which, in empirical social entities, are found in varying proportions [...] If one takes the concepts in this sense, it will then be possible to apply them to historical phenomena without doing violence to the logic of the system'[28].

The heuristic value of Tönnies' typology lies not only in its versatility as a tool for comparative analysis, but also in the fact that it is intuitively very compelling. As a reference point it is universal and applicable in everyday life, enabling us to understand the workings of alien social environments. Two factors have, however, led to Tönnies' work not being, perhaps, as well-known as it should be. One is that, together with other German thinkers, Tönnies has suffered from being associated with Hitler's pot-pourri of dubious political philosophies through the former's

perceived preference of *Gemeinschaft* over *Gesellschaft*. Although Tönnies used the analogy of youth versus old age to say that both had their advantages and one could not be chosen over the other[29], he also sometimes could not 'resist the temptation to moralize, uttering jeremiads against the degeneracy of *Gesellschaft*'[30]. Tönnies' apparent nostalgia for the *Gemeinschaft* thus discredited him amongst many scholars, since, '[a]rguably, Hitler's notion of Das Volk in *Mein Kampf*, with its clear implication that strangers are like a cancer that need to be eliminated for the vitality of the community, is the culmination of this ideal'[31]. Ironically, 'Tönnies' normative emphasis made him popular with the Social Democrats, but suspicious to the Prussian authorities. In fact, Tönnies was of the opinion that the "leftist" political sympathies, so-called, of many German sociologists provided the main reason why sociology did not get official recognition as an academic discipline [...] before 1918'[32]. Tönnies was, in fact, greatly concerned with 'the well-being of the labouring class'[33], and devoted his empirical research to the study of the social problems of the urban proletariat, believing that 'social peace could be guaranteed for the future only by radical social reforms'[34]. His attacks on capitalism would therefore better be interpreted, not as a yearning for a mythical past, but as a vision of a utopian future, similar to that of many of his contemporaries, including Karl Marx[35].

The other factor stems from the antagonism between the rational and empirical philosophical traditions in Europe – the former predominantly Catholic and continental, the latter Protestant and Anglo-Saxon. Tönnies tried to reconcile these two traditions, more specifically the ideas of Hume and Kant[36], by distinguishing between *scientific* and *philosophical* causality. This not being the place for an extended philosophical debate, the point to be made is that, in Tönnies' attempt to bridge the gap between Kant and Hume, Kantian logic prevailed, and there is, in Tönnies' work on *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, a shortage of empirical enquiry, even though he repeatedly stated its importance[37]. As a result of this, he stands accused of 'analyzing concepts, the content of which he systematically develops, rather than observing the facts. He proceeds dialectically; we find in Tönnies those distinctions and symmetrical classifications of concepts which German thinkers hold so dear'[38].

What these criticisms miss, however, is the fact that *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* were never meant to be factual descriptions of objective reality; they are, instead, ideal '*normative concepts*, analytical instruments for apprehending, comprehending and explaining reality and social evolution in their totality and complexity'[39], in other words, they are *models*, to be used as reference points for the comparison of different social structures, in the same way that economists use 'perfect competition'. In this way, although Tönnies' concepts 'are not without links to facts and experience, they are nevertheless entirely independent from them as mental constructs'[40] which serve primarily to compare and contrast societies in both synchronic and diachronic terms. It is for this reason that this author contends they have a potentially very wide application in transition studies, since 'any group or definite period in history may be compared with such mental concepts or constructs as *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*'[41]. This contention is further supported by the fact that, as a methodological framework, they are themselves the product of a transition: Tönnies not only grew up in a small farm in Eiserstedt, in Schleswig-Holstein, which he then left for a world of big cities, but also lived in a time which afforded him the opportunity to observe 'the unfolding of the modern state and of the capitalistic middle-class'[42] – for instance, in the way that 'Eiserstedt, on the incorporation of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein into Prussia, had lost those considerable remnants of autonomous self-government preserved under the Danish regime and had been converted from a semi-mediæval political community into a mere administrative district within a modern state'[43].

The Development of the *Gesellschaft* and the Abstract Human Being

> 'During this development, the original qualities of community may be lost because there takes place a continued change in the original basis upon which living together rests. This change reaches a consummation in what is frequently designated as Individualism. Through this development social life in and of itself is not diminished, but the social life of the *Gemeinschaft* is impaired and a new phenomenon develops out of the needs, interests, desires and decisions of persons who previously worked co-operatively together [...] This new phenomenon, the "capitalistic society", increases in power and gradually attains the ascendancy. Tending as it does to be cosmopolitan and unlimited in size, it is the most distinct form of the many phenomena represented by the sociological concept of the *Gesellschaft*'[44].

Tönnies was greatly influenced by Marx, who had, even before Tönnies, 'summarized all of economic history in terms of the opposition between town and

country'[45], and agreed with Marx's contention that the ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling class, arguing, for example, that '[b]y means of political and other intellectual organization promoted by town and, to a greater extent, city life, the consciousness of the *Gesellschaft* gradually becomes the consciousness of an increasing mass of the people'[46]. Like Marx, and in line with what was said above about the usefulness of his concepts in the study of transitions, Tönnies' historical studies focused on periods of great change, such as the end of the Roman Empire, which he saw as the beginning of the end for *Gemeinschaft* society in Europe, due to the fact that the 'assimilation of Roman law [...] served and still serves to further the development of *Gesellschaft* in a large part of the Christian-German world'[47]. The main difference between the two, however, was that, whereas Marx considered 'technical conditions and progress to be the real motor of social evolution [...] Tönnies conceive[d] capitalism as an outgrowth of trade, in particular of large scale and foreign trade'[48], and was greatly interested in the development of barter and exchange. These two concepts figure pre-eminently in anthropological studies, being, as they are, basic components in the mechanics of social structures. Exchange, primarily, is '[t]he most typical way people involve each other in their daily domestic lives [...] Through exchange transactions, an individual personally mobilizes others as participants in his social network'[49].

The notion of an exchange repertoire 'enables us to integrate the meanings which people attribute to their actions [...] and to investigate the interconnections among economics, politics, religion, morality [and] kinship'[50]. As pointed out earlier, in a *Gemeinschaft* exchange is likely to involve the complete social personæ of the participants, and, since the *Gemeinschaft* involves personal relationships based on trust, barter is likely to be widespread. Trust is fundamental to barter because, since the exchange of goods is not easily measured, participants will have no reason to engage in it unless they can expect transactions to even out in the long term. In a *Gesellschaft*, on the other hand, relationships are impersonal, since the scale and complexity of society does not allow for its members to know each other fully, or even partially, in many cases[51]. Trust is replaced by contract law, and exchange no longer involves the whole social person, since the role complexity of the individual has increased and a person can therefore only fulfil specific roles at specific times. The difference

between the two is best summarized by the fact that, in the *Gesellschaft*, the 'burden of proof is on him who would require the performance of an obligation not obviously and explicitly assumed', whereas in the *Gemeinschaft*, the 'burden of proof is on him who would evade an obligation arising in any [...] contingency'[52]. The main implication of this all is that, in the *Gesellschaft*, individuals in the group have accepted a fragmentation of their social persona, and therefore only know each other in specific roles. This lack of the group's full knowledge of each other weakens the links between them and leads to the atomization, not only of society, but also of people's roles within it, since the individual not only 'acquires beliefs about his social environment' from others, but also 'learns about himself from the group'[53].

Nevertheless, the development of the *Gesellschaft* can never really destroy *Gemeinschaft* relationships. We have already explained that these concepts are models that Tönnies himself did not expect to see in real life in their pure state, and this applies, in particular, to 'a purely "*Gesellschaftliche*" empirical condition of social life', which 'is for Tönnies inconceivable. For, since man, in his behaviour, is never motivated alone by intellect and reason [...] all empirical "associations" must have a "*Gemeinschafts*" [...] basis'[54]. Indeed, '[i]n the rare situations where the element of *Gemeinschaft* is reduced to an utmost minimum, relations between men become dehumanized and cease to be social in Tönnies' sense'[55], that is, in the sense that social relations are 'thought of as something "valid" – not only by the participants but, if it is not a secret relation, by other persons'[56]. The existence of *Gesellschaft* relations which have a strong component of *Gemeinschaftliche* traits, such as are characteristic of the modern capitalist workplace, however, have led some scholars, such as F Talcott Parsons, to argue that the 'professional' role constitutes a third type of social entity, distinct from both *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. To illustrate this new type of social relation, the bureaucratic apparatus is most often used as an empirical example. Since even 'an ideal-typical Weberian bureaucracy could not possibly "work" unless it was suffused with the sociabilities of give and take within the informal hierarchies of the workplace'[57], Talcott Parsons has argued that *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* should not be used as dichotomous classificatory concepts, but rather as names for two possible combinations of certain 'variables' making up different social typologies. This is not

the place for an extended discussion of these 'variables', but it should suffice to say, in order to summarize this school of thought, that

> 'congenial informal relations between co-workers, and not completely detached ones, are a prerequisite for efficient bureaucratic operations. Of course, this does not invalidate the existence of a second prerequisite, which Weber emphasized, namely, that operations must be insulated from the intrusion of personal considerations and obligations.
>
> The coexistence of these two contradictory requirements has given rise to a form of social relationship in bureaucratic work groups that resolves the contradiction. The fact that associations between particular individuals are valued, as in the case of friendships, makes these associations integrative, but the fact that mutual obligations are definitely circumscribed, in contradistinction to those in friendships, precludes unexpected personal services that would disrupt bureaucratic activities. This type of role expectation, which is clearly distinct from either *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft*, has probably become typical of work relationships in the highly bureaucratized societies of today'[58].

This point of view, whilst valid and perhaps necessary from a structuralist and functionalist perspective, is not one that, in the opinion of this researcher, adds anything of conceptual import to Tönnies' framework in terms of the influence of social relations on political culture. As we will see later in this chapter, certain types of values lie at the core of people's beliefs and orientations, and these values can be understood with reference to *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, without the need for further subdivisions or combinations of the elements found in these two models of social relations. The point of Tönnies' dichotomy is that these are two *pure* states: once again, they are *ideal* models. By admitting that the third, 'professional' type is a combination of elements found in the two, Talcott Parsons has himself shown that, as reference points for the study of social relations, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* cover the whole range of possible options by showing what lies at the extremes. Furthermore, in terms of the *purpose* of bureaucracy as of itself, the *Gemeinschaftliche* elements permeating it are, strictly speaking, bureaucratic corruption, and it is ironic that these elements are inherent in the very system which was set up, in Weberian terms, to eliminate personalized relationships from the decision-making processes of the State[59].

This is borne out in practice by the notorious example of the state apparatus in the Soviet Union, where the State had a monopoly on all goods, services and decisions affecting people's lives. This led to a situation where '*informal practices [became] corrupt practices*, practices that [subverted] more than [contributed] to the party's formal goals

and general interests'[60]. What this in fact meant was that *Gemeinschaftlichen* networks did not only survive, but, paradoxically, gained in strength: at the governmental level, the growth of the *nomenklatura* system fostered what was, in effect, a clan system based on patronage rather than kinship; and at the popular level 'the dense network of associations connecting individuals had to remain informal'[61] in order to escape interference, usually harmful, from the State.

What implications does all this have for Russian political culture? Firstly, for Tönnies as for Marx, the nature of economic relations determines political life. The rural-urban divide therefore translates into a series of opposing concepts, the most interesting of which is, in terms of the Russian transition, aristocracy as *Gemeinschaft* and democracy as *Gesellschaft*[62] – in other words, the success of the Russian democratization experiment depends, according to this typology, on the development of *Gesellschaftlichen* socio-economic networks. Secondly, the antagonism between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* has a specifically Russian application: as Andrzej Walicki points out, '[t]he typology adopted by Ferdinand Tönnies in his *Community and Society* can be of great assistance in the clarification and systematization of Slavophile concepts of social cohesion; his contrast between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* corresponds to the Slavophile antithesis of Russia and Europe, of "people" and "society" and of Christian and rationalist cultures'[63].

The Slavophiles, as was pointed out earlier, were essentially products of the Romantic period: they fell in with ideas which were current at the time all over the dreaded Europe and applied them in support of their argument that Russia was not just different, but more Holy, more Noble, superior, because it was the only country – with the possible exception of other Slavonic countries – where the *Volk*, the *narod*, had survived: in Western Europe it had been killed by capitalist development and Roman law. In this respect, there is 'a remarkable correspondence between [Ivan] Kireevskii's and Tönnies' evaluation of ancient Rome and the part played by Roman law in the erosion of "organic" social ties. According to Tönnies, [...] Rome [...] gave birth to the "abstract human being", emancipated from all ties binding him to a concrete collective'[64]. Russian common law as described by Kireevskii, on the other hand, 'grew out of life and had nothing in common with abstract logical

development'[65]. All this is not to say, however, that the ideas of the Slavophiles in general, or Kireevskii in particular, attained the sophistication of Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* model. Walicki does not suggest that Kireevskii 'anticipated an incomparably more complex and internally coherent contribution to sociological theory'; he merely points out that Tönnies' typology 'provides conceptual tools which facilitate the systematization of a certain type of social ideology in philosophical and sociological categories'[66]. This type of social ideology is still present in the Russia of today, and can be summarized in a yearning for the age-old ideal of *sobornost'*, as discussed in Chapter Two. It is an ideology which sees 'the West' as a poisonous influence on the Russian Soul, which advocates a variety of romantic socialist ideas, and which is bitterly opposed to individualism, to private ownership and to anything else that smells even faintly of capitalism. In a word, it is an ideology which wants to turn back the clock and halt the development of the *Gesellschaft*; the link between *Gesellschaft*, capitalism and democracy is thus present in the minds of the Russians themselves.

The Civic Culture and the Open Ego

> '[T]he central property of the democratic character is an "open ego", or a capacity to relate to others and share values with them, a sense of confidence in the benevolence of the human environment, and relative freedom from anxiety'[67].

The idea that, for every form of government, there is a corresponding 'citizen-type' is as old as political philosophy itself[68], and equally old is the idea that the citizens of a democracy operate on the assumption that the human environment is – on the whole – benevolent, since, implicit in the democratic ideal, is the premise that 'most citizens are sufficiently rational to govern themselves'[69]. This characteristic of citizens in a democracy is described by Robert Lane as 'ego strength', a concept which draws heavily from psychology, and can be defined as 'a quality which is usually associated with the capacity to order one's life in a rational fashion, controlling at once the impulses which rise anarchically to the surface from within, and external events, in so far as they can be controlled'[70]. What it amounts to, is a sense of personal competence which leads those who possess it 'to engage actively in community affairs and participate [...] in the political process', since it contains 'the tacit

implication that an image of the self as effective is intimately related to the image of democratic government as responsive to the people'[71].

Almond and Verba followed these ideas, and included in their questionnaire several questions tapping into various aspects of their respondents' social and political self-confidence[72]. They found, as others had done before them[73], a statistically significant correlation between many of the indicators they devised to measure the various aspects of 'ego strength' in a country's population, and the stability of democracy in that country. However, when the relationships examined were defined in more specific terms, not all the correlations were as successful. An examination of group-forming strategies for political purposes, for instance, gave rise to some very interesting questions concerning which factors may cause some people, yet not others, to seek the help of others in order to influence policy. Although some factors, such as 'trust', or the feeling of political competence[74], correlated positively with responses concerning the forming of groups, most of the relationships obtained were not as straightforward: for instance, on the same issue of political strategies, the 'open ego' indicator – valuing generosity and considerateness above other personal qualities[75] – showed a relationship, 'though not a very strong one' in the United States and Great Britain, but not elsewhere: in fact, 'in Germany and Mexico the relationship [was] actually reversed'[76]. Almond and Verba's failure to find consistent relationships between these variables led them, therefore, to conclude that 'the propensity to form political groups does not seem to depend on the differing levels of social and economic modernization within a country [...] If an individual thinks he can influence his government, the probability that he will try to form a group for this purpose appears to depend on the nation in which he lives, and not on other social characteristics. If we are seeking for the reason for differences in political "style" among societies, the search for the roots of this political style – a style that cannot be explained by level of economic development – should prove rewarding'[77].

It is partly this 'political style' that this thesis intends to examine. *The Civic Culture* touched upon questions relating to the impact of modernization on traditional social structures, but its main aim was teleological, and in concentrating on the end result – Anglo-American democracy as the summit of human political development, from the

perspective of which one looks *back* at other democracies – it suffered from a strong cultural bias which permeated all aspects of the study. This meant that the questionnaire itself was designed, not just by Americans, but also largely *for* Americans, and, although this thesis will follow many of the avenues opened up by Almond and Verba's study, the choice of variables with which to assess the psychological characteristics – the 'ego strength' – of respondents will be very different. An attempt will be made, in order to avoid these problems of meaning, to move even closer in to the 'basic values' postulated by Sidney Verba two years after *The Civic Culture* was published[78].

With Reference to Groups

> '[L]ook far enough into the origins of any opinion, and one will find not just an opinion but a sample of how the holder of that opinion copes with his world'[79].

As we saw earlier, a widespread problem with Russian survey data is the amount of missing answers contained in them. We looked at several possible reasons for this, and considered plain apathy to be the most likely cause for the seeming lack of opinions on so many subjects. Quite simply, people will not inform themselves on matters that are of no interest to them. This, of course, reinforces the idea of a correlation between 'ego strength' and the democratic citizen: people with 'weak' egos 'have a pervasive feeling that the world is an unpredictable place in which their influence is minimal and their mastery of the situation small'. It is therefore not surprising that 'persons with this attitude tend to feel that political decisions are made out of reach and that politicians do not listen to "people like us"'[80].

There is another explanation for these missing answers, however, which has more to do with alienation than apathy, contrary to Carnaghan's conclusion. This need not necessarily mean that there are hordes of suicidal Russians out there looking for a second Stalin: what it might mean, rather, is that there is a lack, or maybe even an excess, of 'reference groups'[81] for individuals to identify with. Since, as we saw earlier, 'social attitudes, opinions on social issues, are primarily group products'[82], this implies that an individual needs points of reference with which to construct a world view, and these reference points are found in any groups with which individuals

identify themselves, whether they are part of them or not. Indeed, 'often we find people referring themselves to groups of which they are not members and of which, even, they may never become members'[83] – or, even more interestingly, groups which, in fact, shun them[84]. From this perspective, having no opinion on a public issue might mean that:

> '1. The individual has no reference group within which a stand is taken on the proposition.
> 2. The individual cannot shift psychologically to the appropriate reference group under the circumstances.
> 3. The issue involves an aspect of the reference group's prescriptions about which the individual is unclear' [85].

Reference groups carry certain implications for our central hypothesis, since the self-confident, politically competent citizen will 'identify with a number of groups, perhaps several associational groups and several categorical groups, and at least one or two primary groups, his family and friends'[86]. The broader an individual's social networks, the more reference groups that individual is likely to have, and the more likely it is that the management of those allegiances will make the individual develop a world view in which tolerance and compromise play a large part. Furthermore, '[n]ot only is it clear [...] that in general, those who belong to more organizations of any kind tend to vote more [...] it is also true that if they have more friends, they are more likely to be high participants'[87], perhaps because the democratic citizen not only thinks 'he can participate, he thinks that others ought to participate as well'[88].

Concluding with Open and Closed Systems

> 'Also, let us not take at face value what a person says he believes. He may be deceiving us deliberately or he may be rationalizing. we do not necessarily take at face value a person's endorsements of democracy, humanitarianism, or a particular brand of cigarettes. We have to infer what a person really believes from all the things he says and does. It is in this sense that we will use the term belief, and the total belief-disbelief system would thus be an organization of verbal and non-verbal, implicit and explicit beliefs, sets, or expectancies'[89].

Since this study is to follow Verba's recommendation to focus on 'primitive beliefs', a few words need to be said about the original source of this idea. After observing for a period of years that people could be equally dogmatic and narrow-minded about very different issues – regardless of their position on the political spectrum – Milton Rokeach argued that people's belief systems were of two kinds, open or

closed, the difference between holders of each being the extent to which a person was able to 'discriminate substantive information from information about the source, and to assess the two separately'[90]. People with open belief systems can 'receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the person or from the outside',[91] whereas, for people with closed systems, '[w]hat the external source says is true about the world [becomes] all mixed up with what the external source wants us to believe is true, and wants us to do about it'[92]. Rokeach used a 'Dogmatism Scale'[93] to assess the openness or closedness of his respondents' belief systems, defining dogmatism as 'a closed way of thinking which could be associated with any ideology regardless of content, an authoritarian outlook on life, an intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs, and a sufferance of those with similar beliefs'[94].

Rokeach's framework ties in with all the concepts examined so far in very obvious ways. Firstly, the 'open ego' is clearly another way of describing an ego with an open belief system, since both share characteristics associated with independence, flexibility and the lack of anxiety. Secondly, Rokeach's focus on authoritarianism as a general, ahistorical property of belief systems must inherently be of interest to a study of the Russians, particularly given the emphasis so many scholars have placed on the authoritarian tradition in the former's political culture. Finally, the characteristics of open and closed belief systems also parallel quite closely Tönnies' descriptions of the beliefs predominant in the *Gesellschaft* and the *Gemeinschaft*, and, like them, 'are but ideal types, convenient for purposes of analysis'[95], not to be taken as absolutes.

All the above points are relevant for two reasons. Firstly, large numbers of missing answers to a given question show us that it is failing to tap into the 'basic value orientations' of its respondents[96], those orientations which constitute an individual's belief system and which therefore cannot be absent. Secondly, the correlation between political efficiency – with its implicit 'ego strength' – and membership in different types of social networks suggests that *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* characteristics may be susceptible to analysis through questions relating to the

individual's perception of the self, and not merely through questions relating to specific social networks amongst individuals.

This is important because, having established *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* as normative constructs of heuristic value for the purposes of this study, there still remains the question of their application in empirical terms. As pointed out earlier, although Tönnies carried out a variety of survey research projects, he did not elaborate a research method for measuring these concepts, as he meant to do originally[97]. The selection of variables to serve as *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* indicators has therefore been left unsettled, especially since most sociologists employing Tönnies' framework have tended 'to focus on spatial distribution rather than social interaction'[98], or have been able to use questionnaires about involvement in social networks, specifically designed for the purpose of their study[99]. This researcher, however, will not pursue those lines of enquiry. Even if the variables in existing data sets allowed it, the purpose here is to examine those variables relating to perceptions of the *self* and of the *self in relation to others*. It is to be hoped that, through these variables, an assessment of 'ego strength', with all its implications, can be made, on the basis of which the investigation can extend to other more conventional areas of inquiry into social networks, belief systems and political culture.

Notes

[1]Many of the German terms used in this chapter lose significantly in their translation. This author will therefore keep the German originals wherever possible, in the hope that their varied connotations will transpire through the general argument.

[2]White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics*, p. 3.

[3]Brown, 'Introduction', in Brown and Gray (eds), *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, p. 1.

[4]See Fleron and Hoffmann, 'Post-Communist Studies and Political Science', pp. 379-83.

[5]Alexander Solzhenitsyn being, of course, the foremost case in point.

[6]Dallin, 'Uses and Abuses of Russian History', p. 134.

[7]Rudolf Heberle, 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies', in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 1937), pp. 9-25 at p. 13.

[8]As the interactionist school of sociology argues, 'humans learn their basic symbols, their conceptions of self, and the definitions they attach to social objects through interaction with others' – Norman Denzin, *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*, third edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989), p. 5.

[9] Steven Taylor and Robert Bogdan, *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: The Search for Meanings*, second edition (New York: Wiley, 1984), p. 9.

[10]Robert Lane, *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), p. 190.

[11]Gabriel Almond and Laura Roselle, 'Model Fitting in Communism Studies', in Fleron and Hoffmann, *Post-Communist Studies and Political Science*, pp. 27-66 at p. 52.

[12]*Ibidem.*

[13]Namely, 'they can run away; they can combine to resist; they can submit and make the best of it'. John Davis, *Exchange* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1992), p. 62.

[14]John Lewis, *Political Networks and the Chinese Policy Process* (Stanford, CA: Northeast Asia Forum on International Policy, 1986), p. 5; cited in Almond and Roselle, 'Model Fitting in Communism Studies', p. 53.

[15]William Stafford, 'Ferdinand Tönnies: A Candidate for the Canon?', in *Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (June 1994), pp. 15-20 at p. 15.

[16]Charles Loomis, 'Translator's Introduction', in Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Association* (also known as *Community and Society* in other editions), translated by Charles Loomis, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), pp. ix-xxvi at p. xv.

[17]See Pitirim Sorokin, 'Foreword', in Tönnies, *Community and Association*, pp. v-vii.

[18]Heberle, 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 13.

[19]Stafford, 'Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 16.

[20]Davis, *Exchange*, p. 78; see also Marcel Mauss, *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*, translated by Ian Cunnison, (London: Routledge, 1969).

[21]Stafford, 'Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 16 (italics as in text).

[22]Heberle, 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 14.

[23]*Ibidem.*

[24]Stafford, 'Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 16.

[25]*Küren* means 'to choose' or 'to elect', in German. The term 'arbitrary' is preferred by many scholars, because to call the *Kürwille* 'rational' seems to imply that the *Wesenwille* is irrational, which it is not, even if it can be instinctive.

[26]Rudolf Heberle, 'The Sociological System of Ferdinand Tönnies', in Werner Cahnman (ed), *Ferdinand Tönnies: A New Evaluation* (Leiden: E J Brill, 1973), pp. 47-69 at p. 52.

[27]Stafford, 'Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 16.

[28]Heberle, 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 15.

[29]See Loomis, 'Translator's Introduction', p. xii, note 7.

[30]Stafford, 'Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 17.

[31]Robert Hollinger, *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences: A Thematic Approach* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), p. 26. Hollinger is one of many scholars that, in this researcher's opinion, have misinterpreted Tönnies, who was, in fact, suspect in the eyes of the Prussian State because of his socialist leanings. Hollinger argues that Tönnies yearned for a return to a mythical *Gemeinschaft* in the past, whereas it would be nearer the truth to say that Tönnies, like Marx, looked *forward* to a communistic, utopian *Gemeinschaft* (see *Ibid.*, pp. 26-8).

[32]Anthony Oberschall, 'The Empirical Sociology of Tönnies', in Cahnman (ed), *Ferdinand Tönnies*, pp. 160-80 at p. 180.

[33]Heberle, 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 23.

[34]*Ibidem.*

[35]See Werner Cahnman, 'Introduction', in Cahnman (ed) *Ferdinand Tönnies*, pp. 1-27; see also Heberle, 'The Sociological System of Ferdinand Tönnies', pp. 47-69.

[36]See J Leif, *La sociologie de Tönnies*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1946), pp. 117-9.

[37]In fact, in his later years he carried out some methodologically innovative empirical survey research in Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein. See, for example, Anthony Oberschall, 'The Empirical Sociology of Tönnies', pp. 160-80.

[38]Emile Durkheim, 'Tönnies, F, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*' (book review), in *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, Vol. 27 (1889), pp. 416-22 at p. 422 (my translation). Durkheim nevertheless used similar typologies himself; for example, he made a distinction between *organic* and *mechanic* solidarity in labour relations – see Emile Durkheim, *De la division du travail social* (Paris: Alcan, 1893), pp. 73-141.

[39]Leif, *La sociologie de Tönnies*, p. 123 (my translation).

[40]*Ibidem.*

[41]Loomis, 'Translator's Introduction', p. xix.

[42]Heberle, 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 22.

[43]*Ibid.*, pp. 22-3.

[44]Ferdinand Tönnies, 'Introduction', in Tönnies, *Community and Association*, pp. 3-29 at p. 28. This 'Introduction' is a translation, also by Charles Loomis, of Ferdinand Tönnies, 'Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft', in Alfred Vierkandt (ed) *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie* (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1931), pp. 180-91.

[45]Leif, *La sociologie de Tönnies*, p. 155 (my translation).

[46]Tönnies, 'Introduction', p.29.

[47]Tönnies, *Community and Association*, p. 236.

[48]Heberle, 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 20.

[49]Carol Stack, *All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1974), p. 46.

[50]Davis, *Exchange*, p. 47.

[51]For example, one's life is radically affected by the decisions of people one knows nothing about – and probably never will – who work in banks, mortgage centres, insurance companies, etc.

[52]F Talcott Parsons, 'A Note on *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*', in Cahnman, *Ferdinand Tönnies*, pp. 140-50 at p. 144.

[53]Lane, *Political Life*, pp. 189-90.

[54]Heberle, 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 15.

[55]Heberle, 'The Sociological System of Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 54.

[56]Heberle, 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 16.

[57]Davis, *Exchange*, p. 57.

[58]Peter Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Government Agencies*, revised edition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1972), pp. 177-8.

[59]'Bureaucracy 'develops the more perfectly the more the bureaucracy is "dehumanized", the more it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation' – Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, edited and translated by H H Gerth and C W Mills (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 216.

[60]Kenneth Jowitt, 'Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime', in *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July 1983), pp. 275-97 at p. 275 (italics as in text).

[61]Rose, 'Russia as an Hour-Glass Society', p. 36.

[62]See Leif, *La sociologie de Tönnies*, p. 155.

[63]Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought*, translated by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 169.

[64]*Ibid.*, p. 173.

[65]*Ibid.*, p. 172, citing I V Kireevskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii I V Kireevskago v dvukh tomakh: pod redaktsiei M O Gershenzona* (Westmead, Farnborough, Hants: Gregg, 1970 – facsimile edition of Moskva: Tipografiia Imperatorskago Moskovskago Universiteta, 1911), Vol. 1, p. 218.

[66]*Ibid.*, p. 174.

[67]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 261.

[68]Plato's *Republic* 'dealt with the problem of instilling in youth the qualities of character necessary for effective citizenship; Aristotle (*Politics*) remarked on the necessity of fitting the constitution of a city state to the character of the people' – Lane, *Political Life*, p. 97.

[69]Morris Rosenberg, 'Misanthropy and Political Ideology', in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21, No. 6 (December 1956), pp. 690-5 at p. 690.

[70]Lane, *Political Life*, p. 147.

[71]*Ibid.* p. 149.

[72]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, see Appendices B and C, pp. 526-49, for the interview schedules.

[73]Rosenberg, for example, concluded that 'low faith in people is related to a distrust of the public, a conviction of public officials' unresponsiveness to the people, a belief that political machines run the candidates, a skepticism about freedom of speech, and a willingness to suppress certain political and religious liberties' – Rosenberg, 'Misanthropy and Political Ideology', p. 694.

[74]'The first requirement for the maintenance of a group-forming political style is that individuals believe such an influence strategy will work' – Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 278.

[75]*Ibid.*; see their Appendix B, 'List 1' (pp. 526-36 at p. 527) for the list of qualities most valued in others.

[76]*Ibid.*, pp. 281-4.

[77]*Ibid.* p. 276.
[78]See Chapter 3, n. 82.
[79]M Brewster Smith, Jerome Bruner and Robert White, *Opinions and Personality* (New York: Wiley, 1956), p. 40.
[80]Lane, *Political Life*, p. 148.
[81]See Eugene Hartley, 'The Social Psychology of Opinion Formation', part of 'The Processes of Opinion Formation: A Symposium', in *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 14 (1950), pp. 667-86 at pp. 668-74.
[82]*Ibid.* p. 669.
[83]*Ibid.* p. 671.
[84]For example, a *nouveau riche* trying to fit in with the aristocracy.
[85]Hartley, 'The Social Psychology of Opinion Formation', p. 673.
[86]Lane, *Political Life*, p. 197. Categorical groups are those such as sex, ethnic group or religion, to which the individual belongs to almost without recourse.
[87]*Ibid.* p. 165.
[88]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 257.
[89]Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, p. 32.
[90]*Ibid.*, p. 60.
[91]*Ibid.*, p. 57
[92]*Ibid.*, p. 58.
[93]*Ibid.*, pp. 71-3.
[94]*Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
[95]*Ibid.*, p. 66.
[96]Conversely, just because a question is relevant, it does not necessarily follow that it touches on respondents' basic values.
[97]See Heberle, 'The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 12.
[98]James Christenson, '*Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*: Testing the Spatial and Communal Hypotheses', in *Social Forces*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (September 1984), pp. 160-8 at p. 161. Christenson was referring to studies that focused on, for example, studies of relationships within discrete areas, such as neighbourhoods, rather than on social networks themselves.
[99]See, for example, *Ibid.*

Chapter Five – Methodological Considerations

> 'Be a good craftsman: avoid any rigid set of procedures. Above all, seek to develop and to use the sociological imagination. Avoid the fetishism of method and technique. Urge the rehabilitation of the unpretentious intellectual craftsman, and try to become such a craftsman yourself. Let every man be his own methodologist; let every man be his own theorist; let theory and method again become part of the practice of a craft. Stand for the primacy of the individual scholar; stand opposed to the ascendancy of research teams of technicians. Be one mind that is on its own confronting the problems of man and society'[1].

Human beings learn about the world they live in through two basic learning skills which they apply to their surroundings almost instinctively: broadly speaking, we could say that human knowledge is driven by the urge to count and the urge to classify. In other words, human beings want to know, in any given situation, *how many things* exist and *what manner of things* exist. These two basic types of information lie at the root of quantitative and qualitative research methods respectively, and, although the two are not necessarily exclusive, they are rarely used together, since the development of scholarship in every field has attained such a scale in the twentieth century as to lead not only to increasingly specialized fields of enquiry – gone are the days when everything was considered philosophy – but also narrower methodological approaches. The use of one over the other therefore depends largely on both the research objectives pursued and the resources at hand[2].

Quantitative research, for example, involves surveys, polls and the like, and is best used to collect objective, content- and context-free data for diachronic or synchronic comparative purposes. This type of research depends heavily on technology and, in many cases, on generous financial support, but its ability to produce 'hard' data which is replicable and comparable, means that it is preferred by positivist and behaviourist social scientists, for whom 'the study of society and human behaviour should be scientific in the mode of the natural sciences', and who therefore emphasize 'rigour, objectivity and measurement[3].

Several problems arise, however, when trying to apply the 'scientific method' to the social sciences. The most striking one is that the positivist school tends to disregard the fact that even 'the scientific model is one of direct observation'[4], and not simply

concerned with the collection and counting of raw data. Unfortunately, the bias towards the strictly numerical aspect of the natural sciences has led to a situation where 'positivist social science, in its concern with scientific procedures, hypothesis testing, statistical significance and the like has become sterile and introspective'[5]. Added to this, many of the concepts studied in the social sciences are difficult – if not impossible – to measure[6], which means that the mapping of theory to mathematical data is often done on the basis of presumed relationships – presumed, that is, by the researchers themselves, thus reinserting the subjective element positivists precisely wish to avoid. The same applies when translating data back into a set of meaningful conclusions, and indeed throughout the research process itself: not only are the selection and collection of data affected by the research objectives being pursued, but even the researchers themselves 'contaminate' the final product with their own implicit subjective values and attitudes about the world they live in. Positivist researchers do not seem to realize that to 'try to catch the interpretative process by remaining aloof as a so-called "objective" observer and refusing to take the role of the acting unit is to risk the worst kind of subjectivism – the objective observer is likely to fill in the process of interpretation with his own surmises in place of catching the process as it occurs in the experience of the acting unit which uses it'[7].

Finally, even if the quantification of abstract concepts were possible, there are other problems to be considered. Firstly, 'correlation is not causation'[8]: where two variables are found together, it is often hard to determine which influences which, or whether they are both influenced by a third. Secondly, quantitative methods can easily misrepresent their subject through the difficulties inherent in sampling and achieving data equivalence[9]. Thirdly, 'quantitative methods may establish "what" and "when", but not "why": motivations and meanings are inevitably hidden'[10].

All the above shortcomings of quantitative research can be overcome to some extent, but only by collecting even more data and continuously refining the definitions and samples used, as well as the techniques for processing the data collected – as a matter of fact, '[i]t must also be noted that "measurement-minded" sociologists follow fads and fashions in the use of first one statistical method and

then another'[11]. Quantitative research methods are therefore self-perpetuating, and contribute to what Motyl calls 'routine behaviouralism', the essence of which is 'what Jacques Barzun perhaps too caustically refers to as "doing research" – the vigorous pursuit of data on the faulty rationale that, as only data can generate knowledge, more data must translate into more knowledge. Doing research thus has the advantage of being its own justification: where there is a gap in the data [...] doing research is always ready to spring in'[12].

Qualitative methods, on the other hand, are most appropriate 'where the aim of research is to explore people's subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences'[13], or as tools for the formulation of concepts prior to extensive quantitative research, and for the clarification of survey results after it. They involve participant observation and intensive interviewing techniques, where open-ended questions and informal probing are used 'to facilitate a discussion of issues in a semi-structured or unstructured manner'[14]. What is attractive about qualitative research is the fact that, 'whereas the quantitative approach necessitates standardized data collection, qualitative resources exploit the context of data gathering to enhance the value of the data. Analysis of qualitative material is more explicitly interpretative, creative and personal than [...] quantitative analysis'[15]. In fact, if all that is needed is statistical number crunching, then it can be argued that any corporate or government agency can do the job much better than the academic community, if only through sheer resources. In order to make this type of research relevant, the scholar's true job is therefore to develop theory, since '*[t]heory* is interpretation. It gives order and insight to what is, or can be observed'[16]. The problem with the qualitative approach, however, is that, although it fills in the at times enormous conceptual gap existing between life and statistics, the information obtained from this type of research often uses its strengths to justify its weaknesses: qualitative research is used by those who believe that when 'we reduce people's words and acts to statistical equations, we lose sight of the human side of social life'[17], but its impressionistic, relatively unstructured style can also be used to hide methodological and analytical flaws: an example of this being the ease with which case studies can degenerate into purely anecdotal evidence. Furthermore, 'in making no pretence at measurement, and in relying on inductive reasoning rather than deductive, qualitative research must count as "unscientific" or,

at the very least, pre-scientific'[18]. This is especially problematic in any but the most basic comparative studies, since its lack of standardization also implies a lack of replicability.

Yet the arguments for and against each approach obscure the fundamental problem, which is that, whereas many social scientists 'now use only one method in their studies [a tendency which] has given rise to a rather parochial, specialty-bound use of research methods'[19], the two approaches are, in fact, complementary. There is 'no fundamental clash between the purposes and capacities of qualitative and quantitative methods or data. [The emphasis] depends only on the circumstances of research, on the interests and training of the researcher, and on the kinds of material he needs for his theory'[20]. Both methods benefit from each other: qualitative methods provide the quantitative researcher with 'a framework that is known to be familiar to the respondent, and in which respondents can locate themselves without difficulty'[21], and they in turn receive a broad testing ground for relationships between conceptual categories that may have emerged from a set of interviews, since the 'theoretical relevance of [a] concept is sometimes demonstrated by whether or not its index actually works in a multitude of cross-tabulations'[22]. What needs to be appreciated and accepted, above all, is that reality is [...] socially constructed'[23], and that, consequently, 'no single method [...] can resolve the complex issues involved in the study of politics'[24].

On Grounded Theory

> 'Theoretical sampling is done in order to discover categories and their properties, and to suggest the interrelationships into a theory. Statistical sampling is done to obtain accurate evidence on distributions of people among categories to be used in descriptions or verifications'[25].

For sociologists Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, theory consisted of two elements: conceptual categories and their conceptual properties, on the one hand, and hypotheses, on the other. Categories arise out of empirical data, but, once defined, are not necessarily 'important in themselves; only the category which they indicate must be theoretically relevant'[26] in order to formulate hypotheses. For this reason, the data can change without altering the conceptual categories once they are

defined – at most, all that need happen is a refining of the categories and the relationships between them. Hypotheses in turn arise from the relationships among conceptual categories, and are the '*core of the emerging theory*'[27]. This means not only that the starting point for the development of theory must always be empirical data, but also that the elements of theory, and therefore theory itself, must emerge and develop from data – this is *grounded theory*. According to Glaser and Strauss, proceeding otherwise leads to a temptation to force a fit between theory and data which is 'the result, in most instances, of believing that formal theories can be applied directly to a substantive area, and will supply most or all of the necessary concepts and hypotheses'[28].

This 'process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges'[29] is what these two authors termed *theoretical sampling*, and can be likened to an organic process, since theory grows as more data is fed into it, 'Beyond the decisions concerning the initial collection of data, further collection cannot be planned in advance of the emerging theory'[30], which means that the research is guided by an evolution, not a plan: one item leads to another, and it is only when 'no additional data are being found whereby the [researcher] can develop properties of the category'[31] that the research stops. Glaser and Strauss called this point *theoretical saturation*, and it varies for the different categories found, according to their relevance.

As for the type of data to be used, these authors pointed out that 'any discussion about whether survey data are better or worse than field data is usually meaningless. Often the researcher is forced to obtain only one kind'[32]; nevertheless, in theoretical sampling the analysis of survey data is 'a more limited, narrowly focused effort [...] than presenting the broad description of a population given by the total survey. The description may involve thousands of questionnaire items, while the theoretical analysis only requires consideration of a few hundreds'[33]. This is because '[g]enerating hypotheses requires evidence enough to establish a suggestion – not an excessive piling up of evidence to establish a proof'[34]. Furthermore, 'even if our

evidence is not entirely accurate this will not be too troublesome; for in generating theory it is not the fact upon which we stand but the *conceptual category*[35].

Its emphasis on categories and relationships, regardless of the type of data used, means that theoretical sampling requires the definition of groups, and it is here that parallels with Almond and Verba's five-nation study of civil society can be drawn. *The Civic Culture* is, almost unwittingly, a good example of the combination of the two methods. Although it sets out to be a quantitative study, its use of case studies to illustrate overall survey results has a lot in common with qualitative research methods. Out of the one thousand respondents interviewed in each country studied, Almond and Verba went back to re-interview a target group of one hundred and twenty-five[36] with a 'longer and less structured interview, which attempted to elicit more material of the sort dealt with in the cross-section interview, as well as to obtain a description of what we call an individual's "political life history"[37]. Furthermore, although they tried 'to achieve some demographic balance', the emphasis was on obtaining 'a sample of various "citizen-types"'[38], in other words, to interview respondents who could be said to be representative of larger *groups*. Thus, although not using theoretical sampling as such, Almond and Verba explicitly stated their aim 'to be both descriptive and analytical'[39] by attempting 'to combine theory with empirical research'[40], and their 'citizen-types' approach was one method for achieving similar objectives to those proposed by Glaser and Strauss through the study of groups of attitudes and the *relationships* between them, rather than focusing only on the *frequency* of attitudes in the five nations studied.

The current social and infrastructural situation in the Russian Federation amplifies any problems researchers may find elsewhere. Institutional unreliability, the lack of infrastructure in terms of both telecommunications and transport and the difficulty of achieving a truly representative sample in such a large country with such a varied population are the main obstacles to obtaining accurate data, some of which we examined earlier[41]. An approach which looks at the relationships between groups might therefore achieve better results in terms of the validity of its results than one which focuses on the numerical distribution of groups, since the obsession with numbers has led to a tendency in the social sciences to 'concentrate on consistency

without much concern with what it is we are being consistent about or whether we are consistently right or wrong. As a consequence we have been learning a great deal about how to pursue an incorrect cause with a maximum of precision'[42]. The object of this study will therefore not be to describe the Russian population in terms of percentages, since there are already so many caveats as to the strict accuracy and even representativeness of survey research in Russia, but rather to examine the process of democratization in terms of the social relationships of groups as classified by Tönnies' framework, and of the existence within them of features pertaining to the 'democratic syndrome' found in *The Civic Culture*. In other words, whereas current studies of Russian political culture have focused on the distribution of one or two variables among survey respondents, this thesis will focus on respondents as social *types* in a variety of social structures, not as indicators of one or other measure taken out of all context, since 'it is in terms of specific social and historical structures that the classic problems of social science have been formulated, and in such terms solutions offered'[43].

Towards a Strategy for Research

> 'Cluster analysis, like factor analysis, is not a statistical inference technique where parameters from a sample are assessed as possibly being representative of a population. Instead, cluster analysis is an objective methodology for quantifying the structural characteristics of a set of observations. As such, it has strong mathematical properties, but not statistical foundations'[44].

As mentioned earlier, classification is a 'basic conceptual activity'[45], seen in any attempt to construct groups. Having argued for the use of groups in social science research, and for a complementary use of quantitative and qualitative methods, there remains to be found a research strategy that will accomplish all these objectives, and this is where *cluster analysis* comes into the equation. This technique is a form of multivariate analysis, used for making sense of large numbers of amorphous, undifferentiated data involving hundreds of variables, which attempts 'to identify any possible tendency for data to "clump" together to form groups'[46], and which has a lot in common with factor analysis. Firstly, they both aim to assess 'natural' structures in the data, the difference being that factor analysis groups variables, whereas cluster analysis groups *cases*. Secondly, they are both interdependence methods – that is, methods whereby 'the relationships between objects and subjects

are explored *without a dependent variable being identified*'[47]. Thirdly, they both require metric variables, or, at the very least, variables that can be used as if they were metric[48]. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 'cluster analysis, along with factor analysis, is much more of an art form than a science'[49], for reasons which will be explained presently.

Furthermore, as is also the case in factor analysis in terms of the dimensions underlying the variables under examination, in cluster analysis 'group membership for all cases is unknown. In fact, even the number of groups is often unknown. The goal of cluster analysis is to identify homogeneous groups or clusters'[50]. Cluster analysis is therefore most commonly used in the biological sciences, where it is known as *numerical taxonomy*, but it is also successfully employed in many other disciplines as disparate as astronomy, archaeology, psychiatry, anthropology and market research, where it is used 'to produce groups of consumers with different buying patterns'[51]. Social scientists have therefore perhaps been guilty of not according this technique the attention it deserves, in view of its increasingly widespread use in other such disparate fields of enquiry. Nevertheless, this situation is slowly beginning to change, and many multivariate techniques which had so far been ignored in the social sciences are finally beginning to be put to use in the examination of survey data. What better example of this could there be, given the nature of this thesis, than a group of studies carried out in the State University of Nizhnii Novgorod under the auspices of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which resulted in a collection of articles, many of which made full use of a variety of advanced statistical techniques, foremost amongst which were cluster and factor analysis[52].

However, cluster analysis is not 'a single integrated technique with well defined rules of utilization; rather it is an umbrella term for a loose collection of heuristic procedures and diverse elements of applied statistics'[53], of which there are two main types of techniques, both of which are used with different distance measures and algorithms to form groups[54]. Hierarchical techniques use either agglomerative algorithms, which build clusters by repeatedly pairing off cases or clusters of cases until all the cases form one cluster, or, less frequently, divisive algorithms, which start

with one cluster and end with single cases. These techniques are most often used on small datasets, since 'algorithms that require many computations or storage of all cases in memory may pose difficulties in terms of either the time required to perform the computations or available memory'[55]. Hierarchical clusters are most often illustrated by means of dendograms – tree-like structures which show, not only the number and composition of clusters at any given stage, but also the scale of the distance measures between each pairing. This is particularly important for deciding what number of clusters is most significant: cluster analysis requires the analyst to decide how many clusters to use, and the most common approach to this problem is to draw the line 'when the stress of bringing two clusters together becomes particularly large'[56]. The main disadvantage of hierarchical clustering is, however, that 'it suffers from the defect that it can never repair what was done in previous steps'[57]: when two cases are joined they cannot be separated, and vice-versa.

Partitioning techniques are, in this aspect, a lot more flexible, since they continuously reallocate observations to clusters. These techniques, the most commonly used of which are *k-means* algorithms, build clusters around moving centres, and are 'particularly well adapted to large numerical datasets, because the data is read directly [...] several times in sequential fashion, without requiring large amounts of computer memory'[58]. Initial cluster centres (or *centroids*) can either be defined by the analyst or randomly assigned by the computer; each case is then assigned to the cluster with the closest centre, and it 'replaces a centre if its smallest distance to a centre is greater than the distance between the two closest centres. The centre that is closer to the case is replaced'[59]. This process stops 'either when two succeeding iterations lead to the same partition, or when a [...] chosen criterion (for example, the measure of the within-groups variance) stops decreasing significantly, or when a previously established maximum number of iterations is reached'[60]. Different methods of clustering around moving centres achieve this in slightly different ways; in k-means clustering 'the position of the centres is modified before all of the individuals have been reassigned [...] This procedure therefore gives high quality partition in a single iteration. But it depends on the order of the individuals on the data file'[61], which is not the case with methods which allocate all individuals before recomputing the centroids. All partitioning techniques, however, require that the number of clusters

be decided at the start, which means that, although, according to some analysts, experience 'indicates that it is rare to find a statistically significant solution with more than seven clusters', partitioning can still involve an initial process of trial and error to find the most meaningful number of clusters in terms of the variables being analyzed. This is probably why '[t]he literature contains a lot of wishing for mechanical methods of determining the number of groups'[62]. The best practice is therefore to combine partitioning and hierarchical techniques, first using the latter with a subset of cases to obtain a reasonable number of clusters, and then using the partitioning approach on the whole dataset 'to re-allocate observations and clusters to find a best fit'[63].

All this means that many choices have to be made in the process of clustering data, and that 'the search for clusters in real data involves a series of intuitive decisions as to which elements of the cluster analysis repertory should be utilized'[64]. It is therefore worth noting that 'any classification is a division of the objects or individuals into groups based on a set of rules – *it is neither true nor false* [...] and should be judged largely on the usefulness of the results'[65]. In other words, since different results can be produced from the same data, any 'solutions found should not be seen as absolute truths, but as only one of a set of alternatives [...] No one picture is correct but any one could give an insight'[66]. It is in this sense that cluster analysis, although it deals with quantitative data, is guided by a philosophy more akin to that found in qualitative research. Like many of the methods used in qualitative research, '[c]luster analysis is a tool for suggestion and discovery. It is not in itself a wellspring of either truth or falsehood'[67], and, as was the case with Glaser and Strauss' grounded theory, the object of cluster analysis is to reveal structures and relationships within the data, and to describe them 'in terms of principles and ideas, not individual data units. Once a satisfactory structure is known and defended on its own merits, any cluster analysis that contributed to its discovery is only of historical interest'[68]. Furthermore, implicit in the use of clustering techniques is the recognition that the 'analyst's research objectives permeate the entire investigation'[69], and that, in cluster analysis, it is 'probably the choice of variables that has the greatest influence on the results'[70].

This last point turned out to be of major significance in the elaboration of this study for two reasons: firstly, the variables had to be selected in terms of their relevance to the frameworks set out in previous chapters, a task made difficult by the fact that Russian surveys are limited, not only in number, but also in scope. The questions that need asking have not been asked; areas which need probing are left untouched: the concepts used in this study therefore had to be examined indirectly, through variables which, although meaningless on their own, nevertheless combined with others to form clusters rendering a meaningful picture of the strength and nature of social typologies in Russia. Secondly, since missing answers need to be deleted in cluster analysis[71], the large amount of missing answers in Russian datasets meant that, after cleaning the data, one could end up with only a fraction of an already narrow sample to work with. Questions with as few missing answers as possible thus needed to be found in order to obtain a representative range of groups, and this quest for the right questions became the starting point of the empirical part of this thesis.

> 'The analyst does not simply go out and browse in the world like cattle grazing on the Great Plains of the 1800s. He proceeds with purpose and ignores or prunes away the unnecessary and distractive elements as he sees them[72].

Notes

[1]Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, p. 224.
[2]As well as on each researchers' own temperament and inclinations.
[3]Robert Walker, 'An Introduction to Applied Qualitative Research', in Robert Walker (ed), *Applied Qualitative Research* (Aldershot, Hants: Gower, 1985), pp. 3-23 at p. 9.
[4]Herman Smith, *Strategies of Social Research: The Methodological Imagination*, second edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 184.
[5]Walker, 'An Introduction to Applied Qualitative Research', pp. 10-11.
[6]For example, 'satisfaction' – see Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', pp. 1203-30.
[7]Herbert Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 86.
[8]William Miller, 'Quantitative Methods', in David Marsh and Jerry Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 154-72 at p. 168.
[9]Possible sources of non-equivalence are translations, time-scales or, more problematically, the meanings imbued in actions for different individuals. An example of this would be the following: if we take voting as an indicator of political activism, how do we compare people who vote because they are fined if they don't and people who vote even though they may lose their life? For this and other examples of equivalence problems, see Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, pp. 57-68. They conclude that complete equivalence is probably unobtainable, but there are levels within which it is reasonable.
[10]Miller, 'Quantitative Methods', p. 169.
[11]Denzin, *The Research Act*, p. 74. He goes on to say that 'in the 1940s factor analysis was employed. In the 1950s it was multivariate analysis; in the 1960s, path analysis; and in the 1970s, log-linear analysis. In the 1980s, it [was] the use of LISREL (Linear Structural Relations)'.
[12]Motyl, 'The Dilemmas of Sovietology and the Labyrinth of Theory', p. 79.

[13]Fiona Devine, 'Qualitative Methods', in Marsh and Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, pp. 137-53 at p. 138.
[14]*Ibid.*, p. 138.
[15]*Ibid.*, p. 3.
[16]Denzin, *The Research Act*, p. 4.
[17]Taylor and Bogdan, *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods*, p. 7.
[18]Walker, 'An Introduction to Applied Qualitative Research', pp. 9-10.
[19]Denzin, *The Research Act*, p. 3.
[20]Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), pp. 17-8.
[21]Miller, 'Quantitative Methods', p. 168.
[22]Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*, p. 193.
[23]Tom Mackie and David Marsh, 'The Comparative Method', in Marsh and Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, pp. 173-88 at p. 187.
[24]Devine, 'Qualitative Methods', p. 152.
[25]Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*, p. 62.
[26]*Ibid.*, p. 67.
[27]*Ibid.*, p. 40.
[28]*Ibid.*, p. 34.
[29]*Ibid.*, p. 45.
[30]*Ibid.*, p. 47.
[31]*Ibid.*, p. 61.
[32]*Ibid.*, p. 66.
[33]*Ibid.*, pp. 187-8.
[34]*Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.
[35]Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*, p. 23.
[36]The number of respondents actually re-interviewed was:

USA – 49 UK – 114 Mexico – 120
Italy – 121 Germany – 135

See Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 46, n. 9, and their Appendix A, pp. 509-525.
[37]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 46.
[38]*Ibidem.*
[39]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 47.
[40]*Ibid.*, p. 49.
[41]See also 'Obshchestvennoe mnenie: strategiia massovykh oprosov (kruglyi stol)', in *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, 1993, No. 6 (June), pp. 31-6; and also Rutkevich, 'Sotsiologiia, vlast', obshchestvennoe mnenie'.
[42]Irwin Deutscher, 'Words and Deeds: Social Science and Social Policy', in *Social Problems*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1966), pp. 233-54 at p. 241.
[43]Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, p. 124.
[44] Joseph Hair, Rolph Anderson, Ronald Tatham and William Black, *Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings*, fourth edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), pp. 435-6.
[45]Brian Everitt, *Cluster Analysis* (London: Edward Arnold, 1993), p. 1.
[46]Mike James, *Classification Algorithms* (London: Collins, 1985), p. 3.
[47]John Saunders, 'Cluster Analysis', in Graham Hooley and Michael Hussey (eds), *Quantitative Methods in Marketing* (London: Academic Press, 1994), pp. 15-28 at p. 15 (italics added). This book was originally published as *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 10, Nos. 1-3, Special Issue (January/February/April 1994).
[48]This not being the place for an introductory statistics course, variables can be summarily divided into metric and non-metric, the latter being variables which classify the attributes of a case *without measuring them* – for example, religion. Metric variables, on the other hand are of several types, depending on whether their measurements accurately reflect the exact relationship between cases on the attribute being measured or not: ordinal, where an attribute can be ranked but not measured (e.g., beauty); interval, where the measurement scale has an arbitrary zero point (e.g., temperature); and ratio, where the scale has an absolute zero point, denoting the absence of the attribute being measured (e.g., weight). Factor and cluster analysis will work with ordinal variables which can be used as if they were interval, or dichotomous variables which can be

used as 'dummy' variables – variables coded in terms of the presence or absence of an attribute, however it is measured or categorized.

[49]Hair *et al.*, *Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings*, p. 428.

[50]Marija Norusis, *SPSS Professional Statistics*™ (Chicago: SPSS Inc., 1994), p. 83.

[51]Everitt, *Cluster Analysis*, p. v. For more specific examples of the uses of cluster analysis in different disciplines, see also pp. 8-10.

[52]See S S Balabanov, Z M Saralieva and G L Voronin (eds), *Sotsial'naia mobilnost' i sotsial'nyi konflikt* (Nizhnii Novgorod: Institut Sotsiologii RAN, 1996), particularly S S Balabanov and T N Balabanova, 'Sotsial'nye tipy i sotsial'naia stratifikatsiia', pp. 30–40.

[53]Michael Anderberg, *Cluster Analysis for Applications* (New York: Academic Press, 1973), p. 10.

[54]To summarize, 'clustering methods fall into three groups: linkage methods, error sum of squares or variance methods, and centroid methods. All are based on either a matrix of distances or a matrix of similarities between pairs of cases [...] Since the merging of clusters at each step depends on the distance measure, different distance measures can result in different cluster solutions' – Norusis, *SPSS Professional Statistics*™, p. 97. However, this 'difference is not a matter of one measure being wrong and the others right, but their dependence on measuring different things' – Saunders, 'Cluster Analysis', p. 18. Furthermore, in the experience of this researcher, cluster solutions using different algorithms do not vary radically when the range of codes per variable is not great and the distances therefore small, as will be the case in this study.

[55]Norusis, *SPSS Professional Statistics*™, p. 111.

[56]Saunders, 'Cluster Analysis', p. 20.

[57]Leonard Kaufman and Peter Rousseeuw, *Finding Groups in Data: An Introduction to Cluster Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1990), p. 44.

[58]Ludovic Lebart, Alain Morineau and Kenneth Warwick, *Multivariate Descriptive Statistical Analysis: Correspondence Analysis and Related Techniques for Large Matrices*, translated by Elisabeth Moraillon Berry (New York: Wiley, 1984), p.112.

[59]Norusis, *SPSS Professional Statistics*™, p. 117.

[60]Lebart, Morineau and Warwick, *Multivariate Descriptive Statistical Analysis*, p. 114.

[61]*Ibid.*, p. 116.

[62]Anderberg, *Cluster Analysis for Applications*, p. 15.

[63]Saunders, 'Cluster Analysis', p. 20.

[64]*Ibidem.*

[65]Everitt, *Cluster Analysis*, p. 4 (italics as in text).

[66]Saunders, 'Cluster Analysis', p. 27.

[67]Anderberg, *Cluster Analysis for Applications*, p. 20.

[68]*Ibid.*, p. 19. This should, of course, apply to all research, since 'there is a pronounced tendency to confuse whatever is being studied with the set of methods suggested for its study' – Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, p. 51.

[69]Anderberg, *Cluster Analysis for Applications*, p. 21.

[70]*Ibid.*, p. 12.

[71]It is worth noting that missing data can be a problem in multivariate analyses generally; their impact 'is detrimental not only through its potential "hidden" biases of the results but also in its practical impact on the sample size available for analysis' – Hair *et al.*, *Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings*, p. 43.

[72]Anderberg, *Cluster Analysis for Applications*, p. 21.

Part II: Cross-Sectional Study

Chapter Six – A Portrait of the Population

> 'Shall we assert mastery over our discipline, adapting our techniques to our problems and conceptualizations, or shall we continue to be methodological slaves, permitting a presumed technical proficiency to dictate our interests and our concerns?'[1]

The longevity and recurrence of the ideas expounded so far attested to their intuitive appeal, but, having already discussed the limitations of applying the scientific model to the social sciences and argued for a more creative, humanistic approach, it nevertheless remained to be seen whether these ideas resonated in the empirical data; the research process therefore began with an exploration of the datasets and variables available to this researcher. This soon revealed, with a consistency that was surprising, not only that using variables relating to ego strength was the right approach, but that, in fact, in order to divide the Russian population into discriminate groups, it was the *only* approach – all other kinds of variables yielded a largely homogenous population and suffered from large amounts of missing answers. Even more surprising was that only one survey asked questions relevant to 'ego strength': the *World Values Survey*[2] – although, even in this survey, these questions were not abundant. In spite of its limitations, the *WVS* was nevertheless the optimal choice.

The *WVS* was carried out world-wide in two waves, the second of which included a survey of the RSFSR in January 1991[3]. A representative sample of 1961 respondents was obtained through face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe of adults over the age of eighteen. Ronald Inglehart was a major participant in the organization of the project (he was also primarily responsible for cleaning, assembling and integrating the data), and the survey design and many of the publications based on it are concerned with measuring the degree of 'postmaterialism' in the different societies studied, something which will not concern us here[4]. However, many of the questions used to assess levels of postmaterialism proved useful to this researcher, precisely because they moved away from opinions and attitudes in favour of an approach which focused on the self-perception and 'basic values' of respondents, as we will see later.

This is not to say, of course, that other issues were not addressed in the survey. In the course of the following chapters, we will see respondents' perceptions of the economy, politics and society, and of the impact they perceived these spheres of human activity to have upon them. This will be done, not by analyzing the frequencies obtained from the whole population, but rather, as argued in Chapter Five, through the formation of groups, which will then be described in terms of their characteristics. Nevertheless, before moving on to the perhaps more complex part of this analysis, a brief overview of the sample population's demographic characteristics in terms of straight counts will help us to establish the parameters within which we will be working.

First Impressions

The straight counts for demographic variables showed that the sample population contained a slight majority of females, and that respondents were aged predominantly between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four. Respondents were divided into five age groups of ten years each except the youngest – which ranged from eighteen to twenty-four – and the eldest – which included anyone over sixty-five. This last group was the only one in which females constituted a large majority – twice the number of their male counterparts – as opposed to a slight one. The average age of the sample was 42.76 years.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	male	837	42.7	42.7	42.7
	female	1124	57.3	57.3	100.0
	total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

Table 1: sex

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-24	256	13.1	13.1	13.1
	25-34	446	22.7	22.7	35.8
	35-44	473	24.1	24.1	59.9
	45-54	285	14.5	14.5	74.5
	55-64	299	15.2	15.2	89.7
	65+	202	10.3	10.3	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

Table 2: age groups

Slightly over half of respondents were the chief wage earners in their household, and the majority (68.8%) were in full-time employment. The respondents were divided into thirteen occupational categories, though it is questionable how well these applied to the Soviet workplace. For example, less than three percent of the sample were farmers or farm workers, but, for the purposes of describing someone's lifestyle as rural, it could be argued that 'agricultural worker' would be a better job description to fit the Soviet Union's heavily industrialized countryside, particularly because 10% of the sample lived in towns of under two thousand inhabitants.

A total of 31%, on the other hand, lived in towns of over five hundred thousand inhabitants, with another 27% in towns of over one hundred thousand, making the survey predominantly urban-based, as is usually the case with surveys. A further coding for Moscow and Leningrad (as it was at the time) would have nevertheless given a better idea of the kind of urban lifestyle respondents in the larger towns were accustomed to – whether a relatively metropolitan one or a fundamentally provincial one.

Incomes were coded into ten groups of thirty roubles each, starting at ten roubles per month and finishing at over three hundred and one, with the largest category in terms of number of respondents being 71-100 roubles per month. The income variable was strongly associated, evidently, with the degree of financial satisfaction of respondents, but, interestingly, not as strongly with their happiness 'taking everything into account'[5], a variable with the following frequencies:

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very	104	5.3	5.3	5.3
	quite	822	41.9	41.9	47.2
	not very	776	39.6	39.6	86.8
	not at all	68	3.5	3.5	90.3
	dk	191	9.7	9.7	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

Table 3: overall happiness of respondents

On Clusters and How to Get Them

The *WVS* was submitted to cluster analysis on the basis of nine variables chosen for their relevance in terms of assessing 'ego strength'; these variables were all part of one question, the text of which was as follows:

> A variety of characteristics are listed here. Could you take a look at them and select those which apply to you?
> A) I usually count on being successful in everything I do
> B) I enjoy convincing others of my opinion
> C) I often notice that I serve as a model for others
> D) I am good at getting what I want
> E) I own many things others envy me for
> F) I like to assume responsibility
> G) I am rarely unsure about how I should behave
> H) I often give others advice
> None of the above'[6].

Respondents had been coded according to whether they mentioned a particular characteristic or not, so missing answers were not a problem: even the most confused and apathetic person will perceive whether something applies to them or not – whether they are right or wrong is, of course, irrelevant in terms of self-confidence.

What the straight counts of these variables revealed was that those with which respondents identified less were all those which in any way implied the individual's position in relation to others[7]. 'I often notice that I serve as a model for others' was the least 'popular', followed by 'I own many things others envy me for'. Furthermore, none of the variables was mentioned by more than half of the respondents – 'I usually count on being successful in everything I do' being the only one that even exceeded 40% of the sample. On the other hand, only slightly over a fifth of the sample replied 'none of the above', indicating a relatively low level of apathy and alienation among respondents' reaction to these variables, which was in itself a positive indication of their attitude to the survey. This was a good sign, in terms of the methodology proposed, since it demonstrated that missing answers are not an inevitable fact of Russian attitudinal surveys, and therefore showed that the Russian population's homogeneity might be a result, not of apathy, but of asking questions not deemed personally relevant by the Russians themselves. This is not to say that asking the latter kind of questions is necessarily a bad thing, of course, since

the usefulness of a given piece of research should only be assessed in terms of its own objectives. If researchers want to compare specific aspects of their own culture to others, then they will naturally ask questions of relevance in the former and assess the response in the latter. If, however, researchers aim to establish the nature of the alien culture rather than seek for elements of their own within it, then Glaser and Strauss' method is to be recommended, and the questions asked should arise out of the concerns of the population studied, not those of the population doing the studying. In other words, if it is *Russian* political culture we are interested in, then our starting point should be taken from Russian data, and not from issues relevant to Western data.

The variables listed above were chosen, for this reason, as the basis upon which to cluster the sample population. Since, as explained in Chapter Five, the number of possible groups was unknown, they were first hierarchically clustered and then subjected to principal components factoring in order to determine which cluster solution would be most significant in terms of the variables. Both processes yielded three dimensions of the individual's social persona, easily recognizable in any culture. The first reflected to respondents' perception of their social status in the eyes of others: a measure, in fact, of how envied and admired they felt in their surroundings. The statements relating to this dimension were 'I own many things others envy me for' and 'I often notice that I serve as a model for others'. The second dimension tapped into respondents' social skills and the pleasure derived by them from taking a leading role in social interaction, reflected in the statements 'I enjoy convincing others of my opinion', 'I like to assume responsibility' and 'I often give others advice'. Finally, the third dimension assessed respondents' ambition, as reflected in the statements 'I usually count on being successful in everything I do', 'I am good at getting what I want' and 'I am rarely unsure about how I should behave'.

Several random samples consisting of different percentages of the population were then subjected to a hierarchical clustering procedure on SPSS, using an average linkage between groups method and squared Euclidean distances[8]. From the dendograms obtained, it was determined that the optimal number of clusters would range between four and seven. Using the full population, the SPSS k-means

clustering procedure was run several times with different numbers of clusters, and, after testing the solutions in a number of cross-tabulations with variables found to be of interest to the study, five groups were finally settled on as being the most meaningfully differentiated in terms both of the responses given to the clustering variables and of the demographic characteristics of their respondents[9], with the following numbers of cases in each:

Cluster	1	352
	2	183
	3	549
	4	578
	5	299
Valid		1961
Missing		0

Table 4: number of cases in each cluster

Before proceeding any further, however, the way in which these contingency tables were explored needs to be explained, since it was the axis of the entire methodology. Firstly, the entire survey was purged of 'missing' answers: that is, 'don't know' and 'not ascertained' were included in the variable analyses as valid data in order to see which clusters withdrew on which questions. Then, once a cross-tabulation was carried out, the percentage of responses within each cluster for each value was turned into an index number which expressed, as a percentage or a 'score', the difference between the percentage of cases within each cluster and the percentage of cases within the entire population for each value. In other words, the indices were a measure of the relative deviance of each cluster from the sample totals per value, and were used to establish the comparative likelihood of each cluster responding in a particular way to a particular question, *taking into account the relative size of each cluster.* To illustrate this methodology, we can take a look at the marital status of respondents in the different clusters[10]:

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
MARITAL STATUS	na	Count	2		1			3
		% within CLUSTERS	.6%		.2%			.2%
	marned	Count	242	127	362	420	188	1339
		% within CLUSTERS	68.8%	69.4%	65.9%	72.7%	62.9%	68.3%
	living together	Count	4	5	12	14	9	44
		% within CLUSTERS	1.1%	2.7%	2.2%	2.4%	3.0%	2.2%
	divorced	Count	28	21	71	31	44	195
		% within CLUSTERS	8.0%	11.5%	12.9%	5.4%	14.7%	9.9%
	separated	Count	21	8	40	26	19	114
		% within CLUSTERS	6.0%	4.4%	7.3%	4.5%	6.4%	5.8%
	widowed	Count	6	1	6	4	6	23
		% within CLUSTERS	1.7%	.5%	1.1%	.7%	2.0%	1.2%
	single	Count	49	21	57	83	33	243
		% within CLUSTERS	13.9%	11.5%	10.4%	14.4%	11.0%	12.4%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5: marital status (straight counts)

We can see from Table 5 that, for example, the percentage of married people in the total sample population was 68.3. However, the percentage of married people in each cluster was not 68.3, but varied from 62.9 to 72.7, and the same applied to the percentages in each of the other categories. This gave the following indices for each cluster:

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
MARITAL STATUS	na	Index	300		100			100
		% within CLUSTERS	.6%		.2%			.2%
	marned	Index	101	102	97	107	92	100
		% within CLUSTERS	68.8%	69.4%	65.9%	72.7%	62.9%	68.3%
	living together	Index	50	123	100	109	136	100
		% within CLUSTERS	1.1%	2.7%	2.2%	2.4%	3.0%	2.2%
	divorced	Index	81	116	130	55	149	100
		% within CLUSTERS	8.0%	11.5%	12.9%	5.4%	14.7%	9.9%
	separated	Index	103	76	126	78	110	100
		% within CLUSTERS	6.0%	4.4%	7.3%	4.5%	6.4%	5.8%
	widowed	Index	142	42	92	58	167	100
		% within CLUSTERS	1.7%	.5%	1.1%	.7%	2.0%	1.2%
	single	Index	112	93	84	116	89	100
		% within CLUSTERS	13.9%	11.5%	10.4%	14.4%	11.0%	12.4%

Table 6: marital status (indices)

As we can see in Table 6, the sample total for a variable is thus the baseline, with an index of 100, against which the clusters are compared. In this particular case we can say, for example, that cluster 3 is the most likely to contain separated people, and that the members of cluster 4 are more likely than those of cluster 1 to be single, or, conversely, that respondents in cluster 4 are the least likely to be divorced. This method, which reflects the likelihood of each cluster to respond in different ways, is most commonly used in market research, where high index numbers are used to determine target audiences.

A few points about the significance of the index numbers have to be made, however. Firstly, where the deviance from the norm is very small – in this case, for instance, the scores for 'married' people in each cluster – it may just be the product of natural sample variance, and not an indication of the real propensity of the cluster. For this reason, this researcher focused mainly on scores over ten 'points' above and below 100. Secondly, it obviously remained the case that, due to the great degree of homogeneity in Russian survey responses, many of the variables examined contained values with very small counts, which, again, were not statistically significant – people living together, for instance, as we can see from Table 5. Nevertheless, distinct patterns sometimes emerged even in these variables, so that – to take another example – although very few Russians belonged to voluntary organizations, those who did were distributed among the clusters in very distinctive, consistent patterns in the set of variables for membership in voluntary organizations, which we will return to later in the study. In this sense, statistically insignificant figures contributed distinct properties to the conceptual categories created by the clusters, and added detail to the characteristics of each of the five clusters.

Cluster 3: *'Zatrudniaius' otvetit'...'*[11]

The characteristics that differentiated this cluster from the others were immediately apparent, and a cluster with these characteristics could most consistently be found regardless of the number of cluster solutions employed. The single distinguishing feature of this type of cluster – cluster 3 in the five-cluster solution employed here – was that, for any given variable, its members were usually the least likely (often by a

lot) to commit themselves to an opinion, instead choosing options such as 'don't know', 'neither' or 'none of the above'. They had a propensity to live in towns of under ten thousand inhabitants and to be paid ten to seventy roubles a month, the indices for their salaries forming a steady downward slope as the salary brackets increased; understandably, they were also the most likely to refuse to answer the income question.

When not given an escape option, they were more likely than not to give negative or passive answers, and even where 'don't know' was an option, these tended to be their next most likely answers – a fact illustrated, for example, in a series of variables dealing with morally controversial behaviour ranging from fare dodging to abortion. This cluster was, in these variables, firstly, invariably the most likely to answer 'don't know' and, secondly, usually among the least likely to believe that such types of behaviour could be justified[12]. It is worth noting, however, that the straight counts for positive responses to these variables were statistically insignificant, added to which, although this cluster's scores in the 'often' and 'always' values were small, they were not correspondingly high in the 'never' and 'rarely' values. This could indicate that either the tendencies exhibited in the former values were due to natural sample variance, or it could be seen as another instance of this cluster's propensity to avoid answering questions in an affirmative manner.

What this group did feel more strongly about, however, were personal 'moral' issues, to which they tended to have a traditional attitude. They tended to disagree with the proposition that 'Individuals should have the right to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted'[13], and to consider obedience the most important quality for a child to learn at home. Added to this, they were the most likely to consider themselves religious[14], and thus to consider having shared religious beliefs very important for a successful marriage, whereas things like having a happy sex life, sharing tastes and interests, and being in agreement on politics tended not to be considered as important for a marriage by the members of this cluster[15].

Given these characteristics, and in line with survey findings in other countries, it was not surprising that this cluster was most likely to be composed of women, particularly of women over fifty-five[16].

Cluster 5: The Builders of Communism

The most immediately apparent characteristic of this cluster was their age: they were the oldest group, with a tendency to be over forty-five, and particularly over sixty-five, regardless of sex. This group also had a marked tendency to believe in 'social' virtues, and to enjoy social interaction at a purely *personal* level, as was shown by their lack of interest in formal associational structures, yet their very high scores on variables involving friendships. In fact, what brought this group together, in terms of the clustering variables, was their identification with personal characteristics relating to social co-operation – as opposed to individual success or hierarchical status.

The members of this cluster also the most likely to believe in the ideals normally associated with Soviet Communism, such as preferring equality over freedom, a tendency reinforced by a traditional, 'closed' mindset which manifested itself in, for example, the conviction that good and evil were absolute concepts, independent of circumstances. On the other hand, this cluster's socialist ideals meant that they were also the most likely to believe that, on the whole, people could be trusted.

This cluster had in common with cluster 3 the values and attitudes one normally associates with old age, and these two clusters were, indeed, the oldest and second oldest, respectively, shown not only in their average age[17], but also in their age group indices. It therefore came as no surprise that they tended to worry and be cautious about change, and preferred old ideas to new ones. Values such as obedience and respect for authority were important to these two clusters, but they parted ways in terms of the source of that authority: whereas, as we have seen, religious beliefs tended to be associated with cluster 3, it was an all-encompassing interest in politics that tended to manifest itself in cluster 5's responses.

This focal difference between these two clusters had its impact on a number of variables where one could have been forgiven for assuming that they would respond in similar ways, but where, in fact, traditional values took slightly different forms. Looking, for example, at three questions concerning whether possessing a shared mindset was important for a successful marriage, where the possible answers were 'very', 'rather' and 'not very', cluster 3 was the most likely of the two to consider religion 'very' important, whereas, for cluster 5 it was 'rather' important. Being of the same social background, on the other hand, obtained high scores from cluster five in the responses for both 'very' and 'rather', but not from cluster 3, which had scores below 100 in both these categories, and the same happened in terms of being in agreement on politics. So, as we can see, although a shared social experience was important for both these clusters, which aspects of it were actually important made all the difference under closer scrutiny.

Cluster 2: New Russians in the Making

This cluster, which had the highest propensity to contain men under forty-five, was characterized by the fact that its members identified with *all* the characteristics proposed by the clustering variables, in percentages well above the sample totals. They were therefore not only socially interactive, but also confident, ambitious and proud, with an extremely high propensity to believe that they could count on success and that they served as a model to others. They were also the only cluster within which the majority of people thought they owned many things others envied them for, a fact perhaps accounted for by the fact that they were the most likely by far to be earning over 251 roubles a month.

The members of this cluster had in common with those of cluster 5 a high propensity to enjoy persuading their friends of their opinions: that these were the only two groups which did is not surprising, since they were also the only two groups to load on the 'social' dimension of the clustering variables. They shared cluster 5's sociability and interest in politics, but, once again, these common factors combined to create a very different character type: for instance, cluster 2 tended to consider that it was not only sharing the same social background and the same politics that

was important in a marriage, but also sharing religious beliefs. In this sense, they bridged the gap between clusters 3 and 5 by adding religion to the social dimension, but, at the same time, what they subtracted from it was even more interesting.

What set cluster 2 apart from clusters 3 and 5 were the more 'modern', yet at the same time perhaps less humane, tendencies of its members. The socialism of cluster 5 was not apparent as a marked propensity among cluster 2's responses, but neither were cluster 3's traditional attitudes: for example, the respondents in cluster 2 tended to prefer freedom over equality and to believe in sexual freedom. On the other hand, there was a suggestion in the pattern of their responses that this freedom they tended to advocate might be reserved for themselves and theirs, as illustrated by the fact that they were the least likely to encourage children to be unselfish, but the most likely to encourage them to have determination.

As we have already seen, cluster 2 tended to earn the highest salaries and consider themselves envied by others; this was part of an overall tendency by the members of this cluster to perceive themselves as 'winners'. Cluster 2 were the most likely to believe that people have free choice, implying that life is what you make of it, and, consequently, they had a very marked propensity to welcome change, to adapt to it well, and to think that new ideas were better than old ones. The reason for this may have been that they were younger than the two clusters examined so far, but, support for the contention that there was more to it than that was surely given by the fact that the remaining two clusters, which we will examine presently, also tended to contain young respondents, and yet did not seem to be as aggressively self-confident as cluster 2. That this cluster tended to be male could also be seen as an explanation, especially when combined with youth, but, again, this was also the case in another cluster, without leading to the same results.

Summarizing all these tendencies were the responses to a set of variables tabulating membership of voluntary organizations. Although the responses were statistically insignificant due to the small numbers of people belonging to any organizations at all, cluster 2 was consistently among the most likely to belong to them, with three exceptions: the peace movement, women's groups and health organizations. The

progressive, postmaterialist nature of all three exceptions (to use Inglehart's term) could nevertheless be taken as evidence that they might not be coincidental, and that this cluster was, in fact, exhibiting a definite tendency to disregard those social values normally associated with both the left wing of the political spectrum and traditional society, in favour, perhaps, of more 'Thatcherite' values regarding the individual's position vis-à-vis society and the State.

Clusters 1 and 4: Young Janes and Average Joes

The next two clusters, the youngest in terms of average age, tended to think very similarly on many issues but were divided by the underlying difference between them, which was that cluster 4 was most likely to be composed of men with an added propensity to be young, whereas cluster 1 was most likely to be composed of young people with an added propensity to be female.

These two clusters were interesting precisely because of the two reference groups – based on sex or age – which they could tap into when answering questions, and patterns of agreement and disagreement arose in their responses which seemed to be determined by whichever reference group came to the fore when answering a specific question. For instance, in the clustering variables themselves, a pattern based on traditional sex roles was apparent: regardless of the fact that these two clusters were unlikely on the whole to identify with 'social' characteristics, cluster 1 were even more unlikely than cluster 4 to believe that they served as a model to others – supporting the view that women are not supposed to be as confident as men – but they were less unlikely to enjoy convincing others – falling in line with the argument that women are supposedly better at 'communicating' than men. Furthermore, the characteristics that each group was most likely to identify with also conformed with said ideas: cluster 1 enjoyed responsibility, while cluster 4 counted on success. A clearer example of the sexual divide, seen across all the clusters, were the responses to the question 'Do you think that a woman has to have children to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?'[18]. This split the clusters into 1 and 3 ('no') versus 2 and 4 ('yes'), with cluster 5 staying close to the sample totals, with a very slight tendency to think that women did not need children, possibly due, if not to natural variance, to the fact

that cluster 5's primary defining trait was age, not sex. At other times, clusters 1 and 4 responded in ways one would normally associate with youth, and these were times when their indices would be similar to cluster 2's. They too tended to believe that children should be encouraged to have determination, and to welcome change. These three clusters were also as one in their propensity to consider a happy sex life to be 'very' important for a successful marriage.

The distinctions between sex and age were not clear cut, however, and sometimes operated simultaneously. An example of this was the fact that clusters 1 and 3 followed different trends in their propensities to consider the sharing of household chores as important for a successful marriage: the scores for the value 'not very' were 105 for cluster 3 – the elderly one – but only 89 for cluster 1. In terms of the age divide, there were also a number of occasions in which cluster 2 branched off from clusters 1 and 4, and showed a more hard-nosed approach to certain issues, usually relating to moral guidelines and religion. There were, however, other fault lines which split the 'teams' of clusters in even more ways, and there were a number of variables for which cluster 1 and 4's responses could not be interpreted according to differences in sex or age.

In the majority of these cases, what was striking was cluster 1's definite tendency to respond similarly to cluster 2, giving the distinct impression that, taking into account the fact that both cluster 1 and 4 were more liberal and 'modern' than clusters 3 and 5, cluster 4 was nevertheless not quite with clusters 1 and 2 on many issues, something particularly reflected in, and possibly affected by, its members' propensity not to be particularly interested in politics or other abstract issues. Whereas cluster 1 showed a marked propensity to be interested in politics, and to deviate significantly from the sample totals on a number of political and social issues, the overall pattern of cluster 4's responses was one which deviated very little from the sample totals in the vast majority of variables. This was perhaps not surprising, in the sense that this was, after all, the largest cluster, and therefore likely to show a strong correlation with the sample totals; yet we have already seen that cluster 3, with only 29 respondents less than cluster 4 (less than 2% of the sample), showed pronounced deviations from the norm in consistent patterns. A more interesting conclusion to be drawn, and one

validating this methodology, would be that the archetypal late *Homo Sovieticus* – the Soviet 'Joe Public', in other words – was captured perfectly in cluster 4.

To summarize...[19]

> 'The initial hypotheses about a political culture must thus take the form of statements which hold that the system behaves "as if" certain values, sentiments and orientations were the most critical in giving the collectivity its distinctive character'[20].

The above has hopefully made it clear that, from very early on in the analysis, the clusters exhibited an internal consistency which quickly gave rise to five very definite character types. The responses of these five character types, furthermore, also showed strong correlations between several aspects of the different theoretical frameworks discussed in Part I. Cluster 2, for example, seemed to have all the characteristics relative to 'ego strength', and also to exhibit others which would suggest familiarity with a *Gesellschaft* environment, possessing values similar to those normally associated with the rise of capitalism. Clusters 1 and 4, the two youngest, meanwhile, showed themselves to have predominantly 'open' belief systems, as shown, for instance, in their propensity to believe – as opposed to that of the other clusters – that 'There can never be absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. What is good and evil depends upon the circumstances at the time'[21]. This was important because this 'open' belief system, as we argued in Chapter Four, is also primarily *Gesellschaftliche*.

Nevertheless, confusing fault lines were also evident within each cluster, and needed to be explored further. Following the above example of the 'open mind', the difference between clusters 1 and 4, evident in the former's interest in politics, and the latter's interest in making money – both also *Gesellschaftliche* characteristics – showed that a deeper analysis of the correlations might perhaps establish how many different types of people could be considered *Gesellschaftliche*, and how many of these would be needed to constitute a *Gesellschaft*. In other words, what was being sought was to establish the extent of the *Gesellschaft*'s penetration – or lack of it – in Russian society in 1991, in order to proceed with an assessment of its development since that time.

Consequently, these findings needed to be analyzed and contextualized in order to construct a theoretical starting point for this study. The clusters had to be examined from the point of view of issues pertaining to the study of transitions – that is, issues of modernization related to the rise of capitalism and the consolidation of democracy – in order to establish which of their characteristics emerged as relevant to these issues. To put it in Glaser and Strauss' terms, the clusters' relationship to conceptual categories in the study of transitions needed to be looked at, in order to find what properties these categories might have. Already, certain of these properties were suggesting themselves, supporting Verba's contention that the study of political culture might benefit from Milton Rokeach's approach.

Were this to be so, it would have several implications for the approaches currently employed by scholars and statisticians in the field: if it was found that 'primitive' beliefs played a greater part in shaping the political culture of a nation than strictly political – secondary – beliefs, then this would support the contention that political culturalists using traditional approaches such as measuring party affiliation and voting behaviour to predict the development of democracy should not confuse the prospective stability of democracy in a country with the existence of the ideal conditions – that is, of Anglo-American notions of the ideal conditions – for democracy within it.

> 'The study of human behaviour [...] depends for its success upon the ability of the investigator [...] Quantitative measurements are quantitatively accurate; qualitative evaluations are always subject to the errors of human judgement. Yet it would seem far more worthwhile to make a shrewd guess regarding that which is essential than to accurately measure that which is likely to prove quite irrelevant'[22].

Notes

[1]Harry Alpert, comment to 'The Processes of Opinion Formation: A Symposium', pp. 685-6 at p. 686.

[2]World Values Study Group, *World Values Survey, 1981-84 and 1990-93* [computer file], ICPSR 6160. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research [producer], 1994. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1994. For other surveys examined, see Appendix A.

[3]Conducted by the Institute for Social and Political Research of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (Moscow) under the direction of Vladimir Andreenkov.

[4]See, for example, Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); see also Paul Abramson and Ronald Inglehart, *Value Change in Global Perspective* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

[5]*WVS*, V18.

[6]*Ibid.*, VV326-34.

[7]For the tables of VV326-34, see Appendix B.

[8]'The average linkage between groups method, often called UPGMA (unweighted pair-group method using arithmetic averages), defines the distance between two clusters as the average of the distances between all pairs of cases in which one member of the pair is from each of the clusters' – Norusis, *SPSS Professional Statistics*™, p. 97. The squared Euclidean distance is the sum of the square differences over all the variables used to form the clusters.

[9]The six- and seven-cluster solutions were rapidly discarded for subdividing some of the smaller groups in the five-cluster solution on the basis of very small distances without adding a meaningful dimension to it. The four-cluster solution, on the other hand, was a very strong contender for a long time, and had to be carefully compared to the five-cluster one, to the extent of analyzing the two case by case. In the end, this researcher chose the five-cluster solution as being more clearly differentiated in terms of the 'ego' variables' dimensions, but the choice is probably a matter of interpretation. At the heart of the dilemma were clusters 1 and 4, two clusters which were very similar in some respects, but radically different in others, as we will see over the course of this and the next three chapters.

[10]*WVS*, V181.

[11]The cluster numbers were assigned by SPSS, but this review will proceed in a logical rather than a numerical order.

[12]*WVS*, VV296-319. For the full text of these variables, see Appendix C.

[13]*Ibid.*, v197.

[14]*Ibid.*, V151. This was one of the few variables in which cluster 3 was *not* the most likely to answer 'don't know'.

[15]*Ibid.*, VV198-210.

[16]'"[P]arochial" and "subject" orientations tend to be characteristic of working-class females' – Pateman, 'The Civic Culture', p. 87. Two examples of the empirical evidence supporting this argument can be found in the *WVS*' own modules for Spain and the USA. The Spanish module was conducted in May 1990 by Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Políticos (ASEP, Madrid), under the direction of Juan Díez Nicolás, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (n=1,510); the module for the USA was conducted in May-June 1990 by The Gallup Organization (Princeton) under the direction of Alec Gallup, George Gallup and Max Larsen, The Gallup Organization, and Ronald Inglehart, University of Michigan (n=1,839).

[17]The average ages per cluster were as follows:

1	Mean	40.49
	Std. Dev.	14.92
2	Mean	41.56
	Std. Dev.	15.41
3	Mean	44.14
	Std. Dev.	16.24
4	Mean	40.94
	Std. Dev.	14.63
5	Mean	47.13
	Std. Dev.	16.68
Total	Mean	42.76
	Std. Dev.	15.70

[18]*WVS*, v 215.

[19]For ease of reference over the next three chapters, a short summary of the clusters and their salient characteristics has been given in Appendix D.

[20]Pye, 'Culture and Political Science', p. 73.

[21]*WVS*, V142.

[22]Richard LaPiere, 'Attitudes vs. Actions', in *Social Forces*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (December 1934), pp. 230-7 at p 237.

Chapter Seven – Shades of the Protestant Ethic

> 'And in truth this peculiar idea, so familiar to us today, but in reality so little a matter of course, of one's duty in a calling, is what is most characteristic of the social ethic of capitalistic culture, and is in a sense the fundamental basis of it. It is an obligation which the individual is supposed to feel [...] towards the content of his professional activity, no matter in what it consists, in particular no matter whether it appears on the surface as a utilization of his personal powers, or only of his material possessions'[1].

We saw in Chapter 4 that Tönnies, like Marx, believed that economic development was at the root of cultural change; consequently, before looking at political culture in its narrowest sense, respondents' attitudes to and involvement in the economy needed to be examined, in order to see if consistent patterns emerged within the clusters which could later be correlated to different political cultures among the population. This chapter will therefore proceed with an examination of those variables in the *WVS* which dealt with all aspects of the economy – from the financial situation of respondents to their beliefs about the role of the state in production and trade.

A starting point for this enquiry was provided by other scholars' attempts to relate Weber's ideas on the development of capitalism to his cross-national studies of political culture and postmaterialism[2]. Inglehart's article covered a lot of ground, but for the purposes of this chapter it was his argument that, '[w]hile economic development does not automatically bring about democracy, it does seem to be linked with socio-cultural changes that enhance its chances'[3] which was most relevant. Inglehart's analysis of the data from the *WVS* led him to conclude, firstly, that 'economic development itself is influenced by cultural variables'; and, secondly, that a 'process of cultural change began to take place in the more advanced industrial societies during the second half of the twentieth century' leading to a 'diminishing emphasis on economic growth in these societies together with increasing emphasis on environmental protection and preserving the quality of life'[4].

According to Inglehart, his results indicated that economic development only led to democracy when it brought about changes in the social structure and the political culture of a nation. He also found that '[l]ife satisfaction, political satisfaction,

interpersonal trust, and support for the existing social order [constituted] a syndrome of positive attitudes toward the world one live[d] in' that went 'with enduring democratic institutions', a view consistent with the concept of 'ego strength'. What his article did not address, however, was how extensive those changes and those views needed to be in order for a society to achieve a stable liberal democracy, focusing instead on a broad historical description of the societies under study. In this sense, Inglehart did not concern himself with the *presence* of the syndrome he prescribed as a necessary condition of an enduring democracy, but rather with its simple distribution among the populations concerned, with no regard for their socio-demographic characteristics. If Inglehart's line of reasoning were to be followed, then one would have to conclude that the results obtained from the Russian module of the *WVS* needed not be examined further, since democracy in any sense of the word would be impossible from his point of view.

However, even in 1991 things were not quite that simple. The percentage of Russians who thought that most people could be trusted was 37.5%, above the cross-national average[5]. This result highlighted the main problem with Inglehart's article: that it suffered from the same tautological flaw that several critics argued was found in The Civic Culture: the notion that whatever characteristics are found in countries that happen to be liberal democracies of long standing must necessarily be the characteristics of long-standing liberal democracy[6]. For this reason, although this study will examine the variables on trust and satisfaction with which Inglehart mapped the 'specific syndrome of political cultural attitudes'[7] which he argued was the basis of stable democratic polities, its aim will not be a prescriptive, or even a descriptive, one. The aim of this study will be instead not only to focus on groups, as we explained in Chapter Six, but also to look into the possibility that those groups might behave differently in different situations. In this manner, the whole range of political subcultures that can be present in a polity will be brought into relief, and some insight found into the sufficient conditions for the development of a democracy, even if it means one not conforming to Anglo-American scholars' exacting standards.

Consequently, of more interest for the purposes of this study is Inglehart's argument that 'the available evidence tends to confirm Weber's insight that culture is not just a consequence of economics but can shape the basic nature of economic and political life'[8], an insight that can serve as a frame of reference to supplement Tönnies' theories about the link between capitalism, democracy and the *Gesellschaft*. Both Weber and Tönnies concerned themselves 'with the psychological meaning of social entities rather than with their formal properties'[9], and they both understood that the development of capitalist society – the archetype of the *Gesellschaft* – involved a major shift in the way people conducted exchange transactions: Tönnies showed that barter became business, and Weber added to that the notion that the Protestant sects turned business into virtue, meaning that labour, as a duty to God, 'must be performed as an absolute end in itself, a *calling*'[10]. Bearing in mind that 'the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs'[11], and that modern-day capitalism has abandoned all moral justifications for the acquisition of wealth[12], it is the aim of this chapter to assess what kind of attitudes towards work could be found in Russia at the start of 1991: whether there were consistent attitudes to be found in each cluster, and, if so, whether they showed any correlation with the clusters' other characteristics in a way consistent with the hypotheses put forward so far.

The Sample...

We saw in the previous chapter that the respondents of the *WVS* were predominantly middle-income, middle-level, urban dwellers, as tends to happen in most surveys. Taking into account that in the all-encompassing Soviet bureaucracy the majority of jobs were very similar and salaries strictly ranked, this was even less surprising here. If we added to this the fact, mentioned earlier, that the occupational codes used by the *WVS* were not designed specifically for Russia and were therefore perhaps confusing for both respondents and interviewers, we had a situation in which assessing the population's position in the workplace was not easy[13]. Nevertheless, the accuracy of the survey's occupational classification was not really of relevance in order to assess respondents' 'ego-strength' with reference to the workplace: what we needed to find out was their attitude towards and thoughts

about work; what they put into it, and what they wanted from it; in short, how significant a part of their life it constituted.

At first sight, responses to this type of questions reflected a quasi-unanimous disinterest in work. The straight counts for variables relating to the workplace showed a population whose members, on the whole, did not concern themselves too much with what happened at their place of employment. Variables where missing answers were possible[14] sometimes had over six hundred of them, the record here being held by the question 'How free are you to make decisions in your job?', with 677 (34.5%) missing answers[15]. Indeed, as long as the pay was good and the people were pleasant, the average Russian did not seem very concerned even about things such as having 'Generous holidays' or 'Good job security'. There is no evidence to support this, but it could be hypothesized that decades of guaranteed, almost forced employment had created a population that could not even imagine being worried about such things, for which promotions and initiative were not part of their work experience – or, at least, not linked together.

Looking at these work variables, however, the most interesting feature of the Russian sample, in terms of Inglehart's theory that people in unstable democracies have low levels of satisfaction with various aspects of their lives, was that, of the 1,350 respondents working more than thirty hours a week, 58.1% were satisfied with the job to some degree or another, and, even when all 1,961 respondents were taken into account in order to include 'don't know' responses, the percentage of people satisfied with their job was still high, constituting two fifths of the sample.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	na	611	31.2	31.2	31.2
	dissatisfied	539	27.5	27.5	58.6
	satisfied	784	40.0	40.0	98.6
	dk	27	1.4	1.4	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

Table 7: job satisfaction amongst all respondents[16]

...and the Clusters

However, the cluster formations obtained from the 'ego' variables, cross-tabulated with variables relating to work and the economy, showed a more detailed landscape: one with small, but interesting, demographic differences among the sample population, which were evident even before the attitudinal work questions were run through the clusters. In terms of the employment status of their members, for example, each group showed very definite propensities. Seven of the fifteen respondents who were unemployed belonged to cluster 4, as well as ten of the twenty-two who replied 'other'; clusters 3 and 5 were the most likely to be either retired or housewives (they were, in fact, the only ones with indices over 100 in both categories); cluster 1 was by far the most likely to contain students, followed by cluster 2 (with indices of 143 and 117, respectively); and cluster 2 was in turn the most likely to work more than thirty hours a week, obtaining the only significant index score in this category.

Further exploration of the clusters' occupational characteristics was to be carried out with caution, in view of the problems outlined in the previous section. Nevertheless, the cross-tabulation of occupational codes by cluster[17] revealed some interesting patterns, which were consistent even in those categories with the least number of respondents. The only respondent in the entire sample who had never worked belonged to cluster 4; cluster 3's respondents were the most likely to be farmers or agricultural workers; the members of clusters 2 and 5 were the most likely to be in the armed forces; and cluster 1's respondents were predominantly white-collar. But perhaps the most interesting result for this variable in terms of the development of capitalism in Russia was that respondents in cluster 2 tended to be professionals, employers or managers; and, more importantly, to be employers or managers of establishments with *less than ten employees*. This was significant, given the Soviet workplace, because it indicated the presence among the members of cluster 2 of an entrepreneurial, capitalistic spirit which was, perhaps, already looking beyond *perestroika* itself in the last years of the Soviet regime.

On Satisfaction

We saw earlier that, whereas most of the sample were satisfied with their jobs, the same did not apply to their financial situation. Inglehart's theories on the positive correlation between different types of satisfaction aside, this was not, in itself, a result that needed cause much surprise: it is perfectly possible (some would say normal) to like one's job, but not one's salary[18]. All the same, the nature of the relationship between these variables needed to be examined in terms of the clusters, in order to assess the likelihood of the different possible linkages between the two.

For the variable on job satisfaction, only those respondents working over thirty hours a week were used in the cross-tabulation, since large numbers of 'NA' responses (used to mean 'not applicable' in this variable) would weight the clusters meaninglessly. Nevertheless, the entire sample was also run, as a frame of reference, and, as it turned out, a similar pattern was found in both sets of results: broadly speaking[19], clusters 1, 2 and 4 were satisfied with their jobs, and clusters 3 and 5 were not. An analysis of the full range of values possible for this variable substantiated this conclusion, whilst simultaneously adding detail and depth to it. The ten-value coding showed that, of the three 'satisfied' clusters – 1, 2 and 4 – cluster 4 tended to be the least enthusiastic, with scores over 100 in all the values from 6 to 10 ('satisfied' in various degrees), but with significant scores only in values 6 and 9. Clusters 1 and 2, on the other hand, had a marked tendency to be a lot more positive: cluster 1 obtained scores over 100 only in values 7 to 10, but its scores for 7 and 8 were very high indeed, followed by a fairly significant score for 10, the maximum value[20]. As for cluster 2, its indices shot up well over the sample totals in values 9 and 10, where it obtained scores of 122 and 173, respectively.

The other two clusters, 3 and 5, also showed differences of degree in their dissatisfaction. Cluster 3, although it had the highest index in value 1 (the most 'dissatisfied' a respondent could be) also obtained high indices in values 3, 4, 5 and 6 (crossing over the satisfied/dissatisfied border), whereas cluster 5's highest scores were in values 1, 2, 3 and 6. A further recoding into five values was therefore used to give a more concrete shape to these results, and the conclusion was that, although

both clusters had a high propensity to be dissatisfied, cluster 5's dissatisfaction tended to be greater than that found in cluster 3.

The entire sample was then used to assess the clusters' responses in terms of financial satisfaction, and, although this variable revealed a pattern broadly consistent with the above responses, a few interesting differences arose. When recoded into two values, 'yes' and 'no', it was clusters 2 and 5, this time, that were the most likely to be satisfied, with cluster 3 being the most likely to be dissatisfied and the indices for clusters 1 and 4 hovering around the sample totals in almost identical proportions. A more detailed examination of the full ten-value responses revealed that cluster 3 was the most likely to be totally dissatisfied, whereas cluster 2 scored highly in all the values from 6 to 10, particularly in the two highest[21]. Clusters 1 and 4's detailed results showed that cluster 4 was more likely than cluster 1 to be financially satisfied, and cluster 5's revealed that, although on the whole the respondents of this cluster were more likely than not to be satisfied with their jobs, the pattern of satisfaction within the cluster was inconsistent, with significant scores in values 2, 4, 6, 7 and 9. Reducing the sample population to respondents working more than thirty hours a week, for comparative purposes, had some effect on the indices for each of the ten values – giving, for example, cluster 1 higher scores in all values above 6 – but it did not, surprisingly perhaps, substantially alter the overall results, leaving cluster 3 dissatisfied, clusters 2 and 5 satisfied, and clusters 1 and 4 with indices only slightly above and below 100 in the values for satisfaction and dissatisfaction, respectively.

Work Priorities and A Division of Labour

The above variables intimated that there were indeed differences between the clusters in terms of their employment characteristics, and these differences were substantiated by attitudinal variables related to the workplace. That this was the case could best be illustrated with reference to a set of variables asking respondents what they considered important in a job[22]. Certain patterns arose in the responses that were confirmed by principal components factoring, which resulted in three dimensions in terms of which each variable could be classified: a practical one, one

relating to status and a social one; furthermore, each cluster could be described principally in terms of one of these dimensions.

For example, although cluster 3's indices were generally not far from the sample total, those which exceeded 100 – be it by an insignificant amount – were the ones for variables relating to the practical aspects of work, such as having good hours. Cluster 5, on the other hand, had a propensity to be more interested in the respect, both in terms of oneself and others, to be derived from a job. This propensity was also evident in cluster 1, and the two clusters also shared a second propensity – pertaining to the variables of the third, 'social' dimension – to consider 'meeting people' important in a job. Whether this was out of friendliness or for the purposes of networking can only be surmised. As for cluster 4, a trend which was to become very familiar emerged in these variables: the members of this cluster failed to exhibit, in this set of variables, a pronounced tendency to consider any of the factors surveyed important, except for job security, for which variable they had the highest score. On the positive side, however, the fact that *all* of cluster 4's statistically insignificant indices were over 100 indicated perhaps that, although the members of cluster 4 tended to lack specific preferences in terms of what was important at work, work still counted for something in their lives, perhaps even more than it did in the lives of the members of the other three clusters we have just looked at, since the high scores in terms of some of the variables were complemented by extremely low ones in others. This hypothesis, arguable in cluster 4's case, certainly found support in the results for cluster 2, whose members' interest in work *as of itself* seemed evident, not only because cluster 2 obtained the highest scores in all these variables, (except for 'Good job security', where cluster 4's index was higher) but also because of the characteristics – both attitudinal and socio-demographic – that this cluster had exhibited so far in terms of work.

If comparisons between clusters 2 and 4 seemed forced on this issue, clearer ones could be made between clusters 2 and 5 – although, in their case, it was more a case of contrasting than comparing their attitudes, which differed greatly. That work was a significant part of life was a tendency also exhibited by cluster 5, but cluster 5's

interest in work was more focused and related to specific aspects of it, as opposed to being a general propensity to answer positively on *all* counts concerning work.

At the heart of the differences between clusters 2 and 5 concerning not only work as a personal activity, but also work as a mechanism of the economy, was the fact that the members of cluster 5 – who, as we have already seen, had a tendency to be old-fashioned and with a strong sense of duty, right and wrong – were inclined to see work as a social duty, not an individual career choice. They had, for example, a strong tendency to believe that one 'Should follow instructions of one's superiors even when one doesn't fully agree with them'[23], a statement that not even cluster 3, the cluster least likely to feel that they had decision-making freedom in their job, tended to agree with. The fact that the members of cluster 5 had a strong tendency to be in favour of both state ownership and the notion that 'People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits'[24] therefore came as no surprise. Their tendency to obey authority, coupled with their greater likelihood to believe that, in business and industry, 'The government should be the owner and appoint the managers'[25], completed a portrait of the members of cluster 5 as stalwarts of the command economy.

Cluster 2, on the other hand, could not be more different. We said above that this cluster was the only one which, throughout all the variables relating to work, exhibited a consistent propensity to hold a positive attitude – that is, one which considered work a significant part of life which deserved to be thought about, rather than simply be carried out. This was particularly reflected in the high propensity exhibited by this cluster to consider having 'Good chances for promotion'[26] important in a job, and, more significantly, perhaps, their extremely high propensity to want 'An opportunity to use initiative'[27] in a job – much higher than that of any other cluster. This dynamic, 'can do' attitude spilled over into this cluster's opinions about the economy, about which they tended to think, for instance, that 'Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves', rather than thinking that 'The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for'[28] – the complete opposite of cluster 5's propensity in this variable. This kind of attitude, what we called in Chapter Six cluster 2's 'Thatcherite' edge, could be seen in

many variables: they tended to be in favour of privatization and against making incomes more equal, and tended to believe in wealth as an unlimited asset[29]. Rather more harshly, however, they were also the most likely to believe that 'It is unfair to give work to handicapped people when able-bodied people can't find jobs', and that 'When jobs are scarce, people should be forced to retire early'[30]. On the less callous side, their tendency to believe that 'When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women' was not particularly pronounced, although it was, of course, the 'female' clusters, 1 and 3, that were the least likely to think so[31]. Cluster 2's respondents were also the most likely to believe that a 'Decrease in the importance of work in our lives'[32] would be a bad thing, which was hardly surprising, since they tended not only to derive a lot of satisfaction from work, as we saw before, but also to take 'a great deal' of pride in it[33]. Coming from the cluster most likely to be satisfied with their financial situation and with the highest propensity to think that others envied their possessions, it was also not surprising that they were the least likely to believe that 'Less emphasis on money and material possessions' would be a good thing, although, interestingly, the most likely to believe that it would actually be a *bad* thing to happen in the near future was cluster 1 – diamonds being a girl's best friend, presumably[34].

Cluster 1 was also interesting because, at least as far as the work variables were concerned, it did not, on the whole, deviate from the sample totals in a pattern consistent with that of cluster 3, but was closer instead to clusters 2 and 4, suggesting that age was a stronger factor in these responses than sex. This meant that, although there were questions where cluster 1 did indeed 'side' with cluster 3 instead of clusters 2 and 4 – as well as their tendency to disagree with the statement that men had more right to jobs than women, clusters 1 and 3 also shared a propensity not to consider 'Good job security' an important aspect of work – cluster 1's indices on the whole tended to follow a pattern of either being slightly over the sample total for positive responses, like those of cluster 4, or being significantly above it, like those of cluster 2. For instance, on the one hand, clusters 1 and 4 both tended slightly to be in favour of private enterprise – with scores of 106 and 108, respectively – and tended to disagree with making people take jobs they did not want or lose their benefits. On the other hand, clusters 1 and 2 were similar in their tendency to want responsible

jobs where they could use initiative and achieve something, and in their tendency to think that 'There should be greater incentives for individual effort'[35]. Cluster 1 could not, however, be seen solely in terms of age and sex, and of its relationships with clusters 2, 3 and 4. There was an added dimension to cluster 1's responses, one which was evidenced by the fact that, although its respondents shared with those of cluster 4 a propensity to agree with the statement 'I enjoy working but I don't let it interfere with the rest of my life'[36], they went much further than that, and in fact considered work the most important thing in their lives, a propensity for which cluster 1 obtained the same index as cluster 5.

What lay at the core of these seemingly random patterns were three fault-lines, each of which divided the clusters into different groups. The first, which would emerge with much greater clarity in variables relating to politics and could be termed idealist, could be observed especially in the shared propensities of cluster 1 and 5 with reference to the variable set tapping into the importance of different possible features of the workplace. The second fault-line concerned abstract ideas about the economy and how it should function, and this time the cluster groupings were more complicated: clusters 1, 3 and 4 evinced a consistent lack of deviation from the sample totals in questions about issues such as privatization, income distribution or the welfare state[37]; clusters 2 and 5, on the other hand, deviated markedly from the sample totals and took opposing stances which could be termed 'capitalist' and 'socialist', respectively.

Finally, the third fault-line was the exact opposite of the last one, and divided the clusters in terms of their direct personal experience of the economy. The best example of this was how, in variables relating to finance and the economy, the respondents in cluster 4 came alive somewhat. In their interest in questions pertaining to personal finance they thus resembled cluster 2, a fact not surprising if we consider that cluster 4 was the most likely cluster to earn 191-250 roubles a month, and the second most likely to be financially satisfied overall. So, for example, when respondents were asked whether they thought it was fair that an efficient secretary be paid more than an inefficient one for doing the same job, those in cluster 4 tended, with cluster 2, to think it was fair, even though the former's scores

in such variables were still not very high. Moreover, this variable was another example of cluster 1's 'idealism', since its members shared the tendency exhibited by clusters 3 and 5 to consider the proposition unfair.

The Modern Clash of Civilizations

> 'The spirit of capitalism [...] had to fight its way to supremacy against a whole world of hostile forces. A state of mind such as that [belonging to it] would both in ancient times and in the Middle Ages have been proscribed as the lowest sort of avarice and as an attitude entirely lacking in self-respect. It is, in fact, still regularly thus looked upon by all those social groups which are least involved in, or adapted to, modern capitalistic conditions'[38].

In 1991, *Homo Sovieticus* was waking up, not just to the free market, but to the pursuit of happiness as understood in the American constitution. Among certain sections of what at first seemed a uniformly disenchanted and apathetic population, a new spirit was developing which seemed to indicate the birth of a work ethic similar to that which Weber called 'Protestant'[39]. The development of this work ethic in Russia was of central importance in terms of the framework of this study, since, although '[c]apitalistic acquisition as an adventure has been at home in all types of economic society which have known trade with the use of money' – and was, indeed, present in the Soviet Union under the guise of various types of mafias and rackets, particularly in areas such as Georgia and Uzbekistan – the simple 'desire for wealth [...] has in itself nothing to do with capitalistic action, which involves a regular orientation to the achievement of profit through (nominally peaceful) economic exchange', and one which, in the West, became associated with 'the *rational organization of formally free labour*'[40]. In other words, having posited a link between economic modernization and the development of a democratic polity, it follows that the emergence of this type of ethic in a nation is of central importance in terms of its economic and cultural development because it represents a shift from 'traditional types of enterprise' – such as the Soviet apparatus (for all its scale) or mafia structures – to 'an outlook of a specific kind: the continual accumulation of wealth for its own sake'[41]. Without this outlook, modern capitalism does not make sense[42].

Inglehart's contention that this outlook was no longer prevalent in the Western world, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, does not alter the significance

of this shift in terms of a nation's economic development[43]. This is not the place for an in-depth discussion of late twentieth-century capitalism and the global economy, but even if his argument is right, and it was indeed the predominance of postmaterialist values in the world's most advanced economies which have been the cause of their economic slowdown (because 'postmaterialists are economic under-achievers'[44]), it still remains the case that, regardless of cultural developments in these advanced economies, countries without their level of economic infrastructure will compete with difficulty unless they also undergo that first radical socio-economic transformation which constitutes the shift from the *Gemeinschaft* to the *Gesellschaft*. More importantly, what Inglehart did not examine was the composition of the different publics under study: to say that 'as a result of the historically unprecedented prosperity and the absence of war that has prevailed in Western countries since 1945' postmaterialist values are on the increase among their citizens is simply stating the obvious[45]: increased prosperity means increased leisure time to devote oneself to the finer things in life. But what this argument does not address is the fact that, in every society and at every point in time, there will always be 'postmaterialists' – artists, soldiers, sportsmen, teachers. Consequently, when studying the relationship between culture and capitalism, it might be more useful to apply Ockham's razor and focus, not on the existence of postmaterialists, but on the existence of *capitalists*. In other words, a better question than those posed by Inglehart would perhaps simply be: how many capitalists does it take to build a stable capitalist economy, and where do they have to be?

It has, in fact, been the aim of this chapter to prepare the ground for answering these questions, an aim that has been met with some success. By analyzing variables to do with work, finance and the economy, we saw that some of the clusters did indeed exhibit a tendency to hold an attitude which was 'not simply a means of making one's way in the world, but a peculiar ethic': one which, although stripped of all its religious connotations, fostered the 'idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself'[46]. This tendency was most pronounced in cluster 2, but was also beginning to emerge quite distinctly in cluster 1 and 4, although different aspects of the ethic involved predominated in each. Cluster 2, for example, exhibited many of the characteristics one would

normally associate not only with capitalism, but with capitalism at its most ruthless, whereas the respondents in cluster 4 tended to devote their attention to the personal and financial, being neither the model Soviet citizen nor the capitalistic entrepreneur. Cluster 1, on the other hand, was composed of respondents who were most concerned with personal and ethical issues; a possible interpretation of this idealism would be that, having grown up during a period of greater exposure in the USSR to global issues such as the environment, and possibly being more familiar with Western trends than their older cohorts, the members of this cluster were 'premature' postmaterialists.

Moreover, since these clusters were found to be significantly different from the other two in terms of their respondents' financial and job satisfaction, it remained to be seen whether 'economic development changes the way people think about politics', and 'fosters the emergence of something like a "civic culture"'[47]. If this was the case, as has been argued so far in this study, then clusters 1, 2 and 4 should exhibit at least some of the characteristics pertaining to the democratic syndrome in terms of their orientation to politics, and it is this question which the next chapter will examine.

Notes

[1]Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by F Talcott Parsons (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 54.

[2]See Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', and Rukavishnikov *et al.*, 'Rossiia mezhdu proshlym i budushchim'. The methodological problems of these two articles have already been discussed; it remains to be added that Rukavishnikov's premise was that, since the Eastern European data in the *WVS* showed the state of the countries in that area two years after the velvet revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall, a comparison could be made between the data obtained from these countries by the *WVS* and data obtained in Russia two years later, in 1993-4. Rukavishnikov's team, however, focused their analysis on measuring postmaterialism, and were therefore not as concerned as Inglehart had been on using 'the dominant religious tradition of a given society as an indicator of its preindustrial cultural heritage' – Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1221.

[3]*Ibidem.*

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 1224.

[5]There is no need to repeat here all the questions raised by Inglehart's article, which were reviewed in Chapter Three (pp. 44-6). The results for trust could be supported by the results, already mentioned, of the 1993 and 1994 surveys used by Rukavishnikov *et al.*, which were 54% and 57% respectively – see Chapter Three, p. 44 (n. 8).

[6]'What exactly is the status of the 'civic culture"? Is it a description? Or is it an abstract model of orientations that we should expect to find in the political culture of a democracy? [...] One of the problems of the civic culture is that it hovers uneasily between these two possibilities' – Pateman, 'The Civic Culture', p. 66. Other critics were 'not even sure why we should regard [participant-cum-allegiant] values as "appropriate" or "congruent" for [democratic] systems

other than because we have discovered them there' – Dennis Kavanagh, *Political Culture* (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 66.

[7]Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1203.

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 1229.

[9]Stafford, 'Ferdinand Tönnies', p. 15.

[10]Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, p. 62.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 182.

[12]'In the field of its highest development, in the United States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends to become associated with purely mundane passions, which often actually give it the character of sport' – *ibidem.*

[13]The problems related to the analyses of occupational variables in Russian surveys are important for methodological reasons, and will be dealt with more fully in Chapter Eleven.

[14]As opposed to variables coded as 'mentioned' or 'not mentioned', like the 'ego' variables. It is worth pointing out that with such variable sets respondents were always allowed to see all the options possible and choose the ones which they thought relevant.

[15]*WVS*, V117.

[16]*Ibid.*, V116. 'Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your job?' Respondents were shown a card with a scale from 1 ('Dissatisfied') to 10 ('Satisfied'), on which they marked their position. For the purposes of summarizing general job satisfaction, this variable was recoded here into 'dissatisfied' (values 1-5) or 'satisfied' (values 6-10).

[17]*Ibid.*, V359. The occupational categories given were the following:

'Employer/manager of establishment with 10 or more employees
Employer/manager of establishment less than 10 employees
Professional worker – lawyer, accountant, teacher, etc.
Middle level non-manual – office worker, etc.
Junior level non-manual – office worker, etc.
Foreman and supervisor
Skilled manual worker
Semi-skilled manual worker
Unskilled manual worker
Farmer: employer, manager on own account
Agricultural worker
Member of armed forces
Never had a job'.

[18]The reverse can also happen, of course.

[19]That is, recoding this variable into two values – see n. 16.

[20]Cluster 1's indices for values 7, 8 and 10 were 133, 122 and 114, respectively.

[21]This was not surprising, in view of the fact that, as noted in Chapter Six, the members of cluster 2 were the most likely to be earning over 251 roubles a month, the top income bracket in the survey.

[22]*WVS.*, VV99-114. 'Here are some aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job?

A) Good pay
B) Pleasant people to work with
C) Not too much pressure
D) Good job security
E) Good chances for promotion
F) A job respected by people in general
G) Good hours
H) An opportunity to use initiative
I) A useful job for society
J) Generous holidays
K) Meeting people
L) A job in which you feel you can achieve something
M) A responsible job
N) A job that is interesting
O) A job that meets one's abilities
None of these'.

[23]*Ibid.*, V127.

[24]*Ibid.*, V253.

[25]*Ibid.*, V126.

[26]*Ibid.*, V103.

[27]*Ibid.*, V106.
[28]*Ibid.*, V252.
[29]*Ibid.*, VV251, 250 and 256, respectively. These variables, 250 and 256, asked respondents which of two contrasting statements they agreed with – see Appendix E for the full text.
[30]*Ibid.*, VV131 and 129, respectively.
[31]*Ibid.*, V128. Interestingly, not all males – in fact, not even the majority of males in the survey agreed with this statement:

			SEX		Total
			male	female	
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women	agree	Count	365	379	744
		% within SEX	43.6%	33.7%	37.9%
	neither	Count	58	45	103
		% within SEX	6.9%	4.0%	5.3%
	disagree	Count	371	641	1012
		% within SEX	44.3%	57.0%	51.6%
	dk	Count	43	59	102
		% within SEX	5.1%	5.2%	5.2%
Total		Count	837	1124	1961
		% within SEX	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

[32]*Ibid.*, V265.
[33]*Ibid.*, V115.
[34]*Ibid.*, V264. These variables, 264-271, had three possible values: good, neither, bad – hence the discrepancy.
[35]*Ibid.*, V250.
[36]*Ibid.*, V121.
[37]The exception to this was, of course, cluster 3's characteristically high scores in the 'don't know' box.
[38]Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, p. 56.
[39]To reiterate what was said at the beginning of this chapter, even by the time Weber coined the term it had lost all its religious connotations, and it must not be taken to mean that anyone possessed of the 'capitalist spirit' is necessarily a Protestant. Furthermore, it must also be borne in mind that it was not Weber's intention to maintain that 'the spirit of capitalism [...] could only have arisen as the result of certain effects of the Reformation, or even that capitalism as an economic system is a creation of the Reformation' – *ibid.*, p.91.
[40]Anthony Giddens, 'Introduction', in Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, pp. vii-xxvi at p. xi (italics as in text).
[41]*Ibid.*, p. xii.
[42]As anyone who has tried to explain the workings of the stock exchange will know.
[43]We are referring here, of course, to Inglehart's notion that 'a process of cultural change began to take place in the more advanced industrial societies during the second half of the twentieth century [...] Precisely in those regions that had earlier been most influenced by the Protestant ethic [...] generations emerged that [...] were characterized, increasingly, by the presence of postmaterialist values' – Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture', p. 1224.
[44]*Ibidem.*
[45]*Ibidem.*
[46]Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, p. 51.
[47]Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 396.

Chapter Eight – Looking for the Party Animals

> 'The focus on political *culture* rather than political *attitudes* implies a concentration upon the attitudes held by all the members of a political system rather than upon the attitudes held by individuals or particular categories of individuals. As anthropologists have used the term "culture", it has frequently referred to those aspects of belief systems that are shared by members of a society and that are distinctive to that group. Our approach is somewhat different. To concentrate only on shared beliefs might lead one to overlook situations where significant political beliefs were held only by certain groups, and where the very fact that these attitudes were not shared by most members of the system was of crucial importance [...] Our approach is to begin with a set of belief dimensions that seem particularly crucial for the understanding of the operation – in particular the development and adaptability – of a political system, and then ask whether or not members of a political system share attitudes on these dimensions'[1].

One should perhaps open this chapter with the simplest measure of political attitudes: political stance. However, notions of left and right in the Soviet Union of January 1991 did not translate neatly or directly into the Western political frameworks or points of reference. In the same way that all fascist parties started off as workers' parties with strong ideas about welfare and social co-operation[2], extreme 'left' and 'right' political views, when translated into practice, have more in common than it may at first seem. A full metaphysical analysis is not needed here, but what is relevant about this argument is that one of the things they have in common – perhaps *the* main thing they have in common, and this was Rokeach's point – is that extreme left and right ideologies are both 'closed' belief systems. In that sense, we should look at politics not as a spectrum ranging from left to right, but from 'open' to 'closed'. This is a particularly useful approach in non-western political systems, where political parties do not have an established tradition, and therefore lack an overarching institutional identity behind them, often being set up as showcases for individual populist politicians, using a selective approach to ideological content. As Zhirinovskii once said: 'My program? It is like everybody else's: *perestroika*, free market and democracy!'[3]

In the Soviet Union of January 1991 there was a similar problem. Should 'left' be construed to mean, traditionally, 'progressive' and 'radical', or should it be taken to mean 'conservative', as in 'Soviet'? And what about 'right', what did *that* mean? The answers to these questions, or, at least, what these questions meant to the respondents of the *WVS* will forever remain unclear: however, Rokeach's 'open' and

'closed' framework can be used to, perhaps, make the results a little more illuminating.

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
POLITICAL STAND	left	Count	18	17	29	35	28	127
		% within CLUSTERS	5.1%	9.3%	5.3%	6.1%	9.4%	6.5%
	centre-left	Count	47	26	64	77	51	265
		% within CLUSTERS	13.4%	14.2%	11.7%	13.3%	17.1%	13.5%
	centre	Count	136	58	163	221	95	673
		% within CLUSTERS	38.6%	31.7%	29.7%	38.2%	31.8%	34.3%
	centre-right	Count	19	14	15	33	14	95
		% within CLUSTERS	5.4%	7.7%	2.7%	5.7%	4.7%	4.8%
	right	Count	6	4	8	11	9	38
		% within CLUSTERS	1.7%	2.2%	1.5%	1.9%	3.0%	1.9%
	dk	Count	126	64	270	201	102	763
		% within CLUSTERS	35.8%	35.0%	49.2%	34.8%	34.1%	38.9%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 8: political stand (five values)[4]

Leaving aside cluster 3's propensity not to identify with any political position whatsoever, a definite split between the centre and the extremes of the spectrum emerged, more pronounced than any left-right division. Clusters 1 and 4 which, as we saw earlier, were the only ones to believe that what is right and wrong depends on circumstances, were also the only ones with scores over 100 in the centre of the political spectrum. Clusters 2 and 5, on the other hand, whose moral judgements tended to be less flexible, had high scores at *both* extremes of the political spectrum, with an emphasis on right and left, respectively, adding substance to the small counts at either end. Thus, the results of this variable for clusters 2 and 5 could be interpreted in the following manner: these two clusters, which have already been shown to have been politically engaged and to hold very definite opinions on various issues, showed a tendency to have 'closed' belief systems in that they were the most likely to position themselves at the very edges of the political spectrum, added to which, within that tendency, cluster 2 was more likely to lean to the right, whilst cluster 5's leanings were decidedly to the left – whatever those terms meant to the respondents themselves[5]. Finally, this variable also showed that cluster 4 had overall

higher scores on the right-hand side of the spectrum, a conclusion confirmed by analyzing the variable binomially: using a simple left/right approach, cluster 4 was more likely to position itself on the right, and cluster 1 on the left.

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
POLITICAL STAND	left	Count	187	89	221	295	155	947
		% within CLUSTERS	53.1%	48.6%	40.3%	51.0%	51.8%	48.3%
	right	Count	39	30	58	82	42	251
		% within CLUSTERS	11.1%	16.4%	10.6%	14.2%	14.0%	12.8%
	dk	Count	126	64	270	201	102	763
		% within CLUSTERS	35.8%	35.0%	49.2%	34.8%	34.1%	38.9%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 9: political stand (two values) [6]

The different ways in which such answers could be coded were a reminder of the problems of quantification in the social sciences which we looked at in Chapter Five. Not only in terms of translating subjective self-placement into a meaningful range of positions, but also in terms of the *meaning* of different political positions to different respondents, which, to repeat what was said earlier, was at the core of Rokeach's attempt to transcend superficial political labels in order to tap, as Verba recommended, into the values which lay at the core of people's political and social selves. The self-placement of the survey's respondents therefore needed to be contextualized if it was to be meaningful, something which could only be achieved by looking at these self-placements in conjunction with responses on specific political issues, as, for example, which basic attitude best described respondents' opinion on the ideal processes of change:

'1. The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action
2. Our society must be gradually improved by reforms
3. Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces

Don't know'.

Cluster 3 did not disappoint, and scored very highly in the 'don't know' box. Interestingly, though, it showed a tiny propensity – perhaps only due to sample variance, but constituting an interesting line of inquiry nevertheless – to be of the

opinion that society had to be valiantly defended. Indices for the other clusters, however, were less helpful than could have been hoped for, with one exception: cluster 2 had a very high propensity to believe in radical change, reasserting the fearless entrepreneurial spirit shown by the members of this cluster in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, this variable failed, on the whole, to clarify the meaning of respondents' political stand, and it was perhaps not surprising. What *could* political labels really mean, when the traditional attitudes behind them had suddenly seen themselves reversed? In January 1991, Marxism-Leninism was still the official ideology of the power-holders, and 'the left' was being used by many different groups to mean very different things: from hard-liners defending the *status quo* of the Brezhnev years, to radical reformers advocating *perestroika* and a return to the true teachings of Leninism – which, they argued, had been hijacked by Stalin and corrupted over the years.

On the other hand, responses to a question concerning the pace of political reform showed clear fault lines emerging among some of the clusters. Clusters 1 and 2 tended to disagree with the proposition that political reform was moving too rapidly, whilst cluster 5 tended to agree with it. Respondents in cluster 3 opted for 'don't know' in overwhelming numbers, even for them (24% of the cluster, which gave an index of 172), and cluster 4 seemed undecided, ranging subtly above and below the sample totals, showing the lack of a marked propensity to be of a particular opinion either way – all of which results were consistent with the tendencies exhibited by the clusters in the variables dealt with in Chapters Six and Seven. Cluster 4's lack of any marked propensity to deviate from the sample totals was also emerging as its defining feature, not just in certain types of variables, but overall, as confirmed by most variables to do with politics and the political system. Aside from the variable for self-placement, and with notably few exceptions, its indices for political variables were rarely above or below 10 points on either side of the sample total. Furthermore, those exceptions tended to relate to values and variables which did not particularly reflect any degree of political competence on the part of respondents (an example of one such deviation was the fact that they had 'quite a lot' of confidence in the educational system). All the tendencies exhibited so far by this cluster, then, confirmed that the profile for the members of this cluster was the most similar to

that for the total sample, and that this cluster was therefore the most representative of the average Soviet citizen in 1991 – one more open to consumer society than those found in previous generations, but one whose formative experiences during the stagnation period had left with very low levels of political competence.

On Confidence

Five questions in the WVS could be used to examine whether, in the final years of the Soviet regime, a shift in allegiance from the USSR to the RSFSR was taking place in January 1991, questions asking about respondents' confidence in the Soviet system, and in the government and parliament of both the USSR and Russia[7]. The straight counts showed that confidence in the Soviet political system as a whole was at a cross-roads by this time, with a small majority of respondents replying that they had either 'not very much' or 'none at all'. The same was the case for their confidence in the government and parliament of the USSR, but the situation was reversed when it came to their confidence in those of the RSFSR[8]. However, when these variables were analyzed in order to examine the shift in allegiances that one might expect to find (given developments later that year), what was interesting was that, far from showing a split in respondents' allegiance to different parts of the system, cross-tabulations between these variables revealed a very strong direct correlation between confidence in the institutions of one centre of power and the other.

		CONFIDENCE:GOVERNMENT RUSSIA					
		a great deal	quite a lot	not very much	none at all	dk	Total
CONFIDENCE:GOVERNMENT USSR	a great deal	118	29	23	14	4	188
	quite a lot	81	429	97	18	19	644
	not very much	61	298	234	26	12	631
	none at all	53	131	59	93	9	345
	dk	4	25	6	4	114	153
Total		317	912	419	155	158	1961

Table 10: confidence in the governments of the USSR and Russia (straight counts)

		CONFIDENCE:PARLIAMENT RUSSIA					
		a great deal	quite a lot	not very much	none at all	dk	Total
CONFIDENCE:PARLIAMENT USSR	a great deal	121	33	16	11	1	182
	quite a lot	74	453	100	24	11	662
	not very much	54	283	257	27	14	635
	none at all	42	116	67	88	9	322
	dk	3	25	6	4	122	160
Total		294	910	446	154	157	1961

Table 11: confidence in the parliaments of the USSR and Russia (straight counts)

Confidence in the organs of power was also strongly positively correlated to confidence in the Soviet political system as a whole. The shift in allegiances and its influence on the collapse of the USSR were therefore not as yet apparent in this survey, based on the straight counts. However, the different political subcultures that might exist in a nation do not necessarily carry the same weight, since, as elite theory has argued, 'the beliefs of some are more important than those of others'[9]; the failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union might therefore have been a consequence of the focus on straight counts prevalent to this day in the survey methodology of the social sciences. Part of the reasoning behind the clustering approach was therefore also the fact that analyzing respondents in clusters might be a way of locating these subcultures and assessing their different weights with regards to the country's political and economic situation. If the theories set out in Part 1 of this thesis were correct, then the views of *Gesellschaftliche* respondents would 'count' for more than those of *Gemeinschaftliche* ones, since the former, by virtue of being urban and more educated, would be not only closer to the centres of power, but also more politically competent and better informed. Before looking at each cluster's confidence in the institutions of power and the system, however, we will look at their overall confidence levels in other kinds of institutions, in order to assess whether respondents' confidence levels in the institutions of government were specific to those institutions, or just one more dimension of a general feeling of trust or distrust.

As we saw earlier, cluster 4's indices tended not to deviate significantly from the sample totals in questions about abstract concepts, a pattern maintained in the

'confidence' variable set[10]. There were a few exceptions in these variables, but they were found in those variables briefly described above pertaining to confidence in the Soviet political system and the parliaments and governments of the USSR and RSFSR, which we will examine later. Aside from those five variables, however, there were only two other exceptions to the flat index numbers found in cluster 4's general trend of responses. The first, as was mentioned at the end of the previous section, was that cluster 4 was the most likely to have 'quite a lot' of confidence in the educational system, being, correspondingly, one of the least likely to answer 'none at all'. The second exception was that cluster 4 also tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence in the civil service. Those two exceptions notwithstanding, cluster 4 was remarkable on account of how unremarkable it was in this set of variables, a feature of this cluster which, as we have seen, was proving very consistent.

Cluster 3, on the other hand, followed a pronounced pattern of responses in these variables. Although clusters 3 and 4 were similar in their scores for the values 'quite a lot' and 'not very much', cluster 3 had a greater tendency *not* to answer 'a great deal' or 'none at all'. In fact, in terms of the response 'a great deal', cluster 3's indices were markedly low for many of the variables – often significantly lower than its indices for 'none at all' – in a pattern that suggested a definite scepticism with regards to the agencies of the State. The only institution for which cluster 3 showed even a slight propensity of trust was, in fact, the church, which, with the arguable exception of the press at that point in Soviet history, was the only institution in the given list which could be said to be independent of the State.

In this pattern of scepticism, cluster 3 was similar to cluster 1, the indices of which for 'a great deal' were, on the whole, extremely low. Nevertheless, aside from the fact that cluster 1's tendency to have confidence in the church was much lower than cluster 3's, the former's scepticism was not as pervasive as the latter's, and was counteracted with significant scores for 'quite a lot' in certain variables. In other words, cluster 1's responses might be construed as reflecting a 'healthy' scepticism towards authority, whereby confidence in the institutions of the state was tempered with an awareness of their limitations and a desire to curtail their power. This was suggested by the pattern of cluster 1's confidence levels: some institutions, such as

the press and the legal system, obtained 'quite a lot' of confidence from cluster 1, but agencies of coercion, such as the police and the armed forces, and those of direct 'manipulation' by the State (as it were), such as television and the educational system, tended to be seen with 'not very much' confidence. What was most interesting about these answers, however, was that cluster 1, whether expressing confidence or not, never tended to give extreme answers, once again reflecting cluster 1's overriding propensity to be moderate in most things.

We saw an opposite tendency to opt for extreme values in clusters 2 and 5's responses to political self-placement, and this propensity was also found in their responses to the confidence variables, where they were overwhelmingly the most likely to answer *both* 'a great deal' and 'none at all'. Nevertheless, certain significant patterns could be observed in these variables. Firstly, although their scores were often high at both extremes, cluster 5's indices flattened out around the sample totals in a few of the variables, whereas cluster 2's were high throughout, reflecting perhaps an even more comprehensive world view than that of cluster 5. One such variable was that related to the armed forces: whereas cluster 2 had a very strong propensity to have both 'a great deal' of confidence in them and 'none at all', cluster 5's indices showed a very slight tendency to have confidence in them, but with indices not very far from the sample totals. Secondly, in terms of the patterns of agreement between the two clusters, the underlying factor seemed to be whether or not the variable concerned was one of the five we examined at the beginning, or one of the other nine. The main difference was that, although responses for all these variables showed that the members of these two clusters had 'closed' belief systems, in the extremity of their positions with reference to all the institutions surveyed, in the nine 'non-political' variables (for want of a better word to describe them) their indices did not follow one consistent pattern in terms of their negative responses. Whereas, for instance, respondents in both clusters tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence in the church, the press and the police, cluster 5 exhibited a fairly strong propensity to also *not* have confidence in the church, whilst a similar negative propensity was present in cluster 2's responses concerning the police. Thus it was that, in each of these two variables, one cluster had a strong propensity to go both ways while the other tended definitely to have 'a great deal' of confidence in the institution

concerned in each case. Yet this pattern was not consistent in the variable concerning the press: the two clusters both tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence in the press, without a counteracting propensity to also have 'none at all'. Nevertheless, this researcher would argue that, for the purposes of this study, the main point to be derived from these results was that cluster 2 had, overall, a greater propensity to exhibit the kind of trust expected from a citizen with 'ego strength' than cluster 5. This was significant because these results, coupled with those for the economic and work variables, seemed strong enough evidence to support the contention that there is indeed a link between 'ego strength' and the capitalist spirit.

Having thus seen the clusters' responses in terms of their confidence in various institutions not directly – or, at least, not expressly – of a political nature, we can now return to the five variables cross-tabulated earlier, and examine how responses to these variables fitted in to overall patterns of confidence. As we have seen, the values obtained within each cluster so far resulted in several types of clusters. Firstly, we saw that clusters 1 and 3 could be termed 'sceptical' clusters, with cluster 3 being the least engaged and least likely overall to have confidence in the majority of the institutions surveyed. Then we saw that cluster 4 did not exhibit a marked propensity to reply in any particular manner, and that its indices remained fairly constant around the sample totals. Finally, clusters 2 and 5, and particularly cluster 2, showed a high propensity to respond in extreme terms, whether it be to say that they had 'a great deal' of confidence, or 'none at all', their members often being split between the two extremes, but never showing a propensity to be found in the centre values. The political variables in this set confirmed these conclusions, and added another dimension, one whereby the meaning of 'left' and 'right' – our starting point of enquiry – could be clarified somewhat, a point which we will return to presently.

Cluster 3, to start with the cluster having shown the least propensity to have confidence in any institution, maintained its position of mistrust in terms of the political variables in this set. Aside from its high indices in the 'don't know' box, this cluster had the lowest indices for the positive values in these variables, and stayed close to the sample totals in the negative ones, these values being the only ones for which its indices ventured over 100 at all. The only significantly high score that this

cluster obtained in these five variables, in fact, was that it had 'not very much' confidence in the government of the USSR. What was interesting about this response was that, of the four institutions surveyed (no considering the 'Soviet political system' an institution *per se*), this would have been the one, given cluster 3's consistent lack of knowledge and competence in political and economic matters, that its members must have been most familiar with, if only through daily experience alone. This would seem to suggest that the members of cluster 3 were not so much apathetic as alienated (to use Carnaghan's dichotomy[11]) since, where the objects of political orientation surveyed were known to tem, their responses were definite and distrustful, and that it was due only to their ignorance that a more pronounced tendency towards actual alienation from the system – a system in which, overall, cluster 3 failed to significantly either have confidence or not – was absent.

As for the other cluster which failed to show pronounced tendencies on many variables – that is, cluster 4 – the set of variables relating to the political system finally revealed an interesting and definite tendency among the members of this cluster. Although still keeping close to the sample totals on the questions concerning the two Russian institutions and the Soviet political system, this cluster tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence in the parliament of the USSR and 'quite a lot' of confidence in the government of the USSR. It seemed that the 'Average Joes' had stuck out their necks on this one, and constituted, in fact, the core of respondents whose confidence was not a mere matter of political competence, but one of allegiance to a specific part of the system as it stood.

This was particularly interesting when compared to cluster 1's responses to these same variables. In terms of its members' confidence in the specific centres of political power surveyed, this cluster's indices did not deviate significantly from the sample totals, except to be one of the least likely to have 'a great deal' of confidence in the parliament of the USSR (the other one being, unsurprisingly by now, cluster 3). Furthermore, the other indices that rose significantly above the sample mean were for both 'quite a lot' and 'not very much' confidence in the Soviet political system, with identical scores for each. These responses reflected, once again, this cluster's predisposition to give moderate replies to answers, and, in this manner, confirmed its

centrist leanings, whether centre-'left' or centre-'right'. Yet, in terms of seeking a clearer definition of this cluster's potential position within the framework of the transition that was to come, it might be significant that it was the least likely by far to say that it had no confidence at all in the Soviet political system. This was an important point for two reasons: first, it was in line with the tendency exhibited by this cluster to be progressive, yet to nevertheless still hold valuable the more humanitarian aspects of Soviet society – in other words, and as was suggested before, to have become postmaterialist before their time; second, it also showed a degree of 'openness', in not exhibiting a tendency to either completely trust or distrust the system.

In line with cluster 1 with respect to these ideas was, as we have seen, cluster 5. The latter so far had shown, however, a more 'closed' and perhaps even dogmatic mentality, and greater commitment not only to those aspects of the system valued by cluster 1, but also to many other features of Soviet life, as we saw in Chapter Seven with regards to the economy. In this set of variables, cluster 5 confirmed all the tendencies it had exhibited thus far, including some seemingly contradictory ones. In this it was superficially like cluster 2, both similar once again in their propensity to answer these five questions in terms of absolutes. The difference between the two in these last variables, however, was that, overall, cluster 5 tended to have confidence in the institutions of the Soviet system, whereas, if there could be said to be a fifth column in the Soviet Union, then it would have to have been found predominantly in cluster 2. In spite of the fact that this cluster obtained high indices at both ends of the confidence spectrum for these five variables, the overall results suggest very clearly that this cluster was the most likely to have no confidence at all in either the Soviet political system or the USSR's government and parliament. The only institution in which cluster 2 tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence, without it being counteracted by an even higher tendency to have 'none at all', was the Russian government. Given that this was Boris El'tsin's power base, and that he would come to stand for market reform, it would be interesting to investigate, perhaps in another study of this kind, whether El'tsin took up the fight for the market because he saw a possible constituency, or whether cluster 2 types - the 'New Russians in the Making' – were drawn to the parliament of the RSFSR because El'tsin stood for the market.

Respondents in cluster 5, on the other hand, confirmed tendency to be staunch supporters of the USSR. They obtained very high indices for having 'a great deal' of confidence in the two Soviet institutions surveyed, without a counteracting propensity in either case, and, although their indices for the Russian equivalents were also high, their confidence in Russia's institutions was torn between two opposing tendencies. More interesting, because less predictable, was the fact that cluster 5 was also split – 'a great deal' and 'none at all', of course – as to whether its members tended to have confidence in the Soviet political system as a whole or not. However, this might not be all that surprising. We have seen that cluster 5 was the oldest cluster; if we accept that its members tended to support the old Soviet way of life, their answer to questions of trust, or lack of it, in the Soviet system would necessarily depend on what *they understood to be meant* by the 'Soviet political system': the pre-Gorbachev one which they had known all their life, or the one they found themselves in by January 1991, which, even then, unmistakably heralded the beginning of the end, if not the end itself. In other words, given the overwhelming tendency of this cluster to value traditional Soviet ideals (as shown by the results for the other variables examined so far), the split within the cluster on this question could only be seen as a result of differing interpretations of the question. Any meaningful conclusions about their confidence in the Soviet political system therefore hinged on whether they understood the term as an abstract, immutable one, of which *perestroika* was an aberration that could be rectified, or whether they saw the system as something that had changed and for which there was no way back.

Patterns of Political Protest

It was argued in Chapter One that, for the purposes of this thesis, political behaviour would be seen as part of political culture, yet, so far, we have only seen variables reflecting respondents' political attitudes and values. The reason for this is that, as we said earlier, the *WVS* was primarily an attitudinal survey, with a focus on measuring Inglehart's concept of 'postmaterialism', resulting in a paucity of behavioural variables in the survey. A few were to be found, however, dealing with respondents' willingness to participate in different types of political protest, the text for which was as follows:

> 'I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.
>
> A) Signing a petition
> B) Joining in boycotts
> C) Attending lawful demonstrations
> D) Joining unofficial strikes
> E) Occupying buildings or factories'[12].

In terms of the straight counts for these five variables, it should be noted that the number of respondents who had joined boycotts or unofficial strikes, or occupied buildings or factories was very small. However, a pattern nevertheless emerged among these small counts, the salient feature of which was that cluster 2 was always one of the most likely to have done all of these things. In these small counts it was joined once by cluster 5, once by cluster 4 and twice by cluster 1, but it would be premature to see a definite pattern in these figures, particularly in cluster 4 and 5's single instances, without looking at the indices for the likelihood that they 'might' participate in these actions.

The patterns in this second set of values for these three variables – all of them more extreme forms of protest than the other two – could be said to reflect several of the cluster characteristics seen so far. Firstly, cluster 3 dropped out of the race completely in terms of its indices for what its members 'might do'. Overall, cluster 1 was most likely to sign petitions, in terms both of what it might do, and in terms of having done it, for which value it had the highest index. This cluster was also the most likely to have participated in a lawful demonstration, but, as for the three more radical options, its high scores in the 'have done' box were not substantiated by a similar propensity to consider these options, instead of which its scores stayed close to the sample totals. It appeared, from these results, that sex was a factor in these responses, since females were either non-participants – typified by the members of cluster 3, whose highest scores were, of course, in the 'don't know' boxes, supplemented by a strong propensity to 'never, under any circumstances', take any of the actions suggested – or participants in lawful, non-violent acts – typified by respondents in cluster 1. Secondly, there was a strong suggestion that age was a factor in deciding which form might be the most likely to be considered by each of the 'male' clusters, with cluster 5 opting for unofficial strikes, but steering clear of

occupations, and clusters 2 and 4 tending towards the exact opposite. All three, however, would consider joining a boycott. As for their indices for the two 'safer' forms of protest, all three clusters' indices stayed close to the sample totals, except for cluster 2's scores in the 'might do' boxes for the two variables, which were fairly high.

Political Summary

> 'If the theory that continuity rather than change is characteristic of Russian political culture [is correct] we would expect to see a consistency of political attitudes, values and beliefs about politics across generations. Specifically, we would find no significant differences in political efficacy, political trust, political interest, support for democratic values or political cognition between older and younger cohorts'[13].

The results of the variables that we have seen in this chapter could be summarized, in terms of the overall attitude of respondents towards politics and political objects, in the following two tables obtained from two variables, the first of which asked whether respondents were interested in politics and the second of which whether they considered politics an important part of their lives.

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
INTERESTED IN POLITICS	very	Count	36	31	35	39	55	196
		% within CLUSTERS	10.2%	16.9%	6.4%	6.7%	18.4%	10.0%
	somewhat	Count	167	85	187	253	138	830
		% within CLUSTERS	47.4%	46.4%	34.1%	43.8%	46.2%	42.3%
	not very	Count	125	56	228	235	86	730
		% within CLUSTERS	35.5%	30.6%	41.5%	40.7%	28.8%	37.2%
	not at all	Count	23	10	94	45	20	192
		% within CLUSTERS	6.5%	5.5%	17.1%	7.8%	6.7%	9.8%
	dk	Count	1	1	5	6		13
		% within CLUSTERS	.3%	.5%	.9%	1.0%		.7%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 12: how interested would you say you are in politics?[14]

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
POLITICS IMPORTANT	very	Count	40	24	36	54	61	215
		% within CLUSTERS	11.4%	13.1%	6.6%	9.3%	20.4%	11.0%
	quite	Count	89	56	112	145	82	484
		% within CLUSTERS	25.3%	30.6%	20.4%	25.1%	27.4%	24.7%
	not very	Count	160	62	230	239	100	791
		% within CLUSTERS	45.5%	33.9%	41.9%	41.3%	33.4%	40.3%
	not at all	Count	50	35	134	113	48	380
		% within CLUSTERS	14.2%	19.1%	24.4%	19.6%	16.1%	19.4%
	dk	Count	13	6	37	27	8	91
		% within CLUSTERS	3.7%	3.3%	6.7%	4.7%	2.7%	4.6%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 13: how important is politics in your life?[15]

These two tables not only encapsulate the tendencies we have seen in this chapter regarding each cluster's attitude to politics, but also add detail to the picture by revealing a few additional traits, glimpses of which have already been seen in what has been said up to now. For instance, these two variables show us that the only exceptions to cluster 4's general tendency not to deviate from the norm were to be found in a very marked lack of propensity to be interested in politics or consider it important in their life. This was an attitude which could be seen as the underlying factor beneath cluster 4's lack of definition when examined in the light of political variables. Their lack of interest and concern in politics would also account for, and explain, their consistently flat indices for anything involving abstract concepts, since, it could be argued, politics involves abstraction to a greater degree than any other factor in the average individuals' life. To summarize, the members of cluster 4 tended to be eminently practical, people who would only be likely to give positive answers if the question concerned a somehow tangible proposition of direct relevance to their everyday lives, but whose answers would drop well below the mean in positive values for questions of other types.

Similar to cluster 4 in its lack of interest in political matters was cluster 3, but the latter's disinterest was considerably more open. The members of this cluster not only

lacked a propensity to think that politics was important, but had, in fact, a propensity to think it was not. Their propensity to be interested in politics could be similarly charted, their index numbers increasing in inverse correlation to their interest. In this sense, if our earlier hypothesis about their lack of confidence in the institutions they did know was correct, cluster 3 might be seen as active engineers of their own apathy due to their past experiences and consequent disillusionment with the system, and not just as merely politically incompetent. The same could not be said for cluster 1, whose responses to these two variables seemed to have combined their seemingly contradictory tendencies towards scepticism, on the one hand, and political competence, on the other, whilst simultaneously adhering to the tendency towards moderation so characteristic of their responses. However, these results prompt a new line of argument, one not pursued by Anglo-American scholars in the past. Since citizens in liberal democracies were 'trusting', it was assumed that this was a characteristic of citizens in liberal democracies. The problem with this line of thought was that, at the time when studies such as *The Civic Culture* were carried out, liberal democracy was doing well, and this was not taken into account. Yet many crises and scandals have rocked liberal democracies the world over since then, and there is a strong case to be made for the argument that political competence now involves a healthy degree of scepticism. If we apply this to the Soviet Union in January 1991, after *perestroika* had revealed the appalling state of the economy, the extent of corruption, and the lies that the Communist Party had been telling since the thirties, at least, should it be considered surprising that young, politically competent citizens tended to be sceptical about the organs of government? Perhaps – indeed, almost certainly – not.

The members of cluster 1 were the most likely to think that politics was 'not very' important, but the least likely to think it was 'not at all' important; at the same time, they were the most likely to be 'somewhat' interested in politics, and the second least likely to be either 'not very' or 'not at all' interested.

Also highly unlikely to not be interested in politics or consider it important in some degree were, unsurprisingly by now, clusters 2 and 5. Where the two most politically adamant clusters differed was in the priority accorded to politics in the general

scheme of their lives. Whereas both clusters had a very high propensity to be interested in politics, cluster 5's tendency to consider it a 'very' important part of life was far higher than cluster 2's, whose highest propensity overall for that variable was to consider it merely 'quite' an important part. This, of course, fits in with what we saw of cluster 2's acquisitive drive in Chapter Seven: the members of this cluster seemed to lead almost proto-capitalist lives with *Gesellschaftliche* characteristics; following from this, and from what was explained in Chapter Four about the role division of the individual in the *Gesellschaft*, it could be suggested that the lives of cluster 2's respondents tended to be diversified, and were therefore less concerned with politics than the life of the average cluster 5 respondent – older, less adaptable, and more integrated in traditional Soviet belief systems, where political concerns dominated many people's lives to a great extent.

Our analysis of the clusters has so far yielded some significant, consistent patterns in their attitudes towards a number of political and economic factors. We have seen a portrait emerge of five very distinctive types of people, sharing some things in common, but not others, coming together in different ways on different issues, and each one revealing specific features pertaining to the concepts and frameworks examined in Part I. The varying 'ego strength' and political competence of the different clusters, for example, was already apparent, as well as their position in terms of 'open' and 'closed' belief systems. However, the degree of the different clusters' familiarity with either *Gesellschaft* or *Gemeinschaft* environments still needed to be established in order to finish examining all the issues expounded in Part I of this study. Tönnies' framework, unfortunately, could not be studied by means of variables tapping directly into it, and, consequently, it needed to be approached indirectly, by examining the overall attitudes of respondents towards social life in the abstract, and seeing how they related to society and its mores.

Notes

[1]Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', p. 525.

[2]The Nazi – National *Socialist* – Party was the most obvious example of this, but the same applied to Mussolini and to the theory behind Franco's corporate state, which attempted to do away with social cleavages. Oswald Mosley's East End rallies were also a case in point.

[3]Cited in Gleb Pavlovskii and Nina Belyaeva, 'Introduction: Opposition and Multiparty Politics in Russia', in Vladimir Pribylovskii, *Dictionary of Political Parties and Organizations in Russia*, Significant Issues Series, Vol. 14, No. 7 (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), p. ix-xii at p. ix.

[4]*WVS*, v 248. 'In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?' This variable originally had ten values, 1 being left, 10 right. It was recoded in different ways, in the hope of obtaining perspectives on the two different aspects of the question – that is, left/right vs. open/closed. Table 1 shows the results of a coding which assumes that people around the centre in either direction are closer to each other than they are to people at either end, so that the coding was as follows: (1 thru 2=1) (3 thru 4=2) (5 thru 6=3) (7 thru 8=4) (9 thru 10=5), with the following value labels: 1=left, 2=centre-left, 3=centre, 4=centre-right, 5=right.

[5]It is worth repeating here that we are, as always, examining the clusters' indices, not their percentages, since the latter do not take into account the relative size of each cluster when used to compare them against the total sample.

[6]Following on from n. 4, this recoding divided respondents into right and left, with no considerations of degree. The previous 'centre' value (3), constituted from the original values 5 and 6, was now split, i.e.: (1 thru 5=1) (6 thru 10=2).

[7]*WVS*, VV279, 281-2, 284-5.

[8]See Appendix F.

[9]Sidney Verba, 'Personal Postscript', in Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited*, pp. 394-410, at p. 404.

[10]*WVS*, VV272-85. 'Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?

A) The church
B) The armed forces
C) The education system
D) The legal system
E) The press
F) Trade unions
G) The police
H) The parliament of the USSR
I) Civil service
J) The government of the USSR
K) Television
L) The parliament of Russia
M) The government of Russia
N) The Soviet political system'.

[11]Carnaghan, 'Alienation, Apathy or Ambivalence?'

[12]*WVS*, VV 242-6.

[13]Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 402.

[14]*Ibid.*, V241.

[15]*Ibid.*, V8.

Chapter Nine – Clustering Conclusions

> 'In addition to the division between elite and mass political cultures the process of political development tends to create a second division in all political cultures. This is the division which separates those more acculturated to modern ways of life from the people who are still closer to the traditional patterns of life. The relationship between these two divisions in political cultures and the relative gap between them appear to be decisive factors governing the total course of national development'[1].

In Chapter Eight we looked at different aspects of respondents' attitude to politics at different levels, and ended with an examination of two variables which tapped into their perception of politics as a matter of personal interest and significance. These two variables were of importance to this thesis because they provided a starting point from which to connect the political arena and the social sphere: assigning politics a place in the individual's life was the first step towards finding out its relative position to other aspects of life through variables such as, for example, the frequency with which respondents discussed politics with their friends.

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
DISCUSS POLITICS	often	Count	119	68	125	181	128	621
		% within CLUSTERS	33.8%	37.2%	22.8%	31.3%	42.8%	31.7%
	at times	Count	188	91	279	299	120	977
		% within CLUSTERS	53.4%	49.7%	50.8%	51.7%	40.1%	49.8%
	never	Count	39	20	122	95	46	322
		% within CLUSTERS	11.1%	10.9%	22.2%	16.4%	15.4%	16.4%
	dk	Count	6	4	23	3	5	41
		% within CLUSTERS	1.7%	2.2%	4.2%	.5%	1.7%	2.1%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 14: frequency of political discussions[2]

The above table confirms, in great measure, the patterns and trends found in the previous chapter's examination of political variables, a fact which should come as no surprise, since it seems safe to assume that those who are interested in politics will discuss it more than those who are not. Clusters 2 and 5 therefore had the two highest indices for 'often' (cluster 5 having the highest), and cluster 3 the highest for 'never'. The indices for clusters 1 and 4 were also consistent with previous results and, although neither of these two clusters deviated significantly from the sample

totals, their indices showed that the former tended to be more politically competent than the latter in this variable as well – in other words, they showed that the members of cluster 1 were, on the whole, slightly more likely to discuss politics than those of cluster 4.

We saw in Chapter Six that two of the variables used to form the clusters asked respondents whether they gave advice often and enjoyed convincing others. These two variables were, unsurprisingly, very strongly correlated, and both showed, once again, that clusters 2 and 5 were the most likely by far to identify with them and that cluster 3 was the most likely not to, added to which cluster 1 was less unlikely than cluster 4 to identify with both these variables[3]. To these variables could be added a third, one which also tapped into what could be called respondents' proselytizing tendencies, and added a further dimension in terms of ego strength, and therefore – by extension and in accordance with what has been postulated so far – in terms of political competence. This variable asked the question 'When you yourself hold a strong opinion, do you ever find yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views? IF SO, does it happen often, from time to time, or rarely?'[4], and provided further evidence of the patterns established among the clusters in the other variables just examined. Once again, the members of clusters 2 and 5 were extremely likely to say that they found themselves persuading friends 'often', whereas those of cluster 3 were most likely to reply 'rarely', 'never' or, of course, 'don't know'. Furthermore, in this variable cluster 1 stood out from cluster 4 more distinctly than was usually the case, showing a marked propensity to persuade friends 'at times' which the latter cluster lacked.

Feelings and Formative Years

It has already been said that the surveys available to this researcher did not contain questions tapping directly into the nature of the social environment of respondents, and argued that it would have to be assessed indirectly, using variables that might not seem relevant at first sight to construct indicators of respondents' familiarity with different types of social relationships. The above variables were a few of the building-blocks to be used in this endeavour, since they could be used not only to a

measure respondents' self-confidence and ego strength, but also to assess the social responsiveness of the members of each cluster. These variables, by tapping into respondents' behaviour with their fellow human beings – whether they be friends, relatives or colleagues – gave us an idea of the degree to which respondents felt socially at ease in general. Furthermore, their feelings could be examined in greater depth through a set of questions designed to establish the mood of respondents during the time leading up to their interview[5]: one of these asked whether they had felt lonely in the weeks before being surveyed, a question which was of particular relevance in terms of assessing respondents' satisfaction with their social world. Replies to this last question showed that, although the majority of the sample population had not felt lonely in the weeks leading up to their interview, those who had were most likely to be found in clusters 3 and 5, suggesting that age might be an important factor in this variable. However, what was more interesting was that, although age might be a factor influencing these responses, it was not the only factor: whereas the two youngest clusters, 1 and 4, tended only very slightly not to feel lonely, the highest and only significant score for not feeling lonely was obtained by the members of cluster 2, who were markedly less likely than any other respondents to say 'yes'. Similar patterns were found in replies to being 'depressed' and 'bored'; of note in these variables was the fact that cluster 1 was less likely to be bored but more likely to be depressed than cluster 4, even though the significance of the difference between their indices for this variable was debatable.

To examine the rest of these variables one by one would be a long and repetitive process, since they overwhelmingly confirmed cluster 2 as the most 'positive' of the clusters, and cluster 3 as the most 'negative'. Other interesting points arose, however, concerning the other three clusters, 1 and 4 in particular. These two clusters tended to be, overall, in a positive frame of mind, but in different ways. Cluster 4, on the one hand, tended to be most likely to respond positively to those variables which indicated action in some way: its members were more likely than those of cluster 1 to have felt that they were excited and that things were going their way. Respondents in cluster 1, on the other hand, did not have indices of over 100, however slight, in any of the variables in this set indicating a negative attitude (cluster 4 scored 102 in feeling 'bored'), and their positive feelings seemed to derive more from within

themselves than from any external influences. Thus they were more likely than respondents in cluster 4 to feel pleased and 'on top of the world'. In the light of the characteristics these two clusters had exhibited so far, the reasons for these differences could be hypothesized to be the following: firstly, these results seemed to be conforming to traditional notions of age and sex, cluster 1's enthusiasm springing from the natural exuberance of youth, and cluster 4's externally-focused energies from men's role as active participants in and creators of their environment – an explanation which, given the state of male/female relations in Russian society to this day, merits consideration. Nevertheless, another explanation could also be found to account for the difference between the two clusters, which was related to their educational background.

We saw earlier that the members of different clusters tended to form fairly distinct groups in terms of their occupation, and this was also reflected in the variable tabulating the age at which respondents completed their full-time education[6]. This question was not ideally phrased, since the age at which people finish their education does not necessarily mean that they have attained a certain level; nevertheless, this variable showed a sufficiently strong correlation with the occupational variable to indicate that it was a useful indicator of respondents' qualifications. Another, perhaps more serious, problem was the substantial over-representation of people who had left full-time education at twenty-one years of age or over, constituting 38.1% of the sample. This meant that the straight counts per 'school-leaving' age[7] for each cluster were fairly small, particularly those for the ages ranging from twelve and under to sixteen. With all the above problems in mind, the results from this variable nevertheless showed that the groups most likely to have the most years of education were clusters 1 and 5, whereas clusters 2, 3 and 4 were the most likely not to have gone on to higher education, and thus raised some interesting points with regards to the difference between clusters 1 and 4, in spite of the difficulties involved in assessing its statistical validity. Although there were no questions in the Russian *WVS* with which to directly establish respondents' status in conventional socio-economic terms[8], by combining demographic variables such as the size of town respondents lived in, their occupation and their education, a distinct if impressionistic picture could be painted which could be used as a substitute. Thus,

the differences between clusters 1 and 4 could be seen in the light of these socio-economic differences. Given that the members of cluster 4 tended to leave school early, it came as no surprise that they were almost half as unlikely to be students than those of cluster 1. If we added to this the propensity found in cluster 4 to be interested in making money and getting ahead, it seemed consistent with this philosophy that its members should exhibit a tendency to depend on external achievement in order to feel good about themselves. Conversely, the fact that cluster 1's respondents were most likely to be students in higher education also went some way to explain, not only the idealism they exhibited in their replies to questions on abstract political and social problems, but also their scepticism towards the actual practices of the Soviet socialist state.

Furthermore, if the indices did indeed reveal latent structures in this set of results, then it had to be concluded, given what has been said about the clusters in the previous chapters, that the Soviet regime's educational system fulfilled its indoctrinating mission, and that the longer individuals was exposed to it, the more likely they would be to espouse socialism, either in theory, like cluster 1, or in practice, like cluster 5. On the other hand, factors such as sex could also come into play, and combine with educational level to form different orientations to the system. The members of cluster 4, for example, who were the most likely to have left school at seventeen, were allegiant to the USSR, as we saw in the previous chapter; those of cluster 2, who we saw did not tend to be particularly staunch supporters of the system, had a propensity to leave school even earlier. Respondents in cluster 3, on the other hand, were most likely to either have left school any time up to the age of sixteen or at nineteen, but their school-leaving age had to be considered in combination with their sex and their socio-economic status: as we saw, they tended to live in small towns and do badly-paid jobs, exhibiting a very marked tendency *not* to go on to higher education; given these characteristics, it was hardly surprising that the members of cluster 3 lacked a propensity to actively support the system.

Town, Country and Club

Part of the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* framework as Tönnies developed it was the idea that the evolution of towns and cities came about through rural-urban migration by predominantly young workers, if only because they were able-bodied. Although the incoming labour may no longer be subjected to Dickensian living conditions, it still remains the case that it is the young who are more likely to be drawn to the big city. Added to this, conscription – which only the young are subject to – facilitates the move, a factor reinforced in the Soviet Union by the fact that the army was the quickest channel for social mobility outside the Party. The data from the *WVS* on the size of town that respondents lived in did not contradict this assumption, although it did present some problems.

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
OBJECTIVE SIZE OF TOWN	>2,000	Count	32	16	65	57	26	196
		% within CLUSTERS	9.1%	8.7%	11.8%	9.9%	8.7%	10.0%
	2-5,000	Count	24	9	35	34	29	131
		% within CLUSTERS	6.8%	4.9%	6.4%	5.9%	9.7%	6.7%
	5-10,000	Count	22	13	44	35	20	134
		% within CLUSTERS	6.3%	7.1%	8.0%	6.1%	6.7%	6.8%
	10-20,000	Count	18	4	22	26	9	79
		% within CLUSTERS	5.1%	2.2%	4.0%	4.5%	3.0%	4.0%
	20-50,000	Count	37	18	40	64	30	189
		% within CLUSTERS	10.5%	9.8%	7.3%	11.1%	10.0%	9.6%
	>50,000	Count	18	5	29	34	20	106
		% within CLUSTERS	5.1%	2.7%	5.3%	5.9%	6.7%	5.4%
	>100,000	Count	97	55	138	161	73	524
		% within CLUSTERS	27.6%	30.1%	25.1%	27.9%	24.4%	26.7%
	>500,000	Count	104	63	176	167	92	602
		% within CLUSTERS	29.5%	34.4%	32.1%	28.9%	30.8%	30.7%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 15: size of town (number of inhabitants)

Firstly, it was already mentioned in Chapter Six that Moscow and Leningrad did not receive a separate coding: regardless of the fact that they are the largest towns in Russia – Moscow, in particular, by a substantial number of inhabitants – a city's

capital status and/or attraction as a tourist site provides it with the kind of access to the outside world which must now count as a significant factor in the development of *Gesellschaft* in the modern world[9]. Secondly, and more importantly, the index numbers for all the clusters showed that their respondents largely reflected the geographical distribution of the total sample population, with the consequence that their indices were not only rather flat overall, but also based on very small counts for towns of anywhere under 20,000 inhabitants. It was due particularly to this last factor that the findings obtained from this variable had to be treated with caution; nevertheless, the data seemed to encourage two conclusions: first, that, as we saw earlier, cluster 2 was the most likely to live in the big cities[10]; and second, that clusters 3 and 5 – the older clusters – had a tendency to live in the smaller towns. In this sense, although the connection made above between youth and urban migration was not proved by this variable, its corollary, that the elderly tend to stay in smaller settlements, was supported by the data, such as it was. Clearly, the size of town respondents lived in was not a sufficient indicator for assessing the kind of social environments they were accustomed to. Ideally suited to this purpose, on the other hand, seemed to be a set of variables dealing with respondents' involvement in voluntary organizations, and their reasons for this involvement.

The results of these other variables, however, suffered from the same problem of small counts as the variable on the size of towns, a fact that was mentioned briefly in Chapter Six in order to illustrate the fact that it would not be just numbers that this study would be looking at, but also patterns. It was stated in the aforementioned chapter that, although only a very small percentage of Russians were members of or working for any voluntary organizations, those few who did were distributed among the clusters in consistent patterns. These patterns, moreover, could be summarized in terms of the last variable in this set, which classified respondents into those who *did* do unpaid work for voluntary organizations of some kind and those who did *not* do unpaid work for *any* voluntary organizations.

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
UNPAID WORK - NONE	none	Count	222	117	415	399	196	1349
		% within CLUSTERS	63.1%	63.9%	75.6%	69.0%	65.6%	68.8%
	some	Count	130	66	134	179	103	612
		% within CLUSTERS	36.9%	36.1%	24.4%	31.0%	34.4%	31.2%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 16: unpaid work in voluntary organizations[11]

As we can see in the above table, although cluster 5 obtained a significant score for doing unpaid work, those obtained for clusters 1 and 2 were higher, particularly that for cluster 1. The members of these three clusters were indeed the people most likely, throughout this set of variables, to either be members of or working for different voluntary organizations: the race being closest, usually, between clusters 1 and 2. Thus it was that, although cluster 5's overall political commitment and sense of duty did prompt its members to action, they were not as likely to belong to the various groups proposed as the members of those clusters whose respondents tended to live in larger towns than cluster 5's.

A further lack of *Gesellschaftliche* spirit, as compared to clusters 1 and 2, was exhibited by cluster 5 in another variable, this time part of a set giving the reasons for joining or working for the aforementioned groups. Whereas the members of cluster 1 were the most likely to say that they did voluntary work 'To gain new skills and useful experience'[12], respondents in cluster 5 were the most likely to have done voluntary work 'For social reasons, to meet people'[13]. This difference could, once again, be accounted for by age, in the sense that pensioners no longer really *need* experience (although they could conceivably want to learn new skills – and would that not be a *Gesellschaft* trait?) but, this does not then account for the fact that cluster 2 – an older, wealthier, cluster - exhibited similar tendencies as cluster 1 on these two variables, thus arguing for something besides age as an underlying factor influencing these responses.

The difficulty in identifying what this factor might be lay, once again, in the lack of appropriate variables tapping directly into the features of the frameworks under study. The *WVS* was primarily concerned, as we saw, with measuring postmaterialism through a series of economic and political attitudes; the problem with this approach in terms of this study was that a society might seem 'postmaterialist' whilst being, in reality, '*pre*materialist', in the same way that totalitarian societies were mechanized versions of traditional social hierarchies, as we argued in Chapter Two[14]. This meant that the survey questions, whilst enabling us to identify respondents with very strong *Gesellschaftliche* characteristics (as was the case for respondents in cluster 2), were not as useful when it came to drawing clear lines where the differences were more subtle: where *Gesellschaftliche* characteristics might be emergent but not yet fully developed. This was made even more difficult by the fact that people are by nature *Gemeinschaft*, and not *Gesellschaft*.

On the Personal and the Political

The *WVS* contained 379 variables, most of which were asked in the Russian questionnaire; these variables touched upon many different matters, all of which could have been examined in the light of the cluster groupings. A social scientist, however, 'is an active sampler of theoretically relevant data, not an ethnographer trying to get the fullest data on a group'[15]: in other words, the object here is not to provide an exhaustive account of every single one of the clusters' tendencies in every sphere of life, but rather to draw a meaningful portrait of the Russian population in January 1991, one which with which to illustrate the ideas and conceptual relationships set out in Part I of this study. The purpose of the remainder of this chapter will therefore be to summarize and bring together all the clusters' different characteristics, and to attempt to construct a coherent narrative with reference to which they can be understood.

To this end, it would be appropriate to remind ourselves of what we would expect to find if Tönnies' framework and the ideas we related to it in Chapter Four had been correctly interpreted. Firstly, the central axis upon which we based political and general culture change was the development of the *Gesellschaft*. Attendant to this were

certain socio-economic features that arose, sometimes as a result of this development, sometimes as necessary conditions for it. These were, in no particular order, the notion of the abstract human being, which brought rights and responsibilities – as opposed to privileges and duties – into the social environment; democratization, brought about in its turn by notions of equality before the law; the 'open' belief system, since the competition for power found in democratic systems is based on the losers' acceptance of and respect for the *status quo*; and, concomitant with all this, the development, among significant sectors of the population, of a personality that is secure in its adherence to and belief in all these ideas. Consequently, we needed to see whether, firstly, these kinds of ideas could be found among the Russian population in 1991, and, if so, whether they were correlated in the manner laid out above.

Over the course of the last three chapters it should have become clear that the cluster groupings formed with the set of variables relating to self-confidence in both personal and social situations yielded meaningful, clearly differentiated groups. The characteristics exhibited by each cluster followed highly consistent patterns, and made it relatively easy for anyone familiar with the propensities of each to predict what the results would be for all kinds of variables. Some of the clusters were, of course, easier to identify earlier than others, cluster 3 being the most notorious example of this. This cluster formed, together with cluster 4, the bulk of the Russian population – the mainstream of the nation's cultural trends. These two clusters, the first predominantly female, the other predominantly male, tended to conform to traditional sex roles and be generally conservative in outlook. What was significant about this was that, since together they constituted 57% of the sample, it would explain the apathetic and conservative results obtained in terms of straight counts, not only by the *WVS*, but by most other attitudinal surveys of the Russian population. This in turn illustrated the epistemological position taken throughout this thesis with regards to methodology: that the existence of a consistent majority outlook – or, in this case, of two very compatible ones – does not preclude the existence of other equally consistent ones; of minority views that are not held at random by socio-demographically diverse individuals, but that are held by coherent *groups* in distinctive patterns.

The 'Deviant' Clusters...

Cluster 2 was the smallest of the clusters, constituting only 9.3% of the sample population: the fact that it stood out as the most radically different of them all should therefore perhaps come as no surprise. Nevertheless, this cluster was particularly significant because it was, of all the clusters, the most likely to exhibit the socio-demographic characteristics usually found in urban, *Gesellschaftiche* environments, and therefore a test-case for the ideas outlined above. The search for the attitudes normally associated with liberal democracy in Russian political culture therefore began among the members of this cluster.

This search yielded results that, by and large, substantiated the validity of the conceptual links made in Part I of this study between the different frameworks examined, with two – perhaps related – exceptions: contrary to what one might expect from a group the members of which tended to welcome change and new ideas, and to feel that they had free choice and control over their lives, their responses to a few other variables showed, firstly, that the majority of the members of this group were not as well educated as one would predict respondents with so many *Gesellschaftliche* traits to be, and, secondly, that they had a propensity to have 'closed' belief systems and choose radical solutions to problems, particularly in terms of politics, where they had a noticeable tendency to place themselves at either extreme of the political spectrum. Added to this they also exhibited a marked propensity to obtain very high scores in variables to do with religious matters, which they tended to consider of importance in their lives. The first of these two exceptions would certainly seem to account for the second one: the possession of a 'closed' belief system could often be the result of a lack of formal education, particularly of higher education. Less easy to explain directly, however, was the fact that this relative lack of education had not seemed to have affected the life chances of respondents in cluster 2 in a negative way: as we saw earlier, they had the highest indices for working in urban white-collar jobs, and they also tended to earn the highest wages. For an explanation of this, we must turn to the personal characteristics of the members of this cluster, and speculate how they must have interacted with the features of the late Soviet regime.

Every variable showed that the most conspicuous feature of this cluster was their self-confidence in every situation – this was what had set this group apart during the clustering procedure itself. The Soviet regime, on the other hand, had only recently – in historical terms – come out of the *zastoi*, or 'stagnation'. Growing up in those Brezhnev years, in an atrophied socio-economic system with a stifling educational policy, members of the population with initiative and ambition could only make something out of the debris of the command economy by engaging in black market activities, either using official channels for their personal gain or disregarding them completely. Then, under Gorbachev, began the transition which led the Soviet Union to its disintegration and, more significantly for the purposes of this thesis, to the market economy. It is in the light of this transition, therefore, that the members of cluster 2 must be seen. Their familiarity with *Gesellschaft* environments, and the *Gesellschaftliche* characteristics they exhibited in the variables examined in this study – and in others not included in it – marked them out as character-types of the *Gesellschaft*, certainly, but of the *Gesellschaft* at a very specific stage; at the beginning of its development. Consequently, cluster 2 reflected a certain type of entrepreneurial character: the adventurous, conqueror of the Wild West, self-made man type, as shown by this cluster's rather harsh tendencies with regards to social welfare and any issues involving the compassionate treatment of others. In this, cluster 2 stood out sharply from the other two 'minority' clusters – clusters 1 and 5. These clusters had in common, to an extent, their belief in socialist values, but, given cluster 5's less liberal views overall, and the 'closed' nature of its belief systems, as opposed to cluster 1's more 'open' ones, it was the differences between the two clusters that needed to be analyzed.

The fact that the members of clusters 1 and 5 shared certain affinities in terms of their social values did not, as of itself, say anything about their level of political 'sophistication' as understood in Western liberal democracies, where there is room for left-wing parties as well as right-wing ones. Their differing values in terms of jobs and the economy, on the other hand, whilst seeming a more promising indication of the different levels of *Gesellschaft* development predominant in the two clusters, could – unfortunately for this researcher – also be due to the age difference between the two clusters. This was not to say that either the political variables or the economic

ones had proved completely useless: what it did mean was that they had to be examined in the light of respondents' basic values about themselves and their environment, coming full circle in our analysis of the human social condition.

It was in terms of these, their core beliefs, that respondents of the Russian *WVS* were first clustered. It could be argued that a conclusion based on these same variables would be circular, because it would effectively be saying that respondents were grouped according to their responses to certain variables, and responses to those variables differed according to the groups. That is not the intention here, and two points have to be made before proceeding any further. Firstly, the nine original variables on the basis of which the clusters were created were not the only ones which dealt with respondents' basic values. Secondly, even if it were argued that including other variables *of the same kind* does not avoid the circularity problem, the point of the exercise is to see the *patterns* emerging between primary and secondary beliefs and values – this being the only way that a person's belief system can acquire any meaning.

From the point of view of *meaning*, then, the similarities between clusters 1 and 5 in terms of their political tendencies were not as strong or as consistent as they at first seemed, even in terms of the political variables alone. To begin with, there was the question of cluster 5's propensity to pertain to a 'closed' belief system and make strong moral judgements, in spite of their tendency to trust people and to be politically quite active – two factors which would seem to indicate an 'open' personality. Cluster 1, on the other hand, had a strong tendency to answer in an 'open' manner on most, if not all, variables, in which it was ahead even of cluster 2 – a fact that, as we have seen, might be accounted for by age and educational factors, and to which we will return. Cluster 1 was, in fact, more likely than either of these clusters to position itself at the centre of the political spectrum, regardless of the many tendencies towards social welfare values it shared with cluster 5. We also saw in Chapter Eight how cluster 5 differed sharply from clusters 1 and 2 in thinking that the pace of political reform in January 1991 was proceeding too rapidly, and the very different patterns of confidence in different state institutions found in the responses obtained from clusters 1 and 5. Furthermore, when asked what the aims of their

country should be for the next ten years, the priorities of clusters 1 and 5 were quite different[16]. Cluster 1's concerns tended strongly to be humanistic: of paramount importance was 'Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities'. Cluster 5, on the other hand, had an overall more statist approach, and tended to consider maintaining a strong and stable socio-economic climate a priority.

These three clusters seemed to lack clear, mutually reinforcing divisions. One factor that kept emerging as a possible explanation for many of these divisions, however, was age, affecting the responses to different variables in different ways. We saw this earlier, and argued that other underlying factors must be sought, ones more illuminating in terms of Tönnies' framework. However, given the persistence of age as a possible cause of the changing fault-lines between these three – and, indeed, between all the clusters – its importance as the primary influence in responses could not be denied, and this reassessment led to some interesting conclusions. Given the rapid pace of change in the last years of the Soviet Union, and the very different upbringing between generations, age itself might be an indirect indicator of substantial cultural change. Since, even in the West, 'youth' is treated as a cultural unit and considered a market in itself, might not this be the case even more so in a country undergoing profound economic change? If we take this to be the case, then the character types which emerged from clusters 1, 2 and 5 represented three kinds of politically active late Soviet citizen respectively: a group of young, educated people, advocates of reform but perhaps still influenced enough by their years of academic formation to believe in the ideals of the Soviet Union; a group of middle-aged 'natural' capitalists, unwilling to waste time inside the official structures of the system, but, having grown up within it, possessed of an actual *mindset* not too dissimilar from that prevalent around them during the Brezhnev years; and, finally, a group of older citizens, born and bred within the Soviet system, educated enough to understand the reform process and maybe even be moderately tolerant about their opponents, but still concerned about what the future had in store, due to their inability or unwillingness to adapt to it.

...And the Mainstream

In contrast to the above three clusters, the remaining two were conspicuous for their overall lack of political competence, a tendency found to be particularly pronounced in cluster 3. The members of this cluster were the most likely to opt out of answering questions in an overwhelming number of variables, preferring instead to either reply that they did not know or refuse to answer the question. These results were remarkably consistent, not only in terms of these five clusters, but also in terms of other cluster solutions that were examined in the preliminary experiments with cluster groupings: furthermore, this cluster could be unambiguously described in all cluster solutions as consisting predominantly of older women in low-status jobs. The fact that this was the second largest cluster also accounted for the high numbers of missing answers in Russian surveys.

However, in terms of the implications for democratization, the results obtained from this cluster could not really be said to be disquieting. As Carole Pateman pointed out, liberal theory, based on *representative* government, has become synonymous with 'democracy', to the detriment of classical *participatory* democratic theory, with the result that the political culture of liberalism – what Almond and Verba termed the 'civic culture' – has become 'the political culture of democracy'[17]. However, this kind of 'democracy' actually relies on the non-participation of the majority in the processes of government: 'minimal levels of activity and interest, and largely apolitical attitudes, are required from most citizens; anything more would threaten the smooth working of the political system'[18]. Furthermore, this non-participation has very specific features, since 'liberal theory [...] has always argued that it is middle- and upper-class males who are best "fitted" for political participation and decision making'[19]. In other words, the civic culture itself is 'systematically divided along lines of class and sex', with women of low socio-economic status being the most likely to exhibit a 'lack of civic orientations and political inactivity'[20]. Cluster 3's lack of motivation was therefore not unique to its members, and could be seen in terms of a broader framework, one in which – regardless of the political system – complex underlying social processes combined to achieve the same results cross-culturally. Foremost among these processes was, for Pateman as for Almond and Verba, socialization. This point is of particular relevance to this study because it

implies that different kinds of social relationships lead to different political cultures, even in established liberal democracies, leading us back to the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* model.

One of the most obvious applications of this model at a micro-analytical level relates to anthropological ideas about nature versus culture. In this framework, women represent 'nature' – the *Gemeinschaft* – whereas men stand for 'culture' – the *Gesellschaft*. What is interesting about this model of traditional society is that it unwittingly supports the argument that individuals' social contacts determine in large part, not only their reference groups and outlook on life, but also other people's perception of them; the key here is that women in traditional societies are expected to spend their time with *children*, who are inherently *Gemeinschaft* and, obviously, apolitical. In this small social world, networks are indeed personalized, and women are surrounded by *Gemeinschaft* networks of relatives and, if they are lucky, neighbours[21]. Furthermore, the fact that 'women in the United States and Britain appear as more active, or civic'[22] than those of other countries is more a matter of privilege than of a profound change in social structures, which brings us to the other half of Pateman's argument: class.

Workers in unskilled occupations, whether blue- or white-collar, are unlikely to be required to participate in running the workplace. In fact, these workers find that 'at all stages of the socialization process, their lack of a sense of competence receives further reinforcement'[23]. In this, respondents in cluster 3 were joined by those in cluster 4, who, as we saw, also had a strong tendency to score highly in the lesser-skilled job categories given in the survey, the difference being that respondents in the latter cluster tended to be male. Though less politically incompetent than their womenfolk, the members of this cluster also exhibited a lack of political interest and commitment, which manifested itself in their indices' consistent lack of deviations from the sample totals. This lack of interest in political matters, however, was counteracted by a slight propensity to take more of an interest in matters of personal finance, and an even slighter propensity to agree with economic reform. Cluster 4 was therefore, like clusters 1 and 5, harder to classify than clusters 2 and 3: something which could be seen immediately from the results it obtained in the

clustering variables. Its members had a certain amount of aggressive confidence, but it tended to depend on external achievements rather than personal satisfaction – they were more easily dissatisfied with their situation than the three smaller clusters, even if they did not plumb cluster 3's depths of disaffection. The conclusion to be drawn from cluster 4's results was therefore that, though not particularly staunch supporters of *perestroika*, neither were they its opponents: within their basic loyalty to the USSR they seemed proponents of whatever worked to their advantage. In this sense they were no different from Almond and Verba's respondents of similar socio-demographic characteristics, since their lack of marked participatory tendencies did not seem to be the result of alienation from the system they lived in: for them, as for their counterparts in the civic culture, political participation might simply have not been worth it when compared with their other non-political interests.

Where Do We Go From Here?

> 'Social classifications are not fixed. That is partly because they are inherently incomplete, partly because they are ambiguous. So, on the one hand, the constructions of the mind can never account for all the variety of the world. And on the other, the criteria we create to decide which things belong together are never sufficiently precise or permanent to make every allocation certain'[24].

In the course of Part I of this study, two main arguments were put forward: first, that the Russian people are, in essence, no different to anyone else, and their historical development can be understood in terms of general socio-economic processes; second, that social science data is largely meaningless when analyzed in purely quantitative terms, the aim of the social scientist being 'to understand and to convey to others the understanding of the intricate and often baffling web of social relationships which, being created by man, must be understood by a similar creative capacity in ourselves'[25]. Part II of this study then attempted to prove the first point through the application of the second, creating groups and interpreting them in the light of the concepts set out in Chapter Four. By using a set of variables which asked, not about the kind of beliefs that are acquired consciously in very specific environments, but rather about the kind of beliefs which constitute the core of what we think about ourselves and about how others perceive us, five clusters were formed which divided the population into groups with different degrees of 'ego strength'. At the ends of the spectrum that these clusters could be mapped along

were clusters 2 and 3 – the most and least self-confident, respectively. These two clusters were easily identifiable not just in terms of 'ego strength', but in terms of every other conceptual framework examined in Part I, with clear correlations which supported the theoretical links established between those frameworks. The other three clusters, on the other hand, had to be explored in greater depth before their salient characteristics became clear, and it was in the course of this process that more interesting details came to light, adding complexity to the bigger picture. The final result thus revealed five distinct, recognizable types of Russians, whose propensities and trends were clear and consistent enough to be highly predictable.

The consistency of the results obtained from the clusters was important, in terms of the purposes of this thesis, for two main reasons. Firstly, the consistency found in each cluster's patterns of responses validated the theoretical frameworks on the basis of which the clustering variables were chosen. The results obtained from cross-tabulating the five clusters with different kinds of variables did indeed show marked differences in the tendencies exhibited by groups of respondents clustered in terms of their 'ego strength'. This is not to say, of course, that *every* respondent in each group invariably responded in certain ways to certain questions: human beings are not robots, and the human mind is full of inconsistencies and contradictions. Holding one opinion is never any guarantee that another, 'scientifically' logical one will also be held. This researcher has therefore argued against *counting*, and for *understanding*: just because five out of ten people think Stalin was good for the nation, and five out of ten believe in the ideals of Communism, does not necessarily mean to say that it is the *same* five that support both Stalin and Communism. This is why having obtained the cluster results, it was still not the *number* of respondents in each cluster that was looked at, but the cluster's deviation from the sample mean, that is, the focus was on the difference, or lack of it, of each group from the 'average' Russian.

Secondly, and following on from what has just been said, the consistency exhibited by the cluster results served to validate the methodology. In spite of its limitations in terms of statistical inference, the results of the cluster analysis demonstrated that this technique could be used to examine the structures and relationships hidden in the

WVS dataset – in other words, that it was a practical tool for exploring the results of the *WVS* from a theoretical perspective. Moreover, the exploratory utility of this technique was not limited in application, since the survey could have been clustered in various ways, depending on the research objectives pursued: as is evident from what was said in Chapters Five and Six, cluster analysis requires the researcher to make many decisions of great impact in terms of the final outcome, since it is driven by its research objectives to a greater extent than any other statistical technique, being 'the only multivariate technique that does not estimate the variate empirically but instead uses the variate as specified by the researcher. The focus of cluster analysis is on the comparison of objects based on the variate, not estimation of the variate itself'[26], which means that 'the objectives of cluster analysis cannot be separated from the selection of variables used to characterize the objects to be clustered'[27]. It is, in fact, partly due to the interpretative nature of cluster analysis that it was chosen as one of the main methodological components of this thesis, serving to bridge the gap between quantitative and qualitative research methods, an approach that was argued for in Chapter Five – where it was also argued that social data are themselves inherently 'socially reactive'[28], and that to limit 'subjective' influences may not necessarily solve any problems, or even be desirable in order to achieve an understanding of *meaning*, which, like social reality, is a flexible, mutable concept. The picture obtained through this study's particular clustering procedure was therefore undoubtedly not the only snapshot obtainable from the *WVS* dataset, but it was one that helped to examine the ideas and relationships which it was designed to illustrate, and in that – albeit limited – aim the enterprise was successful.

Notes

[1]Lucian Pye, 'Introduction', in Pye and Verba (eds), *Political Culture and Political Development*, pp. 3-26 at p. 17.

[2]*WVS* V10. 'When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?'

[3]An interesting feature of these two variables was that, although clusters 1 and 4 were almost equally unlikely to mention that they liked giving advice often, cluster 4 was twice as unlikely as cluster 1 to enjoy convincing others. Age might be the underlying factor accounting for this difference, but it might also be the fact that one question asked whether respondents *enjoyed* convincing others, whereas the other was less subjective, asking merely whether they, in fact, gave advice often. This would explain the seemingly curious fact that, even in the straight counts for the total sample, more respondents gave advice often but did not enjoy convincing others (263 respondents), than vice- versa (192 respondents).

		GIVE ADVICE OFTEN		
		mention	no	Total
CONVINCE OTHERS	mention	179	192	371
	no	263	1327	1590
Total		442	1519	1961

[4]*WVS*, V11.

[5]*Ibid.*, VV84-93. 'During the past few weeks, did you ever feel...

A) Particularly excited or interested in something
B) So restless you couldn't sit long in a chair
C) Proud because someone had complimented you on something you had done
D) Very lonely or remote from other people
E) Pleased about having accomplished something
F) Bored
G) On top of the world/feeling that life is wonderful
H) Depressed or very unhappy
I) That things were going your way
J) Upset because somebody criticized you?'

These questions only had two possible responses: 'yes' and 'no'.

[6]*Ibid.*, V356. 'At what age did you or will you complete your full-time education, either at school or at an institution of higher education? (Please exclude apprenticeships)'.

[7]'School' being taken to mean any kind of educational institution. This term is used because it was how the variable was labelled in the survey codebook.

[8]As opposed to the *WVS* carried out in other countries, which coded respondents' socio-economic status as A, B, C1, C2, D or E.

[9]For example, a tourist resort such as Benidorm (province of Malaga, Spain), is noticeably more *Gesellschaftliche* than, for instance, somewhere like Villacañas (province of Toledo, Spain), even though Villacañas is quite probably the larger town.

[10]On the issue of living in towns of over 500,000 inhabitants, although the difference between clusters 2 and 3 was not great in percentage terms, the difference in the indices obtained by these two clusters on this variable – 112 and 105 respectively – was fairly significant in terms of their deviation from the sample total. This is because, to repeat the point once more, the index numbers take into account *the relative size of each cluster.*

[11]*WVS*, V53. For the rest of the variables examined in this section regarding voluntary work and organizations, see Appendix G.

[12]*Ibid.*, V67.

[13]*Ibid.*, V66.

[14]See Chapter Two, p. 35 (n. 26).

[15]Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*, p.58.

[16]*WVS*, VV257-62.

[17]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 3.

[18]Pateman, 'The Civic Culture', p. 65.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 79.

[20]*Ibid.*, pp. 60 and 77.

[21]This not even being the case in cultures where women are kept in gynæcea of one kind or another.

[22]Pateman, 'The Civic Culture', p. 78.

[23]*Ibid.*, p.77.

[24]Davis, *Exchange*, p. 54.

[25]Robert MacIver, 'Is Sociology a Natural Science?', in *American Sociological Society Papers and Proceedings*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (May 1931), pp. 25-35, cited in Denzin, *The Research Act*, p. 42.

[26]Hair *et al.*, *Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings*, p. 423.

[27]*Ibid.*, p. 427.

[28]Walker, 'An Introduction to Applied Qualitative Research', p. 11.

Part III: Longitudinal Study

Chapter Ten – Some More on Theory and Method[1]

> '[W]e have no way of knowing whether a survey accomplished some years ago for other purposes still applies meaningfully to the specific population. This problem of accuracy is not as important for generating theory about a type of social unit as it is for describing a particular social unit or verifying hypotheses. What is relevant for theory is the general categories and properties and the general relations between them that emerge from the data. These can be applied [...] *regardless of whether the specific descriptions yielded by the data are currently accurate for the research population*'[2].

Part II of this thesis was an examination of the *WVS* dataset through the results of a cluster analysis carried out on a set of variables which identified respondents possessing different kinds of 'ego strength'. The groups formed by means of this statistical technique were then subjected to cross-tabulations with many different variables in the survey, which revealed the various salient propensities of each group's responses to the questions asked in the *WVS*. The end result was a portrait of five distinct normative character-types describing the major kinds of political (or apolitical) animals in the population, by means of which could be captured, not only the attributes of the dominant political culture, but also those of significant sub-cultures. To summarize, the aim of Part II was to obtain a meaningful snapshot of the Russian people at a certain point in time, one which was representative of the population, not necessarily in proportional terms, but in categorical ones. However, that was one but not the *only* aim of this thesis: the snapshot obtained in Part II was to serve not only as a self-contained piece of research, but also as a reference point for an analysis of political culture change in the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it was this analysis that was to be the objective of Part III of this study. Further snapshots – that is, other, more recent, surveys – were therefore needed for the purposes of comparison.

Unfortunately – as was briefly explained in Chapter Six – the *WVS* was the only survey available with a range of questions wide enough to lend itself to the creation of clusters which could be used to examine the ideas being discussed in this thesis[3]. Consequently, the surveys to be used in this part of the study would not be ones amenable to being clustered meaningfully for comparative purposes[4]. This had several important consequences for this study, the foremost of which was that the clusters obtained from the *WVS* were to be used not as baselines themselves, but as

sources of *conceptual categories* such as we described in Chapter Five. The clusters had proved to be clearly differentiated in terms of some of their characteristics and not others; for instance, we saw that age was a very strong defining factor of respondents' attitudes, whereas the impact of the size of the locality they lived in was less well-defined. The cluster analysis had therefore revealed certain attributes of the population as being more strongly associated with the indicators used to measure 'ego strength' than others, and all these attributes could now be the measure with which to analyze, by means of other statistical techniques, not only other surveys, but also the *WVS* itself, in order to obtain methodologically comparable results. Furthermore, fairly direct comparisons between the *WVS* and other surveys would be possible – in spite of the narrower range of questions found in the latter – due to the fact that many of the questions used in the *WVS* had been used in later surveys of the Russian Federation.

Proponents of the 'scientific' approach discussed in Chapter Five would nevertheless argue that the purposes of this part of the thesis would have been best served through the use of a year-on-year survey, rather than by mixing and matching unrelated surveys. Whilst, in principle, this would have been the ideal procedure, the practical impediments encountered by this researcher were several. Firstly, there was the fact that, strictly speaking, such a trend survey was not available to this researcher. Year-on-year surveys such as the *NRB* neither went back to 1991, nor did they ask exactly the same questions every year: some were added, and, in consequence, some were dropped. Moreover, the questions that the *NRB* surveys *had* asked every year since 1992 did not, unfortunately, address the issues and concepts which this study was attempting to examine[5]. Other surveys available to this researcher suffered even greater limitations. The *Central and Eastern Eurobarometer* series, for instance, focused – quite understandably – on respondents' attitudes toward and perceptions of the European Union (or Community, as it was known at the time). The *General Social Survey of the Russian Federation*, on the other hand, was geared towards ascertaining the social status of respondents and assessing the nature of social stratification in Russia. Several more surveys were thus examined and rejected for different reasons; finally, the *Political Values Survey* of December 1993 and its February 1996 update (*PVS93* and *PVS96*)[6] were chosen for possessing several

advantages over others – not least of which being the fact that they were readily available[7]. More importantly, these surveys were interesting because many of the *WVS* questions directly related to political culture could also be found in the *PVS93*, making it seem more appropriate to this study than many of the other surveys examined by this researcher.

Nevertheless, the *PVS* also had a few quite stringent limitations, two of which had a significant impact on the methodological development of this thesis. The first was that the *PVS93* and the *PVS96* were designed primarily to study political values, and the range of questions asked, compared to the *WVS*, was therefore relatively narrow. Consequently, theories about the impact of basic value orientations on strictly political values would not be directly amenable to analysis, thus shifting the focal point of the study away from basic value orientations to general political ones. The second was the fact that the *PVS96* was a very abbreviated version of the *PVS93*, conducted for the purposes of obtaining a quick update on a few variables, which meant that it contained a mere thirty-three variables, as opposed to the 210 found in the *PVS93* and the 355 found in the Russian module of the *WVS*[8]. This aspect of the *PVS96* had important methodological consequences for this study; not only did it mean that the amount of information available for 1996 was limited – which, in turn, meant that the comparisons feasible between this survey and the others were also limited – but, more importantly perhaps, the fact that the *PVS96* contained no *sets* of variables limited the number of multivariate techniques which could be meaningfully applied to its dataset, which seemed, on the face of it, more amenable to univariate and bivariate statistical techniques.

Lies, More Lies and Statistics

> There has been in the behaviourist movement a certain amount of *scientism*, a belief in the virtues of exact science and desire for similar precision in the analysis of political phenomena, leading ultimately to the possibility of scientific prediction. At the same time there has been a confusion as to the nature of scientific prediction. Prediction, whether in the most precise of the social sciences, economics, or in the natural sciences, is only possible when models are built, when certain unknown factors are held constant, where, in other words, the necessary qualification "other things being equal", is added. Prediction of concrete, complex reality is quite a different matter from the scientific prediction of scientists, for in the real world other things are never equal[9].

Univariate and bivariate statistics, however, are not ideally suited to complex social science problems of interaction and meaning. These statistical techniques, which involve using frequency and contingency tables to analyze data, variable by variable, tell the researcher little or nothing about *context*: that is, their results do not show – and are not meant to show – how each variable relates, not just to one specific other, but to the dataset *as a whole*. As a result, since they cannot measure the effect of the interaction of more than two variables together, they cannot tell us much about any but the most basic social science processes, and, by measuring the characteristics of the sample individually, they can tell us even less about the possible significance of these characteristics. This is particularly the case with frequency tables, as the following examples from the *WVS* will show.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very	196	10.0	10.0	10.0
	somewhat	830	42.3	42.3	52.3
	not very	730	37.2	37.2	89.5
	not at all	192	9.8	9.8	99.3
	dk	13	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

Table 17: interest in politics (*WVS*)[10]

The above table shows that a very slight majority of Russians were 'very' or 'somewhat' interested in politics, and an even smaller number considered politics important in their life, as shown, in turn, by the table below.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	very	215	11.0	11.0	11.0
	quite	484	24.7	24.7	35.6
	not very	791	40.3	40.3	76.0
	not at all	380	19.4	19.4	95.4
	dk	91	4.6	4.6	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

Table 18: is politics important? (*WVS*)[11]

Taken together, these two variables would seem to indicate a substantial level of political disinterest in the sample, which, based on traditional conceptions of what civil society means to and requires from its participants, would in turn imply that the

Russian respondents of the *WVS* were, on the whole, apathetic and alienated – lacking in the attributes pertaining to the citizen of the civic culture, foremost among which is political competence. There was certainly a case for this argument, based on these two variables, but neither were these the only two variables with which to measure political self-confidence, nor is political self-confidence the only measure of a person's fitness for civil society – a point which has been made repeatedly in previous chapters of this study. Encompassing these two points were two variables which we examined quite closely in Chapter Eight: discussing political matters with friends, and finding oneself persuading others of one's strong opinions. The first reflected what actually happened to respondents, regardless of the interest or significance politics might have had for them; the second was a measure – certainly not the only one, but an important one all the same – of respondents' confidence in common social situations.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	often	621	31.7	31.7	31.7
	at times	977	49.8	49.8	81.5
	never	322	16.4	16.4	97.9
	dk	41	2.1	2.1	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

Table 19: frequency of political discussions (*WVS*)[12]

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	often	422	21.5	21.5	21.5
	at times	643	32.8	32.8	54.3
	rarely	442	22.5	22.5	76.8
	never	386	19.7	19.7	96.5
	dk	68	3.5	3.5	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

Table 20: frequency with which respondents find themselves persuading others to share their views (*WVS*)[13]

Tables Table 19 and Table 20 were interesting for different reasons, the most striking of which was that, although the variables they were obtained from were consecutive and the concept being measured by them – frequency – similar, they were nevertheless coded differently, respondents being given one less possible option

('rarely') to describe how often they discussed politics with their friends. Why the coding was done this way remains unclear to this researcher, and makes comparisons between these two variables less straightforward than could have been hoped for, adding complexity to their interpretation. Since the majority of respondents in surveys opt for middle-range responses to most questions, the loss of information caused by only having one middle value, as opposed to two, is of particular concern; it also puts into question the *meaning* of 'at times': is one to assume that sometimes it encompasses 'rarely', and sometimes not? Problems such as these are inherent in the analysis of secondary data, as we saw in Chapter Five; there is no choice but to work with or around these limitations[14]. Of greater consequence, however, was the interpretation of the data as they stood, as illustrated by a comparison of Tables Table 19 and Table 20 with the same variables' results for Britain, also from the *WVS*[15].

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	often	206	13.9	13.9	13.9
	at times	756	50.9	50.9	64.8
	never	519	35.0	35.0	99.8
	dk	3	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	1484	100.0	100.0	
Total		1484	100.0		

Table 21: frequency of political discussions (*WVS* – Britain)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	often	138	9.3	9.3	9.3
	at times	487	32.8	32.8	42.1
	rarely	419	28.2	28.2	70.4
	never	435	29.3	29.3	99.7
	dk	5	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	1484	100.0	100.0	
Total		1484	100.0		

Table 22: frequency with which respondents find themselves persuading others to share their views (*WVS* – Britain)

From Almond and Verba's point of view, which argued that respondents in liberal democracies were more likely to engage in political discussions and to have 'a capacity for sharing values with others'[16], the results from Tables Table 19 to Table 22 are surprising. Even though a greater number of Russians than Britons replied

'don't know' to both questions, the percentage of respondents who discussed politics and persuaded others of their opinion 'often' was also greater in Russia than in Britain, where higher levels of political and social self-confidence might have been expected, according to Almond and Verba's framework[17]. Furthermore, although the differences between the two countries were significant for the values 'often' and 'never', the same was not the case for the middle-range ones. Yet, in terms of the 'reserve of influence' in civic society – that is, taking into account that, in fact, '[t]he civic culture rests not on the participation of the people, but on their non-participation'[18] – it is precisely these values which are of interest, in the same way that it is floating voters that are the deciding factor in an election: the level of political competence at each extreme is clear, but what remains unclear is what politics means to the majority in the middle, and whether their opinion in fact matters in terms of the political system as a whole. Tables Table 19 to Table 22 thus illustrated one of the basic – and, as yet, unresolved – questions at the heart of liberal democratic theory: what are the *sufficient* conditions for the development of a democratic system? This question will be taken up again in later on in this study, when a more complete picture of political culture in Russia by means of both temporal and spatial comparisons has been obtained. Suffice it to say, for the time being, that these four tables should serve as a warning for Western political scientists not to make too many assumptions, not only as to what one should and should not find in Russian datasets, but also as to the meanings and implications of those findings in terms of the democratic processes in different countries: once again, the scholar should beware of Anglo-American preconceptions, not just about other countries, but even about the UK and the USA themselves[19]. In this particular case, the results from Tables Table 19 to Table 22 could mean one of three different things, if Almond and Verba are to be followed: either these two variables are irrelevant in terms of the process of democratization, or the Russians are more 'democratic' than the British public, or one can take the approach that whatever is found in societies predefined as 'civic cultures' is characteristic of the civic culture[20], thus coming to the conclusion that, in fact, the *less* people discuss politics and try to persuade others of their opinions, the more 'democratic' they are. In fact, the most plausible explanation is that political competence is not isolated, and individuals' self-confidence depends greatly on their environment; given the speed of change in the

USSR since 1985, Russians had obviously come alive to the political process, perhaps feeling that they themselves as individuals could, at last, make a difference. In other words, and to repeat the argument running through this thesis, the results from Tables Table 19 to Table 22 were one more piece of evidence to support the contention that political culture is not static, since it is heavily influenced by broader socio-economic processes.

Qualitative Statistics: Correspondence Analysis and Perceptual Mapping

Having seen the dangers of drawing conclusions from frequency tables without paying attention to their *context*, the problems facing analysts when interpreting cross-tabulations need to be addressed next. Contingency tables – through which the results of the cluster analysis in Part II were examined in order to establish each cluster's attributes – tell the researcher more about the sample than frequencies, but they also need to be interpreted with care, particularly where the research objective is to identify the *nature* of relationships between variables, and several cautions apply. The first is that with large samples, such as those collected for national and cross-national research, there is always a danger of confusing *statistical* significance with *substantive* significance, that is, of confusing 'a significant result with an important result. The fact that your test produced a significant value does not necessarily mean that you have an important or even remotely interesting finding'[21]. This happens, not only because the power of statistical tests increases with sample size, which leads to tests becoming so sensitive that they 'declare as significant even minor deviations from the null hypothesis'[22], but also because 'any large set of data [...] contains some unusual pattern'[23], and, consequently, the more hypotheses are tested on a dataset, the more likely it is that many of them 'be judged *statistically* significant by chance alone [...] without being theoretically significant'[24]. The second caveat is that different measures of association measure different things, and a correlation coefficient of zero does not necessarily mean that two variables are not related. Due to the way the Lambda correlation coefficient is calculated, for example, it fails to capture relationships among variables where responses cluster clearly in one or two categories, yet where neither of these categories is the most frequent one[25] – a

common feature, as we have seen, of Russian surveys. Pearson's *r*, to give another example, also fails to capture non-linear relationships, added to which it can only be used with metric variables. Russian attitudinal surveys, however, are full of precisely these kinds of hard-to-capture relationships, which means that these and other similar coefficients are often inadequate as tools of analysis[26]. In order to counteract the effects of these two problems, the cross-tabulations carried out in the remaining part of this thesis would therefore be examined, not through these techniques, but, instead, by means of correspondence maps.

Correspondence analysis is part of a set of relatively recent statistical interdependence techniques which involve perceptual mapping; that is, assigning spatial co-ordinates – based on different statistical methods – to the variates under examination. Correspondence analysis, however, has gone beyond other interdependence techniques 'in its ability to accommodate both non-metric data and non-linear relationships. In its most basic form, correspondence analysis employs a contingency table, which is the cross-tabulation of two categorical variables. It then transforms the non-metric data to a metric-level form and performs dimensional reduction similar to factor analysis. In addition, correspondence analysis performs a type of perceptual mapping [...] where categories are represented in the multidimensional space. Proximity indicates the level of association among row or column categories'[27]. Where correspondence maps differ from other perceptual mapping techniques such as Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) is in the fact that correspondence analysis calculates and plots *two separate sets of categories*, each of which can be interpreted terms of separate underlying dimensions, not always the same in number[28]. Furthermore, although underlying dimensions for a variable can often be seen in correspondence maps, the correspondence analysis solution is conditioned by the other variables included, which is why it should only be interpreted in the light of all the variables in the analysis. The position of co-ordinates along an axis is therefore less important than their position relative to each other, since their co-ordinates along the axes will be influenced by the similarity of their profiles. MDS, on the other hand, is used to 'identify key dimensions underlying respondents' evaluations of objects'[29] without reference to their attributes, and will also be used later in this study in order to develop the results of factor analyses.

The flexibility of correspondence analysis in terms of the kind of data it can manipulate, and its relative freedom from assumptions – both of which make it ideally suited to examining attitudinal surveys – was one of the reasons it was chosen as the second methodological technique in this study, but it was not the only one. An even more important consideration than this in choosing this technique was the fact that the positioning of categories on perceptual maps reflects the *profiles* of those categories with reference to the other variables plotted on the map. In other words, the co-ordinates reflect which of the categories belonging to any given variable have similar patterns of responses in terms of the other variables on the map. In this sense, correspondence mapping yields the same kind of information as the indices used in the cluster analysis did: it charts the *propensities* exhibited by respondents in different categories, taking into account the size of those categories. Finally, correspondence analysis, being a multivariate technique closely related to factor analysis, also carries (as did cluster analysis) a significant qualitative component in the interpretation of its results – indeed, correspondence analysis is not suitable for the quantitative measurement of relationships. This meant that, as well as being a technique which was ideally suited to the kind of data to be examined here, it was also one which was consistent with the epistemological position taken throughout this thesis with regards to issues of methodology and social science data analysis[30], whereby a qualitative approach should guide the analysis of quantitative data. To conclude, multivariate techniques, and not univariate or bivariate ones, would continue to be used in the remainder of this study because '[f]or the purposes of [...] any [...] applied field, most of our tools are, or should be, multivariate. One is pushed to a conclusion that unless a [...] problem is treated as a multivariate problem, it is treated superficially'[31].

The choice of a statistical technique with which to examine these three disparate surveys was not the only methodological problem to be contended with, however; there was also the fact that the different nature of the questions found in each survey affected the selection of variables for examination. Not only did variables tapping into basic value orientations have to be abandoned, as was stated at the beginning of this chapter, but also the spectrum of issues examined would have to be much narrower than it had been in Part II of this study. The reason for this was that, even

though the *WVS* had had a profound influence on subsequent surveys of the Russian Federation, the number of questions which were *directly* comparable was still small, due to differences in both phrasing and coding. This became particularly problematic where the *PVS96* was concerned, and the following solutions were opted for: first, comparisons between the *WVS* and the *PVS93* would be made on the basis of specific issues in the study of political culture, guided by salient research foci in the literature on the subject, such as 'trust'. Second, the analysis of the *PVS96* would be supplemented with qualitative fieldwork and other secondary sources in order to compose the final snapshot to be taken in this study.

Notes

[1]This author would like to thank William Miller for his help and comments on Chapters Ten, Eleven and Thirteen.

[2]Glaser and Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*, pp. 188-9 (italics as in text).

[3]This does not mean that other such surveys do not exist, but simply that they were not available to this researcher. They can, in fact, be found, mainly at the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, at the University of Cologne. The surveys are carried out in collaboration with VTsIOM, whose staff kindly let this researcher see the questionnaires, but the actual datasets are held and owned by the former organization. This researcher had access to eight variables from a survey carried out in September 1996, and clustered them with very promising results. Unfortunately, the rest of the dataset was not to be had on any terms or conditions.

[4]For example, Chapter Eight showed that the dichotomy between 'open' and 'closed' minds was more useful as an explanatory concept of political attitudes than left-right positioning along a spectrum. Yet, if clusters were run on the basis of political variables, it would be difficult to assess the validity of each of these two frameworks, since the clusters would already have been divided in terms of specific codes. The data would therefore have to be recoded before the clusters were even run, thus inserting an element of uncertainty in the validity of the clusters, since the clustering algorithms would not be running on the original data.

[5]Nevertheless, the revival of interest in political culture has meant a shift in the focus of surveys to questions about values and specific behaviour in and relating to the political sphere, which has meant that similar issues to those examined in Part I of this study have attracted renewed interest, and questions relating to political efficiency and socio-political participation are found in most recent surveys of the Russian Federation, including the *NRBIV*, carried out between 31 March and 19 April 1995.

[6]These surveys were funded by the British Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and conducted by William Miller, Stephen White and Paul Heywood. In 1993, surveys amongst members of the public were carried out in Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic; in 1994, surveys amongst MPs were carried out in Russia, Ukraine, Hungary and the Czech Republic; in 1996, a shorter, update version of the 1993 survey was carried out in Russia alone. The Russian modules, which will be the only ones used in this thesis, were conducted in association with Elena Bashkirova of ROMIR, Moscow. For an extensive account of the results of all these surveys, see William Miller, Stephen White and Paul Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1998). It should also be noted that the shorthand terms *PVS93* and *PVS96* are this author's, and not how these surveys are generally referred to.

[7]Indeed, the author has William Miller to thank, for personally – and repeatedly, due to problems with different versions of SPSS – sending copies of the datasets.

[8]The *WVS* questionnaire contained 379 variables all told, but not all of them were asked in every country.

[9] Brown, *Soviet Politics and Political Science*, p. 11.

[10]As was the case in Part II, 'DK' and 'NA' are considered valid data.

[11]*WVS*, V241.

[12]*Ibid.*, V10

[13]*Ibid.*, V11.

[14]Added to this, although these are the labels used in the actual dataset, the labels used in the codebook are 'Frequently' and 'Occasionally'.

[15]Including Scotland but excluding Northern Ireland; conducted in June-September 1990 by Gallup (London), under the direction of David Barker, Stephen Harding, Gordon Heald and Noel Timms, University of Leicester (n=1,484). These same investigators also conducted a separate module for Northern Ireland in July-September 1990 (n=304).

[16]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 11.

[17]The fact that, in 1991, British politics under Prime Minister John Major were not as exciting as the process of *perestroika* does not undermine this argument, since, in theory, politically competent citizens are interested in politics because they are allegiant to and participant in the system, not because they find it exciting.

[18]Pateman, 'The Civic Culture', pp. 78-9.

[19]It is worth noting that the frequencies for VV10-11 obtained from respondents in the USA module were, overall, more similar to the British ones. This supports the theory that British and American respondents share a similar political culture, but it still leaves Russian respondents in the lead in terms of attributes that, according to traditional ideas about civil society, they should not have in the first place.

[20]*The Civic Culture* was criticised for taking precisely this last approach, since the 'empirical evidence presented in the body of the study confirms the assumptions about the civic culture with which we begin in chapter one – and these assumptions are then presented in chapter fifteen as conclusions about the proper role of the citizen in a democracy' – Pateman, 'The Civic Culture', p. 68; see also Chapter Seven, n. 6.

[21]Adamantios Diamantopoulos and Bodo Schlegelmich, *Taking the Fear Out of Data Analysis* (London: Dryden, 1997), p. 148.

[22]*Ibid.*, p. 149.

[23]David Moore, *Statistics: Concepts and Controversies* (San Francisco: W H Freeman, 1979), p. 294.

[24]Smith, *Strategies of Social Research*, p. 343 (italics as in text).

[25]Lambda is a correlation coefficient used to measure association between non-metric variables.

[26]For a fuller explanation of different measures of association, see Marija Norusis, *SPSS® 6.1: Guide to Data Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, n.d.), pp. 365-82.

[27]Hair *et al.*, *Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings*, p. 513.

[28]For example, the variable for 'sex' only has one dimension: a respondent is either 'male' or 'female'. On the other hand, an occupational variable can have several dimensions, such as skilled/non-skilled, rural/urban, etc.

[29]Hair *et al.*, *Multivariate Data Analysis With Readings*, p. 485.

[30]For more on correspondence analysis, see Hair *et al.*, *Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings*, pp. 513-7 and 523-7.

[31]Ronald Gatty, 'Multivariate Analysis for Marketing Research: An Evaluation', in *Applied Statistics*, Vol. 15 (November 1966), pp. 157-72 at p. 158.

Chapter Eleven – Political Competence

> 'The civic culture is described as a "cultural pattern" with "several significant components", but there is no precise specification of either the empirical indicators of these components or the exact weight they contribute to the overall pattern. The most important component appears to be subjective political competence [...] A person's belief in his competence is described as "a key political attitude" and the "self-confident citizen" is called "the democratic citizen""[1].

The cluster results obtained from the all-Russian module of the *WVS* dataset showed that age and sex were the most salient features in terms of which the clusters could be described. Older women, in particular, had a marked tendency to group together regardless of the variables employed in the analysis or the number of clusters sought, always resulting in a cluster with a very marked propensity to give passive or negative answers to most of the questions asked of them, a result that was not very surprising, since – as has been mentioned previously – women everywhere 'tend to be on the inactive side of the civic balance'[2]. The other clusters, though perhaps not as overwhelmingly homogenous as cluster 3, could also be labelled in terms of the difference between the age and sex of their members as compared to the totality of the sample, even if age and sex did not always reinforce each other, and some clusters could be better described in terms of age (cluster 1 – young), whereas for others sex was a better parameter (cluster 4 – male). In spite of these complexities, then, sex and age were the obvious starting points from which to examine the demographic attributes of respondents with different political values and attitudes.

Political Competence: Sex and Age

Two core variables related to political competence found in both the *WVS* and the *PVS93* – the level of respondents' interest in politics and the frequency with which they had political discussions, which were distinctly correlated in both surveys[3] – showed that males were more likely than females to respond positively to both variables, being not only more interested in politics, but also discussing them more frequently both in 1991 and in 1993. Slight differences appeared between surveys, however, with regards to the age of respondents and their level of political competence. In the *WVS*, respondents aged forty-five to fifty-four – who tended to be male – were the most likely to discuss politics 'often', and respondents in the two

oldest age groups (fifty-five to sixty-four and over sixty-five), who tended to be female, were the least interested in either politics itself or its discussion, the co-ordinates for 'female' and for 'fifty-five to sixty-four' being particularly closely associated with 'don't know' responses. In the *PVS93*, on the other hand, even though the age groups with the lowest levels of political competence still tended to also be female, no age group had a clear tendency to discuss politics 'very often', or to be 'very' interested in politics; instead, politically competent citizens could be described, in relative terms, as those who were 'quite' interested in politics, discussing it 'quite often'. In the 1993 sample, these respondents still tended to be male, but their age range was wider: it was not only respondents aged forty-five to fifty-four – as in the 1991 sample – who were, overall, politically competent, but also those aged fifty-five to sixty-four.

Differences also appeared between the plots of the younger age groups in the two surveys. Whereas the age groups of eighteen to twenty-four and twenty-five to thirty-four were very similar in 1991, the youngest of the two groups was distinctly less politically engaged in the 1993 survey, being also more closely associated with the category 'female'. In this later survey, in fact, the youngest and the oldest age groups (eighteen to twenty-four and over sixty-five) were more similar in their levels of political interest and propensity to discuss politics than any other age groups, in contrast to the 1991 sample, in which it was the two oldest and the two youngest age groups which were similar to each other.

A closer examination of the contingency tables for the two variables on political interest[4] confirmed that, although levels of political interest among males and females were similar in both surveys[5], these levels had undergone changes in the two samples from the point of view of age. Whilst bearing in mind that the two surveys were not comparable in a strictly scientific manner, and all sorts of natural sample variations could account for differences between the two, without indicating the presence of actual trends, these differences formed a pattern consistent enough to suggest a general political culture shift in certain sectors of the population. Worthy of note were three features of these tables: first, disaffection in the two lowest age groups was much higher, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the sample

total, in 1993 than in 1991; second, respondents aged between thirty-five to forty-four were also less interested in politics overall, although they did not exhibit the same strong tendencies not to be interested in politics that their younger cohorts did; and third, it was among respondents aged between forty-five and fifty-four that the propensity to be interested in politics had increased overall. As for the oldest age group, its propensities were polarized at the extremes, tending to be both 'very' and 'not at all' interested in both surveys. The main conclusion to be drawn from these results, then, seemed to be that young Russians had experienced the most disappointment in the first three years of the Russian Federation's existence as an independent political entity, bearing in mind that this disappointment was evident across all age groups.

Political Competence: Educational and Environmental Factors

Certain problems arose in the examination of perceptual maps for the rest of the demographic variables shared by both surveys which were present in all the variables to be cross-tabulated against them – not just in this section, but also in future ones. These problems were the seemingly anomalous positions of some of the demographic categories; namely, those with small counts. What lay at the root of these 'anomalies' was exactly the same phenomenon affecting the indices used to examine the contingency tables obtained for the clusters: the fact that, when counts are very small, the resulting calculations are large. This was not surprising because in all multivariate statistical techniques outliers have a disproportionate impact on results. Rather than eliminating them, however, this researcher chose to leave the outliers in and simply bear in mind the caveat that co-ordinates for small groups were plotted in more extreme positions than would be the case if such groups were larger, an approach which was chosen for two reasons: first, to avoid a loss of data, and, second, because even though the magnitude of the effect may be exaggerated, its general direction remains valid. Since time and space do not permit the production of contingency tables for all the correspondence analyses to be carried out on the remaining demographic variables, the caveat stated above must therefore always be borne in mind when examining the perceptual maps reproduced in this study.

There appeared to be a clear relationship between the age at which respondents left full-time education and the two political competence variables, particularly in the perceptual map for the *WVS* responses. Figure 1 shows that respondents who had finished their education at the ages of twelve or under were likely to be 'not at all' interested in politics, and, although respondents who had finished at the ages of twenty-one or over were not equally likely to be 'very' interested in politics, they were the most likely by far to discuss it 'often', and their overall propensity to be politically competent, in terms of these two variables, was more pronounced than that of any other age group. The political competence of respondents with the most years of education was also in evidence in the perceptual map for the *PVS93* (Figure 2), which also showed that respondents who had finished their education between the ages of fourteen and nineteen were much less likely to either be interested in politics or discuss it often. More significantly perhaps, in terms of the difficulties which lesser-educated respondents might be experiencing in coming to terms with political change, was the fact that they were more likely to respond 'don't know' in 1993 than in 1991. Their greater propensity towards this response suggested that respondents with the fewest years of education had ceased to comprehend or care about the political aspects of the system.



Figure 1: correspondence map for the age at which respondents left full-time education, their interest in politics and the frequency with which they discussed politics (*WVS*)[6]



Figure 2: correspondence map for the age at which respondents left full-time education, their interest in politics and the frequency with which they discussed politics (*PVS93*)

Direct comparisons between the size of towns in which respondents lived were complicated by the very different categories employed in each survey's variable for this demographic[7]. The *WVS*, on the one hand, used a very simple scale, starting at localities of under 2,000 inhabitants, and going up to ones of over 500,000 in irregular increments. The *PVS93*, on the other, had two categories which were not specifically defined by their number of inhabitants: 'rural area/village' and 'capital city'. This last category consisted of the cities of Moscow, Kazan and Abakan; St Petersburg, meanwhile, whilst larger than either of the latter two, belonged to the category 'city over 1 million (including St Petersburg)'. The two surveys thus differed on this variable in that, whereas the *WVS* had four values to describe towns of less than 20,000 people, the *PVS93* only had two – 'rural...' and 'town up to 20,000'. In contrast, where the *WVS* only had one category for any locality with more than 500,000 inhabitants, the *PVS93* had three: 'city over 500,000-1 million', 'city over 1 million...' and 'capital city'. Although these differences were not, in themselves, problematic in terms of correlating the responses found in each survey, recoding the values in each survey into fewer categories – and equal number in both, with matching values – was an option that could have made the perceptual maps, by virtue of being less cluttered, easier to read and compare. The problem with this procedure, however, was twofold: first, it could not be determined which of the *WVS* categories corresponded to the value 'rural area/village', and second, not all three capital cities numbered over 500,000 inhabitants[8]. A trial recoding of the two variables showed, however, that the resulting correspondence maps did not add any information to the original values, or make the results of the two initial maps any clearer, and this approach was therefore abandoned, leaving the variables with their original codes.

Both correspondence maps reflected the relationship found elsewhere between the two political variables, but the co-ordinates for 'size of town' (*WVS*, Figure 3) and 'locality' (*PVS93*, Figure 4) formed very different shapes on each map, reflecting the lack of an overall pattern on the basis of which to make solid theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, the theory that *Gesellschaftliche* environments are conducive to the development of 'ego strength' and, consequently, of political competence seemed confirmed by both sets of results, since the inhabitants of large

towns were the most likely to respond most positively to the political competence questions in both surveys. The maps for these results were also interesting in terms of the profiles for 'don't know' responses: whereas, in the *WVS*, this answer was distributed amongst different sizes of location in manner similar to the responses 'not very' and 'at times' (see Figure 3), in the *PVS93* respondents answering 'don't know' to the two questions were similar to those answering 'not at all', and to be a predominant tendency only amongst the inhabitants of the smallest category of town. This seemed to suggest that, by 1993, respondents in middle-sized towns had become more competent than they had been in 1991, or, at least, more consciously aware of political processes.



Figure 3: correspondence map for the size of location in which respondents lived, their interest in politics and the frequency with which they discussed politics (*WVS*)



Figure 4: correspondence map for the size of location in which respondents lived, their interest in politics and the frequency with which they discussed politics (*PVS93*)

The variable for respondents' occupation also posed certain complications in terms of accurately interpreting its results, largely due to the occupational categories employed in the *WVS*. As was mentioned in Chapter Seven, they were based on occupational structures in Western market economies, and might be subject to very different interpretations in the Soviet context, since, to give but one example, 'it is doubtful whether one can speak of engineers (or of any other comparable occupation) as a profession in the Western sense'[9]. Moreover, even if Soviet respondents had understood the categories correctly, there remained the problem that the categories employed by the *WVS* were not mutually exclusive, and seemed to measure different things. Whereas some of the categories related to the occupational *sector* respondents worked in – for example, 'armed forces' or 'agricultural worker' – others described the *type* of work respondents did – 'skilled', 'semi-skilled' or 'professional' – and yet others, the *position* they occupied, regardless of what kind of job they did in which sector – 'junior' and 'supervisor', for instance. To add to all this, there were then two other categories which simply offered respondents the choice of describing themselves as 'employer/manager of establishment with ten or more employees', or of one with less than ten. Supplementing this somewhat contentious variable was another, classifying the employment status of respondents into eight categories:

30 hours a week or more
Less than 30 hours a week
Self-employed
Retired/pensioned
Housewife or not otherwise employed
Student
Unemployed
Other

A cross-tabulation of the two variables, moreover, revealed another problem with these codes: some housewives, for example, were classified in different occupational categories – ranging from 'professional' to 'farmer' – but for most, the occupational variable was considered 'not applicable'. This was also the case for other non-working categories, notably 'unemployed', thirteen members of which group were coded as 'NA', and the remaining one of which was considered 'semi-skilled'. How all these cross-classifications were arrived at is not clear, but they would seem to indicate that different interviewers understood these two variables differently[10].

These problems were not found in the *PVS93*, on the other hand, probably because respondents' occupations were covered not by just one, but by a number of variables, which, together, dealt with the various problems outlined above. These variables asked the nature of respondents' occupation; whether they considered themselves part of either the management or the work force; which sector they were in; and, finally, how many people there were at their place of work. Due to the radically different approaches used in the two surveys, then, they needed to be considered separately.

The *WVS* variable on occupational categories had two main features: first, the occupational categories tended to cluster together quite heavily with only a few outliers. This illustrated an important property of the occupational variable, which was the lack of a discriminating occupational dimension to the two political variables being discussed. However, a few general points could be made on the basis of the correspondence analysis of this variable in terms of political competence. Most occupations were associated with *some* degree of interest in politics and political discussions, the strongest tendencies to respond positively to these questions being found amongst respondents occupying the traditionally more 'respectable' echelons of the Soviet hierarchy: supervisors, professionals and members of the armed forces. More significantly, however, was that respondents who were managers of businesses with 'less than ten employees' also tended to be 'very' interested in politics. This result was particularly interesting because the association between these small entrepreneurs and political competence was seen in the members of cluster 2.

Even clearer results, in terms of political competence, were achieved by the variable on employment status – a feature of these two occupational variables which was to repeat itself time and time again. Even though the overall lack of discrimination in the variable for occupational categories was reflected in the fact that all working categories had similar profiles in terms of their competence, non-working respondents were positioned clearly on the less 'competent' side of the map. Housewives were characterized by their propensity to reply 'don't know' to both questions, as could be expected from all the findings obtained so far; retired and unemployed respondents were likely to say that they were 'not at all' interested in

politics and 'never' discussed them. Finally, students and respondents having replied 'other' to the status question tended to have the highest political competence of the politically disaffected, discussing politics 'at times' but being 'not very' interested in the subject. In view of the levels of discrimination possible in terms of employment status, then, it was clear that the *WVS* occupational categories had not, on their own, sufficiently captured the characteristics of the working Russian population.

Four occupational variables in the *PVS93* were used to gather information about the propensities towards political competence found among different sections of the working population. The first of these combined the two *WVS* occupational variables by including, among various occupational categories, several categories aimed at non-working respondents. This showed that one of the main dimensions underlying the two variables used to measure political competence was the fact of being in paid employment as of itself. Students, pensioners and people who had never worked were most closely associated with low levels of interest in politics and its discussion – in particular, the category 'never worked', which was present in three of the four variables. Another clear line could be drawn, showing that politically competent respondents tended to belong not only to traditional Soviet high-status occupations – the army, the police, the defence industry – but also to new groups, easily recognizable as the products of market economies: the self-employed, for instance. However, not all new groups were equally self-confident in political terms: *employees* in the private sector and in co-operatives, for example, even though more likely to be interested in politics than those working for the State in civil industries, were not as politically competent as those working in foreign companies. The line marking out political competence can be seen even more clearly in Figure 5, which shows that managers were more likely to be politically competent than ordinary workers.



Figure 5: management and political competence (*PVS93*)

Less revealing, however, was the map for the size of respondents' work places. Aside from those who had never worked and those who did not know how many other people there were at their place of work, both of which categories were closer to 'don't know' and 'not at all' than any of the others, the rest of the values for this variable fell in a close-knit group between the two middle values for both variables. Although, within this group, 'five hundred or more' fell closest to the higher levels of competence and 'less than twenty' to the lowest, the other two values, '20 to 199' and '200 to 499' did not follow a linear progression: in fact, they were reversed, the former falling closer to 'more than five hundred' and the latter to 'less than twenty'. Bivariate correlations were explored, in an attempt to find a possible relation between 'size of work place' and either of the two political variables that might not be obvious from the map, but these, though significant, resulted in very small negative coefficients.

We can thus conclude that the occupational characteristics of the *PVS93* respondents were not all equally relevant in terms of the two political variables examined so far. The exact nature of their job, in fact, did not seem to be as significant as, first, whether they had a job at all, and, second, the position they occupied within the hierarchy of their work place – both in the private and the public

sector. This supported the argument that the range of categories used in the *WVS* occupational variable were not clear enough to capture the possible relationships between respondents' occupation and their political competence, since, aside from the two initial categories – 'employers/managers...' – the others did not, in the main, tap into respondents' status in the work place.

Conclusions on Competence

The results obtained from the demographic variables analyzed for both the *WVS* and the *PVS93* in terms of the political competence of respondents – as measured by their interest in politics and the frequency with which they had political discussions – showed that there was one major trend in the responses of all these variables; a trend which could be used to summarize and describe the changes taking place in the orientations of Russians towards the political process since the collapse of the USSR. For each demographic variable, overall patterns of confidence seemed to have been radicalized in the years that passed between the two surveys, the line between the politically competent and the disaffected appearing to be much more clearly defined in 1993 than it had been in 1991.

Females seemed to have retreated even further into the *Gemeinschaft*, young people appeared to have lost interest in the politics of the new order, and the difference in the political competence different occupational strata could be more clearly seen in terms of the 'winners' and 'losers' of the post-Soviet transition. Small villages seemed more isolated than they had previously been, and the poorly-educated exhibited a greater tendency in 1993 than they had done in 1991 to be disaffected from the political process. The transition seemed to have acted as a filter through which only those with a strong propensity towards political competence could pass, leaving behind those whose 'competent' tendencies had not been as strong.

However, all these demographic groups and their categories could not be said to constitute the exact same respondents every time, and these results highlited the problem of deciding which characteristics can best be used to describe an individual. Is a male lathe operator 'competent' because of his sex, or 'incompetent' because of

his occupation? The contrast here with the clusters was clear: clustering respondents on the basis of their 'ego strength' yielded *discrete* groups, which could then be examined, not only in terms of political competence, but even in terms of their demographic attributes themselves. Since it was not possible to cluster either *PVS* in the same way as the *WVS* had been, however, the demographic attributes which have been examined in this chapter needed to be examined in more depth, in order to achieve a greater understanding of the possible significance of the results obtained from them.

Assessing the Relevance of Demographic Characteristics

This chapter has shown that not all of the demographic variables in the two surveys yielded the same wealth of results. The *WVS* occupational variable, in particular, was subject to many complications which made it a poor indicator of respondents' socio-political self-confidence in this instance. The results of the cluster analysis showed, however, that respondents' affect varied according to the object of orientation being examined: respondents in cluster 2, for instance, showed clear signs of possessing 'ego strength' in all walks of life; those in cluster 3 were highly alienated and disaffected; respondents in other clusters, however, differed in their attitude towards various political and economic objects and concepts – cluster 1 was more interested in political matters, cluster 4 was not competent when dealing with abstract questions and cluster 5 did not, on the whole, approve of market reforms. The implication of this was that, although the demographic variables examined so far in this chapter were not all equally relevant to political competence, they could not be sorted and discarded according to the two variables on interest in and discussion of politics, because their relevance might change with respect to other types of variables. For this reason, the demographic variables themselves were plotted on perceptual maps, in order to better understand the patterns found in the two samples.

First, however, the occupational variable was removed from the set of demographic variables. The reason for this was not only its problematic use in comparative terms, but also another, perhaps more significant, consideration. The cluster analysis had shown that the *WVS* occupational variable was not the most salient with which the

clusters could be described. Although general occupational trends were present within each cluster, the association between clusters and occupations were neither the strongest, nor the most relevant in terms of their 'ego strength', which was better manifested in terms of their members' *attitude* towards work, regardless of their occupation. The occupational variable was most relevant, however, in relation to those variables to do with the economy and finance, equivalent variables for which were not, unfortunately, present in either *PVS*.

The rest of the variables, then, were plotted against each other in a variety of perceptual maps for both surveys, using the variables on sex, age, school-leaving age and size of locality. A number of relationships emerged from these maps, the most salient of which was that between length of education and location size: respondents living in large cities were the most likely to have spent the longest in full-time education in both samples. The age/sex distribution, on the other hand, differed in that, whereas in the *WVS* sample, the older the age groups, the higher their propensity to be composed of females, in the *PVS93*, this propensity was shared only by the eldest and youngest age groups, as shown by the following contingency table:

			AGE						Total
			18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	
SEX	Male	Count	77	199	240	141	168	105	930
		% within SEX	8.3%	21.4%	25.8%	15.2%	18.1%	11.3%	100.0%
	Female	Count	118	238	271	167	217	200	1211
		% within SEX	9.7%	19.7%	22.4%	13.8%	17.9%	16.5%	100.0%
Total		Count	195	437	511	308	385	305	2141
		% within SEX	9.1%	20.4%	23.9%	14.4%	18.0%	14.2%	100.0%

Table 23: sex by age group[11]

Males also showed a stronger association with a school-leaving age of over twenty-one than females, but this did not mean that the latter had a correspondingly strong one with very young school-leaving ages; rather, they tended to leave school at ages ranging from seventeen to twenty in both surveys. Finally, there was a noticeable difference in the patterns exhibited by each survey's location and age variables, since

in the *PVS93*, the population in the largest cities tended to be younger than that in the *WVS*; significant propositions about this finding could not be made, however, due to the differences in coding between the two surveys – to repeat what was said earlier, whereas the *WVS* grouped all towns over 500,000 inhabitants under one category, the *PVS93* had three categories for large towns, and this must certainly have had an effect on the relationship between this variable and age.

Knowing the patterns exhibited by the demographic variables of the two surveys could not, however, replace cluster analysis as a valid method for the formation of groups and for the derivation of character types to represent these groups. Neither was Almond and Verba's method of selecting 'average' respondents from a series of in-depth interviews an option, since this researcher did not possess such material from either of the points in time at which these surveys were carried out[12]. Since fixed reference groups to which the variables to be examined in this and the following chapter could not be successfully constructed, the demographic variables would therefore have to be kept as reference points of varying relevance, and their relationships to other variables be compared to their associations with each other.

Notes

[1]Arend Lijphart, 'The Structure of Inference', in Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited*, pp. 37-56 at p. 41, citing Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, pp. 440, 218, 231.

[2]Pateman, 'The Civic Culture', p. 78.

[3] *WVS* VV10, 241; *PVS93* qq53-4. The wording of the questions in each survey was:

WVS	*PVS93*
When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?	Do you discuss politics... Very often Quite often Only occasionally Not at all?
How interested would you say you are in politics? Very interested Somewhat interested Not very interested Not at all interested	How interested are you in politics? Are you... Very interested Somewhat interested Not very interested Not at all interested?

[4]These variables were chosen in this instance because they were coded with the same number of values, and were therefore more directly comparable than those obtained from the variables on political discussions, which were coded with different values. See note 3 for the full text of the four questions.

[5]These comparisons were made using the same indexing method used in Part II to compare the clusters to each other. The percentages in each category for each age group were measured against the sample totals per category, and the index numbers from the corresponding cells in each table were then compared against each other. For example, in 1991, females who were

'not very' interested in politics scored 113 against the sample total, and in 1993, females who were 'a little' interested scored 108. Obviously, a case could be made here for not making such comparisons, due to the problems we examined in Chapter Five with reference to language and translations in questionnaire design. Whilst it is true that all such comparisons should therefore be made with caution, they can nevertheless be used as a qualitative reference point which might help to understand the processes under study, without making exaggerated claims to quantitative accuracy (see main text).

[6]Leaving school at the ages of twelve and under is represented by the expression '<12yrs'. While this is mathematically the incorrect notation, the diagrams could not be labelled otherwise for technical reasons.

[7]*WVS*, V368; *PVS93*, P7.

[8]The exception being Abakan, with 159,000 inhabitants as of 1 January 1994 (source: http://members.tripod.com/~argun/abakan.htm).

[9]Risto Alapuro, 'Categories, Networks and Civil Society: Teachers' Social Ties in St Petersburg', in *Civil Society in the European North: Concept and Context*, proceedings of the seminar held in St Petersburg, January 18-19, 1996 (St Petersburg: Centre for Independent Social Research, 1996), pp. 109-16 at p. 112.

[10]*WVS*, VV358-9.

[11]The indexing method used in Part II is also to be used here in order to see the propensities exhibited by the different age groups to be either male or female.

[12]The analysis of the *PVS96*, on the other hand, *will* be supplemented with such fieldwork which, even though not obtained simultaneously with that survey, was at a close enough point in time to be comparable to it.

Chapter Twelve – Trust and Confidence

> '[O]ne might have beliefs about individuals as political actors that are somewhat independent of beliefs about people in general. Where politics involves a high level of antagonistic conflict among groups with opposing interests and ideologies, it is possible one would have a lower impression of the trustworthiness of individuals when they are considered in political terms [...] than when they are considered in general'[1].

Respondents' confidence in the different institutions of the USSR was discussed in Chapter Eight, with special emphasis on the fact that the *WVS* was carried out in Russia at a particularly crucial moment in the history of the Russian people. We saw that loyalties were shifting, and that the legitimacy of the different institutions surveyed varied greatly among respondents. A comparison of these results – in other words, of the different kinds of 'trust' found amongst *WVS* respondents – with those obtained from the *PVS93* would therefore be of particular interest in assessing changes in orientation towards the State and other organizations. These comparisons, however, would focus on the general levels and dimensions of trust in the two samples rather than on the specific objects of this trust, since the items surveyed in each survey's set were not identical. Added to this, the variable for trust in ordinary people was part of the set in the *PVS93*, but not in the *WVS*[2], for which reason it was removed from the former set. This was not to prove a problem in terms of the validity of the rest of the analysis because 'trust in ordinary people' constituted a factor on its own in the solution chosen as optimal: its removal from the variable set did not, consequently, significantly alter the rest of the factors, and it could therefore be analyzed separately.

Once again, the *PVS93* and *WVS* variables for trust in people were not coded in the same way, the former giving respondents the choice of five values, whereas the latter only offered a yes/no alternative. Nevertheless, both samples showed that trust in people could best be expressed in terms of age – older respondents being more likely to trust other people than younger ones – and that other attributes such as length of education and occupation could not as easily be discriminated by trust in people in either survey. The similarity of the results for both surveys only differed in terms of sex: whereas this attribute was not a discriminating characteristic in the *WVS*, the *PVS93* sample showed that females were more likely to trust people than men in

1993. Whether this was a result of men's greater exposure to corruption and violence in the early years of post-Soviet Russia was a possible hypothesis, but seemed contradicted by the *PVS93*'s finding that women were more likely than men *not* to expect fair treatment from officials[3]. The reason for their greater trust in people, then, might be a result, instead, of women's continued status as *Gemeinschaftliche* social beings who separated more radically than men their perceptions towards the private and public spheres. This conjecture appeared to find support in the evidence obtained from the rest of the variables related to trust in both surveys.

The Confidence and Trust Variable Sets

Factor solutions for the two variable sets in each survey relating to trust (or 'confidence', as it was termed in the *WVS* questionnaire) in different institutions of the system, showed a striking similarity in their underlying dimensions, in spite of there being almost three years' difference between the two surveys[4]. Both solutions could be divided into two dimensions consisting of 'political' and 'non-political' variables. Within the latter dimension, three further sub-dimensions could be distinguished: one pertaining to the church (or 'churches', in the *PVS93*), another related to the mass media, and a third which could be identified in terms of confidence in the institutions of law and order. As for the political dimension, the surveys reflected the changes in the Russian political sphere which had occurred in the time intervening between them. In the *WVS*, the 'political' had two very distinct aspects to it: allegiance to the USSR, or allegiance to Russia. In the *PVS93*, however, political confidence, or rather, confidence in the political machine, had fragmented into trust in the executive and trust in the legislature – both the old and the new parliaments[5]. Trust in the institutions pertaining to each of these two branches of the political machinery was not distributed evenly, however, as shown in Figure 6. This graph is a multidimensional scaling map of the *PVS93* trust variable set. As explained in Chapter Ten[6], the purpose of MDS is to plot the similarities or distances between the response profiles in a variable set, without taking into account respondents' attributes: objects which elicit similar patterns of responses from the population surveyed are placed closer together than those whose response profiles are dissimilar. Figure 6 thus serves to illustrate how, although the profiles for respondents' trust in

the institutions of the 'government' dimension (the executive) were very similar, their profiles for trust in the old and new parliaments and in trade unions[7] – the 'non-government' dimension – varied substantially. The changing role of trade unions in the post-Soviet world, and the fact that the new parliament had only just been elected by the time the survey was finished must certainly account for the lack of homogeneity with which respondents perceived these institutions' to be worthy of their trust.



Figure 6: multidimensional scaling map of respondents' perceptions of the trustworthiness of trade unions, the prime minister, the government, the president, and the old and new parliaments (*PVS93*)

The Non-Political Dimension: Sex and Age

An examination of the two surveys' 'non-political' factors in terms of sex and age confirmed what was seen in the results of the cluster analysis: the profile for women across all these variables was characterized by their association with 'don't know' responses; this was the case both in 1991 and 1993. However, the sex variable was not completely static, and a change took place in the patterns of male and female responses from one survey to another: whereas the female respondents of the *WVS* were uniformly more likely to have confidence in *all* the institutions named than their male counterparts, in the *PVS* the positioning of males and females on the maps for the variables on law and order had shifted slightly. Females still tended to trust the media and the church more than males, but their propensity to trust the police and the army had diminished: their profiles for these variables were characterized by 'don't know' and 'mostly' responses. Only 'judges and courts' retained their trust.

Males, on the other hand, whilst still tending not to trust either the media or the church, seemed much more confident in the police and the army than they had been in 1991. The results for sex, then, supported the argument that levels of trust in a person are not absolute, but depend on the *object* of trust being enquired about.

Another shift in trust was also in evidence among respondents over sixty-five, who exhibited a clear propensity toward positive responses in the *WVS* maps, but showed an even more marked one towards answering 'don't know' across all the trust variables in the *PVS93*. The only exceptions to this rule for this age group were, not surprisingly, those institutions with which these older respondents were familiar – meaning, primarily, the institutions pertaining to the 'law and order' dimension; in these maps, over sixty-fives were positioned somewhere between 'don't know' and either or both of the positive responses ('yes' and 'mostly'[8]). The younger age groups, on the other hand, were clearly distrustful of the forces of law and order – particularly the police and the army – in both surveys: the cut-off point varied, but it tended to be those respondents over forty-five whose profiles showed more positive responses to the variables composing this factor. Age thus seemed a strong discriminating variable for this dimension: young respondents clearly tended to be wary of authority, whereas older ones tended to support and endorse it. What is important about this, from the point of view of this thesis, is that in developed economies – where the ability to acquire new skills and knowledge quickly are at a premium – respect for one's elders is less than in traditional societies – where tried and tested ways offer the best chances for survival. In this sense, even though respect for the rule of law is essential to civil society, the distrustful attitudes of Russian youth towards the institutions of law and order might perhaps constitute a more significant sign of socio-economic development[9].

An equally distinct line could not, however, be drawn on the maps for the 'media' variables: respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four, for instance, could not be well defined in terms of their trust or lack of it in the media at the time of either survey: although their responses tended to be positive, their co-ordinates were plotted at a significant distance from those of the media variables' values. Respondents aged twenty-five to forty-four, on the other hand, were distinctly lacking in confidence in

1991, but less easily classified in 1993, particularly in terms of newspapers, which they were equally likely to both trust and distrust. What was interesting about the overall decrease in trust in the press, however, was that the *PVS93* showed that it was not reflected in a similar lack of trust in respondents' *own* newspaper. In this sense, it could be argued that trust had become more parochial or factional: either because respondents were feeling increasingly alien to distant, abstract notions of State and Society, or because they now had the chance, under a multi-party system, to express allegiance to different ideas. Overall, however, the *PVS93* results showed age to be strongly positively associated with levels of trust in the media, to a degree that was not the case in the *WVS*, where sex seemed a more important factor.

Finally, trust in the church produced a consistent, pattern in both surveys: although the respondents over fifty-five tended to have confidence in the church and those under fifty-five tended not to, the co-ordinates for the age group between twenty-five and thirty-four corresponded, in the maps for both surveys, to profiles of trust in the church. The explanation for this, in the case of the *WVS* could have been seen to be that the age group in question tended to be female, but this did not apply at all to the *PVS93* data, and the explanation did not hold. A more plausible hypothesis, however, is suggested by research on religious beliefs in Russia done by other scholars, which found that 'religion had become fashionable among intellectuals' under Brezhnev, a process which gathered speed over the 1980s[10]. Moreover, levels 'of identification with the Orthodox Church [...] were considerably higher [...] than the proportion of the population that reported a belief in God'[11] in 1989. The age group ranging from twenty-five to thirty-four could therefore be argued to be more confident in the church than others due to the fact that they had become adults in this climate.

The Non-Political Dimension: *WVS* Educational and Environmental Factors

In the *WVS* dataset, the variable for the size of town which respondents lived in correlated strongly with the 'law and order' variables, showing that confidence in these institutions was greatest in smaller settlements, whereas respondents in towns

of over 500,000 inhabitants were the most likely to reply 'not at all'. This was perhaps another instance of the development of the same characteristics which were seen to be associated with youth in advanced economies: given Russians' experience with authority, there was strong support for arguing the case that urban respondents' distrust of authoritarian structures was a sign of their political competence, and not necessarily of their lack of a civic culture. The press, on the other hand, obtained greater levels of trust in the larger towns than in the smaller ones, whilst television was widely distrusted in all kinds of localities – a result, probably, of Leonid Kravchenko's hard-line, pre-*glasnost'*-style rule at Gosteleradio. The cover-up of events in the Baltic states, in particular, showed television to be a much less reliable medium than the press.

Patterns of trust according to the age at which the *WVS* respondents left school showed that the longer respondents had been in full-time education, the less likely they were to trust the institutions pertaining to the 'law and order' dimension. The educational variable could not, however, be satisfactorily described in terms of confidence in the church or the media, since the school-leaving age profiles for 'quite a lot' and 'not very much' were similar across all these variables. Nevertheless, it remained the case that the lesser-educated respondents in the sample were invariably the most likely to have 'a great deal' of confidence in the institutions surveyed.

The *WVS* variable on occupational categories, which had obtained such low levels of discrimination when cross-tabulated by the two political variables examined in the previous chapter, also yielded less information about the three 'non-political' dimensions of the 'confidence' variable set than the variable on respondents' employment status: respondents' confidence could be clearly defined in terms of those working and those not working. The profile for retired respondents, for example, was characterized primarily by the tendency to have 'a great deal' of confidence in the institutions surveyed, and secondarily by their propensity towards 'don't know' responses. Their confidence was particularly in evidence in the maps for the police and the armed forces, and their ambivalence between 'a great deal' and 'don't know' in those for the press and the legal system. This, added to the fact that their confidence in television – over which the Soviet state did not relinquish as

much control as it did over newspapers – was unshaken, suggested that they trusted most those institutions which had been least changed by *perestroika*. Students and the unemployed, on the other hand, were characterized by very low levels of confidence in anything, especially in the institutions pertaining to the 'law and order' dimension. The difference between these two groups was that, whereas students were clearly positioned somewhere between 'none at all' and 'not very much', the unemployed shared with housewives a strong propensity towards 'don't know' responses. As for respondents who were either self-employed or working over or under thirty hours a week, their profiles were consistently similar across all the variables, being substantially dissimilar to the profiles for other categories. This would seem to suggest that being in a working environment was a significant factor in determining the outlook of the *WVS* respondents (see Figure 7).



Figure 7: correspondence map of respondents' employment status and their confidence in the armed forces (*WVS*)

To summarize, the findings from all the *WVS* educational and environmental variables considered here showed that categories closely related to age or sex – retired respondents, for example – were clearly differentiated from the others in terms of their confidence profiles, and that *Gesellschaftliche* attributes – such as living in large towns, or having spent a long time in full-time education – tended to be associated with lower levels of confidence in the institutions of the 'law and order'

dimension than *Gemeinschaftliche* ones, but overall higher levels of confidence in the press.

The Non-Political Dimension: *PVS93* Educational and Environmental Factors

Where the *WVS* had presented some problems of meaning and method due to its occupational variable, similar difficulties in the *PVS93* were caused by the variable on the location of respondents – the *PVS* equivalent of 'size of town'. The ambiguities inherent in the classification of cities in this survey, which we saw in Chapter Eleven, were clearly in evidence in the perceptual maps for the 'trust' variable set. Whereas 'capital city' was always positioned close to cities with populations ranging from fifty thousand to one million inhabitants, the category 'over one million (including St Petersburg)' was consistently plotted at a considerable distance from those other cities. This could, of course, be an accurate representation of the population of the three cities which had been classified together as capital cities, but the possibility that results from the smaller cities of Kazan and Abakan were pulling Moscow's responses away from their 'true' co-ordinates – that is, closer to St Petersburg – could not be discounted.

In order to determine why there was such a difference between the results for Moscow and those for St Petersburg, therefore, the variable for size of location was cross-tabulated with another of the *PVS93* variables which detailed the republic or *oblast'* in which each interview had been carried out. What this showed was that it was not Moscow which was being 'pulled' (being the predominant value in its category), but rather that it was more likely that St Petersburg was suffering this fate, since it only accounted for 24% of its category: the other cities it was grouped with were Nizhnii Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Perm and Samara.

Nevertheless, the results from this variable revealed certain consistent patterns in the profiles for the different sizes of location involved. The forces of law and order, for example, did not inspire as much confidence in large cities as they did in small ones, with the exception of the 'more than one million' category, the respondents of which were equally likely to reply 'yes' and 'no' to these variables. As for the variables

pertaining to the 'media' dimension, although newspapers in general did not achieve high levels of discrimination in terms of the size of locality, trust in one's own paper showed that levels of trust across the board tended to be low – cities of over one million being, this time, clearly defined by the tendency of their inhabitants to 'hardly' trust their own paper. The division between this category and the other large cities still being present, the latter were less distrustful, exhibiting propensities towards 'neither trust nor distrust' and 'mostly' responses. Torn between 'mostly' and 'don't know' were inhabitants of cities with one to five hundred thousand inhabitants, and showing a clear tendency to 'mostly' trust their own paper were rural inhabitants alone – perhaps a result of the fact that local news is most important in small localities. Television, on the other hand, fared slightly better than the press, with the majority of categories being positioned around 'mostly' and 'neither'. Only the profile for towns ranging from five hundred thousand to one million inhabitants showed more of a tendency to distrust this medium completely. Given the *WVS* results for this variable, it would seem that the greater the size of location, the less likely its inhabitants were to have forgotten television's role under the Soviet regime and even under *perestroika*.

The final dimension, –'churches' in this survey – lacked even the most basic signs of a rural/urban divide, with St Petersburg *et al* presenting a profile similar, not just to that of towns of under twenty thousand inhabitants, but also to that pertaining to the category encompassing rural areas and villages – a profile which showed these three categories to be divided between 'yes' and 'no' tendencies. Further to this, although 'capital city' and the category for towns of between twenty and fifty thousand inhabitants were similarly inclined to 'hardly' trust churches, that for towns with a number of inhabitants ranging between one to five hundred thousand had a marked tendency to 'mostly' trust them. These results would seem to indicate a spread of religious conviction outside the major urban centres (the problematic coding for St Petersburg notwithstanding), and to support the contention that, in 1993, 'levels of religious affiliation were higher than in the late communist years'[12].

The age at which respondents in the *PVS93* finished full-time education did not obtain high levels of discrimination in terms of the 'media'-variables, but, broadly

speaking, respondents with the most years of education behind them tended to trust the mass media more than those who left school earlier. A dividing line between educational levels could also be drawn on the perceptual map for trust in churches, which showed that respondents with less years of education behind them were overall more likely to either trust the church or reply 'don't know' than their longer-educated counterparts. Finally, trust in the institutions of law and order was most likely to be greater the less time respondents had spent in full-time education: respondents who had stayed in school beyond the age of sixteen tended towards the lower levels of trust across all the variables pertaining to this dimension.

The trust profiles of two of the occupational variables found in the *PVS93* were examined: respondents' occupation, and their position as either managers or part of the workforce, a variable with greater discriminatory ability in the profiles obtained for levels of trust. This was particularly clear in two cases: the legal system (as represented by judges and courts) and the church. Whereas the occupation of respondents could not be discriminated by their trust in either of these two institutions, managers had a very marked propensity not to trust either category – especially 'churches'. Respondents in the 'workforce', on the other hand (that is, those not at managerial level), tended to trust churches, but were less likely to trust judges and courts. Added to this, managers were the most likely to trust the army and the police, but not the legal system – a somewhat surprising finding, but perhaps accounted for by the rampant corruption they encountered in their business dealings[13] – whereas the workers were the least likely to trust the forces of law and order. Trust in the media was more likely, conversely, to be found amongst the workforce than amongst managers, who had a marked propensity to trust the media either 'hardly' or 'not at all'.

Where occupational categories did discriminate well amongst respondents was in the marked lack of trust in any of the institutions pertaining to the 'media' dimension exhibited by respondents in the category 'armed forces, police'. Conversely, a marked propensity to trust in the army and the police was not found amongst anyone but themselves, with the partial exception of pensioners, who had a tendency to 'mostly' trust them, the army in particular. Trust in the media, and particularly in the press, on

the other hand, tended to be most in evidence amongst students and professionals, confirming the earlier findings for length of education.

The Non-Political Dimension: To Conclude

Looking at the results from the reverse angle – that is, in terms of attitudes instead of socio-demographic characteristics – the profiles for the responses 'hardly' and 'mostly' were very similar in terms of all the variables examined so far, supporting the contention that the middle-range attributes in an attitudinal or behavioural scale have more in common with each other than they do with those at either extreme of the scale. That this idea found support in the data was of particular import in terms of making direct comparisons between the two surveys, since the coding of the 'trust' and 'confidence' variable sets was different in each: whereas the *WVS* lacked a middle value, the *PVS93* did not. The loss of information highlighted by the attempt to compare the two variable sets was not, however, important from the point of view of the 'open' and 'closed' framework because the difference between extreme and middle values was of greater significance than that between 'sides'. What this meant, in terms of this analysis, was that, whereas some of the respondents who answered 'not very much' in the *WVS* might have answered 'neither trust nor distrust' if given the option, it is very unlikely that a similar shift would have occurred amongst those respondents who answered 'a great deal'.

Furthermore, even though 'scientific' comparisons were not possible between the results of the two surveys, the overall relationship between confidence and the demographic attributes common to both surveys had held: respondents with *Gesellschaftliche* attributes tended to trust the media, but not the church or the institutions of law and order, whereas the latter two sub-dimensions were characterized by the fact that both females and older respondents had a propensity to trust them. According to these results, then, developments in Russia since 1991 had affected overall levels of trust, but not its distribution amongst different sections of the population. However, the idea that the 'democratic' personality was an 'open' – and therefore a trusting one – seemed to be contradicted by some of these results: both surveys showed, for example, that trust in ordinary people was more likely

amongst older citizens, the same citizens who tended to trust the army more than they did the press. This, coupled with findings by other scholars which showed levels of trust to be higher in Russia than in many countries of the Western hemisphere[14], would seem to indicate that perhaps different kinds of trust were at issue, a conclusion which found support in the fact that there was a clear difference in the demographic profiles obtained from the different kinds of institutions surveyed. In other words, the results suggested that people's trust in different types of institutions was not uniform, and, consequently, trust in the political arena might be a very separate psychological element from trust in the social sphere. Indeed, this separation might be, in itself, a key difference between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* personality types. Having thus examined the levels of confidence in the institutions pertaining to the 'non-political' dimension, the 'political' dimension needed to be examined next.

The Political Dimension: Sex and Age

Five variables constituted the political dimension of the *WVS* confidence set, four of which dealt, as was detailed in Chapter Eight, with the parliaments and governments of Russia and the USSR, and another one of which related to people's confidence in the Soviet political system as a whole. Also closely related to the Soviet political apparatus, in respondents' perceptions, was the civil service, as reflected in the results of factor analysis, which had included it in this dimension. A common thread running through all these variables was the fact that both females and older respondents tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence in all the 'political' institutions, the association being stronger for older respondents than it was for females. Indeed, the overall demographic profiles for all six variables were very similar, but they did nevertheless have one very interesting feature: whereas the younger age groups were clearly inclined to lack confidence in the institutions of the USSR, their tendencies were divided with reference to their specifically Russian equivalents, being similarly likely to have either 'not very much' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in them. As for the Soviet political system and the civil service, there was a clear tendency amongst males and amongst respondents under forty-five not to trust either of them.

The propensity to reply 'don't know' to questions about orientation towards political objects was evident in the females of both surveys, but in the *PVS93* sample it was most marked in respondents over sixty-five. This was coupled with a decrease in the propensity of respondents of any age or sex to 'completely trust' the institutions surveyed[15], a feature which was also particularly noticeable amongst respondents aged over sixty-five, previously those with the greatest propensity towards positive responses. Disaffection had also increased amongst respondents in the thirty-five to forty-four age range, suggesting that the expectations of this age group – respondents in the prime of their working life – had not been fulfilled by the post-Soviet regime. As for the younger age groups, the most salient finding to emerge from their results was that *PVS93* respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four were predominantly characterized by their tendency to 'neither trust nor distrust' the political institutions in question. This made comparisons between the two samples' respondents for this age group difficult, since this middle value was not, as has been explained before, an option in the *WVS* questionnaire; nevertheless, this tendency was of interest because it showed a marked level of disinterest in politics amongst young Russians in 1993, corroborating the statement that 'younger cohorts are more politically cynical regardless of education'[16].

The general increase in disaffection was even more pronounced in terms of the sex variable. Females, the profiles for which had previously been characterized by a relatively marked propensity to have confidence in most of the institutions surveyed, did not tend to show as great a propensity to trust the political objects of the system in 1993 as they had exhibited in 1991. Their profiles for the variables in this dimension were characterized predominantly by a tendency to 'hardly' trust the institutions in question. The only significant exception to this overall tendency was a propensity not to know whether to trust the new parliament, which, presumably, they were as yet unsure of. As for males, in 1993 they exhibited a particularly marked tendency to 'completely distrust' all six political institutions.

The Political Dimension: Educational and Environmental Factors

Profiles for respondents' trust in political institutions by employment status in the *WVS* showed that housewives tended not to have very much confidence in several of the institutions of the political dimension, particularly the government and parliament of the USSR. Students shared their lack of trust in these two institutions, but also tended to have a similar lack of confidence in the Soviet political system as a whole, a question which housewives tended to reply 'don't know' to. The response 'a great deal', on the other hand, tended to correspond most closely to the category 'retired' in all the maps for the 'political' dimension, whilst those in full-time work of any description were the most likely to reply 'quite a lot' to all six questions. It could therefore, once again, be argued that being in a working environment seemed to be shaping respondents' attitudes in specific ways, and that age – reflected in the category 'retired' – was also an underlying factor in these responses.

The occupational categories obtained from the *PVS93* sample suffered from a similar lack of differentiation in their profiles for both of this surveys' political dimensions, but some general points could nevertheless be made to describe the overall tendencies evident in these maps. The 'government' dimension was characterized by the fact that it was the Government variable itself which had the most discriminating ability in terms of the survey's occupational codes: professionals and managers 'mostly' trusted the government; housewives, students, the self-employed and farmers were most likely to 'neither trust nor distrust' it; and engineers, secretaries and skilled workers had a propensity to show varying levels of distrust.

Neither were the institutions of the 'non-government' dimension likely to be 'completely' trusted in terms of the profiles of the occupational categories, but clear differences in degrees of distrust were nevertheless obvious amongst them. Trust in trade unions, for example, tended to be associated with certain levels of skill, with unskilled and 'other' workers being the most likely to 'completely trust' them, and managers, engineers, and the self employed being the most likely not to trust them at all. Working respondents of all kinds, on the other hand, tended to either not trust the new parliament, or not to know whether to trust or distrust it. Distrust in the old

parliament was general amongst all groups except pensioners, farmers, the police and the army, all of which were more likely to trust the old parliament than they were to trust the new one.

As for the variable concerning the position of respondents in the workforce, it was best differentiated in terms of their trust in the Prime Minister: whereas both managers and workers had fairly similar profiles of trust in the President and the Government, the former showed a marked propensity to 'completely' trust the Prime Minister, as opposed to the latter's tendency to 'neither trust nor distrust' him. Given the then Prime Minister's status as a former director in the huge energy industrial complex, this result was perhaps not surprising.

Moving on to the 'non-government' dimension, the perceptual maps for respondents' position in the workforce showed that managers were the most likely to both 'trust' and 'distrust' the institutions of this dimension, whereas the workforce profiles were distinguished by their middle-range responses – 'mostly trust', 'neither' and 'mostly distrust'. These results seemed to corroborate those obtained from cluster 2, which had been the most likely to contain managers and whose respondents had been prone to a 'closed' belief system. The only exception to this pattern was the general lack of confidence in the new parliament by both managers and workers, probably the result of a 'wait and see' attitude on the part of respondents.

PVS93 respondents in capital cities and cities of over one million inhabitants were the most likely to trust the institutions of the 'government' dimension, whereas those in smaller locations were the most likely not to trust them. The opposite was true for trust in the agencies pertaining to the 'non-government' dimension, particularly in the case of trade unions, which were most likely to be trusted by respondents in middle-sized towns, but least likely to be trusted by those in capital and large cities. Respondents in smaller settlements tended to opt for 'don't know' as their answer. Confidence in both the old and the new parliaments followed a similar pattern: the category 'capital city' was strongly associated with a lack of trust in the old parliament in particular, and cities of anything over one hundred thousand inhabitants also

exhibited marked propensities towards varying degrees of distrust in the two parliaments. Trust was, conversely, most likely to be found in rural and small settlements, with towns of between twenty to one hundred thousand inhabitants tending to reply 'don't know' to these two variables.

The propensity towards distrust exhibited by *PVS93* respondents in large cities found resonance in the results obtained from the *WVS*. What was even more interesting about the *WVS* respondents, given subsequent historical developments, was the fact that those in towns of over five hundred thousand inhabitants tended not to be very confident in any of the political agencies related to the Soviet State – including the Soviet political system itself – yet tended to have 'a great deal' of confidence in both the parliament and the government of *Russia*. The same pattern of trust and distrust was also found in the propensities exhibited by the category of towns from one to five hundred thousand inhabitants. This seemed to suggest that, whatever other levels of confidence were found in smaller settlements, the legitimacy – or, at the very least, the efficiency – of the Soviet system was being questioned in the major urban centres of the USSR. Given what has been postulated so far about the urban, *Gesellschaftliche* population being the motor of change and development, the implications for the future of the Union were therefore already rather serious by January 1991. That a similar danger was not present in 1993 might therefore only be due to the lack of alternative centres of power to which people could turn, as they had done towards Russia in 1991.

The age at which *WVS* respondents had finished their full-time education showed the general rule for the 1991 sample to be that trust tended to decrease with length of education. This propensity was particularly marked in the correspondence found, on the one hand, between having left school at the ages of twelve and thirteen, and trusting the political agencies of the system (and the system itself) 'a great deal', and, on the other, in that between leaving school at the ages of twenty-one and over, and having 'not very much' confidence, or 'none at all', in these agencies[17]. The degree of correspondence between the categories for length of education and trust was not, however, uniform across these variables, particularly for respondents in the middle categories for length of education. At either extreme were the variables for trust in

the Soviet political system (see Figure 8) and in the parliament of the USSR (see Figure 9). The maps for these two variables showed how, for school-leaving ages of fourteen to eighteen, the tendency of these respondents not to trust the parliament of the USSR was more marked than their tendency not to trust the Soviet political system.



Figure 8: correspondence map for the age at which respondents finished their full-time education and their confidence in the Soviet political system (*WVS*)



Figure 9: correspondence map for the age at which respondents finished their full-time education and their confidence in the parliament of the USSR (*WVS*)

In spite of the difference in the profiles of the educational variable's middle values, the *WVS* did nevertheless show a certain stability in the relationship between length

of education and trust. In the case of the *PVS93* sample, however, there did not seem to be an overarching pattern which could explain, even broadly, the perceptual maps obtained from these variables. Partly to blame for this was the over-representation of respondents with higher education, which led to small counts in the lesser-educated categories. However, similar marginal frequencies for the educational variable were found in the *WVS* as in the *PVS93* without leading to the same lack of a clear conceptual relationship between length of education and trust. Trust in the agencies of government, for instance, could not be explained in terms of length of education. For example, even though those respondents who had finished their full-time education at the ages of twenty-one or over were highly likely to 'mostly' trust the Government, the President and, to a lesser extent, the Prime Minister, respondents who had finished at nineteen and twenty responded very differently to these questions. Moreover, the profiles for respondents with few years of formal education were also very dissimilar amongst themselves, as shown by the perceptual map for trust in the President (Figure 10).



Figure 10: correspondence map for the age at which respondents finished their full-time education and their trust in the President (*PVS93*)

A similar lack of clear propensities was in evidence in the variables of the 'non-government' dimension across all educational categories. However, the maps for trust in the parliaments and trade unions revealed that educational differences between respondents led to differences in *political competence*, since the profiles for the educational categories could be described in terms of those who had a definite opinion and those who did not – 'don't know' and 'neither trust nor distrust'. Seen

from this point of view, the longer respondents had been in full-time education, the more likely they were to take a stand on the question of their trust in the political objects of the system, as illustrated by Figure 11.



Figure 11: correspondence map for the age at which respondents finished their full-time education and their trust in trade unions (*PVS93*)

The only exception to the 'competence' hypothesis in the above map was the category for respondents who left school at eighteen, who were as likely as those who left at twelve to give 'incompetent' replies. This is important because it serves to illustrate the fact that, although respondents can sometimes be sufficiently described in terms of just one or other of their attributes, univariate statistical analyses do not reflect the sum total of a person, a point which we will return to presently.

The State of the Nation so Far

As was explained in Chapter Ten, the choice of variables used in this part of the study was guided primarily by considerations of emphasis. Having analyzed the *WVS* survey from the point of view of a broad theoretical framework, examining many of the different aspects which constitute a nation's culture, we proceeded to narrow down our field of enquiry back to its original starting-point in Chapter One: political culture. Further to this, the subject of political culture itself was examined through two very specific sets of variables, chosen for their relevance in terms of more orthodox approaches to the topic than those used in Part II of this thesis: variables

measuring political competence, and the heuristically widely-used notion of 'trust'. These two sets were explored through a few demographic variables, selected on the basis of also being present in both surveys. Two points about them needed, nevertheless, to be borne in mind at all times; first, the demographic variables included in the comparison of these two surveys were not necessarily the best or the most meaningful ones; second, even these variables were not always coded in the same way, or even coded in a way that was best suited for the analyses being carried out. This last point needs further elaboration.

It has already been explained that correspondence analysis is a way of plotting mathematical distances which are, in essence, equivalent to the deviations from the sample total obtained from indices such as those used to examine the clusters' contingency tables. This means that the same caveats which applied to the analysis of those contingency tables apply to correspondence maps, particularly those concerning categories with small counts. In the same way that these categories obtain very large index scores, their co-ordinates on perceptual maps are plotted very far along one or both of the axes, with the attendant result of 'bunching' other categories together. For this reason, correspondence analysis works best where there is a small number of similarly-sized categories, a fact which could serve to justify the low levels of differentiation found in for example, both surveys' perceptual maps for the occupational categories of their respondents.

Nevertheless, the above explanation did not wholly account for the different levels of discrimination obtained by the demographic variables examined in the last two chapters. Respondents' answers to the questions examined were, for instance, as clearly differentiated in terms of age as they were in terms of sex, a variable with far fewer categories (evidently). This would seem to suggest that coding alone was not responsible for the varying levels of discrimination found amongst the demographic variables examined in this part of the study. Removing those variables known *a priori* to be problematic showed this clearly, since sex and age were the most clearly differentiated attributes of respondents, a fact which had also been apparent in the cluster results.

The importance of age, in particular, as a determinant factor in responses was not surprising, given the high level and speed of change in the years from 1991 to 1993. Although 'one must be careful not to assume that a generational change means automatically political change'[18], the connection between age and adaptability to new environments is a strong one, as was evident from the distribution of responses to change amongst the clusters. Nevertheless, in times of great upheaval, a great degree of uncertainty can be witnessed, not just amongst the old, but amongst the population in general, and signs of this were definitely apparent in the results obtained from both the *WVS* and the *PVS93*. The 'trust' and 'confidence' variable sets reflected this especially clearly in the way that the political dimensions of these sets, particularly of the *PVS93* set, were not as well differentiated as the others, with, moreover, a greater propensity towards ambivalence and abstention in both. This seemed to suggest that respondents were more confident of their opinions concerning those institutions with which they were already familiar, at least in form, if not in content – that is, with those institutions which had suffered the least changes since the beginning of *perestroika*. At the same time, this is a clear illustration of the shortcomings of traditional methods of survey analysis, methods which, even with the degree of sophistication provided here by correspondence analysis, fail to reveal the latent tendencies and hidden evolution of *groups* within the general population. The points made in defence of an approach which uses core basic values in the formation of groups will not be repeated here, since they will be taken up later, but a short review of the two methods used thus far in this study need to be made before proceeding on to a third approach, to be used in the next chapter.

The clusters formed in Part II could be fairly well described in terms of sex and age, but what was more important about them was that each cluster, over and above the demographic characteristics of its members, could be best described in terms of certain mindsets given, not by one or a set of variables, but by the underlying pattern of their responses throughout the survey. Hence, what the clusters created were not *demographic* types, but *character* types. The same procedure could not be used in the longitudinal analysis, and, consequently, an assessment was made instead of the political orientation of different demographic categories. Whilst it is true that different research objectives were pursued in each part of the study and the two

methods were therefore used to achieve different aims, a comparison between the two sets of results can nevertheless be made from the point of view of *significance.* Even though this and the previous chapter achieved their objective, which was to interpret change in the Russian Federation, their findings are not only less detailed – the selection of only a few salient variables being partly a consequence of constraints upon time and space – but also less *meaningful*, from the point of view of all the arguments put forward in Part I in favour of a new approach to the study of political culture. It is the gap between the two methods, then, that Chapter Thirteen will seek to bridge, by supplementing the dry, factual, information obtained from the cross-survey comparisons with more qualitative information from other sources, aiming to complement simple demographics with, as it were, character references which might help to establish what happened to the clusters in the years since 1991.

Notes

[1]Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', p. 536.
[2]*WVS*, V94; *PVS93*, Q6A.
[3]*PVS93*, Q34.
[4]*WVS*, VV272-85; *PVS93*, Q6B-N, RQ6X1-2. See Appendix H for the full text of both sets.
[5]The *PVS93* was scheduled to be carried out throughout December, before the elections had been called. Consequently, 1,095 respondents were interviewed before the elections, and 1,046 after them.
[6]See Chapter Ten, p. 207.
[7]The variable for 'trade unions' belonged to this dimension in the *PVS93* but not in the *WVS*, perhaps because of their continuing dependence on the government after the collapse of the Soviet system.
[8]For ease of reading on SPSS perceptual maps, the values for the *PVS93* trust variables were assigned new labels by this researcher. The old and new labels were as follows ('don't know' remained the same):

Old	Completely trust	Mostly trust	Neither trust nor distrust	Mostly distrust	Completely distrust
New	Yes	Mostly	Neither	Hardly	No

[9]Perhaps this was even a sign of 'postmaterialism' comparable to that of the 1995 protesters at the Newbury Bypass.
[10]Stephen White, Ian McAllister and Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaya, 'Religion and Politics in Postcommunist Russia', in *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 73-88 at p.75.
[11]*Ibid.*, p.76.
[12]Stephen White and Ian McAllister, 'The Politics of Religion in Postcommunist Russia', in *Religion, State and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (September 1997), pp. 235-52 at p. 241.
[13]For more on trust as related to corruption, see Miller, White and Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe*, pp. 101-5 and 183-90.
[14]See Rukavishnikov *et al.*, 'Rossiia mezhdu proshlym i budushchim', pp.79-80.
[15]The 'president' and 'prime minister' were, of course, individuals, but, since they were not referred to by name, they will be treated here as institutions, for ease of reference.
[16]Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 419.

[17]Straight counts in other sets of results from 1991 also found that education appears to enhance cynicism – see Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 419.
[18]Brzezinski, 'Soviet Politics', p. 345.

Chapter Thirteen – Decreasing Social Circles

> 'People are very busy and have smaller circles of friends now; everybody has less money, and they have to work very hard for it, so there is less money and less time to spend with friends. We meet sometimes for dinner in friends' flats, but we don't go out as much anymore'[1].

Chapters Eleven and Twelve examined data from the two surveys carried out in early 1991 and late 1993, and looked at a number of variables related to politics, with reference to the conceptual frameworks set out in Part I of this study. What the data used in these chapters did not illustrate, however, was the one aspect of respondents' lives which was argued in Part I to be a core factor in the formation of their world-view: their social relations. Questions relating to respondents' involvement in social networks were limited to their participation in different kinds of *Gesellschäfte*. Even using the German word literally to mean 'associations', the theoretical implications of this are clear: these associations, by virtue of being groups which individuals *chose* to participate in, pertained inherently to the *Gesellschaft*, even if, by virtue of the nature of their objectives, some were more *Gesellschaftliche* than others. Even religious organizations, in the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts, were not organic, communal units to which individuals belonged since birth, but rather associations like any others, which individuals consciously joined. What all this meant was that the quantitative data on social networks could only be used to assess, and only to a certain extent, respondents' involvement in the *Gesellschaft*. Yet, since the social life of individuals – which was established in Part I as a determining factor of their political culture – cannot be described or defined simply in terms of their membership, or lack of it, in *Gesellschaftliche* groups, networks pertaining to the *Gemeinschaft* needed to be assessed as well, and the data from the *WVS* and the *PVS93* therefore would have to be supplemented with data from other sources. Prior to an examination of *Gemeinschaftliche* relationships, however, the quantitative data available on membership and participation in different organizations needed to be examined, to see just how big an area of Russians' lives the *Gemeinschaft* might be occupying.

Unfortunately, comparisons between the *WVS* set of organizations and that of the *PVS93* were, once again, subject to certain cautions, since the former survey's set had sixteen variables, whereas the latter had only four. Nevertheless, the results from

both surveys led to two main conclusions: first, membership of *Gesellschaftliche* associations was not widespread among the general Russian public; and, second, the overall impression obtained from these results was that of a decreasingly socially active population, at least in terms of a *Gesellschaft*. We saw that the *WVS* sample had very small membership percentages for all variables except one: membership in trade unions. The frequency table for this variable showed that 61.7% of respondents belonged to a trade union, a figure which was much higher than that for membership in any other kind of organization, the second highest of which – political parties, which we will come back to presently – was only 11.3%. This huge difference suggested that membership in trade unions might be the result, not of an anomalous aspect of Russians' social competence, but rather of pressures external to the individual. This hypothesis then seemed to be confirmed by the results of the *PVS93* trade union membership variable, which showed that a mere 12.1% of the sample took part in trade unions or other professional organizations[2]. This drop in membership suggested that Russians had belonged to trade unions only because it was either compulsory or necessary, and that when the compulsion or need disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the command economy, then so did membership. The highest membership percentage in the *PVS93* was the 43.8% of respondents taking part in 'a hobby, sports or cultural organization'[3], but this figure too, like the *WVS* percentages for trade unions, might be misleading, or masking other effects. The small percentages of the sample belonging to either religious, political or professional organizations suggested that, since the variable for 'a hobby, sports or cultural organization' grouped many different organizations together, as opposed to the other three variables which were much narrower in scope, the relatively high percentage obtained for recreational organizations might be the result of grouping together what would otherwise have been very small individual counts.

Diaries and Other Stories

'Theory as interpretation should be grounded in the worlds of lived experience'[4].

Complicating the assessment of social networks even further was the fact that no variables of any kind related to this issue were found in the *PVS96*. This researcher

therefore decided to supplement this particular gap in the data with fieldwork, by collecting qualitative data of an admittedly highly impressionistic character in the months of September to December of 1997. Inherent in the nature of qualitative research of this kind, however, is the fact that '[t]he researcher starts out with a general idea of what people to interview and how to find them, but is willing to change course after the initial interviews'[5], and this is exactly what happened in the process of the fieldwork conducted for this study. The initial research plan was to select a number of respondents on the basis of different demographic characteristics, and to give them diaries to keep over a fortnight, in which they would register all contacts they made over that space of time, the nature of the contact, and their relationship to the person being contacted. Added to this, a short questionnaire was to be administered to them, containing questions designed to gather further information about their social networks and their political attitudes. This methodology was based on another study, conducted amongst teachers in St Petersburg and Helsinki, which showed that whereas, in Helsinki, teachers 'offer skills to the market, and significant decisions in their lives are structured according to their market capacities – stages like finding a job and therefore moving to Helsinki, finding an apartment as a function of this move, etc.', for the teachers in St Petersburg, '[s]uch patterns [...] of everyday life as housing and work depend on *personal* acquaintance or on kin'[6]. The study's most significant finding was that the market mechanisms which determined the Helsinki teachers' lives transformed them into a social class by involving them in middle-class networks, in contrast to the situation in St Petersburg, where 'the interpersonal relations that break the horizontal group formation constitute a very charged dimension in the social space: a distinct class-based categorization is far less significant in marking the teachers' networks'[7].

This researcher envisaged several problems with the project, however. Firstly, through interviewing procedures a researcher 'can usually learn how informants view themselves and their world, sometimes obtain an accurate account of past events and current activities, and almost never predict exactly how an informant will act in a new situation'[8]. Secondly, compiling the contact diaries presented an even more complex problem, since it involved, not only selecting an appropriate number of appropriate subjects, but also making sure that the subjects completed their diaries truthfully and

without supervision. It was the second of these problems which caused this researcher the most concern, particularly because the question of truthfulness was not one which could be solved other than by an 'unscientific' exercise of judgement: responses would have to be examined in the light of both other responses and this researcher's observations of post-Soviet Russian life. With these problems in mind, this researcher set off for Moscow in September 1997, hoping for the best.

It soon became apparent, however, that neither the diaries nor the interviews were going to be reliable methods of collecting the information desired, and that the foremost problem was the small amount of leisure time available to most Russians[9]. This, which at first seemed simply a circumstantial problem, turned out to be arguably the most striking characteristic of Russian life nearing the end of the twentieth century: the retrenchment of social life into very small, primarily family-based, circles. Further research into secondary sources, moreover, showed that this characteristic was neither a coincidental feature of the situation prevailing at the time of the fieldwork conducted for this study, nor the result of one researcher's judgement, based on a specific set of cultural values and prejudices: the issue of Russians' diminishing social environments has been the central theme of at least one major research project[10].

Several factors seemed to be causing this retrenchment, affecting different demographic groups in different ways. Pensioners' social circles, for example, were obviously affected by the number of their friends and relatives who had quite simply died of old age. Since the average life span of Russians is only about sixty years, this meant that 'old age' came much earlier than it might have done, and that it was not just pensioners, but people over fifty in general who suffered losses in this way. Nevertheless, the most substantial impact on the social networks of most Russians – regardless of their socio-demographic category – was a direct consequence of the economic reform process. Whereas workers in the command economy had been able not to put too much effort into work, and had expended their time and energy looking for goods and contacts instead, in post-Soviet Russia the exact opposite was true: the shops were full of goods, but in order to pay for them, Russians needed to work harder than they ever had before – often in several jobs which could take up

the entire day. As a consequence of this, by late 1997 contacts among both friends and family members seemed to have suffered.

> 'No, we haven't seen Pavel Aleksandrovich in years. Even though him and my father [his first cousin] grew up like brothers, in these last years we have only seen him a couple of times, if that. My father and him call each other on the phone, of course, but they cannot afford to visit each other any more, they have neither the time nor the money to do it. Pavel Aleksandrovich is very keen on keeping the family together and all that, but, you know...'[11]

In many cases, even the contact time between family members living quite close to each other was very short, an impression which was strong even where contacts were frequent. Three informants in particular, all of them divorced women with one or more children, saw their mothers often, but rarely for more than ten or fifteen minutes, largely a matter of dropping the children off and picking them up again, or bringing their mothers some shopping and leaving almost immediately. These three informants' accounts of their relationship with their mothers were interesting on several levels, because they seemed to illustrate perfectly the results of social transition. On the one hand, they needed their mothers to take care of things while they were at work, often for very long hours. Two of them went as far as buying their flats practically next door to their mothers' flats – one of them in the same building, the other in the same group of buildings. On the other hand, however, the pressures of working such long hours – for so little money, in a different pair of the cases – meant that, even though they realized how much assistance their mothers were, these three women were not emotionally reliant on them, being more concerned about their job prospects and careers than they were about the more traditional aspects of their lives and roles as members of the family unit. In this sense, they and others like them were torn between their desire to be part of the new economic system – in some cases even to the extent of wanting to leave Russia altogether and settle down in Europe or the USA – and the ties binding them to the old family networks. It was this researcher's impression that, in many cases, the latter were losing the tug of war: not only was there simply no time for prolonged family contact if food was to be put on the table, but also, as was illustrated by the three divorcees and their (married) mothers, there was a vast generational difference between the younger women trying to get ahead in a harsh, almost frontier-like nascent market economy and the older women, all of them pensioners who were

more or less constantly waxing nostalgic about the good old days of the Soviet regime:

> 'Before, people worked very hard, but with enthusiasm. Now, all they think about is money, and they do not have a conscience, or pity, or compassion, or any of the things which make a man. It seems to me that we have made a lot of very bad changes in a short space of time'[12].

The mothers of these three informants were not only nostalgic, but also extremely fearful, something which they shared with other people their age, even those still working. The constant reports in the media of the most violent and morbid crimes were a source of anguish to these informants, in some cases affecting their lives substantially. One old couple in particular lived in such fear that they had almost completely ceased to leave the house: when they did, it was never later than six in the evening because after that time they were sure that criminals of all shades and colours were lurking in every corner, even in their own stairwell. Without necessarily going to such extremes, the fear of crime could be felt distinctly amongst older informants, and the less people these informants saw – that is, the smaller their social circles – the more afraid they were, and the more convinced that 'in the old days, children wanted to be cosmonauts, pilots, doctors; now all the boys want to be criminals, and all the girls want to be prostitutes'[13].

Not all of the older informants were haunted by fear and nostalgia, however: some had managed to 'reconstruct themselves', others had never been keen supporters of the Communist regime in the first place. It was not the case, however, that these 'adaptable' informants had not done well under the Communist regime: many of them had occupied – and some still occupied – respected positions in radio stations, universities, engineering plants and the like. Furthermore, not many of the 'reconstructed' informants who had done well under the Communists were doing particularly well in post-Soviet conditions. Moreover, many of those informants who had not adapted to their new circumstances shared a similar background to those who had. What the 'adapted' informants really had in common was that either they or their partners had been to the West, either for a prolonged stay, or on repeated occasions, whereas those who had *not* adapted, even though in some instances their own children had lived or were living abroad, had never themselves experienced life in a market economy. What was most significant about this difference, however, was

that, although social life in general was not great, 'reconstructed' informants, those with less fear and more 'open' personalities, had nevertheless a more active life than those who had remained staunchly entrenched in Soviet ways.

Seemingly supporting this conclusion was the difference between the social lives of Russians and of foreign residents. Invariably, the latter made more of an effort to get together with friends fairly regularly, and to organize social activities such as playing sports or going to the cinema. Obviously, many of these foreigners were paid Western salaries and, consequently, did not have to have more than one job in order to be able to afford to go out or receive guests frequently. However, even in those instances where this was not the case, foreigners still made more of an effort, not just to meet their friends, but also to make new acquaintances. This applied even to foreigners who had lived in Russia since before the Soviet Union collapsed.

The Shape of the Russian World-View

> 'I'm not just saying this, it's true. It's a well-known *fact* that many Orthodox children go missing at Easter, because they are kidnapped by Jews for their Easter rituals, which involve using the blood of Christian children [...] Well, maybe in the West they don't do that, I can well believe that – things are more civilized over there, so I'm sure your Jews do not do these things; however, in *this* country, that's the way it is'[14].

The initial plan was, as explained earlier, to supplement the information obtained from the diaries with semi-structured interviews. This researcher found, however, that interviews elicited answers from respondents which were at odds with the opinions expressed by them in the course of normal, unguarded conversation[15]. Whereas, under Soviet rule, Russians would deliver the party line to Westerners they did not know very well, in these post-Soviet times informants' fear seemed to be, not that the KGB would be knocking on their door, but rather – and almost ironically – that a Westerner such as this researcher would think they were closet Communists if they did not voice their enthusiastic support for economic and political reform. Casual conversation and further acquaintance, however, would reveal opinions – not only about political or economic matters, but about all sorts of other topics as well – which at first remained hidden in interview settings, however informal.

Most saliently, Russians seemed to have an almost childish belief in the magical and the supernatural. One example of this was the tale told to this researcher about Tsar Paul I. Having been foretold by a seer that he would be murdered, he decided to build what is now known as the Engineers' Castle on the banks of the Fontanka in St Petersburg, in order to lock himself away and ensure nobody could get at him. To cut a long story short, he was indeed suffocated in his bed, and this was seen by the narrator (a former Intourist guide with a degree in English) not as the result of a conspiracy which took advantage of the Tsar's fear and superstition, but as the inevitable fulfilment of the prophecy. This story, and the general point it serves to illustrate, are substantiated by the findings, not only of recent research, but also of studies made in the years before the collapse of the USSR. 'Alternative ideologies, including supernatural ones, had certainly become well established by the late Communist period', with 'many more believers than disbelievers in omens, telepathy, horoscopes or even flying saucers'[16]. Related to these kinds of beliefs was the emergence, amongst some of this researcher's older female informants, of a religious feeling which focused on the more mystical aspects of religious belief, particularly miracles and rituals. The latter were observed, often without full comprehension of their meaning, as in the case of the old Jewish couple whose son had emigrated to Israel. He called them on Yom Kippur, so that they would make sure to light a candle, which they did with standard candles, kept in case of power failures, which they then stood on saucers, not having any real candlestick holders in their flat. Nevertheless, and in spite of all the trouble they went to, neither could explain the significance of the ritual, or had even been previously aware that this was what Jews did on that date. Their assimilation to atheist Marxist-Leninist doctrine had been complete: so complete that, in the wake of the breakdown of the system which had upheld it, they were consciously seeking to embrace the religion of their forefathers, in order to fill the void left by the collapse of their old beliefs.

A further aspect of this disposition towards the esoteric and the mysterious was a widespread belief in conspiracy theories. Although it was mainly the old and the infirm who turned to the supernatural for guidance[17], informants of all ages and backgrounds were inclined to choose intrigue over accident as the explanation for all kinds of events. A striking example was the account given of Stalin's death by one

informant, who, as a scientist himself, might have been expected to be more sceptical about such rumours. He claimed, not only that Beria had poisoned Stalin (which this researcher had heard before), but also that the poison had caused Stalin's corpse to decay so quickly that an actor who used to double as Stalin in various official visits and ceremonies was somehow killed so that he could take Stalin's place in the mausoleum. Consequently, it was the fear that the ruse would be discovered which prompted the Politburo to withdraw 'Stalin' from the mausoleum, and not destalinization. This is not the place to cover the whole conspiracy with all its ramifications, but it will suffice to say that there was also an attendant anecdote about how Stalin's daughter Svetlana had called Beria a murderer in front of the Politburo, and how this was the real reason why Beria had been shot.

The relevance of the above stories might not seem clear, at first sight, but they do indeed have a function, beyond that of providing the reader with some light entertainment after what have been two very dry chapters. Given the theories expounded and espoused in Part I this study, and the small dimensions of the social lives of most of the informants encountered, that so many of them should believe so fervently and staunchly in one kind of hidden dimension of reality or another (whether that meant a spiritual dimension or simply a political one) should come as no surprise, illustrating as it did precisely the sort of relationships between individuals' external and internal constructs of the world posited in this thesis. This was reinforced by the fact that those informants who subscribed the least to conspiracies, miracles and the like were also the ones with the widest circles of friends and – perhaps more importantly – acquaintances. Working in environments with foreigners, and having access to the world media contributed to make their world even larger, and their views more sceptical about supernatural phenomena than those of their more isolated compatriots, even though these informants still showed an inclination towards conspiracy theories, to some degree. Of course, the existence of conspiracy theories is perhaps more understandable in Russia than in many other places. To begin with, any casual observer cannot help but notice that those who have done well under capitalism are very often the same ones that did well under communism. Secondly, the disclosure of many events which, though taught in Western schools, were neither discussed nor accepted in Soviet historiography, must

surely have created in many Russians to whom the new version of events came as a shock a sense that fact is often stranger than fiction: that, if Soviet textbooks had lied, then maybe nothing was as it seemed. All the same, these tales of conspiracy, mystery and magic served to illustrate a very important point, which was that they reflected a view of the world as being full of alien, uncontrollable and unknowable forces, a world in which the individual is the subject of hidden processes, powers and forces. In other words, they reflected a view of the world in which the individual has no *competence.*

Political Competence: One

> 'Leaving aside the [...] question of responsibility for the actions of relatives, all other types of bonds "of obligation" prove to have weakened significantly. People do not feel as responsible for their country, their government or their industry as they did five years ago. It is worth noting that even "ethnic" responsibility has decreased sharply: ethno-social relationships have not in any way filled the gap between the Government and society'[18].

This researcher's informants, however, were a very small group, and it could be argued that they were perhaps not representative. The data from the *PVS96* was therefore examined with a view to assessing the validity of the findings obtained from the fieldwork, particularly on the subject of competence, an assessment of which had also guided the analysis of variables from the other two surveys employed so far. The variables chosen from those two surveys – the *WVS* and the *PVS93* – 'measured' respondents' interest in politics and the frequency with which they engaged in political discussions, and they were used to compare the levels of political competence found amongst various demographic groupings. These two variables were chosen on the basis of the results obtained from the contingency tables for cluster membership and other variables, which showed clear patterns of association between 'ego strength', *Gesellschaftliche* characteristics, and political self-confidence – or competence – reflected in high levels of interest in politics, high frequencies of political discussions, and, in the *WVS*, high values for other variables (such as the importance of politics) not used in Chapter Eleven because they were absent from the *PVS93* questionnaire. This reduction in the number of variables which could be used to make comparisons between surveys became even more acute in the case of the *PVS96*. None of the variables examined – not only in Chapter Eleven with

regards to competence, but also in Chapter Twelve with reference to trust – were present in the 1996 survey. For this reason, the political self-confidence of the *PVS96* respondents would have to be measured through other variables, and comparisons between this last survey and the previous two made in very general terms. The qualitative tone of this chapter, already mentioned above with regard to the fieldwork, would therefore permeate even the quantitative side of the results.

The purpose of *PVS96* was to obtain a quick impression of the general trends in attitudes towards political objects three years after the original survey was carried out. The questions which could be used in this study to assess the political competence of respondents were therefore originally geared towards assessing Russian attitudes towards the main participants in the political arena, and the overall level of support for the theoretical principles of liberal democracy and the market economy. In other words, respondents were asked, on the one hand, about their support for specific objects of orientation and, on the other, their opinion of various abstract political and economic ideas. It is the latter kinds of questions that will be used here as indicators of political self-confidence, but, for those who would rather this study measured support for *concrete* political objects, a few words need to be said – or rather, reiterated – about the conceptual pitfalls of using such questions in a search for respondents' political values at a meaningful level.

Political Self-Placement

'Future voters distinguish badly between right and left'[19].

We saw in Chapter Eight, with reference to the cluster results, how the self-placement of respondents on a political spectrum posed several conceptual problems, and the variable in question was therefore coded in three different ways, illustrating some of the parameters which could be used to interpret the results obtained from it. This problem of interpretation was highlighted when the results of the *PVS93* were examined, and intensified when the *PVS96* was added to the analysis. In the first instance, the *PVS93* was coded with three values: left, centre and right, thus determining the codes to be used in the comparison and not giving the analyst an option to recode the variable in different ways, as it was possible to do

with the ten-point scale used in the *WVS*. Even more problematic for the purposes of comparison, however, was the absence of this variable from the *PVS96*.

If deductions about the political stand of the 1996 sample needed to be made, therefore, the variables which would have to be used were ones which asked about respondents' support of the government and political parties, and about their belief in the ideals of communism[20]. Once again, however, the *meaning* of respondents' answers to these variables was not easily interpreted in terms of traditional Western political thought for several reasons. First, El'tsin's 'government' is not a fixed, clearly definable entity: in the years since he first came to power, the constant reshuffles to which it has been subjected have meant that, in political terms, it has faced opposition from virtually all parties and factions in the Russian political arena at one point or another. Consequently, although support for the government could be taken as an indication of, at the very least, broad support for reform, opposition to the government should not as of itself be taken as an indicator of political stance. As to the question of support for political parties, and its subsidiary variable detailing which parties were specifically supported, this researcher's main concern was whether Russians classified 'left' and 'right' on the basis of the same ideas about political values as citizens in Western liberal democracies. Empirical evidence found elsewhere, however, seemed to indicate that this was not the case: an All-Russian survey carried out in 1995 by the Public Opinion Foundation asked respondents to classify a list of parties into left, right and centre, and the results showed a wide range of disagreement as to which parties belonged to which side of the political spectrum; the KPRF, for example, was assigned to the 'right' by 16% of 'right-wing' voters, and by 22% of 'left-wing' voters[21]. Party support was therefore also not as clear an indication of political self-placement as might be hoped for.

Furthermore, even if party support had been a reliable indication of political stance, respondents' affiliation would not necessarily be a true measure of their political competence. The fact that an individual supports a given party does not inherently mean that the individual in question is a politically competent citizen, as examples from authoritarian regimes and the Soviet Union itself can show: in the USSR, in fact, it was sometimes the *lack* of party affiliation which was a sign of political

sophistication. A good example of this were two of the variables in the *PVS93*, one asking whether respondents were supporters of any political party, and the other – which we will return to in the next section – asking respondents whether they agreed with the proposition that none of the parties in Russia represented the views of people like themselves. Although 46.9% of the sample were supporters of one party or another, only 32.9% felt that parties *did* represent their views[22], which would seem to support the notion that party support (or 'identification', the meaning of which, given these results, is unclear) is a poor measure of political culture, except in terms of measuring whether there is a culture of party membership or not. To summarize, on the question of party support, the habit of belonging to 'a' party may perhaps have dictated the responses of Russian respondents, leaving their choices uninformed.

Political Competence: Two

> 'If we accept the Greeks' definition of the idiot as an altogether private man, then we must conclude that many citizens of many societies are indeed idiots'[23].

Following on from the points made in the previous section, therefore, the variables to be considered for an assessment of respondents' self-confidence in political terms were those questions which focused on opinions rather than attitudes, on the basis, perhaps subjective, that respondents would have had to think more carefully about their replies to the former, and that these questions would therefore be a more accurate reflection of the degree to which respondents were willing to become involved and take an interest in political matters.

Chapter Eleven showed that the overall level of interest in politics amongst the Russian public in 1993 was lower than it had been in 1991. This trend was confirmed by the results of two other surveys carried out in April 1993 and November 1994, which also showed an overall decrease in the percentage of respondents who were interested in politics[24]. However, the drop in interest from 1993 to 1994 was not as great as it had been from 1991 to 1993. The difference in elapsed times notwithstanding, the loss of interest in politics seemed a fairly solid trend in all these surveys, and it therefore remained to be seen whether this trend had continued into

1996, by examining two variables in the *PVS96* which showed, first, the degree of alienation from political parties felt by the survey's respondents – a variable which established an *a priori* sense of respondents' sense of engagement in the political process – and, second, whether this alienation was due to the nature of the *existing* political parties, or to the *existence* of the multi-party system itself.

This first of these variables consisted of responses to the statement: 'None of the existing parties represents the interests and views of people like me'[25]. Bearing in mind the disparity of this question with those on political interest in the other two surveys, a speculative comparison could nevertheless be made by including in the examination the *PVS93* results for the variables taken from the *PVS96*. In this way, the *PVS93* could be used to link, as it were, the two different questions in the 1991 and 1996 surveys, which were, moreover, to be seen as aspects of competence as a whole, rather than as specific issues in themselves. The correspondence analysis of the *PVS93* variables on respondents' political interest and their feeling of being represented by a party revealed that responses to these questions could indeed be seen in terms of competence, the profiles of categories indicating low and high political competence being very similar for both variables, as shown in Figure 12.



Figure 12: correspondence map of respondents' political interest and party alienation (*PVS93*)[26]

Figure 12 shows that, particularly in the case of the more moderate responses ('agree', 'a little', 'quite', 'disagree'), respondents who felt that parties did not represent their views tended to be less interested in politics than those who did, and that the profiles for respondents who opted for 'don't know' as an answer were similar as well to those for the less politically competent responses. Compared to the 1993 results for the variable on feeling represented by political parties, those from the 1996 survey showed that, whereas a substantially smaller percentage of people 'agreed' with the proposition, there was also a fairly substantial increase in the percentages of people who either 'completely agreed' or 'neither agreed nor disagreed' with it[27]. In other words, the results appeared to suggest that, whereas some people had become completely disillusioned with political parties, others, though not totally won over by them, were less sceptical of them than before. Alternatively, this latter group could simply have become used to the presence of political parties, and had ceased to really care either way – from this point of view, parties might be considered merely an inconsequential part of the political landscape.

In order to attempt to clarify which of these two options might be closer to the truth in most cases, a second variable was examined, one which asked respondents which option they thought would be best for Russia: a one-party system, a multiparty system with less parties, the multiparty system as it was, or a system with no parties at all (what this would involve was not specified)[28]. This variable also showed a polarization of opinion, with a smaller percentage of the 1996 sample believing that the existing system was the best for Russia, and a much greater percentage being of the opinion that a one-party system would be best. These results supported the contention that it was indeed disillusionment that was affecting respondents' choices with regards to parties. Substantiating this conclusion further were the results of a third variable, concerning which organism should have the final say in political decisions, whether Parliament or the Government[29]. Whereas in 1993 43.9% of the sample thought Parliament should have the final say, by 1996 this figure was down to 38.0%, whilst the percentage of respondents favouring the Government went from 27.2 to 34.3. On the other hand, one final variable asking respondents whether holding regular elections had any effect on politicians in terms of their responsiveness to people's demands[30] appeared to suggest the opposite, showing an

increase in the percentage of people who thought that regular elections had 'some effect' on politicians.

Analyses of the demographic characteristics of the *PVS96* sample with reference to their political opinions showed that, overall, females tended to be less politically competent than males, and that respondents over sixty-five years of age tended towards either 'don't know' answers or, together with respondents aged between fifty-five and sixty-four, towards believing in the ideals of communism[31]. As for party membership, the results showed that the younger the respondents, the less likely they were to support a party; respondents aged between fifty-five and sixty-four were the most likely to be party supporters, whereas respondents under thirty-four (involving two age groups) were the least likely to be supporters of any party.

Scepticism as to whether regular elections made politicians responsive to voters' views was rife amongst all age groups to varying degrees, but, interestingly enough, the youngest age group were the only ones being even remotely likely to think that they would be treated fairly by officials, that is, without using *blat*[32]. They were also, overall, less politically competent than the youngest respondents had been in the other two surveys – the impression derived from the 1996 response was that young people were not too bothered either way with politics, a characteristic they perhaps shared with their counterparts in developed liberal democracies. They were not even the most likely to believe that the creation of a market economy was good for Russia, although the only age group that believed it was actually wrong was, once again, the category of respondents aged between fifty-five and sixty-four. Most likely to believe that the market economy was right for Russia were those respondents aged between twenty-five and thirty-four. These respondents were also the least likely to believe in the ideals of communism, both of which results are easily understandable because it was precisely people of that generation who had spent their youth – a time of life when the individual wants excitement, adventure, and fashion – under Brezhnev, at the height of the stagnation.

As had been the case in the other two samples, the biggest difference in terms of the occupational characteristics associated with different views was whether respondents

worked at all, or not. Pensioners were, understandably, the most likely to believe both that the creation of a market economy was wrong for Russia, and that a one-party system would be best. The unemployed, on the other hand, were, overall, the most likely to give 'don't know' responses, to every question, and that 'no parties at all' would be the best system – reminding one, perhaps, of the tree-dwelling, tunnel-digging anarchists found in the British polity itself. Housewives, working people and students, on the other hand, seemed to combine realism about the situation in Russia (housewives, in particular, tended to think that only through *blat* could one expect to be treated fairly by officials) with beliefs which suggested that it was nevertheless preferable to the old system.

The variable for the size of town which respondents lived in was, unlike in the previous two surveys, very well defined in terms of the characteristics of respondents in different sizes of location. People living in the larger towns and cities were the most likely to support both the creation of a market economy and a multiparty system, whether the one they had as it was, or one with fewer parties. However, they also tended to be sceptical about the treatment they would receive from officials (that is, they considered having connections necessary), and about the effect elections really had on politicians, which they tended to think was 'not very much'. The profiles for villages and smaller locations, on the other hand, were characterized by two main tendencies: they were likely to give either 'Soviet' replies to questions, or to opt for 'don't know' as their answer.

Perceptual maps for the contingency tables of educational level and the attitudinal variables of the *PVS96* showed that the better educated respondents tended to also support the values associated with the market economy and liberal democracy, whereas respondents with less years of education behind them were more likely to hold views consistent with the Communist system. Added to this, people with higher or specialized education were more likely to give moderate responses than those with PTU or SPTU qualifications, the latter of which were the most likely to both 'completely agree' and 'completely disagree'. As for respondents who had completed nine grades or less, they were likely to either agree with the statement or not know what to reply.

The Rent in the Social Fabric

> 'Gorbachev, with perestroika, did away, I think prematurely, with all agencies of social cohesion. Nowadays there are no housing associations, no party cells, not even the family really holds. So the individual is left with no points of reference, and society is completely disorganized'[33].

Due to the small number of relevant variables in the *PVS96*, the amount of information which could be extracted from it was, of necessity, very limited. Any comparisons to be made with the other two surveys were also affected by this, as well as by the fact that the 1996 sample was somewhat smaller than that of the earlier surveys, and showed signs of not having been conducted and coded with perhaps as much care as could be hoped for. Nevertheless, and bearing in mind all the limitations and constraints to which this study had been subject to since its inception, the *PVS96* could still be used as a guideline, if nothing else, to assess the kind of processes that might be going on in Russia. The results from the *PVS96* indicated that, in spite of the disillusionment and the hardships endured by the Russian public in the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there still remained a sizeable proportion of the population which did not wish for a return to the good old days. Moreover, the most likely demographic and socio-economic attributes pertaining to those respondents who had attitudes consistent with market reform and liberal democracy were such as to support the hypothesis that 'all the various aspects of economic development — industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education — are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy'[34].

Support for this contention was also found in the fieldwork findings. Bearing in mind that the 'sample' was tiny and based almost exclusively in Moscow and St. Petersburg, it still remained the case that, having factored location into the equation, those informants who were younger and better educated were the most 'liberal' in their views. Nevertheless, this was not always the case, and there were several cases amongst older informants where almost identical socio-demographic characteristics would be coupled with widely different attitudes to the world. Yet when Tönnies' ideas were brought into the equation, and informants were classified according to the social interactions they were predominantly involved in, the results strongly suggested that – in spite of the limitations inherent in carrying out research on such a

modest scale – there was a very strong case to be made for the explanatory potency of Tönnies' sociological framework.

Informants who, on the whole, interacted meaningfully with nobody outside their very immediate family lived in fear and anxiety, and tended to believe that all these freedoms had brought nothing but sufferings and crime to the Russian people (women, in particular, were initially unsure about voicing these kinds of opinions, and when they finally did so, they were usually very apologetic about them, as if to assure this researcher that they knew they must be wrong). On the other hand, those informants who not only had wider circles of friends, but who also, through work, had extensive contacts and exchanges of ideas with *colleagues* were glad that the Soviet Union was no longer; for these respondents, spiritual freedom was worth any material price. This was best expressed by one informant whose father had been executed by Stalin – for being, not only German, but also an engineer.

> 'In spite of all the shortages, and the hardships, it's still much, much better now. The freedom to say what you think! I mean, in the old days it was just terrible: whenever you were going to say something you had to think: "is this safe?" "can I say this?" "can I trust this person?" and you just ended up not saying anything, because you *never* knew who to trust. Every day you lived with this awful fear – "did I say this?" "did I say that?" "will so-and-so think I'm like this or like that?" *Every day*, do you realize? No, it's much, much better now; it's *absolutely* worth it'[35].

Similarly, another informant, in a more material vein, argued that 'at least now you can buy things; if you really need or want something, you can scrimp and save and somehow get the money together for it. At least it's there, you know, whereas before you might have all the money in the world, but the goods weren't there and there was nothing you could do about it; it was especially frustrating when it was something you really *needed*'[36]. The culture clash between 'reconstructed' and 'unreconstructed' respondents even came to the surface on a couple of occasions, and the interesting thing about them was that the explanations given by the 'hard-liners' themselves concurred with the arguments being put forward in this thesis: 'Ever since he went to the States, he's been different, unsettled, a bit strange in the head, even. He's flipped, I think – he hasn't been quite right since. Nothing here is good enough any more, he keeps talking about how in the States it was like this, and in the States it was like that... It did his head in, it really did'[37].

The End of History? Perhaps Not

> 'The constant warning against premature conclusions and foggy generalities implies, unless properly qualified, a possible taboo against all thinking. If every thought has to be held in abeyance until it has been completely corroborated, no basic approach seems possible and we would limit ourselves to the level of mere symptoms'[38].

It is of course true that spending a couple of months in Russia talking to people is not necessarily a scientific pursuit. Nevertheless, this researcher hopes to have shown, over the course of this chapter, that, modest as her fieldwork was in resources, and modest as the *PVS96* was in variables, the combined results of the two sets of findings did manage to paint a coherent, consistent, and – more importantly – *meaningful* picture of the Russian people and their world. Furthermore, this combined approach, whereby one source dealt strictly with political culture, while the other explored the social arena, served to demonstrate how the different theoretical concepts examined in Part I could be found to interact in practice. This alone would be a sufficient goal to have accomplished in this chapter. However, there was also another subject which needed to be explored, and in this the enterprise was perhaps less successful: assessing the development of Russian political culture since 1991. For a full and scientific account of that particular matter, a trend study would have been essential, one with a questionnaire asking questions which addressed, not just voting behaviour or political convictions, but which also touched on the social and psychological life of the individual. That such surveys were not available has already been explained, and the limitations of the 1996 data understood. Nevertheless, it still befits the subject matter of this study that this researcher should at least attempt to draw some sort of conclusions, however speculative, from the very different data obtained from all three surveys, by taking the results from each as a whole, rather than analysing their constituent parts (that is, each of their variables) at a micro level.

The most salient characteristic of these surveys was their consistency in terms of the attributes associated with levels of support for the reform process. All in all, theories of modernization, and of its impact on the polity, appeared to be supported by the empirical evidence, but certain of the relationships one might have expected to find had changed, notably the more marked tendency towards political apathy found amongst younger respondents in 1996 compared to the previous years. This,

however, far from being a sign of a regression towards the old Soviet polity, could, in fact, be taken as a sign of the exact opposite: just as Western youth is almost totally disillusioned with politics, so Russian youth seems to be going through a belated wave of 'eighties' consumerism. Aside from this group, however, all other trends seemed to indicate a hardening of positions, with a noticeable decrease in the propensity of all demographic categories towards 'don't know' replies. This decrease was evident even amongst females and respondents over sixty-five, both of which groups, though still the most likely to reply in such a manner, exhibited less marked tendencies to do so.

Confidence in political parties and Parliament had also decreased by 1996, whereas support for the Government – or, at the very least, for the idea that the Government should take precedence over Parliament – had grown. This general disillusionment with political parties, coupled with the unfortunately realistic scepticism of most Russians towards the workings of the political machinery seemed to suggest that they had, after five years of relative chaos, decided that it might be better to let the Government get on with it, as the only hope of bringing this new 'Time of Troubles' to an end. This researcher would, however, caution those who would read this as a desire or longing for a dictatorship. Although much is made in Western scholarship about the Russians' need for a 'strong hand', what is not really considered is that, when Russians talk about a strong leader, these days what they might mean is someone like Margaret Thatcher, or (if the Russian in question is a Communist) someone like Yurii Andropov, *not* necessarily someone like Joseph Stalin[39].

In spite of their political disillusionment, however, most Russians admitted that the presence of goods on shop shelves was a good thing. Only a couple of pensioners, who had done very well indeed under Communism (to the extent that one of them claimed to have had a maid) and now saw their fortunes severely overturned did not think that well-stocked shops – run by criminals, anyway – compensated for the chaos and suffering which were ravaging the land. They were the exception, however, and the relatively new abundance of consumer goods might not only be compensating the public for their political disillusionment, but also distracting their attention and their interest from the political process. Primakov's proposals of a

'New Deal' for Russia are perhaps a tacit acknowledgement of this, a fact all the more significant because even 'Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and new Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov [have] derived inspiration from the New Deal, which used State funds to prop up struggling businesses'[40].

To conclude, this chapter has shown, first, that there was strong empirical evidence to support the conceptual relationships posited in Part I of this study, and, second, that, whilst there might still be large sections of the population possessed of a traditional or Soviet mindset, Russian political culture – and, indeed, Russian culture as a whole – was nevertheless changing, evolving into patterns of attitudes consistent with capitalism and an emerging liberal democracy. That the old ways of thinking had not been eradicated by 1996 did not mean that this change was any less important or profound: many Latin American countries, and Spain itself, bear traces of their defunct dictatorships to this day, and all Western liberal democracies have to cope with all kinds of social and demographic groups with all kinds of political attitudes. Russia's size makes changes all the more slow and cultural survivals all the more persistent: however, not all groups are as important as others, and, even if the old Communists never die, the key question is not (as was said in Chapter Five on the subject of research methodologies) *how many* of them are they, but rather *who* are they and *where* are they. Should the old beliefs continue to be found predominantly amongst the uneducated and the rustic, so to speak, then this in no way will affect Russia's chances of becoming a fully established market economy. The question is therefore not so much whether Russia will once again become the USSR, but rather, whether it will become Brazil or – overcoming all the odds – the USA.

Notes

[1]Male, 45, employee in foreign venture, Moscow. This and other quotes in this chapter were obtained during this researcher's stay in Moscow and St Petersburg from September to December 1997. Names will be withheld, but sex, age, occupation and place of residence will be given as above. All translations in this chapter of both fieldwork and published materials will be this author's unless otherwise stated.

[2]*PVS*, Q1C. The notation *PVS* is employed instead of the more specific *PVS96* in those cases where the questions were found in both surveys.

[3]*PVS*, Q1A.

[4]Denzin, *The Research Act*, p. 33.

[5]Taylor and Bogdan, *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods*, p. 83.

[6]Alapuro, 'Categories, Networks and Civil Society', pp. 114 and 111 (italics as in text).
[7]*Ibid.*, p. 114.
[8]Taylor and Bogdan, *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods*, p. 83
[9]For fuller details of the methods employed to conduct the fieldwork, see Appendix I.
[10]See Robin Goodwin, 'Who Has Time for a Social Life? Social Networks and Social Support in Russia, Georgia and Hungary', in *British East-West Journal*, No. 108 (December 1997), p.4. The article is based on fieldwork conducted during 1995 and 1996; the Russian research team was headed by T P Emelyanova (Tver State University).
[11]Female, 39, employee in a small business trading canned food, St Petersburg.
[12]Female, 68, retired English teacher, Moscow.
[13]Male, 73, retired chemical engineer, St Petersburg.
[14]Male, 63, botanist at MGU, Moscow.
[15]Bearing in mind that, even in ordinary settings, '[e]very conversation has its own balance of revelation and concealment of thoughts and intentions: only under very unusual circumstances is talk so completely expository that every word can be taken at face value' – Mark Benney and Everett Hughes, 'Of Sociology and the Interview', in Norman Denzin (ed) *Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook*, second edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), pp. 175-81 at p. 175.
[16]White, McAllister and Khryshtanovskaya, 'Religion and Politics in Postcommunist Russia', p. 77.
[17]This is meant literally; indeed, one of the many presents given to this researcher during her stay in Russia was a set of divining cards (with instructions).
[18]Yurii Levada, 'Teper' my bol'she dumaem o sem'e, chem o gosudarstve', *Segodnia*, 24 January 1995.
[19]'Rossiiane skuchaiut po Leonidu Brezhnevu i khotiat vyborov', *Segodnia*, 7 May 1995.
[20]*PVS*, Q20, RQ21B1 and Q45, respectively.
[21]See 'Rossiiane skuchaiut po Leonidu Brezhnevu i khotiat vyborov'.
[22]This is the cumulative percentage of the responses 'completely disagree' and 'disagree'.
[23]Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, p. 41.
[24]Yurii Levada, 'V Rossii ustanovilas "demokratiia besporiadka"', *Segodnia*, 15 April 1995.
[25]*PVS*, Q33D.
[26]*PVS93*, Q33D, Q53. Please note that responses are inversely coded, as it were: positive responses to the question on parties indicate a *lack* of political competence, whereas positive responses to the other question indicate the presence of it.
[27]What is meant is that these percentages were large enough to suggest that the difference was not due to natural sample variation, as was the case for the remaining responses.
[28]*PVS*, Q28.
[29]*PVS*, Q29.
[30]*PVS*, Q22.
[31]*PVS*, Q45.
[32]*PVS*, Q34.
[33]Male, 28, St Petersburg.
[34]Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, expanded edition (London: Heinemann, 1983), p.41.
[35]Female, 59, administrator at MGU, Moscow.
[36]Female, 66, retired journalist, Moscow.
[37]Female, 65, retired naval engineer, St Petersburg.
[38]Mark Horkheimer, comment to Arne Naess, 'The Function of Ideological Convictions', in Hadley Cantril (ed), *Tensions That Cause Wars: Common Statement and Individual Papers by a Group of Social Scientists Brought Together by UNESCO* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1950), pp. 257-98 at p. 297.
[39]See T M Martinova, 'Mnogoobrazie tsennostei politicheskoi kul'tury sovremennoi Rossii', in I A Batanina (ed), *Politicheskaia kul'tura Rossii: Traditsii i sovremennost'* (Tula: Tul'skii Gosudarstvennyi Tekhnicheskii Universitet, 1995), pp. 15-25 at p. 18.
[40]Martin Bright, 'Primakov rules out return to Soviet era', *The Observer*, 13 September 1998.

Conclusion

Connecting the Links in the Chain of Thought

> 'Throughout this paper it has been implied that underneath their differences in culture, people everywhere are the same. If persons have a universal human nature, they themselves are not to be looked to for an explanation of it. One must look rather to the fact societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters. One way of mobilizing the individual for this purpose is through ritual; he is taught to be perceptive, to have feelings attached to self and a self expressed through face, to have pride, honour and dignity, to have considerateness, to have tact and a certain amount of poise [...] If a particular person or group of society seems to have a unique character of its own, it is because its standard set of human-nature elements is pitched and combined in a particular way'[1].

The aim of this thesis has been to analyze the political culture of Russia since 1991 by focusing, not on the distribution of attitudes related to political culture, but on the propensities of groups to hold those attitudes. This approach, not one normally used in the study of political culture, was based on the idea that political culture, like any other aspect of culture, is inherently a function of the individual's 'basic value orientations'[2], and that these are, in turn, shaped by that individual's social relationships. This theory was explored in Part I by examining and linking the theoretical concepts and frameworks underpinning it. Then, once the theoretical validity of using groups as a unit of analysis had been established, the study of their tendencies was developed in two different ways in the empirical parts of this thesis. In Part II, group propensities were illustrated by reproducing contingency tables where they were deemed particularly interesting, in order for readers to be able to work out the relevant indices for themselves. Part III, on the other hand, showed graphs plotting responses along two axes; nevertheless, these graphs were nothing more than a visual representation of the propensities obtained from contingency tables. The method used to describe groups was therefore the same: all that varied were the grouping variables and the presentation of the results.

In Theory...

> 'At the heart of man's relation to his society is his relation to other people. He may accept the beliefs of the society, and may have mastered the skills necessary to earn a living, but unless he relates well to the people he meets daily, he is unlikely either to be a happy individual or to be effective, at least in urban living. In the very concept of citizen, indeed, there is implied the notion of a man among men, a social human being'[3].

Part I of this thesis sought to develop the ideas, both epistemological and methodological, which were to guide this research into Russian political culture since the collapse of the USSR. The first two chapters explained this researcher's position on the issues of political culture in general and of Russian political culture in particular, and made two main points on these subjects: first, that political culture should be taken to mean the sum total of attitudes, values, behaviour and orientations with reference to politics, and, second, that Russians are not, and never have been, a people so different to any other that they could not be studied within the framework of social science concepts.

The study of Russian political culture was dominated, in the seventies, by the debate over how political culture was to be defined: in particular, whether the term should include political behaviour or not. According to those who would not include behaviour in their definition of political culture, the behaviour of people in the political arena was precisely one of the phenomena which political culture – as understood to mean values, beliefs, and attitudes – served to explain: for them, the study of political culture was a means towards the understanding of political actions. Narrowing the definition of 'culture', they argued, increased its explanatory potency. For other scholars, however, people's political behaviour was one of the many manifestations of their political culture, and should be studied as an integral part of it. From this alternative point of view, political culture was to be used as a frame of reference with which to map the political life of a society, composed of many different aspects – both attitudinal and behavioural – which, in turn, helped to explain specific characteristics of the societies under study. The difference between the two definitions was, however, heuristic rather than philosophical: both sides agreed that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour was worthy of study, but differed over whether this relationship operated between two separate concepts – behaviour and culture – or *within* one overarching one – culture.

In this thesis, the 'behaviourist' definition was subscribed to as being more logical: if one was to single out behaviour for use as a separate concept, then why should values, attitudes and beliefs not also be treated as independent categories in themselves? Of all the components of an individual's political experience, why

should only *some* of them be considered 'cultural'? Defining political culture as the sum total of this experience seems more intuitively consistent, if nothing else. Indeed, once the Soviet Union collapsed, and all kinds of data became available, the behaviourist approach came to predominate –practical experience seems to have shown that to study attitudes and behaviour separately is to miss part of the picture, and that it is only by examining them both as closely related components of a greater whole that the study of political culture can yield a meaningful set of results.

Having established that a definition of political culture which included behaviour would be used in this thesis, it was then argued that those features of the Russian nation considered traditionally and often exclusively 'Russian' could indeed be found in other nations, and particularly in nations which, like Russia, had not been part of the first wave of countries to undergo the industrial revolution; without even resorting to examples outside Western Europe, this meant countries such as Spain, Portugal and Italy. These nations had all 'lagged behind' the countries of north-west Europe and North America, and their predominantly agricultural economies had sustained a system of quasi-feudal social relationships for so long that, when economic change did begin, these relationships proved very hard to undermine. What this means is not only that Russia's so-called traditional cultural features are not exclusive to it, but also that they are the effect and cause of mechanisms which can be found at work anywhere, even in the most 'modern' of countries, since all countries can trace their history to a 'traditional' past. When scholars emphasize the pervasive nature of *blat* in Russia, for example, they sometimes forget that '[p]atronage is a widespread, perhaps almost universal dimension of social systems'; the only difference between agrarian and industrial nations is that 'it is perhaps only in feudal and quasi-feudal societies that it assumes a central organizing importance'[4]. Russia, like the countries of the Mediterranean basin, remained predominantly agrarian long after other countries had undergone profound socio-economic and political changes, and Russian society, like societies across the Mediterranean, therefore continued to be based on patron-client relationships right up to the twentieth century.

The social processes taking place in Russia were therefore not unique, and neither can it be a coincidence that these same countries all made the transition from traditional to modern economic systems under authoritarian dictatorships of one kind or another. Growing international trade – which Tönnies, differing from Marx, argued was the principal motor of development and change – meant that these agricultural countries did not have centuries, or even decades to develop an industrial society, but years. A strong, tyrannical leader managing and controlling the transition from above seems so far to have been history's only solution to the terrible socio-economic upheavals brought about by the need to adapt to the modern world. In these dictatorships, a kind of compromise was reached: the State, on the one hand, supervised the process of economic modernization, whilst, on the other, it attempted to freeze society and social relations, providing a cushion for the blows which the destruction of agrarian networks would bring. These processes took place in Russia, but were not unique to it. What was unique to Russia was the length of this economic transition as compared to that of the other countries given as examples. This was partly because of the Soviet Union's greater size and consequently greater backwardness, but also because of the ideological content of the dictatorship. Whereas in Franco's Spain the country's integration into world markets eventually created an elite which was ready for a democratic polity, an elite whose members wanted to be seen as civilized, modern equals by those of other nations, in Russia isolation and the abolition of the market (at least officially) created elites which were, in the main, content to remain as they were, particularly given the privileges which were granted to them[5]. Even so, the inevitable consequences of the modernization of Russian society could not be delayed for ever, and the seeds of a modern polity began to emerge in Russia even before stagnation brought the economy to a halt, because the 'increased complexity of social structure that accompanied such a transformation could not be accommodated within the framework of an authoritarian state system'[6].

That these ideas, advocating a greater comparative perspective in the social sciences, were taking root amongst political scientists became evident in the political science scholarship carried out during the eighties, which was examined in Chapter Three. New ideas about the development of advanced capitalist societies also came to the

fore, notably Ronald Inglehart's concept of 'postmaterialism', the notion that, as wealth increases in a given society, its members become less focused on it and more concerned with their spiritual and environmental well-being. Inglehart's theory thus argues that, paradoxically, the more advanced and wealthy the society, the more 'postmaterialists' it will contain[7]. In a sense, then, these postmaterialists – who can be identified by the fact that their survey responses show them to be more interested in the personal satisfaction to be derived from a job than the money to be made doing it, for example – are an indication of a country's level of socio-economic – and, therefore, political – development.

Interesting as this idea is, however, the survey analysis on which it was based poses certain problems, ones common to most survey research carried out in the field of political culture. Firstly, there are the problems inherent in any social science survey data: the difficulty in measuring abstract concepts (such as, for example, 'satisfaction'); the lack of a 'control' dataset; the influence of time and impact of specific events on the population surveyed; the possible and sometimes undetectable cultural differences between surveyors and surveyed which might be permeating the interpretation of responses, particularly where several languages are used; and, last but not least (in a list which is by no means exhaustive) the difficulties involved in any attempt to obtain a truly representative sample. This first set of problems is practically unavoidable, and 'contaminates' to varying degrees the analysis of social science data. However, measures can and are taken to limit them, for instance by using local interviewers, back-translating questionnaires several times, and weighting biased samples. The second set of problems, however, derive from the methods of data analysis prevailing in most social science research, which concentrate on examining the univariate distribution of attitudinal variables deemed relevant to the study of political culture. The main characteristics of this approach are the following: first, its practitioners use the individual as their unit of analysis; second, the variables they use are chosen on the basis of being direct measures of political culture – questions which ask respondents to choose between freedom and order, for example – and which, consequently, cover a fairly circumscribed area of a respondent's life; and third, by using mainly univariate and bivariate techniques to analyze the variables selected, they risk the danger of missing the overall patterns of responses found in a

survey, without which the analysis of single variables lacks context. Illustrating this last point is the fact that being 'against' one particular thing does not always inherently imply being 'for' something else; not all variables are binomial, nor is one response always the result of the same impulses. There is therefore a clear argument for examining all variables with reference to one another, which ties in with the second point made above, since it follows that, in order to obtain the most contextual information possible, it is also necessary to expand the analysis of variables beyond the grounds of the strictly political arena. The logical conclusion of this argument is, consequently, that political culture should not be taken as an isolated, self-contained part of human experience, but rather as part of 'culture' as a whole – and as such, influenced by cultural factors extraneous to it. That this should be the case is not surprising, since the political sphere is not one which is of primary importance in most people's lives: examining political variables on their own will therefore fail to tap into the belief systems of many respondents, and therefore into their political culture – which might, in their case, manifest itself in ways not familiar to the observing scholar. In order to be able to examine the political orientations of *all* respondents, however apathetic, alienated or apolitical, researchers therefore need to first examine respondents' primary beliefs about themselves and the society they live in – values held which are so basic that individuals do not even consciously articulate them, and which implicitly and covertly inform their values and beliefs about the world around them.

These arguments were pursued further in Chapter Four, which explored concepts in other social sciences outside politics, and posited a set of explanations to account for cultural differences, not only between countries at the same level of economic development or countries with similar political systems, but also between citizens in one country alone. This chapter showed the way in which different social science frameworks could be linked through their component concepts to form an overarching theory which explained differences in political culture; at the core of this theory was the idea that 'it is in terms of specific social and historical structures that the classic problems of social science have been formulated, and in such terms solutions offered'[8]. This overarching theory was composed of the conceptual

elements needed to tap into the basic values of respondents in this study of political culture.

'Culture' was argued to be a group product, the outcome of specific socialization patterns to which individuals are subject. The human being is a social animal, and if people are to develop the complex knowledge and advanced communication skills which distinguish humans from other animals, they need to grow up and be socialized within a *group* of other human beings. It is thus from the group that individuals derive their cultural characteristics, and it is the group which more often than not acts as a reference point in matters about which an individual member might be unclear[9]. Most importantly, the cultural characteristics which the individual derives from the group need to be internalized if that individual is to be genuinely integrated: they need to form part of the basic values (mentioned above) intrinsic to a person. Once these characteristics are internalized through the socialization process, they constitute an inalienable part of individuals' personalities which loosely identifies them as members of a certain cultural group[10]. The group therefore has a profound impact on the basic values and primitive beliefs of its members, and, consequently, the *nature* of the group – the essence of which is contained in the dynamics of the social relationships within it – is a crucial element in understanding the world-view – in other words, the culture – of its members.

The social bonds between people can be of two fundamental kinds, and they determine not only the relationship between two individuals, but also the character of entire groups. These two kinds of relationships have been given different names by different thinkers through the ages, but the most enduring terminology used to define them is Ferdinand Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. The first kind of social bond is the primary bond, an organic bond based on kinship, friendship or other 'irrational' considerations, requiring what anthropologists call *prestation totale* – the involvement of a person's *whole* social being; the second is deliberately sought or created by individuals in order to achieve a common end, and it involves only those parts of the social person which are relevant to this end. In the *Gesellschaft*, 'what other ends the individual parties may entertain besides those involved immediately in the relationships become irrelevant. In particular [and contrary to what happens in

the *Gemeinschaft*], it is irrelevant whether the ultimate value systems of the parties are integrated'[11]. These relationships between individuals can be extrapolated to larger groups, and even historical epochs, due to the fact that *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* were designed primarily as normative concepts with which to effect social classifications according to which of the two relationships was seen to predominate in specific social and historical groups and structures. Using this typology, then, traditional economic systems are *Gemeinschaft*, and market capitalism *Gesellschaft*. Indeed, for Tönnies, capitalism was the ultimate manifestation of the *Gesellschaft*, which, although it could never exist in pure form (since nearly everybody has a family, at the very least) was embodied in the very spirit of capitalism – based, as it is, on the ideas of rational economic exchange and the division of labour. And if capitalism was the economic embodiment of the *Gesellschaft*, then liberal democracy was its political manifestation, guided by the idea that all individuals are equal regardless of their personal characteristics, whether these be related to their abilities or their status.

Since groups shape individuals, and groups can be of different kinds, it follows that the ideal members of each of these different kinds of groups will also differ significantly. The idea that individuals reflect the characteristics of the groups they have been socialized into, and that each ideal type of group or society will have a corresponding 'ideal' member means, in political terms, that every form of government has a particular kind of citizenry, an idea whose most famous exponent was, of course, Aristotle. Twenty-four centuries later this idea still has currency, and it is the fit between liberal democracies and their citizens – in other words, the political culture of liberal democracy – which is of particular interest to modern political scientists. Many scholars have turned their attention to this subject and have come to varying conclusions, but there is general agreement on the existence of a few key attributes which have been found to be strongly associated with the democratic citizen in many studies. Of these, two are of major interest from the point of view of assessing the basic values underlying an individual's core cultural identity. First is Robert Lane's concept of 'ego strength', which is a syndrome of attitudes which add up to a personality which is self-confident and politically competent – political competence being the feeling that one can actively participate in the political process

and achieve the results desired, which amounts to an interest and belief in the political life of the nation[12]. The qualities associated with 'ego strength' – freedom from anxiety and fear, self-confidence in social situations and a belief that one is 'in control', to name a few – result in 'a personality orientation which stresses the active self-aware role in life [and] is the cause of a general behaviour pattern which includes social consciousness and political activity'[13]. Most of all, individuals with 'ego strength' believe in the rational organization of life and their mastery over the environment. These qualities make these individuals the ideal citizens of a liberal democracy – since this political system rests on the philosophical premise that all its citizens are equally entitled and able to make political decisions – and liberal democracy is, in turn, the ideal breeding ground for the development of these qualities amongst significant sectors of the population, and not just a few 'enlightened' individuals. In other words, there is a 'fit' between liberal democracy as a political system, and 'ego strength' as a psychological set of attitudes. Second is the framework of 'open' and 'closed' belief systems, elaborated by Milton Rokeach in response the fact that, often, people with extreme and opposing views see the world in ways that are very similar. In other words, even though the *content* of extremist beliefs may vary, their holders will share more personality traits in common with each other than they will with people holding moderate opinions, who, in turn, will also be more similar to each other than to the former, regardless of the actual content of their beliefs. Rokeach found that people with extreme beliefs had 'closed' belief systems, whereby all their information came from one source which was unquestioned, whereas people with 'open' belief systems accepted information from many competing and even contradictory sources, making 'open' people the ones better suited to democratic systems. Indeed, Lane and Rokeach's ideas dovetail each other: an individual possessed of 'ego strength' is an individual with an 'open ego'[14], and it is precisely the self-confidence and freedom from anxiety found in people with 'ego strength' which enables them to deal with and tolerate information which may contradict their own previously held assumptions. Correspondingly, individuals with 'closed' belief systems are better suited to dictatorships (regardless of ideology), since these regimes control the flow and content of the information available to their citizens (or subjects), and 'protect' them from the world they are so anxious about due to their lack of 'ego strength'.

The fact that there is a correspondence between political systems and their 'ideal' citizen-types, then, corroborates the existence of a strong link between the individual and the group. Furthermore, 'open' and 'closed' regimes (as characterized by their citizen-types) also correspond to each one of Tönnies' two types of social bonds: just as liberal democracy is the political manifestation of the *Gesellschaft*, the *Gemeinschaft* is closer to authoritarian regimes, with their reliance on rigid hierarchies, unquestioned paternalistic and patrimonial authority, and charismatic, unaccountable leadership – all features of traditional, family-based societies. To summarize all the points made so far, it can therefore be argued that the socialization of individuals is the process whereby their basic values are moulded to fit the values of the group, and that their values are therefore greatly influenced by the kinds of social structures and networks which *predominate* in the group, given that Tönnies' models can never really be found in their pure states.

However, just as *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are only normative concepts, the fit between a political system and its citizens is not as close as the theory would suggest either – if it was, there would be no need to analyze the political culture of a given nation, since it could easily be surmised by the characteristics of its political system. The fact is that a polity is composed of many different kinds of citizens: what is significant is the distribution of these different citizen-types. An example of what is meant by this can be seen in Inglehart's work on postmaterialism, which we referred to earlier: his argument was not that in developed societies *all* citizens were postmaterialists, but that there was a greater number of them than in less developed ones. Another way of saying this is that, societies not being homogenous, they are best measured in terms of the *trends* prevailing within them, trends concerning not only the political orientations of respondents, but also measuring the 'ego strength' and 'openness' of the population surveyed.

This, however, leads us back to the points made earlier about analyzing single variables out of context. We argued then for a broader selection of variables, one which, taking the points made in the above paragraphs, encompassed questions tapping into 'ego strength' as a measure of the basic values of the population. Yet, even with more variables thrown into the analysis, there still remain certain problems

with regards to establishing the kinds of citizen-types found in a society: namely, a 'citizen-type' has to be representative of a significant sector of society, transcending and summarizing the myriad combinations of views which single individuals may hold. Almond and Verba's solution to this problem was to re-interview in greater depth a sub-sample of their respondents in the five nations, chosen 'on the basis of their answers in the cross-section interview', in order to 'obtain a sample of various "citizen-types"'[15] which would broadly reflect and represent the findings from the larger sample. However, another way of finding the different citizen-types predominant in a society without being unduly misled by outlying individuals or tiny, unrepresentative minorities is by finding *groups* within the sample. This level of analysis solves several problems: first, it is consonant with the epistemological position that the individual is shaped by the group, which makes the group a more interesting unit of analysis than the individual; second, it allows for the fact that some – or many – individuals will give outlying responses to certain variables, and make them seem isolated, whereas, by looking at groups with different propensities over a wide range of variables, those individuals will be accommodated into the groups that they belong to overall – eccentric is not the same as absolutely unique; and third, the analysis of groups is also consonant with the search for predominant citizen-*types*: it is not the knowledge of every single citizen in a society which will further our understanding of that society, but the awareness of the predominant, salient features of its citizenry, features which can best be identified at a macro level by examining the attitudinal propensities of predominant *groups*.

The reason for examining the propensities of groups, rather than concentrating on marginal frequencies – as most studies on the subject do – was clearly illustrated at the beginning of Chapter Ten, in a comparison between Russia and Britain in terms of two variables reflecting respondents' political competence and social confidence[16]. These variables showed that the frequency with which respondents in Britain discussed politics and generally found themselves persuading others to share their views was, overall, *less* than the frequency with which their Russian counterparts engaged in these two activities. Taken on their own and at face value, then, these two variables would seem to suggest that, of the two nations under study, Russia was the more democratic of the two, or at least the one with the most 'democratic citizens'.

The marginal frequency tables for those variables thus clearly showed that focusing on single issues and questions was not an adequate way to describe a political culture, and lent support to the case made here for shifting the focus of studies of political culture away from specific *attitudes* and their distribution and towards the *people* whose political culture is being studied. By *people*, however, it is not the *individual* that is meant, either: to extrapolate small instances into general theories without reference to a larger context is to run opposing but equally dangerous risks. Therefore, in order to remain a *social* scientist, whilst not subsuming individuals into an amorphous mass that is far too removed from the world of lived experience to really carry any meaning, this researcher has, throughout this thesis, focused on *groups*, keeping group identities as reference points even when observing individuals.

The central hypothesis of this thesis therefore combined all the above ideas and theories and can be formulated in the following manner: that groups formed on the basis of the level of 'ego strength' of their members will show attitudinal and behavioural propensities consonant with *Gesellschaftliche* social relations – in other words, they will be compatible with and adaptable to the market economy and liberal democracy.

...And in Practice

> 'The problem of empirical verification is "how to get down to facts" yet not get overwhelmed by them; how to anchor ideas to facts but not to sink the ideas'.[17]

How the analysis of groups was actually to be carried out in order to prove this hypothesis was discussed in Chapters Five and Six, bridging the first and second parts of this study. In these two chapters a set of statistical multivariate techniques classified under the umbrella term of *cluster analysis* were explained, with a view to use them as the primary methodological tool of the research. The purpose of these techniques is to identify the hidden patterns in a dataset by measuring either the distance or similarity of case responses over a number of variables[18], which, in this particular study, were to be variables measuring the 'ego strength' of respondents. The research plan was to examine two datasets, one as close to 1991 as possible – and another as close to 1997 as possible – by dividing the population into groups (or

clusters) with varying degrees of 'ego strength', and then, having saved respondents' cluster membership as a new variable, cross-tabulate this variable with any other variables deemed to be of interest for the purposes of this study. Examples of such variables would be, not only those dealing with the political orientation of respondents, but also those tapping into their opinions on economic reform and ethical issues with a bearing on the country's economic and political system, such as – to take an example from the first survey eventually used – whether they would deem it unfair if two secretaries were paid different salaries on the basis of each one's efficiency. The results for each cluster would be compared to those for the sample total and expressed as an index showing the relative propensity of each cluster to deviate from the average response: in other words, it would show how likely it was for the members of each cluster to express certain opinions.

Unfortunately, the analysis of groups constructed by means of variables relating to the basic values of respondents – variables tapping into 'ego strength' – proved not to be possible. At first the problem was finding a survey which tapped into both the political and the personal dimensions needed in order to analyse political culture on the basis of 'ego strength', given that most surveys have relatively specific objectives, whereby one type of questions precludes another. Consequently, most surveys designed with the purpose of studying political culture concentrate on political questions, and most surveys tapping into the psychological character of respondents do not look into their political attitudes and behaviour in any depth. Two surveys meeting all this researcher's requirements were eventually found, nevertheless, and these were the *World Values Survey* of January 1991 and a survey carried out by VTsIOM in September 1996. The analysis of the clustering results from the *WVS* was therefore well under way by the time this researcher found out that the owners of the VTsIOM dataset would not release it[19]. Another survey was therefore needed to replace it, but, as was explained above, no other survey (apart from the *WVS*) covered both politics and 'ego strength'. The 1996 survey was therefore eventually replaced with the *Political Values Survey* – carried out in two waves, November 1993-January 1994 (*PVS93*) and January-February 1996 (*PVS96*)[20] – which covered a wide range of political issues but did not ask respondents questions related to their self-confidence and character. This led to a fairly radical change in the research plan,

whereby the cluster results from the *WVS* were to stand alone, as reference points which would indicate the salient categorical relationships to be explored in a comparison between the two surveys by other means. Instead of creating groups on the basis of respondents' 'ego strength', groups already present in both surveys would be used: socio-demographic groups – the disadvantage of this second approach compared to the cluster analysis being, of course, that each socio-demographic category constituted different individuals, so it would not be the *same* groups of people whose propensities would be analyzed across the board. Abandoning the analysis of unchanging, discrete groups in favour of analyzing a series of separate groups based on a single characteristic (age, for example) did not, however, mean also abandoning the method whereby these groups were analyzed. As with the clusters, the socio-demographic groups were to be examined in terms of their propensities, the only difference being that this time they would be illustrated by perceptual maps using another multivariate statistical technique: *correspondence analysis*. This technique can be described as a method for 'spatially portraying categorical data, originally expressed as cross-tabulations'[21]; by plotting variables in a joint space, correspondence analysis is therefore another way of showing how the responses for two or more variables relate to each other, and how similar or dissimilar their profiles across other variables are.

Different as the two surveys were, however, they shared at least one thing in common; neither was designed to tap into the *Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft* dichotomy, and, although through questions on the workplace and on participation in different types of associations one could assess the possible degree of respondents' familiarity with the structures and mechanics of the *Gesellschaft*, the same could not be done for their involvement in *Gemeinschaft* networks. It was therefore in order to fill in this gap in the data as well as to bring the study as up to date as possible that this researcher carried out fieldwork in Moscow and St Petersburg in the months of September through December 1997. This fieldwork, originally planned as a series of interviews covering participants' social networks, their 'ego strength' and their views on politics and the economy, eventually turned into three months of participant observation, due to the discrepancy between informants' responses in and outside an interview setting[22]. The empirical part of this study thus ended up consisting of three sets of

data, divided into two according to the grouping method used: Part II consisted of the cluster results from 1991, whereas Part III was composed of both the results of correspondence analyses performed on variables from both 1991 and 1993, and the survey data and fieldwork from 1996 and 1997, respectively.

Before embarking on a final analysis of the conceptual relationships examined in this study, however, the two techniques used to examine them need to be reviewed, in order to fully understand the methodological position taken by this researcher. It is worth repeating here that, although the two methods employed for exploring the results of the *WVS* and the *PVS* might at first seem very different, they were both guided by an underlying philosophy which did not change from one survey to another: the key to examining the data was, in all cases, to find out the attitudinal propensities of *groups*, whether these groups be formed through variables related to 'ego strength' – as was the case in Part II – or through socio-economic and demographic variables – as was done in Part III.

Added to all this, it was not the distribution of specific attitudes within groups that was examined here, but rather their profiles in terms of different attitudes: to see which groups were the most and least likely to answer questions in certain ways – to examine their *propensities*. This approach was used in both parts of this thesis, and although the methods used to assess these propensities differed superficially, in essence they were the same. In Part II, the cluster membership of each respondent was saved as a new variable, which was then cross-tabulated with others deemed of interest for the purposes of the study. The contingency tables resulting from these cross-tabulations were then analyzed, not by means of correlation coefficients or even straight counts, but instead by means of *indices*, which showed how each group differed from the sample mean, and by how much. These indices reflected the relative likelihood of obtaining a given response in each group, and where a small number of respondents in one group replied in a certain way, this was considered important if none of the other groups showed any propensity at all to reply that way. An alternative, perhaps more simple method of analyzing these tables would have been to use standard correlation coefficients in order to measure the degrees of association between different categories. However, aside from the fact that the

coefficients commonly used in statistical analyses are each designed to measure a specific kind of association and fail to detect others, even where a coefficient works, its purpose is to measure correlations between specific responses, and not to assess the relationship between a category and *the entire range* of values in another variable. In other words, correlation coefficients cannot describe the *profiles* of socio-demographic groups in terms of their attitudinal responses and vice-versa. Yet it is the study of these profiles – of the tendencies of groups to contain one or another kind of members – which this researcher contends is a key element in the process of understanding a given population, because even '[d]escriptive statistics always show that the difference between groups is one of tendencies rather than absolutes'[23].

A more complex issue than the superficial change in methodology, however, was the selection of variables for manipulation and analysis. This was important, not only in terms of what issues could be looked at from the point of view of attitudinal distributions amongst the sample populations, but as a key factor in the kinds of groups which could be used as units of analysis. The kinds of variables available in each survey had an enormous impact on this research, since they determined the shape which this study was to take, having the major consequence that, as was mentioned above, the groups used in the second and third parts of this study were very different. Ideally, this researcher would have hoped for a fairly extensive set of questions asking respondents about themselves, in the manner of the 'ego' variables in the *WVS*. Added to these, variables on respondents' social life – how often they met up with friends, how long they had known them, where they had met them, how many of their relatives they saw and how frequently – would have established a sense of the *Gemeinschaftliche* relations in their life. These variables could have then been assessed against other variables dealing with individuals' involvement in *Gesellschaftliche* networks, not only such as those found in both the *WVS* and the *PVS93* concerning membership in different kinds of associations, but also other, more subtle ones, such as the variable in both *PVS* questionnaires asking respondents whether they expected to be treated fairly by officials. Answers such as 'only by using connections' were perhaps even better indicators of the mentality of the *Gemeinschaft* than more direct questions about membership, since, even in liberal democracies, not wanting to join an association of some kind does not necessarily

mean one does not understand the social mechanics operating within it. Further to all these variables a survey would then, obviously, have to have political and economic variables of different kinds, but this researcher would be particularly interested in variables which tapped into respondents' *understanding* of political and economic processes, rather than on their political stand or their political views; even though these two issues are, of course, also important, questions such as these are so specific to the political realm as to constitute a peripheral part of an individual's life, as Sidney Verba aptly pointed out[24]. Unfortunately, the range of variables available to this researcher was not as extensive as the list above would require, and rarely tapped into the 'basic values' of respondents, concentrating instead in their attitudes towards specific social, political and economic issues. Furthermore, each survey yielded different information to the other two, whether because of its content – the *WVS* covered a wider range of topics than the *PVS*, which was strictly political – or of its scope – the *PVS96* was a short 'update' survey, asking only a small fraction of the questions contained in the *PVS93* questionnaire, and therefore yielded considerably less information than either the *WVS* or the *PVS93*.

The Cluster Results[25]

> 'Or should we consider what is the starting point of people's identity, and what is the importance of this in shaping people's orientation to politics?'[26]

Five clusters were formed on the basis of the nine variables tapping into different aspects of respondents' self-confidence[27]; these clusters could therefore primarily be defined in terms of their 'ego strength', which varied greatly. Most clusters exhibited a propensity to have *some* kind of self-confidence, if not in some situations, then in others. However, there were two exceptions at opposite ends of the spectrum; cluster 2 tended to be confident in all situations, whereas cluster 3 tended not to identify with *any* of the propositions in these variables, except 'none of the above', showing a lack of confidence both in themselves as people and in their social relationships with others. Clusters 1, 4 and 5, on the other hand, identified with some of the self-confidence indicators, but not others.

The archetypal member of cluster 5, for example, identified most clearly with those variables in the set related to being a useful –possibly leading – member of their social environment: they gave advice often, for example, enjoyed convincing others and liked responsibility; on the other hand, they tended not to identify with propositions more directly related to their own selves without reference to others: counting on being successful in life, for instance. These characteristics tied in well with the fact that, upon cross-tabulating cluster membership with age, this cluster emerged as the one most likely to contain the oldest respondents in the sample. Their view of themselves as sources of advice and authority, and, equally, the fact that they did not feel they could count on success (since, presumably, they already had either 'succeeded' or 'failed') were therefore consistent with this particular demographic characteristic of the cluster.

Clusters 1 and 4, on the other hand, differed in terms of an underlying dimension of the variable set. Taken collectively, the propensities exhibited by these two clusters seemed to suggest that, whereas the members of cluster 1 identified with propositions which involved confidence in their own proven abilities – such as liking responsibility and always getting what they wanted – those of cluster 4 seemed to count on success without also liking responsibility, feeling that they had always got what they wanted so far, or showing any interest in social interaction: they seemed to think that their success would come about by sheer force of will. Since it is often the case that men tend to exhibit greater self-confidence than women regardless, in many cases, of social background or actual achievement, the fact that cluster 4 had a strong tendency to be male was therefore not unduly surprising.

Further examination of the clusters' attitudes to economic and political issues revealed consistent attitudinal orientations in each of the clusters. The aim of the analysis was to assess the 'democratic' potential of each cluster, and their potential adaptability to a market economy. By using Max Weber's ideas on the evolution of capitalism, Chapter Seven searched the clusters for evidence of the kinds of attitudes which constitute the work ethic necessary for the development of a capitalist society. This search revealed that the clusters most amenable to the market economy were the three youngest – clusters 1, 2 and 4 – and that, within these three clusters, cluster

1 stood out from the other two because its economic concerns were not primarily individualistic: unlike the members of clusters 2 and 4, who showed a marked tendency to be interested in pursuing their own financial gain, those belonging to cluster 1 believed in market reform as part of a package to renew the whole system, and not as a source of personal enrichment. Clusters 3 and 5, on the other hand, were afraid of and ill-equipped to deal with change. Cluster 3, in particular, was characterized by a very strong propensity to be alienated from the political and economic processes, being the cluster the most likely, in the vast majority of cases, to opt for 'don't know' or 'NA' responses. Moreover, this cluster also had a marked propensity to be composed of older females – given that other studies on civil society and political culture have also found that both old people and females tend to be associated with missing answers of varying kinds, that cluster 3 showed a tendency to be old, female and undecided was a sign of the effectiveness and theoretical validity of the cluster formations. This indecision was not, however, a sign of apathy, or of the unwillingness to answer the questionnaire, since there was an area which cluster 3 was very clear about: this cluster had very clear ideas about spiritual and moral issues – again a trend consonant with the findings for older females in other countries.

The members of cluster 5 shared with those of cluster 3 the tendency to be inflexible when confronted with moral dilemmas, both clusters tending to believe in categorical, unwavering moral guidelines – the notion of good and evil as absolute, not relative concepts. The two clusters differed, however, on the issue of religion, which was not as important to cluster 5 as it was to cluster 3, and the reason for this could be found in the results for political variables. Whereas cluster 3 maintained the same strong propensity to be alienated from political questions and resistant to political change as it had shown in the variables related to the economy, cluster 5 exhibited tendencies consistent with political competence, and in this it was similar to clusters 1 and 2. There were nevertheless differences between these three clusters, which clearly set them apart as citizen-types; these differences formed a matrix along one side of which could be ranged 'reform' and 'reaction', and along the other side of which the choice was between either 'individualist' or 'socialist' values, as shown in the table below.

	Reform	Reaction
Individualist values	Cluster 2	
Socialist values	Cluster 1	Cluster 5

Table 24: matrix for the political orientations of clusters 1, 2 and 5

As for the political orientations of cluster 4, the lack of any strong propensity to deviate from the norm seemed to suggest that, even though the members of this cluster were clearly interested in bettering their material conditions (as had been shown by their responses to variables directly related to their personal finances) they tended to be far less interested in abstract political issues. Although this had already been somewhat apparent in their responses to those economic variables which dealt with matters of economic principle rather than objective or practical problems, the narrow, individualistic outlook of cluster 4's respondents was far more visible when they were confronted with political questions.

The cluster results therefore proved the hypothesis that there existed an association between 'ego strength' and political competence, since not only was the only cluster without any degree of self-confidence the least politically competent (cluster 3), but also the most self-confident cluster was the only one whose members tended to be 'competent' throughout the survey, and not just in terms of one or another type of question (cluster 2). Furthermore, the cluster results showed that, of the three intermediate clusters (in terms of levels of 'ego strength'), the cluster whose members tended to identify with the most variables also exhibited strong signs of political competence and (cluster 5), and had in common with cluster 2 a tendency to have a 'closed' mindset. Clusters 1 and 4, on the other hand, tended to identify with fewer of the 'ego strength' variables, and showed themselves to be 'competent' in different ways: cluster 1 showed a propensity towards political competence in the responses of its members, whereas cluster 4 tended to be more interested in the practical aspects of the economy. These two clusters shared, however, a tendency to have an 'open' mindset, and it could therefore be argued that 'open' and 'closed' belief systems had shown themselves more likely to be a function of age rather than a feature of respondents' predisposition towards reform.

The Correspondence Results

> 'As in western surveys, it is the less educated, the very old and the very young, and women who, most of the time, are less likely to answer questions. Similarly, it is people who are not interested in politics but who are neither particularly in favour of nor opposed to democracy who find it hard to answer'[28].

The clusters thus showed, by being fixed, discrete groups, how the socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of respondents related to each other comprehensively, and which of these characteristics were most significant in terms of analysing the political culture of Russian respondents. This was therefore used as a starting point for the comparison of the socio-demographic groupings of the *WVS* and the *PVS93*, a comparison which began by looking at the political competence of respondents as reflected primarily in the frequency with which they discussed politics and their levels of interest in politics, the results for which were set out in Chapter Eleven. What the results from these two surveys primarily showed was that the findings from this study were generally consistent with findings elsewhere in liberal democracies: as other scholars have found, variables associated with support for democratic and market values were most likely to be found amongst the young, amongst males, amongst urban respondents and amongst the well educated[29]. This was particularly clear in the case of the variables for respondents' sex and the size of town they lived in, the findings for which were almost exactly as one would expect from the literature on all kinds of societies. Females were consistently less likely to be politically competent than males, and urban respondents were more likely to be politically competent than rural ones.

The comparison between the two surveys showed, two major trends in the Russian population: first, an increase in the general disillusionment with politics – particularly amongst the young – and second, a radicalization of political competence along the lines of what could be termed the 'winners' and 'losers' of the economic process – reflected, for instance, in the high levels of political competence of managers and respondents in the largest localities. In other words, two years after the collapse of the USSR, the hardships of the transition seemed to have had the effect of polarizing the population to the extent that only those whose political competence was very strong and *rewarded* by their success in the post-Soviet world had remained politically competent, whereas those with weak levels of political competence – reflected in the

middle values for the relevant variables – had become increasingly disaffected from the political process.

However, certain peculiarities in the Russian data were also evident, foremost amongst which was 'trust', an issue which has been a prickly one in the study of Russian survey data since its very beginnings. Although trust has been posited as a key indicator of the 'democratic syndrome' – a set of attitudes of which 'ego strength' can be said to be a part – levels of trust in Russia are well above those which could be expected from a nation at its stage of political development, being higher, in some cases, than those in established democracies. This researcher therefore felt that the issue of trust – or 'confidence', as it was termed in the *WVS* – was worth exploring in some depth, and dedicated Chapter Twelve to it. The results reported in this chapter suggested that political scientists may have been subsuming several different concepts under the one banner of 'trust', and that people's trust is not a universal attitude which they either have or lack to one or another degree. Chapter Twelve clearly showed that levels of trust depend on the object of trust, and that trust in people was not necessarily directly related to trust in the institutions of government: political cynicism is not the same as universal scepticism. Indeed, these surveys showed that trust in the institutions of government was not a function of political competence, but rather the opposite. Given the Soviet State's record of rewriting history and science, it is no surprise that education tends to decrease the confidence of individuals in the state; that the greater analytical powers that education confers on people leads them to fear that history will repeat itself, and that the post-Soviet government with its familiar faces is, in essence, no different than what went before. Moreover, this is probably the case elsewhere as well. Trust should not be confused with allegiance: believing in the British democratic system is not the same as believing that politicians are not likely to be corrupt – it would remain to be seen if, in spite of Inglehart's assertions, this was ever the case, or whether questions about trust have so far been phrased so generally as to lose meaning.

Trust in Russia, then, could not only be differentiated clearly in terms of whether the object of trust is political or not, but was also affected by the familiarity of the said object, particularly in the case of old people, who were torn between two main

propensities: trusting and 'don't know' replies. This, however, was not unique to their responses on trust, but was a rift which was also in evidence in the questions about political competence, and the explanation for this divergence in the propensities found amongst older respondents could be found by referring back to the cluster results. The clusters clearly showed that old people in Russia could be of two types: whereas some old people – most likely to be female – tended to conform to the stereotype of being completely alienated and disenfranchised (cluster 3), other old people were politically competent (cluster 5). Furthermore, both sets of results – those in Part II and those in Part III – seemed to suggest that the key factor in predicting which of the two groups older respondents were most likely to belong to was their level of education. Thus, by showing that education had a significant effect on respondents, these findings seemed to provide indirect support for the contention that, although 'a better educated population may not automatically or necessarily be more democratic in its political culture, education does seem to contribute to making a democratic culture possible. It provides people with the skills necessary to *understand* political choices and to communicate preferences to those who make decisions'[30]. On the other hand, 'lower levels of education tend to predispose people to look for simple solutions to complex social problems'[31].

Another peculiarity of the results examined in this thesis was the limited usefulness of occupational variables in the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts, particularly when the categories employed to code these variables were originally designed with Western employment structures in mind. More useful information could instead be derived by examining respondents' position in the workplace and, to an extent, the size of their workplace. The most significant result of these two variables was that an absence of political competence was most likely to be found amongst respondents who did not work and whose lack of an occupation implied a lack of extensive contacts – particularly of a *Gesellschaftliche* type – with others: these respondents were housewives, pensioners and the unemployed. Even students, however, were not as politically competent as might have been expected, but this tied in with a propensity to political cynicism on the part of this group which would suggest alienation rather than apathy. On the other hand, people aged between thirty-four and fifty-five and people who were in full-time employment both showed marked propensities to be

socially and politically self-confident. This last point is what is most significant in terms of the link between the social networks of respondents and their 'ego strength': those respondents who were in contact with other people in a working environment – and not just, as students are, predominantly in contact with friends – were the most likely of all respondents to show evidence of the qualities deemed desirable in a citizen of the democratic polity.

The results of the comparative analysis thus not only seemed consistent with the findings of other studies, but also showed that this type of socio-demographic analysis benefited from the results obtained from the cluster groupings, as was shown above in the case of older respondents, for example. In this sense, although the socio-demographic analysis yielded a wealth of descriptive results and suggested the presence of certain trends developing amongst the Russian population in terms of their political culture – namely, that it was one of increasing disillusionment with the political process – it had certain limitations which could only be overcome in conjunction with other methods, a point which we will return to later.

The Fieldwork Results

> '*Demokratiia* is to *demokratizatsiia* what *kanal* is to *kanalizatsiia*'[32].

Three months of participant observation in Moscow and St Petersburg in late 1997 showed that there were two main concepts by means of which the Russian population could be understood: 'fear' and 'self-reconstruction' – or, put in Russian terms, the ability to *perestroit'sa*. Russian respondents were all aware of the increase in crime[33], but they differed in their response to it along a continuum which went those respondents who were so terrified of what they heard on the news that it had altered their lives completely to those – invariably the youngest informants – who knew there was a lot of crime, but argued that reports of it were exaggerated. The presence or absence of fear in informants also seemed very strongly associated with the ability to 'reconstruct' themselves. Not everybody, even by the end of 1997, had 'reconstructed' themselves as a result of the official transition to a market economy since 1991. Some sectors of the population had welcomed and embraced change, others had come to terms with certain aspects of it, and yet others were deeply

nostalgic about the past. This 'self-reconstruction' was reflected in support for the market economy and democratization, and a willingness to adapt to new circumstances, however harsh, as opposed to a yearning for the old Soviet days and ways. In the Russian context, moreover, 'self-reconstruction' was also closely related to 'ego strength' and an 'open' mindset – not surprisingly, perhaps.

Also related to having an 'open' mindset and 'ego strength' was respondents' willingness to believe in the occult and in conspiracy theories, themes which recurred time and time again during the course of the fieldwork. This illustrated perfectly the way in which individuals without a strong, 'open' ego – that is, without 'ego strength' – tend to fear the world around them, considering it an unknown and unknowable environment, full of dangerous forces beyond their control. The fewer people informants meaningfully interacted with on a regular basis, the more likely they were to subscribe to all kinds of cryptic conspiracies and esoteric beliefs. This tendency was particularly pronounced amongst older, female informants, many of whom were seeking to replace the certainties of the past with new belief systems, usually turning to one of the major monotheistic religions. The mystical and ceremonial aspects of religion was especially appealing to these kinds of informants: prayers, fasting, rituals, miracles and the like all held these informants in awe, in spite – or perhaps, because – of the fact that they hardly even comprehended the meaning of the acts they had taken to performing.

Older males, on the other hand, were less spiritual in their lack of 'competence' with regards to the world around them, and believed instead in conspiracies which ranged from the unlikely to the downright bizarre. Belief in the less outrageous amongst them was also shared by younger respondents, a phenomenon not altogether unknown in the western polities (as a quick browse through the internet will show). In the Russian case, however, the widespread belief that things are not always what they seem is hardly surprising if we consider that Soviet children were brought up in a kind of parallel universe, where the telephone, television, and just about everything else worth inventing had been invented by Soviet scientists[34]. Having only recently found out that many of the things they had been taught at school were not true, it is only natural that Russians should now suspect every claim and every pronouncement

of the State, particularly since the State is governed largely by the same elites as it was before. Nevertheless, in spite of the widespread belief in conspiracy theories, particularly where the activities of the former Soviet state and the KGB were concerned, it still remained the case that younger respondents, and those most involved in *Gesellschaftliche* exchanges were less susceptible to conspiracy theories.

The fieldwork also showed better than the survey data had the strong link between social networks and political culture. The smaller and more *Gemeinschaftliche* a respondent's world, the less inclined that respondent was to feel safe and confident in the post-Soviet world: this was particularly the case with pensioners, who could be said to be suffering from a series of mutually reinforcing characteristics – their age meant that they had spent most of their life under the Soviet regime and that they were no longer at work; the first two of these factors cannot but have reinforced their tendency towards a 'closed', dogmatic outlook, and, in turn, the small diameter of their social circle (so to speak) cannot but have reinforced the closed nature of their outlook, in turn undermining their 'ego strength' by removing them from the world around them and thereby making them fearful of it.. On the other hand, the more exposed respondents were, not just to a wide circle of family and friends, but to strangers and the world outside the former Soviet Union (personally, not just from hearsay), the more likely they were to be resigned to the hardships they were enduring and willing to make the best of the situation; in other words, these respondents had both 'ego strength' and *Gesellschaftliche* characteristics. These 'open' informants were free from the paralyzing fear endured by their 'closed', *Gemeinschaftliche* counterparts, and they clearly felt that, bad as the situation might be, their life was theirs to control and improve. This feeling was, moreover, accentuated by a further factor which emerged in the course of the fieldwork: informants' ability to 'reconstruct' themselves appeared to be strongly related to their *personal* experience of the West. Most 'reconstructed' informants seemed to have had persistent direct contact with the cultures and peoples of western Europe and North America (as opposed to indirect, passive exposure to them through the media, for example). Whether it was this contact which had 'opened up' their worldview and fostered their ability to 'reconstruct' themselves, or whether it was an already-present ability to 'reconstruct' themselves which had made them more 'open' to western contacts,

however, could not clearly be ascertained. Nevertheless, the relationship between these two factors was clearly present, and, in the opinion of one informant, it was 'people who don't know anything about how you live in the West that don't understand how bad things were; you can't miss what you've never known'[35].

Some Final Words on all these Subjects

> '[T]he test is not whether a final state of perfect explanation has been achieved but the *distance* that has been travelled over negative cases and through consequent qualifications from an initial state of knowledge'[36].

Over the course of thirteen chapters, this thesis has attempted to open up new fields of enquiry in the study of Russian political culture, both in terms of the issues to be explored and of the methodologies to be employed in exploring them, setting out to demonstrate that Russian political culture can and should be studied using broader theoretical and methodological frameworks than have up until now been used in the field of Russian studies. At the heart of the epistemological position guiding this approach were two propositions: first, that 'insight into human behaviour is only possible because the researcher and subject share a common humanity'[37], and, second, that political culture should not be studied as a discrete, self-contained unit, but always as part of a greater whole, with reference to the research and scholarship done in other social sciences outside the study of politics. In other words, contrary to those scholars who have argued for a narrow definition of political culture, this researcher has consistently aimed to obtain as wide a perspective as possible on the subject.

The constant search for new ways of doing things and looking at things; for possible contributions from other disciplines as diverse as anthropology and marketing; the belief that knowledge is not only about depth, but also about breadth; all these have been the common features of all the chapters constituting this body of research, regardless of how disparate they may at first have seemed. There was, indeed, always the danger that, by trying to cover so much ground and refer to so many theories and techniques, the primary aim of the study – an analysis of political culture in Russia since 1991 – would get lost in a maze of social science pathways. This problem was exacerbated by the lack of empirical data necessary to examine some of these

concepts and their relationships, which meant that different issues receded and came to the fore at different times during the study. To give an example of this, whilst Part II showed how cluster analysis could be successfully applied to social science data, it was not possible to explore *all* of the issues set out in Part I; and, although the data from the *WVS* showed that there seemed to be a clear relationship between 'ego strength', the 'open mind' and democratic, market-oriented values, neither its dataset nor those of the other two yielded any substantial information about respondents' social networks. The three disparate approaches – the two quantitative analyses and one qualitative – were therefore used to complement each other in order to construct the links between the theoretical frameworks under study. In this author's opinion, this approach was successful, and it is now the time to formulate the sum total of results in a way which illustrates clearly how the empirical data in Parts II and III linked together all the theoretical and methodological concepts expounded in Part I; that is to say, by examining the two issues of political culture and social networks in turn, and seeing how the results showed them to relate to each other.

It has been argued both here and elsewhere in the political science literature that political competence, as understood to mean 'the sense of ability to participate in politics'[38], is linked to 'ego strength' and to the support for democratic values and the market economy. However, 'there exist in any country groups divided by gender, nationality, language, region, beliefs, class, traditions, historical experiences and so on'[39], and it was therefore to be expected that the political competence of respondents and its associated characteristics would vary among different sectors of the population. This was indeed the case in the results for both the clusters and the socio-demographic groups, and, most importantly, both sets of results showed that 'ego strength' in Part II was related to the same socio-demographic characteristics as it was in Part III.

Part II was interesting, moreover, because it also showed that there were cleavages within the different socio-demographic categories, particularly in the case of age groups. Old people, for example, tended to conform to one of two types, as shown by the differences between clusters 3 and 5: whereas cluster 5 had a certain level of – at the very least – 'subject' competence[40], the members of cluster 3 were clearly

'parochial' in their orientations to the system, with a marked tendency to '[expect] nothing from the political system'[41]. Also evident was the fact that the youngest respondents were also likely to fall into one of two types, one with a tendency to be politically conscious (cluster 1), and one whose members were mostly concerned with their own financial welfare (cluster 4). The socio-demographic results of Part III supported these results, particularly in the way that results for the two youngest age groups (the age groups most likely to be found in clusters 1 and 4) were not always consistent on all questions, whereas respondents slightly older than them (as cluster 2 tended to be) showed a much more stable pattern of self-confident responses.

The fieldwork carried out in the course of this study, was a final confirmation of the validity of the findings obtained from the clusters, showing as it did that people with similar socio-economic backgrounds could differ greatly in terms of their 'ego strength' – their openness and confidence in their environment (manifested most clearly in the fieldwork data as an absence or presence of fear in informants) – and their political culture – seen not merely in terms of party allegiance or participation, but, more importantly, in terms of informants' ability to 'reconstruct' themselves, and adapt to the post-Soviet environment. Even though, broadly speaking, specific socio-demographic attributes did prove to be associated with certain mindsets, both in the fieldwork data and in the correspondence analyses of the *PVS* data, the results of the cluster analysis added more significant dimensions to the broad guidelines derived from simple socio-demographic features of the sample population. Youth, for example, tended to be associated with support for market reform, but there were added dimensions to this socio-demographic category which could best be seen in the results obtained for clusters 1, 2 and 4. The three youngest clusters differed greatly among themselves, and their members combined with each other in a variety of cross-cleavages which showed that not all issues were equally important to the younger age groups. Whereas the members of cluster 1 shared with those of cluster 2 a tendency to be politically competent, the latter in turn had in common with the members of cluster 4 a propensity to 'look out for number one' which was not as evident in the other three groups: clusters 1 and 5 evidenced more altruistic propensities – or, at least, concerns about the fabric of society – and cluster 3 tended

to be composed of members whose world was too small and too harsh to even consider that any kind of improvement was worth thinking about.

Moreover, the socio-demographic results benefited from the clusters in another way which helped to explain, for instance, the seeming lack of political competence amongst respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four. The cluster results clearly showed that, similarly to what was said earlier about trust, political competence can be affected by political disillusionment, but this need not mean, as of itself, a lack of political consciousness, which cluster 1 clearly had. A single variable thus does not always yield enough information with which to make statements that can reflect reality with any kind of meaning, in this case because not all individuals draw on the same reference groups, even if they share them: an eighteen-year old female may be politically competent because she is young, but, equally, she may be alienated from the political process because she is female, or uneducated, or living in a village. A complementary analysis of both sets of results thus seemed to show very clearly that 'demographics alone [...] do not suffice to account for the patterns of values in [Russia]'[42], and that there was a very strong case indeed for the arguments made throughout this thesis for the formation of groups on the basis of respondents' basic values.

These results thus pointed to the fact that, in Russia as in any other country having suffered a dislocation of its traditional socio-economic systems, simple demographic attributes are no longer sufficient to describe a person. What was here argued to be more important in assessing the political culture of respondents was therefore the *interaction* of these attributes, not only with each other, but also with the characteristics of the social environment in which they are found.

There were clear differences between the clusters in terms of their social networks as well as their political culture (as reflected partly in their levels of political competence). Clusters 3 and 5 were the most *Gemeinschaftliche* in their views on their social environment, particularly in the case of cluster 3, whose members were the most likely to live in small provincial towns and rural areas. The character-type pertaining to cluster 2 was, on the other hand, clearly a member of the *Gesellschaft*.

The remaining two groups, clusters 1 and 4, were also familiar with the *Gesellschaft*, but each seemed to embody different aspects of it: cluster 4 exhibited a consistent propensity not to be interested in abstract political issues, but its members also showed an equally marked tendency to support the market economy and to want to do well. On the other hand, the members of cluster 1, being younger and more educated, did not tend to be as concerned with the material aspects of life, but had instead had a definite political mindset, even though they seemed to be rather sceptical of existing political institutions,. Two aspects of the *Gesellschaft*, then – economic and political - were split between these two groups. In cases like this, the socio-demographic results are there to be brought into play. They showed that the most salient factor associated with political competence was occupational status, with workers being more likely to be more competent than students. Bearing in mind that the 1991 'worker' set and cluster 4 were not the same two groups of people, it can nevertheless be argued that cluster 4's respondents – who tended to be in full-time employment, in the lesser-skilled occupations – derived their *Gesellschaftliche* self-confidence from work, but that their educational level – which did not tend to be very high – meant that their *Gesellschaftliche* orientations were relatively unsophisticated, and therefore primarily micro-economic, as opposed to those of the better-educated members of cluster 1.

The clusters which exhibited *Gesellschaftliche* characteristics, then, were also the ones with a propensity towards 'ego strength', but political competence alone did not account for a respondent's commitment or adaptability to the process of democratization. The explanation for this can be found in the fact that, as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba postulated, 'political competence' can be of several kinds. Even though the members of cluster 5 were not primarily *Gesellschaftliche*, and even though they exhibited a clear resistance to change and reform, they were nevertheless still possessed of a kind of political competence: *subject* competence, whereby '[T]he subject is aware of specialized governmental authority; he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he evaluates it as either legitimate or not. But the relationship is [...] essentially a passive relationship'[43]. Consequently, the political culture found predominantly amongst the members of cluster 5 was congruent with the old regime, and not with a liberal democracy, which in turn

showed that the links postulated between social networks, 'ego strength' and political culture still held.

It can, and always should, be argued that correlation is not causality; in this sense, this study falls short of proving what came first, the chicken or the egg. Nevertheless, all the results obtained from the different types of data used in this study showed that a familiarity and ability to function within *Gesellschaftliche* networks were clearly most likely to be found amongst self-confident, 'reconstructed' respondents (to use the term that came out of the fieldwork): this was best illustrated by cluster 2's greatest propensity to belong to organizations of one or another kind, followed by cluster 1, who, as politically cynical students, tended to be members of more 'green' and idealistic groups. Yet even in broader terms, indirect support for the hypothesis set out in this study could be argued to be the fact that at the end of 1997, just as the reform process in Russia was increasingly seen to be faltering, so were the Russian people's social circles becoming smaller and smaller across the board.

The value of the observations obtained from grouping respondents according to their perceptions of themselves and their place in society could not be doubted: the 'ego strength' groups were discrete sets of respondents which were found to answer different questions – taken from variables other than the ones they had been grouped by – in fairly homogenous ways which created very distinct patterns for each group and revealed the possible contextual meanings of single variables. The socio-demographic variables, on the other hand, had to each be taken separately, thus forming *different* sets of groups per variable; this meant that, for any given variable, the propensities of each group applied only to itself. That this involved a considerable loss of detail should come as no surprise, since nobody is just 'young' or just 'educated' or just a 'skilled worker'. Furthermore, the way in which all the attributes that describe a person come together is even more important than each of these attributes individually, with the consequence that the sum total of a person's experience and environment will determine whether 'education' leads to Akademgorodok or the Gulag.

A clear indication of such rifts within groups of people possessing a given socio-demographic characteristic was the fact that respondents' attributes often fell half-way between two attitudinal categories in many of the correspondence maps analyzed in Part III of this study. The results of the *PVS* clearly showed that such groups were often poorly discriminated in terms of their orientation to politics, and that, even though patterns consistent with trends found among Western publics did nevertheless emerge among Russian respondents – for example, people with higher education were more likely to be politically competent than those with little schooling – many nuances were lost. For instance, the *WVS* cluster results showed that, although attributes such as sex and age had certain socio-political orientations in common, the way in which these were manifested was subject to different combinations. Clusters 3 and 5, for example, both tended to be composed of older respondents, but they were two distinct types of old people: the former apathetic and alienated from major abstract social, political and economic processes and ideas, and the others staunch believers in the old Soviet regime. This division within the older age groups, revealed by classifying them according to their 'ego strength', went a long way to explain the results later obtained from the *PVS*, which often showed old respondents' propensity to be torn equally between two replies.

To conclude, then, it is worth restating the aims and achievements of this research project. The hypothesis set out in this study postulated a high degree of association between social networks and political culture, arguing that *Gesellschaftliche* networks were more consonant with the culture of liberal democracies, and therefore individuals who not only were familiar with such networks, but had also internalized the kinds of values necessary to function within them would be likely to also have a political culture congruent with – or, at the very least, adaptable to – liberal democracy and the market economy. This hypothesis was proved by first examining a series of theoretical concepts taken from the social science literature which were posited as key constituent elements of the argument, and then examining three sets of empirical data with reference to these concepts, and with a view to exploring the posited links between them. It is this researcher's contention that the conceptual elements set out in Part I as building blocks of the hypothesis were related to each other in a logical fashion, and that the theory constructed as a result was itself

coherent, internally consistent, and supported by the empirical evidence analyzed in this study. Nevertheless, and as a final word of caution, we would do well to bear in mind that human beings have a tendency to find what they are looking for, and that the pitfalls of fitting data to theory are nowhere greater than in the social sciences. This researcher has tried to remain as true to the findings as possible, and to avoid preconceptions; it is up to the reader to decide how far these and all the other aims of this study have been achieved.

> '[I]f a theory is well crafted, its elements will fit tightly because they will have been chosen, modified and adjusted to fit tightly. But if well-crafted theories are human constructs that can explain only what they purport to explain, then it is impossible to tell whether or not social scientists paint bull's-eyes around gun shots or actually shoot at the targets'[44].

Notes

[1]Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behaviour* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), pp. 44-5.
[2]Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', p. 518.
[3]Lane, *Political Life*, p. 163.
[4]T H Rigby, 'The Need for Comparative Research' (general comments in 'Clientelism', a symposium), in *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. 12, Nos. 2 and 3 (Summer-Autumn 1979), pp. 159-211; cited in Almond and Roselle, 'Model Fitting in Communist Studies', p. 55.
[5]Ironically, it was the Communist threat and the Cold War which prompted the USA to finally lift the embargo on Spain and accept the country as a member of the international community. Had the USSR remained an American ally, things might have turned out very differently for Spain.
[6]Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 399.
[7]Inglehart, 'The Renaissance of Political Culture'.
[8]Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, p. 124.
[9]This is, of course, yet another reason for using groups as units of statistical analysis, rather than individuals.
[10]Which is, of course, where ethnic and cultural stereotypes come from.
[11]Parsons, 'A Note on *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*', p. 142.
[12]See Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 278.
[13]Lane, *Political Life*, p. 117.
[14]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 11. The authors borrowed this term from Harold Laswell.
[15]*Ibid.*, p. 46.
[16]See Chapter Ten, pp. 202-4.
[17]Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, p. 125.
[18]For more on cluster analysis, see, for example, Hair *et al.*, *Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings*, pp. 420-83; also Everitt, *Cluster Analysis*.
[19]See Appendix A.
[20]Once again, it is worth pointing out that the shorthand terms *PVS*, *PVS93* and *PVS96* are this researcher's own, and not how these surveys are generally known.
[21]Paul Green, Catherine Schaffer and Karen Patterson, 'A Reduced-Space Approach to the Clustering of Categorical Data in Market Segmentation', a case study in Hair *et al.*, *Multivariate Data Analysis with Readings*, pp. 542-55 at p. 542. This case study combined the use of cluster and correspondence analysis.
[22]See Appendix I.
[23]Saunders, 'Cluster Analysis', p. 25.
[24]See Chapter Three, pp. 56-7 (nn. 81-2).

[25]For a synopsis of the five clusters' characteristics, see Appendix D.
[26]Wyman, 'Russian Political Culture', p.38.
[27]For the text of the nine 'ego strength' variables, see Chapter Six, p. 94.
[28]Carnaghan, 'Alienation, Apathy or Ambivalence?', p. 361.
[29]See, for example, Reisinger *et al.*, 'Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania'.
[30]Hahn, 'Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture', p. 417 (italics added).
[31]Wyman, 'Russian Political Culture', p. 35.
[32]Russian post-Soviet joke.
[33]As with all societies where freedom of information is new, it could be argued that the increase in crime might only have been a *perceived* increase; nevertheless, this is not important in terms of the framework being set out here, since it was the *fear* of crime, and not crime itself (none of this researcher's informants had *actually* been the victims of crime) which was the key factor in the classification of respondents.
[34]The last generations of children educated by the Soviet regime play an amusing game with westerners whereby different inventions are named and the Soviet and western inventors of each are given. The results are usually surreal for both sides.
[35]Female, journalist, 49.
[36]Jack Katz, 'A Theory of Qualitative Methodology: The Social Science System of Analytic Fieldwork', in Robert Emerson (ed), *Contemporary Field Research: A Collection of Readings* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1983), pp. 127-48 at p. 133 (italics as in text).
[37]Walker, 'An Introduction to Applied Qualitative Research', p. 13.
[38]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 253.
[39]Wyman, 'Russian Political Culture', p. 26.
[40]'The competence of the subject is more a matter of being aware of his rights under the rules than of participating in the making of the rules' – Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p.214.
[41]*Ibid.*, p. 18.
[42]Reisinger *et al.*, 'Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania', p. 202.
[43]Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 19.
[44]Motyl, 'The Dilemmas of Sovietology and the Labyrinth of Theory', pp. 89-90.

Appendices and Bibliography

Appendix A – other surveys examined

Datasets

Karlheinz Reif and George Cunningham, *Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer 2: Current Affairs and the Media, September-October 1991* [computer file]. Conducted by Gallup International (Europe), London. Köln, Germany: Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung [producer], 1992. Köln, Germany: Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1994.

Karlheinz Reif and George Cunningham, *Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer 3: Political Disintegration, October-November 1992* [computer file]. Conducted by Gallup International (Europe), London. Köln, Germany: Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung [producer], 1992. Köln, Germany: Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1994.

Karlheinz Reif and George Cunningham, *Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer 4: Political and Economic Change, November 1993* [computer file]. Conducted by Gallup International (Europe), London. Köln, Germany: Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung [producer], 1995. Köln, Germany: Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1995.

Karlheinz Reif and George Cunningham, *Central And Eastern Euro-Barometer 5: European Union, November 1994* [computer file]. Conducted by GfK Europe Ad hoc Research, Brussels. ICPSR version. Köln, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung [producer], 1995. Köln, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1995.

Michael Swafford, Polina Kozyreva, Mikhail Kosolapov, Anton Kovtoun and Alfiia Nizamova, *General Social Survey of the Russian Federation and Central Asia, October-December 1992* [computer file]. ICPSR version. Michael Swafford, George Washington University, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies/ Polina Kozyreva, Mikhail Kosolapov, Anton Kovtoun and Alfiia Nizamova, Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences [producers], 1993. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1995.

International Social Survey Programme, Social Inequality II. The Russian Federation survey was conducted in February-March 1992 by VTsIOM under the direction of Liudmila Khakhulina. Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, Köln [depositor].

was therefore requested, and it was only then that this researcher found out that the Forschungsstelle für empirische Sozialoekonomik could not sell this particular dataset because it had, in turn, commissioned the survey on behalf of a client and could therefore not release the remaining data until they had finished analyzing the survey results themselves.

Appendix B – the 'ego' tables (*WVS*)

The following tables show the marginal frequencies for *WVS* variables 326-334, which we have called the 'ego' variables. These tables show large majorities of 'not mentioned' responses, but case-by-case analyses of the sample revealed distinct patterns in the observations; it was these patterns which made a successful clustering procedure possible. It is also worth noting, in view of the Russians' reputation for apathy and alienation, that 'none of the above' (V334) was not the one with the largest percentage of 'not mentioned' responses.

I USUALLY COUNT ON BEING SUCCESSFUL IN EVERYTHING I DO

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mention	884	45.1	45.1	45.1
	no	1077	54.9	54.9	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

I ENJOY CONVINCING OTHERS OF MY OPINION

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mention	371	18.9	18.9	18.9
	no	1590	81.1	81.1	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

I OFTEN NOTICE THAT I SERVE AS MODEL FOR OTHERS

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mention	176	9.0	9.0	9.0
	no	1785	91.0	91.0	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

I AM GOOD AT GETTING WHAT I WANT

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mention	606	30.9	30.9	30.9
	no	1355	69.1	69.1	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

I OWN MANY THINGS OTHERS ENVY ME FOR

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mention	249	12.7	12.7	12.7
	no	1712	87.3	87.3	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

I LIKE TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mention	479	24.4	24.4	24.4
	no	1482	75.6	75.6	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

I AM RARELY UNSURE ABOUT HOW I SHOULD BEHAVE

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mention	687	35.0	35.0	35.0
	no	1274	65.0	65.0	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

I OFTEN GIVE OTHERS ADVICE

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mention	442	22.5	22.5	22.5
	no	1519	77.5	77.5	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

NONE OF THE ABOVE

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mention	419	21.4	21.4	21.4
	no	1542	78.6	78.6	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

Appendix C – 'ethical' variables (*WVS*)

The text for *WVS* variables 296-319 was as follows: 'Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.

g) Claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to
h) Avoiding a fare on public transport
i) Cheating on tax if you have the chance
j) Buying something you knew was stolen
k) Taking and driving a car belonging to someone else joyriding
l) Taking the drug marihuana or hashish
m) Keeping money that you have found
n) Lying in your own interest
o) Married men/women having an affair
p) Sex under the legal age of consent
q) Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
r) Homosexuality
s) Prostitution
t) Abortion
u) Divorce
v) Fighting with the police
w) Euthanasia terminating the life of the incurably sick
x) Suicide
y) Failing to report damage you've done accidentally to a parked vehicle
z) Threatening workers who refuse to join a strike
aa) Killing in self-defence
bb) Political assassinations
cc) Throwing away litter in a public place
dd) Driving under the influence of alcohol'

Appendix D – Cluster Synopses

Each cluster exhibited a series of propensities which described where certain socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics were most likely to be found. On the basis of these, 'citizen-types' such as those Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba describe in *The Civic Culture* could be drawn to represent the predominant tendencies within each cluster.

Cluster 1: Young Janes

The typical member of this cluster was a university graduate exhibiting high levels of political competence. This was a young person – more likely to be a woman than a man – with strong humanitarian values, politically slightly left of centre and valuing social justice and equality more than material gains and ambitions. Politically sophisticated, this young woman (for ease of reference) held moderate and tolerant views, whilst exhibiting a healthy degree of scepticism towards the institutions of the Soviet system. She seemed self-confident, but not overwhelmingly so, and obviously enjoyed communicating with others both socially and professionally. To summarize, this young woman could clearly be described as one of Ronald Inglehart's 'postmaterialists'.

Cluster 2: New Russians in the Making

The primary characteristic of the typical member of this cluster was aggressive self-confidence in all situations. A man in his late thirties or early forties, the pursuit of success was his motivation in life; justice, social welfare and other humanitarian considerations were of little or no consequence to him. His material bent, however, did not preclude a high level of political competence: he had strong, definite opinions with regards to most questions, and seemed to view life in black and white terms. This man was, not surprisingly, very entrepreneurial in a fearless, possibly risk-taking way, and did not seem particularly worried about what the future might bring, being absolutely confident in his own success. His attitudes and behaviour also indicated a possible willingness to take the law into his own hands, and his

fearlessness and lack of compassion were reminiscent of what fledgling entrepreneurs must have been like in the American frontier. His primitive capitalism, whilst promising in terms of the potential development of a market economy and the entrepreneurial spirit in Russia, also served to remind one of the harshness and opportunism inherent in emerging capitalism.

Cluster 3: *'Zatrudniaius' otvetit'...'*

An alienated older woman living outside the relatively cosmopolitan environments of Moscow and St Petersburg was the typical member of this cluster. Overwhelming feelings of alienation were evident in her responses to all questions; poorly educated and engaged in unskilled, badly paid labour for most of her life, her political competence could be described as practically non-existent. Her answers to most questions were characterized by the response 'don't know', and when she did decide to give an opinion it was usually one reflecting a passive attitude, or one resistant to change. This lack of competence or self-confidence was evident even in non-political situations, and only where moral or religious issues were at stake did this woman express a definite opinion, invariably one concomitant with traditional values. This meant not 'Soviet' values, but rather the kinds of beliefs held by women of low socio-economic status everywhere: values centred on religion, the family and an absolute measure of right and wrong. Therefore, although the archetypal member of this cluster was clearly not a member of a modern, capitalist *Gesellschaft*, neither was she a strong supporter of the Soviet regime.

Cluster 4: Average Joes

This citizen-type was a man, most likely in his late twenties or in his thirties and with few years of education. Unskilled or, at best, semi-skilled, this man was nevertheless fairly self-confident in practical, everyday matters. Abstract or theoretical issues, on the other hand, were of little interest to him, notably where political matters were concerned: this man was primarily concerned with his own financial prosperity, and did not seem to subscribe to any specific political ideologies. His willingness to embrace change and innovation and his self-confidence in social and professional

situations, however, indicated that his low levels of political competence should not be seen as a complete absence of 'ego strength': this citizen was developing along *Gesellschaftliche* lines, but was, so to speak, still at a relatively unsophisticated, purely economic stage in his attitudinal orientations.

Cluster 5: The Builders of Communism

The archetypal member of this cluster was an old-style Communist pensioner. This citizen-type was equally likely be male or female: for this reason we will take one of each and refer to them as 'they' in order not to ascribe to this citizen-type a propensity which the cluster does not possess. This couple, then, could be predominantly characterized by their very 'closed' belief system, in spite of the fact that they were well educated. They invariably chose the welfare of the collective over that of the individual, they believed in equality even regardless of merit, and they did not want change in their lives. However, even though material issues were less important to them than moral ones, they were not religious, and their many other *Gemeinschaftliche* attributes combined with high levels of political competence, since, in their responses to abstract political questions, they clearly subscribed to a political ideology.

Appendix E – variables on the economy

The statements for variables 250-6 read as follows: 'Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right, or you can choose any number in between.

Incomes should be made more equal	There should be greater incentives for individual effort
Private ownership of business and industry should be encouraged	Government ownership of business and industry should be increased
Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves	The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for
People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits	People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want
Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas	Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people
In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life	Hard work doesn't generally bring success – it's more a matter of luck and connections
People can only accumulate wealth at the expense of others	Wealth can grow so there's enough for everyone'.

The last pairing was used to assess the clusters' attitudes in terms of Foster's concept of 'limited good' – see Chapter Two, pp. 33-4.

Appendix F – tables for confidence in the political system (*WVS*)

The following variables were, obviously, country-specific.

CONFIDENCE:PARLIAMENT USSR

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	a lot	182	9.3	9.3	9.3
	quite	662	33.8	33.8	43.0
	not very	635	32.4	32.4	75.4
	notatall	322	16.4	16.4	91.8
	dk	160	8.2	8.2	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

CONFIDENCE:GOVERNMENT USSR

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	a lot	188	9.6	9.6	9.6
	quite	644	32.8	32.8	42.4
	not very	631	32.2	32.2	74.6
	notatall	345	17.6	17.6	92.2
	dk	153	7.8	7.8	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

CONFIDENCE:PARLIAMENT RUSSIA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	a lot	294	15.0	15.0	15.0
	quite	910	46.4	46.4	61.4
	not very	446	22.7	22.7	84.1
	notatall	154	7.9	7.9	92.0
	dk	157	8.0	8.0	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

CONFIDENCE:GOVERNMENT RUSSIA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	a lot	317	16.2	16.2	16.2
	quite	912	46.5	46.5	62.7
	not very	419	21.4	21.4	84.0
	notatall	155	7.9	7.9	91.9
	dk	158	8.1	8.1	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

CONFIDENCE:SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	a lot	201	10.2	10.2	10.2
	quite	597	30.4	30.4	40.7
	not very	596	30.4	30.4	71.1
	notatall	357	18.2	18.2	89.3
	dk	210	10.7	10.7	100.0
	Total	1961	100.0	100.0	
Total		1961	100.0		

Appendix G – tables for membership in voluntary organizations and voluntary work (*WVS*)

The following tables from *WVS* variables 19-35 show that the members of clusters 2, 1 and 5 were consistently the most likely (in that order) to belong to voluntary organizations, even if the numbers of those who did were very small in each case. Possible evidence to substantiate the claim that the consistency of this pattern gave it validity in spite of the small counts involved was the fact that, in the case of trade unions – the only organizations to which a majority of Russians belonged – clusters 1 and 2 still obtained high indices. That cluster 5's index was below average could in turn be explained by the fact that they were, after all, the oldest cluster and therefore 25.4% of them were retired (as compared to 18.7% of the sample).

SOCIAL WELFARE * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
SOCIAL WELFARE	belongs	Count	11	5	10	10	8	44
		% within CLUSTERS	3.1%	2.7%	1.8%	1.7%	2.7%	2.2%
	no	Count	341	178	539	568	291	1917
		% within CLUSTERS	96.9%	97.3%	98.2%	98.3%	97.3%	97.8%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION	belongs	Count	3	4	6	7	3	23
		% within CLUSTERS	.9%	2.2%	1.1%	1.2%	1.0%	1.2%
	no	Count	349	179	543	571	296	1938
		% within CLUSTERS	99.1%	97.8%	98.9%	98.8%	99.0%	98.8%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

EDUCATION/CULTURAL * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
EDUCATION/ CULTURAL	belongs	Count	19	17	17	30	14	97
		% within CLUSTERS	5.4%	9.3%	3.1%	5.2%	4.7%	4.9%
	no	Count	333	166	532	548	285	1864
		% within CLUSTERS	94.6%	90.7%	96.9%	94.8%	95.3%	95.1%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TRADE UNIONS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
TRADE UNIONS	belongs	Count	229	130	319	361	171	1210
		% within CLUSTERS	65.1%	71.0%	58.1%	62.5%	57.2%	61.7%
	no	Count	123	53	230	217	128	751
		% within CLUSTERS	34.9%	29.0%	41.9%	37.5%	42.8%	38.3%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

POLITICAL PARTIES * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
POLITICAL PARTIES	belongs	Count	50	23	38	67	43	221
		% within CLUSTERS	14.2%	12.6%	6.9%	11.6%	14.4%	11.3%
	no	Count	302	160	511	511	256	1740
		% within CLUSTERS	85.8%	87.4%	93.1%	88.4%	85.6%	88.7%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

COMMUNITY ACTION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
COMMUNITY ACTION	belongs	Count	12	10	11	9	7	49
		% within CLUSTERS	3.4%	5.5%	2.0%	1.6%	2.3%	2.5%
	no	Count	340	173	538	569	292	1912
		% within CLUSTERS	96.6%	94.5%	98.0%	98.4%	97.7%	97.5%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT	belongs	Count		2	3	2		7
		% within CLUSTERS		1.1%	.5%	.3%		.4%
	no	Count	352	181	546	576	299	1954
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	98.9%	99.5%	99.7%	100.0%	99.6%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

ENVIRONMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
ENVIRONMENT	belongs	Count	8	4	10	8	3	33
		% within CLUSTERS	2.3%	2.2%	1.8%	1.4%	1.0%	1.7%
	no	Count	344	179	539	570	296	1928
		% within CLUSTERS	97.7%	97.8%	98.2%	98.6%	99.0%	98.3%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

PROFESSIONAL ASSOC * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
PROFESSIONAL ASSOC	belongs	Count	6	4	13	8	4	35
		% within CLUSTERS	1.7%	2.2%	2.4%	1.4%	1.3%	1.8%
	no	Count	346	179	536	570	295	1926
		% within CLUSTERS	98.3%	97.8%	97.6%	98.6%	98.7%	98.2%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

YOUTH WORK * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
YOUTH WORK	belongs	Count	17	12	8	11	11	59
		% within CLUSTERS	4.8%	6.6%	1.5%	1.9%	3.7%	3.0%
	no	Count	335	171	541	567	288	1902
		% within CLUSTERS	95.2%	93.4%	98.5%	98.1%	96.3%	97.0%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SPORTS/RECREATION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
SPORTS/ RECREATION	belongs	Count	23	12	17	31	20	103
		% within CLUSTERS	6.5%	6.6%	3.1%	5.4%	6.7%	5.3%
	no	Count	329	171	532	547	279	1858
		% within CLUSTERS	93.5%	93.4%	96.9%	94.6%	93.3%	94.7%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

WOMEN'S GROUPS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
WOMEN'S GROUPS	belongs	Count	14	4	12	10	4	44
		% within CLUSTERS	4.0%	2.2%	2.2%	1.7%	1.3%	2.2%
	no	Count	338	179	537	568	295	1917
		% within CLUSTERS	96.0%	97.8%	97.8%	98.3%	98.7%	97.8%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

PEACE MOVEMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
PEACE MOVEMENT	belongs	Count	4	2	6	6	2	20
		% within CLUSTERS	1.1%	1.1%	1.1%	1.0%	.7%	1.0%
	no	Count	348	181	543	572	297	1941
		% within CLUSTERS	98.9%	98.9%	98.9%	99.0%	99.3%	99.0%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

ANIMAL RIGHTS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
ANIMAL RIGHTS	belongs	Count	3	6	6	5	1	21
		% within CLUSTERS	.9%	3.3%	1.1%	.9%	.3%	1.1%
	no	Count	349	177	543	573	298	1940
		% within CLUSTERS	99.1%	96.7%	98.9%	99.1%	99.7%	98.9%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

HEALTH-VOLUNTARY * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
HEALTH-VOLUNTARY	belongs	Count	4	1	5	4	5	19
		% within CLUSTERS	1.1%	.5%	.9%	.7%	1.7%	1.0%
	no	Count	348	182	544	574	294	1942
		% within CLUSTERS	98.9%	99.5%	99.1%	99.3%	98.3%	99.0%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

OTHER GROUPS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
OTHER GROUPS	belongs	Count	14	5	12	9	3	43
		% within CLUSTERS	4.0%	2.7%	2.2%	1.6%	1.0%	2.2%
	no	Count	338	178	537	569	296	1918
		% within CLUSTERS	96.0%	97.3%	97.8%	98.4%	99.0%	97.8%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

MEMBERSHIP-NONE * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
MEMBERSHIP	no	Count	76	33	162	141	90	502
		% within CLUSTERS	21.6%	18.0%	29.5%	24.4%	30.1%	25.6%
	yes	Count	276	150	387	437	209	1459
		% within CLUSTERS	78.4%	82.0%	70.5%	75.6%	69.9%	74.4%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The next set of tables (variables 37-53) were the results of answers to the question: 'which, if any [voluntary organization] are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?'

SOCIAL WELFARE * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
SOCIAL WELFARE	yes	Count	4	6	7	4	4	25
		% within CLUSTERS	1.1%	3.3%	1.3%	.7%	1.3%	1.3%
	no	Count	348	177	542	574	295	1936
		% within CLUSTERS	98.9%	96.7%	98.7%	99.3%	98.7%	98.7%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION	yes	Count	3	1	10	3	2	19
		% within CLUSTERS	.9%	.5%	1.8%	.5%	.7%	1.0%
	no	Count	349	182	539	575	297	1942
		% within CLUSTERS	99.1%	99.5%	98.2%	99.5%	99.3%	99.0%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

EDUCATION/CULTURAL * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
EDUCATION/ CULTURAL	yes	Count	11	10	10	11	9	51
		% within CLUSTERS	3.1%	5.5%	1.8%	1.9%	3.0%	2.6%
	no	Count	341	173	539	567	290	1910
		% within CLUSTERS	96.9%	94.5%	98.2%	98.1%	97.0%	97.4%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TRADE UNIONS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
TRADE UNIONS	yes	Count	33	15	35	52	34	169
		% within CLUSTERS	9.4%	8.2%	6.4%	9.0%	11.4%	8.6%
	no	Count	319	168	514	526	265	1792
		% within CLUSTERS	90.6%	91.8%	93.6%	91.0%	88.6%	91.4%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

POLITICAL PARTIES * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
POLITICAL PARTIES	yes	Count	16	14	15	24	20	89
		% within CLUSTERS	4.5%	7.7%	2.7%	4.2%	6.7%	4.5%
	no	Count	336	169	534	554	279	1872
		% within CLUSTERS	95.5%	92.3%	97.3%	95.8%	93.3%	95.5%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

COMMUNITY ACTION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
COMMUNITY ACTION	yes	Count	10	7	7	9	6	39
		% within CLUSTERS	2.8%	3.8%	1.3%	1.6%	2.0%	2.0%
	no	Count	342	176	542	569	293	1922
		% within CLUSTERS	97.2%	96.2%	98.7%	98.4%	98.0%	98.0%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT	yes	Count	3	2	1	1		7
		% within CLUSTERS	.9%	1.1%	.2%	.2%		.4%
	no	Count	349	181	548	577	299	1954
		% within CLUSTERS	99.1%	98.9%	99.8%	99.8%	100.0%	99.6%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

ENVIRONMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
ENVIRONMENT	yes	Count	6	3	5	9	5	28
		% within CLUSTERS	1.7%	1.6%	.9%	1.6%	1.7%	1.4%
	no	Count	346	180	544	569	294	1933
		% within CLUSTERS	98.3%	98.4%	99.1%	98.4%	98.3%	98.6%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION	yes	Count	7	5	2	1	2	17
		% within CLUSTERS	2.0%	2.7%	.4%	.2%	.7%	.9%
	no	Count	345	178	547	577	297	1944
		% within CLUSTERS	98.0%	97.3%	99.6%	99.8%	99.3%	99.1%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

YOUTH WORK * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
YOUTH WORK	yes	Count	11	7	10	12	11	51
		% within CLUSTERS	3.1%	3.8%	1.8%	2.1%	3.7%	2.6%
	no	Count	341	176	539	566	288	1910
		% within CLUSTERS	96.9%	96.2%	98.2%	97.9%	96.3%	97.4%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SPORTS/RECREATION * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
SPORTS/ RECREATION	yes	Count	15	6	8	22	9	60
		% within CLUSTERS	4.3%	3.3%	1.5%	3.8%	3.0%	3.1%
	no	Count	337	177	541	556	290	1901
		% within CLUSTERS	95.7%	96.7%	98.5%	96.2%	97.0%	96.9%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

WOMEN'S GROUPS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
WOMEN'S GROUPS	yes	Count	2	3	3	6	6	20
		% within CLUSTERS	.6%	1.6%	.5%	1.0%	2.0%	1.0%
	no	Count	350	180	546	572	293	1941
		% within CLUSTERS	99.4%	98.4%	99.5%	99.0%	98.0%	99.0%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

PEACE MOVEMENT * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
PEACE MOVEMENT	yes	Count	2	3	3	6	6	20
		% within CLUSTERS	.6%	1.6%	.5%	1.0%	2.0%	1.0%
	no	Count	350	180	546	572	293	1941
		% within CLUSTERS	99.4%	98.4%	99.5%	99.0%	98.0%	99.0%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

ANIMAL RIGHTS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
ANIMAL RIGHTS	yes	Count	4	2	2	4	2	14
		% within CLUSTERS	1.1%	1.1%	.4%	.7%	.7%	.7%
	no	Count	348	181	547	574	297	1947
		% within CLUSTERS	98.9%	98.9%	99.6%	99.3%	99.3%	99.3%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

HEALTH-VOLUNTARY * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
HEALTH-VOLUNTARY	yes	Count	4	4	3	2	3	16
		% within CLUSTERS	1.1%	2.2%	.5%	.3%	1.0%	.8%
	no	Count	348	179	546	576	296	1945
		% within CLUSTERS	98.9%	97.8%	99.5%	99.7%	99.0%	99.2%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

OTHER GROUPS * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
OTHER GROUPS	yes	Count	16	4	10	10	6	46
		% within CLUSTERS	4.5%	2.2%	1.8%	1.7%	2.0%	2.3%
	no	Count	336	179	539	568	293	1915
		% within CLUSTERS	95.5%	97.8%	98.2%	98.3%	98.0%	97.7%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

VOLUNTARY WORK-NONE * CLUSTERS Crosstabulation

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
VOLUNTARY WORK	no	Count	222	117	415	399	196	1349
		% within CLUSTERS	63.1%	63.9%	75.6%	69.0%	65.6%	68.8%
	yes	Count	130	66	134	179	103	612
		% within CLUSTERS	36.9%	36.1%	24.4%	31.0%	34.4%	31.2%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The final tables for *WVS* variables 55-68 constitute the answers to the question: 'Thinking about your reasons for doing voluntary work, please use the following five-point scale to indicate how important each of the reasons below have been in your own case (WHERE 1 IS UNIMPORTANT AND 5 IS VERY IMPORTANT)*.

SOLIDARITY WITH THE POOR AND DISADVANTAGED

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
SOLIDARITY	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	18	5	17	21	9	70
		% within CLUSTERS	5.1%	2.7%	3.1%	3.6%	3.0%	3.6%
	fairly unimportant	Count	9	8	18	11	6	52
		% within CLUSTERS	2.6%	4.4%	3.3%	1.9%	2.0%	2.7%
	neither	Count	23	15	33	43	16	130
		% within CLUSTERS	6.5%	8.2%	6.0%	7.4%	5.4%	6.6%
	fairly important	Count	26	15	17	29	13	100
		% within CLUSTERS	7.4%	8.2%	3.1%	5.0%	4.3%	5.1%
	very important	Count	27	16	18	36	30	127
		% within CLUSTERS	7.7%	8.7%	3.3%	6.2%	10.0%	6.5%
	dk	Count	21	7	21	30	22	101
		% within CLUSTERS	6.0%	3.8%	3.8%	5.2%	7.4%	5.2%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

COMPASSION FOR THOSE IN NEED

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
COMPASSION	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	13	1	7	12	7	40
		% within CLUSTERS	3.7%	.5%	1.3%	2.1%	2.3%	2.0%
	fairly unimportant	Count	7	5	23	10	7	52
		% within CLUSTERS	2.0%	2.7%	4.2%	1.7%	2.3%	2.7%
	neither	Count	21	15	26	36	15	113
		% within CLUSTERS	6.0%	8.2%	4.7%	6.2%	5.0%	5.8%
	fairly important	Count	32	14	23	38	19	126
		% within CLUSTERS	9.1%	7.7%	4.2%	6.6%	6.4%	6.4%
	very important	Count	36	23	27	48	25	159
		% within CLUSTERS	10.2%	12.6%	4.9%	8.3%	8.4%	8.1%
	dk	Count	15	8	18	26	23	90
		% within CLUSTERS	4.3%	4.4%	3.3%	4.5%	7.7%	4.6%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

AN OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE SOMETHING BACK

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	16	7	22	21	16	82
		% within CLUSTERS	4.5%	3.8%	4.0%	3.6%	5.4%	4.2%
	fairly unimportant	Count	10	4	19	9	7	49
		% within CLUSTERS	2.8%	2.2%	3.5%	1.6%	2.3%	2.5%
	neither	Count	21	12	15	33	11	92
		% within CLUSTERS	6.0%	6.6%	2.7%	5.7%	3.7%	4.7%
	fairly important	Count	15	12	19	23	12	81
		% within CLUSTERS	4.3%	6.6%	3.5%	4.0%	4.0%	4.1%
	very important	Count	38	18	29	42	24	151
		% within CLUSTERS	10.8%	9.8%	5.3%	7.3%	8.0%	7.7%
	dk	Count	24	13	20	42	26	125
		% within CLUSTERS	6.8%	7.1%	3.6%	7.3%	8.7%	6.4%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

A SENSE OF DUTY, MORAL OBLIGATION

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
SENSE OF DUTY	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	11	3	11	7	3	35
		% within CLUSTERS	3.1%	1.6%	2.0%	1.2%	1.0%	1.8%
	fairly unimportant	Count	5	5	11	5	3	29
		% within CLUSTERS	1.4%	2.7%	2.0%	.9%	1.0%	1.5%
	neither	Count	17	10	19	20	5	71
		% within CLUSTERS	4.8%	5.5%	3.5%	3.5%	1.7%	3.6%
	fairly important	Count	26	13	26	42	21	128
		% within CLUSTERS	7.4%	7.1%	4.7%	7.3%	7.0%	6.5%
	very important	Count	48	30	41	72	45	236
		% within CLUSTERS	13.6%	16.4%	7.5%	12.5%	15.1%	12.0%
	dk	Count	17	5	16	24	19	81
		% within CLUSTERS	4.8%	2.7%	2.9%	4.2%	6.4%	4.1%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

IDENTIFYING WITH PEOPLE WHO ARE SUFFERING

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
IDENTIFY SUFFERING	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	18	4	16	17	8	63
		% within CLUSTERS	5.1%	2.2%	2.9%	2.9%	2.7%	3.2%
	fairly unimportant	Count	13	7	17	16	10	63
		% within CLUSTERS	3.7%	3.8%	3.1%	2.8%	3.3%	3.2%
	neither	Count	26	14	29	42	8	119
		% within CLUSTERS	7.4%	7.7%	5.3%	7.3%	2.7%	6.1%
	fairly important	Count	23	18	22	32	22	117
		% within CLUSTERS	6.5%	9.8%	4.0%	5.5%	7.4%	6.0%
	very important	Count	20	14	11	27	18	90
		% within CLUSTERS	5.7%	7.7%	2.0%	4.7%	6.0%	4.6%
	dk	Count	24	9	29	36	30	128
		% within CLUSTERS	6.8%	4.9%	5.3%	6.2%	10.0%	6.5%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

HAD TIME ON MY HANDS, WANTED SOMETHING WORTHWHILE TO DO

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
WORTHWHILE TO DO	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	23	12	26	28	11	100
		% within CLUSTERS	6.5%	6.6%	4.7%	4.8%	3.7%	5.1%
	fairly unimportant	Count	15	4	13	14	10	56
		% within CLUSTERS	4.3%	2.2%	2.4%	2.4%	3.3%	2.9%
	neither	Count	14	9	17	25	12	77
		% within CLUSTERS	4.0%	4.9%	3.1%	4.3%	4.0%	3.9%
	fairly important	Count	26	17	24	35	19	121
		% within CLUSTERS	7.4%	9.3%	4.4%	6.1%	6.4%	6.2%
	very important	Count	30	18	24	44	14	130
		% within CLUSTERS	8.5%	9.8%	4.4%	7.6%	4.7%	6.6%
	dk	Count	16	6	20	24	30	96
		% within CLUSTERS	4.5%	3.3%	3.6%	4.2%	10.0%	4.9%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

PURELY FOR PERSONAL SATISFACTION

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
PERSONAL SATISFACTION	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	39	18	43	59	44	203
		% within CLUSTERS	11.1%	9.8%	7.8%	10.2%	14.7%	10.4%
	fairly unimportant	Count	21	13	10	12	6	62
		% within CLUSTERS	6.0%	7.1%	1.8%	2.1%	2.0%	3.2%
	neither	Count	14	11	20	22	15	82
		% within CLUSTERS	4.0%	6.0%	3.6%	3.8%	5.0%	4.2%
	fairly important	Count	15	11	16	22	7	71
		% within CLUSTERS	4.3%	6.0%	2.9%	3.8%	2.3%	3.6%
	very important	Count	14	8	9	24	5	60
		% within CLUSTERS	4.0%	4.4%	1.6%	4.2%	1.7%	3.1%
	dk	Count	21	5	26	31	19	102
		% within CLUSTERS	6.0%	2.7%	4.7%	5.4%	6.4%	5.2%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	61	36	67	92	59	315
		% within CLUSTERS	17.3%	19.7%	12.2%	15.9%	19.7%	16.1%
	fairly unimportant	Count	17	8	13	19	5	62
		% within CLUSTERS	4.8%	4.4%	2.4%	3.3%	1.7%	3.2%
	neither	Count	12	6	3	13	2	36
		% within CLUSTERS	3.4%	3.3%	.5%	2.2%	.7%	1.8%
	fairly important	Count	10	3	6	6	4	29
		% within CLUSTERS	2.8%	1.6%	1.1%	1.0%	1.3%	1.5%
	very important	Count	5	7	8	8	6	34
		% within CLUSTERS	1.4%	3.8%	1.5%	1.4%	2.0%	1.7%
	dk	Count	19	6	27	32	20	104
		% within CLUSTERS	5.4%	3.3%	4.9%	5.5%	6.7%	5.3%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TO HELP GIVE DISADVANTAGED PEOPLE HOPE AND DIGNITY

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
GIVE HOPE/DIGNITY	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	20	8	24	26	15	93
		% within CLUSTERS	5.7%	4.4%	4.4%	4.5%	5.0%	4.7%
	fairly unimportant	Count	12	6	17	13	8	56
		% within CLUSTERS	3.4%	3.3%	3.1%	2.2%	2.7%	2.9%
	neither	Count	25	14	27	38	18	122
		% within CLUSTERS	7.1%	7.7%	4.9%	6.6%	6.0%	6.2%
	fairly important	Count	23	12	18	32	13	98
		% within CLUSTERS	6.5%	6.6%	3.3%	5.5%	4.3%	5.0%
	very important	Count	21	15	13	24	21	94
		% within CLUSTERS	6.0%	8.2%	2.4%	4.2%	7.0%	4.8%
	dk	Count	23	11	25	37	21	117
		% within CLUSTERS	6.5%	6.0%	4.6%	6.4%	7.0%	6.0%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO MY LOCAL COMMUNITY

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	19	5	18	17	6	65
		% within CLUSTERS	5.4%	2.7%	3.3%	2.9%	2.0%	3.3%
	fairly unimportant	Count	8		12	10	4	34
		% within CLUSTERS	2.3%		2.2%	1.7%	1.3%	1.7%
	neither	Count	19	14	16	31	11	91
		% within CLUSTERS	5.4%	7.7%	2.9%	5.4%	3.7%	4.6%
	fairly important	Count	22	20	32	43	19	136
		% within CLUSTERS	6.3%	10.9%	5.8%	7.4%	6.4%	6.9%
	very important	Count	38	22	26	43	36	165
		% within CLUSTERS	10.8%	12.0%	4.7%	7.4%	12.0%	8.4%
	dk	Count	18	5	20	26	20	89
		% within CLUSTERS	5.1%	2.7%	3.6%	4.5%	6.7%	4.5%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TO BRING ABOUT SOCIAL OR POLITICAL CHANGE

			CLUSTERS					
			1	2	3	4	5	Total
SOCIAL/POLITICAL CHANGE	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	20	6	19	20	5	70
		% within CLUSTERS	5.7%	3.3%	3.5%	3.5%	1.7%	3.6%
	fairly unimportant	Count	9	4	14	6	3	36
		% within CLUSTERS	2.6%	2.2%	2.6%	1.0%	1.0%	1.8%
	neither	Count	17	10	18	25	9	79
		% within CLUSTERS	4.8%	5.5%	3.3%	4.3%	3.0%	4.0%
	fairly important	Count	19	16	29	34	19	117
		% within CLUSTERS	5.4%	8.7%	5.3%	5.9%	6.4%	6.0%
	very important	Count	41	25	28	60	38	192
		% within CLUSTERS	11.6%	13.7%	5.1%	10.4%	12.7%	9.8%
	dk	Count	18	5	16	25	22	86
		% within CLUSTERS	5.1%	2.7%	2.9%	4.3%	7.4%	4.4%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

FOR SOCIAL REASONS, TO MEET PEOPLE

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
SOCIAL REASONS	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	18	4	13	14	1	50
		% within CLUSTERS	5.1%	2.2%	2.4%	2.4%	.3%	2.5%
	fairly unimportant	Count	8	2	10	7	4	31
		% within CLUSTERS	2.3%	1.1%	1.8%	1.2%	1.3%	1.6%
	neither	Count	18	18	21	17	12	86
		% within CLUSTERS	5.1%	9.8%	3.8%	2.9%	4.0%	4.4%
	fairly important	Count	22	13	24	41	19	119
		% within CLUSTERS	6.3%	7.1%	4.4%	7.1%	6.4%	6.1%
	very important	Count	45	24	42	70	42	223
		% within CLUSTERS	12.8%	13.1%	7.7%	12.1%	14.0%	11.4%
	dk	Count	13	5	14	21	18	71
		% within CLUSTERS	3.7%	2.7%	2.6%	3.6%	6.0%	3.6%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

TO GAIN NEW SKILLS AND USEFUL EXPERIENCE

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
USEFUL EXPERIENCE	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	20	3	15	16	9	63
		% within CLUSTERS	5.7%	1.6%	2.7%	2.8%	3.0%	3.2%
	fairly unimportant	Count	6	8	15	6	9	44
		% within CLUSTERS	1.7%	4.4%	2.7%	1.0%	3.0%	2.2%
	neither	Count	11	11	16	22	11	71
		% within CLUSTERS	3.1%	6.0%	2.9%	3.8%	3.7%	3.6%
	fairly important	Count	22	18	28	48	17	133
		% within CLUSTERS	6.3%	9.8%	5.1%	8.3%	5.7%	6.8%
	important	Count	46	21	30	54	25	176
		% within CLUSTERS	13.1%	11.5%	5.5%	9.3%	8.4%	9.0%
	dk	Count	19	5	20	24	25	93
		% within CLUSTERS	5.4%	2.7%	3.6%	4.2%	8.4%	4.7%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

I DID NOT WANT TO, BUT COULD NOT REFUSE

			CLUSTERS					Total
			1	2	3	4	5	
COULDN'T REFUSE	na	Count	228	117	425	408	203	1381
		% within CLUSTERS	64.8%	63.9%	77.4%	70.6%	67.9%	70.4%
	unimportant	Count	47	24	35	53	40	199
		% within CLUSTERS	13.4%	13.1%	6.4%	9.2%	13.4%	10.1%
	fairly unimportant	Count	12	7	15	15	10	59
		% within CLUSTERS	3.4%	3.8%	2.7%	2.6%	3.3%	3.0%
	neither	Count	20	12	24	24	8	88
		% within CLUSTERS	5.7%	6.6%	4.4%	4.2%	2.7%	4.5%
	fairly important	Count	12	8	9	20	7	56
		% within CLUSTERS	3.4%	4.4%	1.6%	3.5%	2.3%	2.9%
	very important	Count	12	6	8	15	4	45
		% within CLUSTERS	3.4%	3.3%	1.5%	2.6%	1.3%	2.3%
	dk	Count	21	9	33	43	27	133
		% within CLUSTERS	6.0%	4.9%	6.0%	7.4%	9.0%	6.8%
Total		Count	352	183	549	578	299	1961
		% within CLUSTERS	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Notes

*The labels 'fairly unimportant', 'neither' and 'fairly important' were assigned by this researcher to values 2, 3 and 4 respectively.

Appendix H – the trust and confidence sets (*WVS* and *PVS93*)

The text for *WVS* variables 272-85 was as follows: 'Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?

a) The church
b) The armed forces
c) The education system
d) The legal system
e) The press
f) Trade unions
g) The police
h) Parliament (USSR)
i) Civil service
j) Government (USSR)
k) Parliament (Russia)
l) Television
m) Government (Russia)
n) The Soviet political system'.

PVS93 variables Q6A-N and RQ6X1-2 asked: 'Now I'd like to ask how much you feel you can trust some people and other things. Please could you choose the answer that best represents your opinion.

a) Most ordinary people that you meet in everyday life
b) The newspaper you read most often
c) Newspapers in general
d) Television
e) Radio
f) The government
g) The president
h) The prime minister
i) Trade unions
j) Churches
k) Judges and courts
l) The army
m) The police
n) State security services
X1) The old parliament suspended by El'tsin
X2) The new parliament to be elected in December'.

Appendix I – Fieldwork

The fieldwork in this thesis was carried out in the months from September to December, 1997. This researcher spent seven weeks in Moscow and five in St Petersburg, and interviewed ten and five respondents, respectively. The interviews were unstructured, but the aim was to establish a social history of respondents. The following lines of enquiry were pursued:

> How many of respondents' friends were childhood friends
> Had their circle of friends and acquaintances broadened considerably over time
> How many people they worked with
> How often they met their friends
> How often they met their family, and how close-knit was their family
> How many of their neighbours they knew, and how well
> How often they were in contact with people on a professional or impersonal basis.

The interviewees were selected on the basis of snowball sampling from contact points which this researcher had established in Moscow through various connections prior to arriving there. Their socio-demographic characteristics were as follows:

Location of interview	Sex	Age	Occupation
Moscow	Female	59	Administrator, MGU
	Male	63	Botanist, MGU
	Female	64	Retired musician
	Male	35	Geologist, Akademgorodok
	Male	32	Geologist, MGU
	Female	NA	*Dezhurnaia*
	Female	68	Retired English teacher
	Male	72	Retired engineer
	Female	29	Secretary, joint-stock venture
	Male	46	Plumber
St Petersburg	Female	65	Retired naval engineer
	Male	67	Retired naval engineer
	Female	31	Secretary, small private company
	Male	41	Steelworker
	Female	63	*Dezhurnaia*

As we can see from the above table, the sample was heavily biased towards respondents with a university education – ten respondents, or two-thirds of the sample (one of the secretaries was also a graduate). The sample was also biased towards older respondents, one-third of the sample being pensioners. The reason for this was that, the lower the education of informants, or the younger their age, the more jobs they had to do – or were able to do – to make ends meet, and the less free time they had to participate in this research project. The shrinkage of their social

circles also had the added effect of making snowball sampling difficult to implement, since respondents could simply not direct this researcher to as many people as a representative sample would have required. Respondents were, in principle, eager to participate, but when attempts were made to make specific arrangements they found it difficult to find the time for an interview.

At the interview, some informants – the ones interviewed before all the problems which were to plague the research project became apparent –were also asked to keep a record of their social contacts over the following two weeks, noting whom they met, why they were meeting them, and what their relationship with the people in question was. Of the seven requested to do so, two 'completely forgot', three wrote their contacts down at sporadic times, and filled the gaps in from memory, and only two – both pensioners – recorded their contacts faithfully, revealing that they hardly saw anybody at all. The fact that only pensioners seemed to have the time to keep accurate diaries showed that this method would not yield very useful results, except to indicate how busy different types of respondents were, which was already becoming apparent from the interview project.

For all these reasons, then, the research strategy changed two weeks after the fieldwork began in Moscow, and a week after the second attempt to pursue it in St Petersburg (where the quality of life was lower than in Moscow) also failed to net the required number of respondents. An added consideration which led to the abandonment of those particular research methods was the increasingly apparent – and wide – discrepancy between the interview results and this researcher's own independent observations. In other words, informants' opinions, given in the course of unguarded conversation, were significantly different from those obtained from them in an interview setting, however informal.

As an exercise in the pitfalls of social science research this project was therefore very informative, but as a method of collecting data for this thesis it did not, in this researcher's opinion, meet the minimum standards of validity required for a meaningful analysis of the data. A different approach was therefore employed instead, one based on participant observation, during which this researcher

unobtrusively made notes on informants and their conversations, without putting them under the pressure of feeling that specific responses were expected of them. The fieldwork therefore yielded two sets of data: the notes taken from the interview project, and those taken in the course of this researchers' independent observations. Of the latter set, comments from the following informants were also used in this study:

Location of interview	Sex	Age	Occupation
Moscow	Female	49	Journalist
	Male	45	Employee in foreign venture
	Male	73	Pensioner
	Female	66	Retired journalist
St Petersburg	Female	39	Employee, small business venture
	Male	28	NA

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